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TAPIO HÄYHTIÖ AND JARMO RINNE1
Introduction: Seeking the citizenry 
on the Internet – Emerging virtual creativity
THE CHANGING SCOPE OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Political participation is undergoing a profound change throughout 
the world. Development hints that politics seems to pervade from in-
stitutions to people’s daily living, from nation-state to global and local 
level. Politics has disembedded from structural frameworks and moved 
to a networked society facilitated by computer-mediated communica-
tion (CMC). As a result of this evolution, the new media is taking 
more and more visible role regarding to political communication and 
activity. The Internet is viewed as a tool, channel and forum enabling 
citizens to make an impact on social, cultural and political change. 
In the process, civic empowerment through the Internet emerges in 
people’s everyday lives. The Internet is a powerful medium for gathering 
coalitions and organising mobilisations of all kinds. It also transforms 
political styles and types of activities.
Traditionally, we have been told, by politicians as well as political 
scientists, politics is an instrument for distributing good (and bad) 
in communities. The scope of politics is in fi nding solutions and 
resolving the confl icting views within communities, allocating values 
with legitimate authority, organising the changes and directions of 
communal life. Politics is, thus, governing and an organised attempt 
to bring order in a pluralistic chaos. (See for instance Arendt 1958; 
Beetham 1991; Keane 1998.)
1.  Both authors have contributed equally to this article.
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Along with the movement of politics to a networked society, 
there are traces of a new orientation in political science research; the 
shift of studies is increasingly taking into account the activity by the 
people instead of activity for the people. This change has also had 
a profound effect on the notion of citizenship. In previous decades 
political citizenship was, in principal, reduced to the right to vote in 
elections. Participation through voting had been regarded as a suffi cient 
condition for democratic governance in some infl uential commentaries 
(for instance Downs 1957). However, electoral participation has de-
creased all around the world in liberal democracies (for the defi nition, 
see Held 1997, 81; Heywood 2004, 225-227) and political culture is 
taking steps along the path towards a more reciprocal and interactive 
participation process. A revised paradigm encompassing political citi-
zenship along with the notion that people should “have a voice during 
electoral periods, too’, has been introduced by many political scientists 
in various models. Versions of participatory democracy models have 
been developed to generate a greater involvement and say in decisions 
concerning the position of citizenry and the future shape of communal 
life. At the same time, along with this ongoing participatory evolution 
citizens’ own activism to initiate spontaneous/voluntary civic activity 
groups and get involved in public matters and discussions has also 
increased. This self-made do-it-yourself-activity takes a contrary stand 
to the earlier top-down electoral mode of democracy. The forms and 
forums along with the concept of political activity and participation 
are changing, and it is causing controversial implications – actionist 
and administrational consequences. Citizens’ activism in forming 
groups to express opinions and attitudes is part of the process linked 
to evolutionary democratic change. 
The prevailing form of political rule in liberal democracies is the 
representative model, in which people have the right to elect political 
rulers to make public decisions for them. The very idea of representa-
tion therefore recognises the dilemma between the government and 
the governed. The formal procedure of selecting the representatives 
is through periodical elections. Thus, the representation suggests that 
an individual, or group, can stand for a larger group of likeminded 
people (Heywood 2004, 233) mirroring their ideas, values, and opin-
ions in political decision-making. However, the representative model 
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of democratic participation has been a target of serious criticism. It 
has been criticised as not being a microcosm of society at all. To put 
it simply, according to critics representatives are not representing all 
segments of societal groupings in proportion to their size; elected 
politicians tend not to resemble the population in terms of school-
ing, social class, professional status etc. (ibid., 233). It has also been 
pointed out, that electoral participation imply but a limited periodical 
involvement in political life for ordinary people during the campaigns 
and through voting. Intermediate times between elections are mute 
in terms of civic involvement. A focal point should be, whether this 
amount of participation is enough in terms of democratic governance 
to be thoroughly democratic and accountable?  People are choosing 
between candidates in elections, not necessarily (and in fact hardly 
ever) between different policies. Thus, in elections the selection of 
the personnel is in focus, not the future lines of political action. In 
practise, the idea of Dahlian procedural democracy in which demos 
should have an enlightened understanding of political issues to be to 
able to participate effectively (Dahl 1997, 111-112), is seldom present 
in campaign rallies. The rhetoric of candidates is opaque and obscure 
and tends to avoid clear-cut political pledges or policy-linings.  
So, what do we have to offer instead of electoral democracy, 
then? In recent decades we have witnessed the emergence of civic 
empowerment through the Internet. The varieties of political activity 
and participation have stretched beyond the reach of traditional party 
and association-oriented politics. This development is by no means 
accidental, rather it is synchronized coincidence. Instead of involving 
into traditional politics, political activity and commitment is being 
replaced with individually oriented working sketches of the ‘new 
politics’, which creates new kinds of unequalled political communities 
from below, which acknowledge no borders of any kind. The span of 
cyber-activism has expanded into the fi elds of e-democracy, citizens’ 
panel, user-generated communication, information warfare, security 
and e-crimes. The politics of the Internet is a politics of many actors, 
many levels, and actions of a heterogeneous multitude.
Linked to the political transformation two rather different ap-
proaches to political citizenship and participation have entered the 
stage in western liberal democracies. The discussions concerning civic 
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participation can be labelled either as administrational or actionist 
approaches. The fi rst mentioned aims to create and rationalise the 
practices of participation from above (e.g. the planning of land use and 
urban construction and good governance practices). Various attempts 
to increase citizens’ participation in the political decision-making proc-
esses have been launched by modern democratic governments.  The 
main challenge in such efforts is to establish infl uential and empowering 
mechanisms for the expression of a separate judgement” by interested 
people with respect to their elected representatives. The basic problem 
of these efforts are crystallised in the contrast existing between the 
notions of “representative” and “participatory” democracy.  Activities 
(actions) in politics are in many senses brought about by the sensitive 
balance of mobilising from above and participating from below. The 
crucial question then is: How much immediate participation by citizens 
to infl uence the political/public matters should there be? (See Molinari; 
Lehtonen; Calenda & Meijer and Vromen in this volume).
The second approach takes an opposite stand, when compared 
to the earlier approach. The focus in this second approach is to self-
initiate alternative meanings and practices from below. To do so, active 
people are creating interpretative frames to understand and portray 
their own political activities. Through and within such frames actors 
are constantly and interactively refl ecting on a mixture of different 
motivational stimuli, that consist of actors’ understanding regarding 
their own activities; interpretations of their aims and relevant means 
to achieve their goals; and lessons learned from past action in relation 
to future expectations. Thus, self-initiated frames are used to make 
sense of new opportunities and challenges as they arise (see Vromen; 
Gillan; Häyhtiö & Rinne; Rättilä and Baringhorst in this volume). 
The distinction between the actionists and the administrational ap-
proaches is explicit. In the administrational approach public authori-
ties are involving citizens in decision-making, but contrary to this the 
citizens in the actionist approach are active somewhere other than in 
the traditional sphere of institutionally organised participation. 
So, the contemporary milieu of political action and participation 
has fractured into a diverse, complex multi-spatial network in which 
several controversial motivational drives; re-scaled political priorities; 
manners and styles of making an impact are emerging. In this political 
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jungle the value of individualism and post-materialism (see Inglehart 
1997, 35) are hailed, and the signifi cance and sensibility of political 
participation springs not only from the impact and consequences of 
the action but also from the participative action itself. This individu-
alised political empowerment could potentially cause the renaissance 
of personalised politicisation and might be the cure for the perceived 
political apathy troubling modern societies.  People claim to win back 
their authenticity and autonomy through the process of individualisa-
tion’s privilege of becoming “who one really is” and autonomy as the 
privilege to “be one’s own person”.  The purpose in this is to enable 
people to use their own talents to bridge the gap between what they 
are and what they want to be.
The indubitable danger in such understanding emphasising the 
importance of individualism, is that society is seen merely as a matrix 
of atomistic free agents moving from one position or coalition to an-
other. To avoid the lurking risk of extreme individualism, it is vital to 
bear in mind that the emancipation of individuals and collectives as 
well, comes from what they are enabled, or feel to able, to do refl ex-
ively for themselves and (or) for their societies. The major incentive 
in any political activities is to make an impact on public issues. The 
motivation explaining people’s postmaterial engagement may be a bit 
different from the motives behind electoral participation. Involve-
ment and activity in general, in individualised politics is not based on 
ideological differences nor on the traditional attachment to a certain 
class, or group membership. Rather is it motivated by the self-narrated 
and subjectively felt problems of everyday life that generate different 
personal political homes for each actor, and are motivated by personal 
interests and aims. This view is in concert with the old Aristotelian 
idea of politics, in which people as social beings produce a good life 
for a community to be able to live a good life. 
FROM ONE-WAY MASS MEDIA TO DIGITAL NETWORKS
When analysing the relationship of political participation to publicness 
in more detail, it is quite easily noticeable that since the 1980’s “old 
democracy”, public spheres have gone through signifi cant expansions 
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and transformations, which have affected the culture of political par-
ticipation. The exponential growth of commercial media and digital 
communication and the acceleration of globalisation have had great 
infl uences on the change. (Keane 2000, Kellner 2000.) Modernised 
societies have become media societies in which new interactive media 
and communication modes (the Internet, mobile phones, Digital-
TV) extend the media landscape of traditional one-way mass media 
(newspapers, radio, TV). People increasingly spend their time using the 
media, and perceive their glocalised environment through the media 
and product media contents alone (see Calenda & Meijer; Lehtonen 
and Mosca in this volume). 
The multiplicity of networked spaces of communication has 
broken down mass media’s hegemonic position in mediating politi-
cal publicness (see Baringhorst; Häyhtiö & Rinne in this volume). 
The practices of political public life have also been disentangled ef-
fi ciently from public institutions and state territories by the fracturing 
networks. A useful heuristic tool for analysing the political features 
of public spheres and fl uid media environments – which suits the 
Internet well – comes from civil society researcher John Keane. He 
divides publicness into three different categories of spheres: micro-, 
meso- and macro-public spheres, which practically permeate each other. 
Political micro-spheres emerge, when people encounter each other and 
dispute about controversial issues. A micro-public sphere is a space, 
generated between groups of civil society as well as single individu-
als, where public deliberation is conducted, opposing views confront 
each other and existing standpoints and interpretations are challenged 
by bringing forth alternative stances in the political playground. In 
Keane’s model the notion of a meso-public sphere resembles tradi-
tional mass media which frame spaces of public debate for millions 
of potential spectators, listeners and readers mainly in nation-states. 
The agenda of a meso-sphere is fi ltered and edited, which means that 
it is not formulated in horizontal civic communications. The concept 
of a macro-public sphere refers to a globalised fi eld of publicness, in 
which the most important actors are transnational media companies. 
(Keane 2000; Häyhtiö & Rinne 2007.)
 When following Keane’s line of thinking, we can understand 
how Internet publicness has become a tool, channel and resource for 
17
political infl uence. The accessibility of www browsers in the 1990’s 
created a setting for the notion of Web 1.0 that refers to easy-to-use 
computer-mediated communication (CMC). The expanding growth 
in the capacity of computing devices, software and data transfer led 
to the fi nal breakthrough of the Internet and multiplied the number 
of users. The Internet became a graphic environment in which people 
can consume, publish content freely, create sites and communities, 
seek linked information, “surf” from one place to another, entertain 
themselves, conduct politics and meet people. (Walch 1999, 39-49; 
Chadwick 2006, 45-47.) In CMC the most signifi cant political fea-
ture is de-medialization, which refers to the fracturing mediator role 
of mass media and the emergence of horizontal communication.  As 
the Internet expanded, new styles of communication activism arose, 
because it was impossible to control them and anybody could try to 
bring matters to public discussion. (Walch 1999, 67-75.) Web 1.0 
styles of communication enable bi-directional change of information 
between different actors in political scenery. It is well suited for various 
organisations’ purposes to distribute their strategies, aims and modes 
of action and launch interactive discussions among those related to 
these activities (see Mosca; Vromen; Gillan; Molinari; Paltemaa, Lap-
palainen and Baringhorst in this volume)  
Studies considering citizen initiated politics have shown a grow-
ing interest in the paradigm shift in the political use of the Internet 
– labelled as a politics of Web 2.0. The notion of Web 2.0 encompasses 
sites based on user-generated content, networking and sharing. (Wyld 
2007; Lehtonen; Jordan; Häyhtiö & Rinne; Hintikka and Rättilä in 
this volume.) Today, the services and applications offered by the In-
ternet are largely commercial but this has not hindered spontaneous 
political civic activity in emerging onto the platforms of social media. 
In fact, it is understood that Web 2.0 sites in general are transforming 
the Internet into a mode of space where users do not simply discuss 
but do things together (O’Reilly 2005). It presents an Internet where 
contents are created and shaped by networking individuals. (Wyld 
2007, 43-44; Chadwick 2006, 8.)  In user-generated content produc-
tion individuals themselves control creation processes by developing, 
classifying, architecting or evaluating Web content. Indeed, Web 2.0 
sites can be defi ned as peer-to-peer media, in which collectivities 
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consist of the choices of individuals to connect to platforms and to 
act voluntarily in them. (O’Reilly 2005.) Web communities can also 
manifest sources of collective political activity when swarming and 
meshworking individuals visit interesting websites and hubs to solve 
problems or attain shared aims or orientations. The multitude of 
individuals may grow into a politically effective force by uniting. By 
meshworking the swarming effect turns the plurality into unity (cf. 
Osterweil 2004, 504; see Häyhtiö & Rinne in this volume.)
  Through the Internet actors may disseminate their aims and 
agenda horizontally, from peer to peer, by opening new public places 
within the complex structure of overlapping public spheres micro-, 
meso- and macro-public spheres, which form according to John Keane 
(2000, 77-78): “...a[c]omplex mosaic of differently sized, overlapping 
and interconnected public spheres.” In addition, the employment of 
CMC offers multiple layers of spatial asynchronous contexts and op-
portunities to mobilise and advocate political pursuits. Publishing 
and sharing self-made media content horizontally through the Net is 
a process in which media outputs are received and conceived by their 
audiences in discursive and interactive manners. In this context any 
issue may take on political relevance. The meanings of these outputs 
are formed through communicative practises of sharing and delivering 
self-created material and information. Meaning-making is open-ended; 
even loose talk in which politics can materialise in the context of 
discursive interaction, when the new ways of framing and perceiving 
social/political issues, and new formulations of strategies are formed 
(cf. Dahlgren 2006, 279). The processes can be reciprocal, mutual 
attempts or launched even by a single active individual. It is possible 
to defi ne issues as political, in other words politicise chosen topics, 
by denaturalising the conventional perceptions or through ironic and 
sardonic approaches. (Häyhtiö & Rinne 2009.) 
Self-initiated and self-assertive production of de-medialised public 
arenas and communicating within its’ boundaries means circulating 
unedited and unfi ltered communication. It can be done practically by 
anyone who wants to intervene to publicly pursue whatever aims they 
wish. (Walch 1999, 67-71.) The power to start public discussions or 
debates is, at least partly, removed from the hands of the traditional 
mass media (Chadwick 2006, 137-138). It has proved to be impossible 
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to control civic discussion on the Net, communication just occurs on 
the Internet. Communicating and news making have also moved in a 
more interactive direction; they have evolved into truly bi-directional 
communication. Mass media keenly follows the on-line discussions 
and is picking up interesting topics from the Net for inclusion in the 
news. (Bennett 2003, 20; 2004, 141.) Being on the pulse of themes 
within micro-public spheres has become a vital part of media-reality 
and media criticism. 
CIVIC EMPOWERMENT: IN BETWEEN 
ADMINISTRATIONAL E-DEMOCRACY AND ACTIONISM 
Using the Internet seems to be a very promising tool in overcoming 
traditional apathetic political involvement, and empowering commit-
ment to political issues. Both institutional and civil societal actors and 
even single individuals have noticed that the Internet and other CMC 
– related technical applications have inherently politically facilitating 
features. 
The practices of new institutional-related public involvement 
have their roots in two different sources, which are New Public Man-
agement (NPM) reforms and forms of political participation theory. 
In a peculiar manner they have been converted into innovations of 
public involvement. During recent decades various modernisation 
reforms have been carried out at different levels and in different fi elds 
of public administration in OECD countries.  In addition to many 
other functions public administration reforms have striven to connect 
citizens more effectively to the decision-making processes. Citizens are 
considered as subjects with needs and wishes that have to be met in 
order to produce good, effi cient, governance. This is the reason why 
representative government is supplemented by a range of devices for 
public hearing and consultation to ensure the direct representation of 
citizen’s views. (See Pollitt & Bouckaert 2004.) 
The implementation of NPM strategies has led to the emergence 
of new practices and theories of political governance (Pierre 2000, 1-
3; Hirst 2000, 18; Bingham et al. 2005, 549). One mode of political 
governance is public involvement culture, which aims to construct and 
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rationalise the practices of civic participation from above (see Häyhtiö 
& Keskinen 2005; Bingham et al. 2005; Bang 2003). The culture 
of public involvement is a model of new steering, inclusive political 
communication, which invites lay people to exercise civic infl uence in 
new access points and to partake in a systemic decision-making process 
(Bang 2003; see also Molinari and Lehtonen in this volume).                                
In addition to NPM reforms, the culture of public involvement 
has been infl uenced by the fact that the distance between political par-
ties and citizens is widening. To answer this problem the ideas given 
by participatory democracy theory, deliberative democracy theory 
and most recently e-democracy have been set up because they stress 
the importance of citizen participation in public deliberation and 
decision-making (Bingham et al. 2005: Häyhtiö & Keskinen 2005; 
Dahlberg 2001). These models of participation aspire to political 
deliberation, in which people are motivated to deliberate in a civil 
and reasonable manner. Theories emphasise the distribution of infor-
mation and knowledge as a material used by public in order to form 
arguments or to support their political opinions so that confi dence 
among citizens increases. A democratic community is therefore to 
be founded on solidarity and intellectual deliberation and effective 
cooperation. The admission of legitimacy emerges from reasonable, 
logical and knowledgeable arguments that are approved by a majority 
(Häyhtiö & Keskinen 2005, 430)    
 The ongoing discussion of political alienation is an expression of 
concern about the unpopularity of political participation. The reign-
ing political elite has recognised the need for the formation of new 
media for deliberation and forums of participation to bring about a 
more justifi ed and legitimate form of governance. The aim and the 
promise of various local, regional, national, EU and global participatory 
projects and initiatives consist of closer bonds between public offi cials, 
politicians and citizens. The purpose is to create and introduce such 
procedures within the political governance system that strengthen the 
legitimacy and accountability of political decision-making. (Coleman 
& Gøtze 2001; Macintosh et al. 2002; Malina 2003; Tsagarousianou 
1999; Schulman et al. 2003; Schlosberg et al. 2007.) Amongst these 
new channels to empower are digital networks, especially the Internet. 
They offer new methods of democratic participation (see Molinari; 
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Lehtonen; Paltemaa and Lappalainen in this volume). Most of the 
experimental public involvement e-projects utilise fairly similar infra-
structures of CMC, notably various Internet applications. In general, 
the electronic democracy discourse is marked by two grand promises: 
the citizen’s free access to public information and open discursive 
deliberation on the electronic Net (Tsagarousianou 1999).  
 The characteristic feature of the new public involvement culture 
is that it is giving voice to the citizens in such matters that fi t into 
the context of representative political governance. The representative 
bodies, or civil servants, set the agenda. The citizens themselves do 
not set the agenda (see Macintosh et al. 2002; Malina 2003; Tsagarou-
sianou 1999; Schulman et al. 2003; Schlosberg et al. 2007; Wiklund 
2005; Albrecht 2006). Thus, active civil discussion is about matters, 
which are considered suitable (and usually they are rather harmless 
or insignifi cant) (Blaug 2002; Lappalainen in this volume; Häyhtiö 
& Keskinen 2005). Nevertheless, despite the fact that the topics of 
desired civil discussion are fi xed, the very tendency to seek more legiti-
macy by allowing the citizens to participate in governance, tells of the 
transformation of the political culture. Those in power recognise the 
need to fi nd out the attitudes and opinions of people at intermediate 
times between elections. (See Bang & Dyrberg 2003).
However, it must be acknowledged that several aspects of par-
ticipatory, deliberative e-democracy theory materialise in many public 
involvement projects. People participate in the deliberations as equal 
citizens: the participants could be considered equal speakers and per-
formers in relation to one another. Electronic deliberations – with the 
background information provided – could be considered as processes 
of political reasoning and argumentation, and the deliberations are 
free and public. Presentations are not generally hindered or restricted 
by any authority and they are all public, (cf. Dahlberg 2001a; 2001b), 
although, it has to be acknowledged that many discussion services are 
premoderated. Participation is voluntary and its aim is to infl uence 
politics. Nevertheless, people do not actually have a direct opportunity 
to contribute to policymaking. However, the explicit aim of the public 
involvement website forums is to promote democracy and the citizens’ 
opportunities to participate in politics. The forums therefore seem to 
seek a kind of consensual politics by means of argumentative delibera-
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tion. The aim of public deliberation is to legitimate future policies. 
In the forums, participation is reciprocal. This gives the participants 
an opportunity to justify their arguments and to assess the arguments 
delivered by others.
When comparing badly manifested civic empowerment of ad-
ministrational e-democracy to actionist discourse of Internet politics, 
we may more profoundly understand the relation of the Internet to 
citizen initiated politics. For example, Internet research has concretely 
shown how new civic movements have adopted the logic of computer-
mediated communication, which enables nearly unlimited freedom 
to produce citizen-oriented contents on the network. These digital 
contents highlight political struggles arising from citizens’ own experi-
ences, which can as well be local, national, or global. (Meikle 2002; 
McCaughey & Ayers 2003; Donk et al 2004; see also Lehtonen and 
Lappalainen in this volume). Variations in net-politics can manifest 
contents, methods of action and aims of whatever are the manifold 
civic actions, in which political stand-taking happens open-mindedly. 
Citizen initiated net-politicking is already considered as a basic style 
for the actors of civil society (cf. Calenda & Meijer and Lappalainen in 
this volume). Net-activity is incredibly capable of infl uencing the self-
empowerment of various political groupings. In a society of interactive 
media, do-it-yourself civic activity is much easier than before.
In the present refl exive and global world individuals are in a posi-
tion of constant judging. They are making choices and commitments, 
planning, and trying to tune in their preferences regarding the way 
they hope to conduct their own everyday lives. The identities of these 
individualised atomistic actors are constructed through complex sets 
of discursive interactions between the individual and the surround-
ing reality. In discursive interactions individuals may face risks, fears, 
threats, confl icts, injustices, uncertainties. (Beck 1995; see also Holzer 
& Sørensen 2001, 3-6; Bennett 2004, 126-127.) Refl exive politics 
emerges, when people are trying or wanting to take care of and handle 
responsibly the problems which occur in everyday life at the level of 
individual action (Micheletti 2003, 33). Thus public political activities 
become something more than mere mean, or instrumental action being 
pursued incrementally to achieve some ends. They are transformed 
into expressive performative activities, through which political actors 
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may represent involvement, engagement, social and political references, 
belonging, and personal value commitments. (Dahlgren 2005, 155; 
McDonald 2006, 33; Häyhtiö & Rinne 2007.)
CMC enables digital micro-politics that fosters the new ideas and 
modes of action along with the “snowball-effect” that can, during a 
timely course of action, permeate into meso-, or even macro-political 
publicness. The asynchronous temporal dimension is then fortifi ed 
when people decide to join the original online campaign after noticing 
it from some other media.  Hence, the Internet is to be considered 
as a locus, channel, and to some extent even a temporal space for 
political and communicative action, participation, and mobilisation. 
(Meikle 2002; Donk et al. 2004; della Porta & Mosca 2005; Garrett 
2006; Häyhtiö & Rinne in this volume.) Various uses of the Internet 
facilitate different civic networks and organisations to introduce their 
aims and strategies, and to outreach target groups and members of the 
public. In addition, they may also more effi ciently run the core tasks 
of campaigning projects, such as communicating with supporters, 
coordinating events in the fi eld, organising crowds in fast-breaking 
situations, and reacting quickly to breaking news, and gain publicity 
for their issue (Mosca; Gillan and Baringhorst in this volume). The 
empowering potentiality of the Internet is so impressive, that hardly 
any serious political actor (or “wannabe” actor) could overlook its’ 
facilitating features (Chadwick 2006). The technical development of 
the Internet and the plural forms of communication empower activity 
by opening a radically individualised environment, where personal 
concerns may be politicised.
REFLEXIVE CITIZENS AS GATEKEEPERS IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
Refl exivity expands the notion of politics to deal with self-initiated, 
individual, and subjective choices, which have an effect on the emer-
gence of new types of political involvement, participation, and activi-
ties. Refl exivity means an active interaction between an individual and 
the surrounding world. It is taking responsibility for the subjective 
self-construction as an actor (see McDonald 2006, 14), and thus it 
is activity by the people instead of waiting for something to be done 
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by the government. A shift towards refl exive politics means a greater 
involvement and say in matters that are subjectively chosen to be 
important. The altering of the scope regarding political mobilisa-
tion, activity, and participation is contradicting traditional views of 
political activities. The transformation has controversial implications 
in respect of civic involvement and engagement; the changing of the 
paradigm towards a more individualised participation in which people 
are forming constantly changing representational multitudes through 
action (ibid., 34). Being part of or belonging to such multitudes offers 
an important insight into how people assess their self-identifi cation, 
which is a primordial element of a complex structuring of identity and 
a self-defi ned understanding of “who am I?”. The notion of refl exivity, 
as we understood it, resonates seamlessly with the personal identity 
formation and individualised political activity, in which the acting 
subject is intertwined in many personal passing projects that contribute 
to the subjective self-image of the agent. Civic involvement, defi ning 
a self as a stakeholder of public or common issue, is thus embedded 
in people’s everyday lives (see Reimer 1999, 25-26), and that conducts 
the citizen’s moral sentiments and actions. Hence, the very identity of 
an acting citizen is not stable; rather it is undergoing constant change 
according to the situation. The identity is a contingent, though refl exive 
fabric and an expression of advocated value commitments through 
different performances, mirroring the aspects of the individual’s own 
life (ibid., 31).
The phenomenon of refl exive politics refers to an individualised 
politics that does not fi t into the frameworks of old structural poli-
tics nor does it follow the logic or procedures of traditional political 
agenda setting. On the contrary, it seeks to respond to the limitations 
of collective political activity by turning the focus on the structural 
shift in the nature of participation (Micheletti 2003, 28).  Subjec-
tive do-it-yourself politicisations generate different personal political 
homes for each actor, and politicised issues are motivated by personal 
interests and aims also refl ecting modes of action. Politicised issues 
emerge from everyday life and the variety of them might cover the 
whole spectrum of human life that is related to the question of lead-
ing an ethical and fair life. Such issues consist of, for instance, human 
rights, political rights, political consumerism, animal rights, housing 
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and urban planning, sexual identities, environmental issues, health 
and so forth. (Beck 1995; della Porta & Diani 1999; Polleta & Jasper 
2001, 285-6; Micheletti 2003; Dahlgren 2005, 154; Bernstein 2005, 
54.) Real or alleged moral sentiments and ethical ethos are fuelling 
a force for taking action and motivation arises from personal agenda 
setting when political is understood as an answer to the question of 
“How should we live?”
The newly emerged political consumerism as a form of refl exive 
politics highlights the typical features of the transformation of the 
political. Political consumerism refl ects a change in citizen initiated 
politics, in which people direct activity to fi elds that allow them to seek 
individual and spontaneous forms of political expression. (Micheletti 
2003, 15, 24.) Evidently, the market sphere and consumption need 
to be conceived of as a tool and arena of politics, which citizens are 
willing to use in infl uencing politics. Political consumerism is often 
considered from a narrow point of departure that focuses on single 
shopping decisions.  In a broader defi nition, political consumerism 
means civic activity that politicises market practices, corporate poli-
cies and market society. It displays numerous forms and manners of 
activity, such as performing global social justice criticism, human 
rights, sustainable development, animal rights, ecological lifestyles etc. 
(Micheletti et al. 2005, 258-259; Micheletti 2003, 15; see also Mosca in 
this volume). Also “one-target campaigns” highlight the politicisation 
of the market sphere and consumption, when a single corporation or 
market practice is attacked by intensive politicking (see Baringhorst; 
Häyhtiö & Rinne and Hintikka in this volume). Furthermore, it has 
to be noticed that political consumerism broadly includes different 
alternative modes of consumption, such as the open source movement, 
net piracy, the fair trade movement, dumpster diving, ethical banking 
and environmental labels etc. 
   A characteristic feature of the forms of refl exive political ac-
tion is, due to its’ meshworked nature, that it is not very consistently 
organised and they do not follow the traditional patterns of collective 
mobilisation. Mobilisation resembles more closely action networking 
than institutional structuring, and it employs publicity or may even 
produce publicness autonomously by using the tools and channels of 
new information technology (Chadwick 2006, 119; Wright 2004, 
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91; Bennett 2004, 127-130). Also, a successful activity is news itself. 
Typical of these actionist networks is that they fl ourish for a short but 
intensive time period capitalising on the publicity in provocative ways 
trying to raise new confl ict settings that strengthen the impression of a 
truly affective political actor (see Baringhorst; Gillan; Jordan; Vromen; 
Häyhtiö & Rinne; Rättilä and Hintikka in this volume). In fact, most 
issue-specifi c individually orientated political interventions differ both 
from the traditional social movements, as well as from the “new social 
movements” in respect of their agenda, aims, temporal duration, and 
lines of chosen activities (Crossley 2002, 4; Osterweil 2004, 499, 
504).  Their ability to attract new followers and active participants is 
to be understood in terms of their capability to effi ciently permeate 
different public spheres. By this capability they are able to offer people 
shared defi nitions in regard to the social grievances. To some extent 
this constructed relationship between individual and collective action 
is conceptually exactly what could be labelled as ‘social’ or ‘socialisa-
tion’, and which constructs the sense of belonging in actions when 
individual agents are refl ecting and swarming around the emerging 
issues. (Polletta & Jasper 2001, 295; Bernstein 2005, 50; McDonald 
2006, 22-3.) Thus, it is no wonder that the activities often take the 
form of countercultural intervention utilising its’ styles and tactics 
(McDonald 2006, 35-6).
CITIZEN INITIATED INTERNET POLITICS 
EMERGING: OUTLINING THE THEMES
As a channel, the Internet is tolerant and produces repertoires of con-
tention and challenging information. It connects a many voiced crowd 
to discuss certain issues bringing participants from various backgrounds 
together to share and contest their views. The multitude of people may 
unite into a meshworked collectivity or the opinions may polarise or 
diversify. Yet, as a political facilitator and meet-up place, the Internet 
has shown its’ potentiality. The horizontal participation and action 
culture, characteristic of the Net, is far more radically democratic 
than traditional vertical democratic governing. Open and free Web 
communication based on the premise that all participants are equal 
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changes the nature of political communication and deliberation. The 
persuasiveness of arguments is dependent on the quality of argumen-
tation, not on the position or status of the participant. The lack of 
personal face-to-face communication underlines the signifi cance of 
appealing argumentation. This feature is important when we think of 
its outcomes in regard to political action. The transformative change 
is crystallised particularly in net-politics, because it is used to mobilise 
supporters and gather coalitions. Communicative refl exivity could be 
considered as a vitalisation of personal political empowerment, where 
collectivities and communities might be constituted just by clicking 
the mouse.
The volume is divided into two parts. The chapters in the fi rst 
part discuss issues dealing with civic net-empowerment in relation to 
public bodies, political institutions, governments, and e-participation. 
The chapters in part I introduce innovative and creative forms of reac-
tive politics responding to social and political wrongs. The chapters in 
part II, on the other hand, deal with different modes of net-activities 
introducing proactive civic empowerment in its various guises. The 
chapters in part II focus especially on citizen initiated styles of action 
emerging on the Internet.
Part I begins with Lorenzo Mosca’s chapter. He studies the In-
ternet’s contribu tion to political processes. In his analysis the Internet 
is viewed as a dou ble-faced media that creates opportunities as well as 
poses new challenges for political actors, especially for civic associa-
tions. The focus in his chapter is twofold: it clarifi es the role of Internet 
usage among the organisational activities, and analyses the leadership 
positions of different organisational sectors within the Italian Global 
Justice Movement. Mosca’s chapter is built on both quantitative and 
qualitative research gathered from the participants in the demonstra-
tion on the Bolkenstein directive in Rome in 2005. Mosca provides 
an in-depth insight into relations among variables concerning the 
political use of the Internet and detailed information on the Internet 
use in the daily life of the organisations.
Kevin Gillan’s chapter draws on qualitative data. The dataset 
comprises transcripts from over sixty interviews with anti-war activists 
carried out 2006-7, fi eld notes from numerous observations of anti-war 
activity and documentary analysis of media sources and movement 
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produced literature. Even if ICTs have become nearly ubiquitous in 
campaign organisations, as Gillan’s examples from the UK demon-
strates, this by no means implies a homogeneous relationship between 
activists and technologies. When particular technologies employed by 
the activists are considered, we fi nd highly uneven usage from group to 
group and individual to individual. Gillan argues that, in understanding 
the variable uptake of web applications, one key factor for considera-
tion is the political perspectives of the actors involved. Particular uses, 
to which technologies are put is differentiated by a range of factors 
including campaign goals, organisational structures and strategies for 
change, and are analysed in Gillan’s chapter. 
In her chapter Ariadne Vromen explores the distinction between 
conventional and non-conventional forms of participation that chal-
lenges established relationships of contact between citizens and their 
parliamentary representatives. Her chapter is based on in-depth analysis 
on Australian internet-based organisation, GetUp.org. Vromen claims, 
in her chapter, that the Internet facilitates collective action by new 
communities of political actors, and also that existing interpretations 
of social movement action as distinct from interest group activities are 
questioned due to these new forms of well resourced, internet-based 
participation that disrupt established power relationships. Vromen’s 
analysis includes interviews, site analysis, media analysis and survey 
data with participants, showing that GetUp has been successful in 
achieving its campaign outcomes and has managed to attract attention 
from non-internet media and institutionalised political actors.
Francesco Molinari provides in his chapter an insight into the 
implementation of ICTs in public institutions and its potential value 
to an increased (e-)participation in the political decision-making proc-
ess. He critically explores the technological, social and institutional 
conditions enabling the current “best practices” of e-democracy to be 
turned into stable components of a participatory legislative process 
as well as citizen’s involvement in the defi nition and evaluation of 
policy targets and initiatives. Three main paradoxes of collective action 
related to representativeness, accountability and scale are brought up 
as challenges that need to be further clarifi ed, in order to ensure the 
execution of a quality legislative process, and the active engagement 
of individual citizens. Requirements for this do not only include the 
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establishment of mechanisms for the expression of a “separate judge-
ment” by interested people with respect to their elected representa-
tives, but also the settlement of conditions for a timely, informed and 
responsible judgement.
Pauliina Lehtonen’s chapter on civic activism explores the use 
of the Internet and especially the expansion of social media usage 
linked to the changes within communication practices. Her chapter 
addresses the theme of citizen-orientated and produced online space at 
local grass-roots level. Analysis of the web portal of Manse Square, that 
was designed to provide a forum for different aspects of civic action by 
voluntary citizens, focus on the communal and political impacts of an 
example of local civic participation through the Internet.  By analys-
ing civic action and its potential impacts for social learning, Lehtonen 
provides an insight into civic action from two viewpoints: 1) collective 
civic action as social participation which might lack direct affi liation 
to political aims, and 2) collective action as political participation 
that has been initiated in the Manse Square environment more rarely 
than communally oriented forms of participation. The chapter leans 
on research material that consists of theme interviews (conducted in 
2004), a web survey (in 2003–2004) and data gathered by participa-
tory action research methods.
In his chapter Lauri Paltemaa analyses the so called “dictator’s 
dilemma” between the need to import and apply new technology for 
economic development and upholding autocratic practises of an illiberal 
regime.  Technologies related to the Internet are necessary for modern 
economic growth and development, but at the same time they serve 
as an information channel that is diffi cult to control by the authori-
ties and therefore makes oppositional activities against authoritarian 
regimes more likely to occur and achieve success. Paltemaa discusses, 
in his chapter, how, under these contradictory predictions, one should 
assess the impact of the Internet on the political future of China. The 
crucial question, then, is what does the Chinese example tell us about 
the possible social and political roles of information technology? Is it 
but an “update of an authoritarian system to the digital age”, or is it 
a means that forces the system to liberalise eventually? 
Part I ends with a chapter by Davide Calenda and Albert Meijer. 
They provide a large scale cross-national empirical analysis of university 
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students’ Internet activities and perceptions related to online politics. 
Their study contributes to the understanding of changes brought by 
Internet politics and gives empirical evidence of how extensive the 
political use of the Internet is. The descriptive analysis is framed within 
an interpretation schema that includes data on national differences 
and student’s trust of the Internet as a means of empowering political 
citizenship. Their analysis confi rms that using the Internet for poli-
tics has become a “normal” practice for the students and although it 
has not yet beaten the mass media, the use of the Internet for public 
activities is widespread. In addition, the study reveals that students 
make an integrated use of media to inform themselves about politics 
and demonstrates the similarities in political online activities as well 
as perceptions of politics amongst young people. 
Part II begins with Pertti Lappalainen’s chapter. He claims that 
experience is a basic element of political action. His chapter is built on 
John Dewey’s concept of experi ence introducing the idea of political 
style and also distinguishing various ways for political actors to stand 
out from other actors. In his chapter, Lappalainen develops the notion 
of the “politgenicity” of action, and discusses public involvement, a 
style of political activity enabled by the Internet. Lappalainen treats 
public involvement as a “political behaviour” that is a distinct alterna-
tive to political action. On the other hand, in the chapter the Internet 
is perceived as a forum of opportuni ties for multiple political styles. 
Thus, it enables contingent action and new political activities as well 
as political behaviour which tries to commit citizens to the strategy 
of governing bodies.
Tim Jordan’s chapter explores a number of related, activist forms 
of politics that could not have come about without the existence of a 
range of internet technologies. From these he draws general proposi-
tions for a tentative and complex view on the Internet and politics. 
Jordan outlines three fi gures of virtual politics, or ‘hacktivism’, which 
are; mass embodied online protest; internet infra structure and informa-
tion politics; and communicative practices and information control. 
Through these three fi gures of resistance, he provides an insight into 
the complexity of the situation whereby politics has collided with 
the Internet. When looking at the examples that Jordan offers in his 
chapter, the specifi city of a politics that operates within social and 
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cultural norms that are dependent on Internet technologies, is that 
Internet politics is dependent on expertise and this expertise enables 
intervention into the infrastructure of the ‘world’.
Sigrid Baringhorst describes in her chapter general characteristics 
of political consumerism looking at the politicisation of consumption 
as a new form of political participation. The Internet is discussed in 
her chapter in terms of an empowering tool for such activities by 
providing consumers effi cient means for the collective production of 
knowledge that can be used to enhance the market power of consum-
ers as well as their infl uence as civil society actors. The Internet allows 
many-to-many self-initiated communication and may strengthen 
network-based participatory politics. However, political consumer-
ism is critically discussed in Baringhorst’s chapter in terms of political 
legitimacy and accountability. Even though direct activism in hori-
zontal networks has the advantage of a broader public participation, 
it may lack accountability towards a wider public. The high profi le 
consumerist campaigns run the risk of being merely event politics, and 
the question of representation, which is a crucial question of liberal 
democracy, remains unsolved.
In their chapter Tapio Häyhtiö and Jarmo Rinne describe how 
the role of the Internet is becoming increasingly signifi cant with 
regard to political participation and mobilisation. They claim that 
the Internet is a powerful tool in gathering coalitions and organising 
mobilisation. In their analysis they show, how the use of the Internet 
is transforming political styles, forms and organisational structuring of 
political activities and the temporal nature of such activities. Individu-
ally steered collective meshing creates an actionist network and brings 
the element of subjectivity into politics. On the Internet the temporal 
dimensions of past, present, and future may blur, because the Internet 
dislocates space from temporality allowing people to share the same 
virtual space without necessarily sharing a real-time co-presence.  The 
co-presence might be temporally not-coincidental making the political 
action on the Net more fl uid and contingent. Häyhtiö’s and Rinne’s 
analysis is based on the analysis of exceptionally intense Finnish net 
protest against gossip journalism right after the fi rst Finnish victory 
in the Eurovision song contest in spring 2006.
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Kari Hintikka’s focus, in his chapter, is on the Nordic Internet 
piracy movement and its recent activism in Scandinavia. The activities 
of the piracy movement includes successful denial-of service-attacks 
against government and police www services in Sweden and the at-
tempts to buy an island and to form a sovereign country for pirates. 
Hintikka examines how the modus operandi of some new social move-
ments are changing from the traditional work-intensive to the network 
intensive model and how the Internet itself is becoming an identity 
megaplex where an individual can easily select and mix social and 
political offerings and act on their behalf. The Net piracy movement, 
Piratpartiet, is an example of a protest movement reacting proactively 
towards such issues as the copyright laws and digital privacy. According 
to Hintikka, the ongoing change from material and location-based 
production and distribution to the global and networked economy 
should not be considered merely hacktivism but as a signal of the 
deeper change both of a new repertoire and a political opportunity 
structure for new social and political movements.
In her chapter Tiina Rättilä studies the user-generated mode of 
political communication, namely the blogs. Rättilä argues that blogs are 
rich in communicative elements, both visually and rhetorically. Even 
the names of many blogs represent, or include a message through which 
bloggers try to “reveal the truth”. By putting on a show bloggers are 
creating a performance as they simultaneously play with their narrated 
identities. Rättilä’s analysis introduces the performative perspective on 
communication, is that in which the blogosphere is viewed as a public 
communicative process that is inclusive and open to all interested 
participants making the production of new political ideas and public 
initiatives possible. This approach allows different forms of expression 
accepting social and political diversity. As user-generated communica-
tion blogging is considered a horizontal social media-application that 
enables the DIY-approach in (political) communication. That leads us 
to a situation in which, quoting the author: “Perhaps the best we can 
do is to say that democracy on the net is becoming increasingly creative, 
diverse, and messy”.
As a result of this volume the effects of the Internet on political 
civic empowerment can be analysed as follows. First, computer-medi-
ated communication is a resource for the activity. The Internet has 
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modifi ed movements and organisations. It has increased meshworking 
and made them more networked, fl uid, and dispersed. Collective mobi-
lisation and the opportunities for direct action are feasible for ordinary 
citizens. The Net also facilitates the construction and strengthening 
of collective identities and the dissemination of alternative informa-
tion. Second, micro-public spheres of the Net are potential places 
for the usage of actionist power; the Net is an open space both for 
political judgements and opinions and for choosing political styles. 
On the Net, basically anybody can try to infl uence matters that are 
considered important. Third, the communication platforms on the 
Internet construct personalised connections, such as user identifi ca-
tions, bookmarks, link listings, archives, email lists, blogs etc., which 
may be latent connections of social networks for a long time, but in 
the unpredictable situations of Net politics they may become politically 
signifi cant nodes. Fourth, the Internet as an experience-based space 
enables different learning processes through which individuals can 
improve their self-governance related for instance to technical skills, 
information retrieval and self-generated content and knowledge which 
are also crucial arts for practising spontaneous Net politics.  Fifth, open 
publicness facilitates the making of comments and remarks by other 
Net users. In the Internet milieu the notion of public means that the 
message of a sender is in the public domain, that is, it is accessible to 
others, but still the message is not necessarily communal, i.e. it does 
not necessarily become a public issue.
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A double-faced medium? The challenges and 
opportunities of the Internet for social movements1
INTRODUCTION: THE DEMOCRATIC POTENTIAL OF THE INTERNET
This chapter draws on the recent debate on the democratic potential of 
the Internet. Such debate has often been dominated by the confronta-
tion between sceptical and optimistic views, especially over the potential 
contribution of new technologies to improving political participation 
and democracy. The Internet has been considered by some to be a 
medium that favours those already interested and engaged in politics 
(Norris 2001). Other scholars claim that it can reduce political inequali-
ties (Meyers 2001). Indeed, the Internet multiplies the channels for 
political information and participation at the individual level, provides 
new opportunities for communication, mobilisation and interaction 
at the organisational level, and creates new pluralistic public spheres 
where citizens can discuss issues of general interest directed towards 
to the public good at the macro level (della Porta & Mosca 2005a). 
The effects of the Internet have been discussed over many important 
fi elds, including its impact on participation and pluralism.
1. An earlier version of this essay has been presented in the ECPR joint sessions of 
workshops in Helsinki (May 7-12, 2007, workshop Democracy in movements. 
Conceptions and practices of democracy in contemporary social movements) and 
in the third Karlstad Seminar on Studying Political Action (October 18-20, 2007). 
The author wishes to thank the convenors, the discussants and all the participants 
for useful comments. A previous version of this chapter has been published as a 
working paper of the European University Institute (Series/Report no.: EUI MWP 
2007/23) and translated by Jarmo Rinne in Politiikka 50:1, 51–68, 2008. 
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As for participation, unlike television and other high-cost types 
of communication, the Internet has been presented as a technology 
that allows broad participation and also reduces hierarchies, favouring 
horizontal forms of communication and organisation. More optimistic 
scholars such as Ayers (1999) stressed the capacity of the Internet to 
give more voice and power to the powerless. The “equalising” effect of 
the Internet has, however, been denied and challenged by more scepti-
cal scholars such as Margolis and Resnick (2000) who have claimed 
that this new medium favours organisations already rich in resources 
and people already engaged in politics. Most recent literature on this 
topic seems to provide support for sceptic arguments.
As for pluralism, the Internet has certainly increased the quantity 
of information available and facilitated access to it. However, also on 
these issues, some skepticism has emerged on the quality of information 
available online (in particular in relation to the diffi culties involved 
in assessing its reliability) as well as on the capacity of Internet com-
munication to overcome social and/or ideological barriers (Sunstein 
2001; Rucht 2005). Furthermore, the online presence of resource-poor 
organisations is overshadowed by what has been called “googlearchy”, 
that is the tendency of search engines to over-represent mainstream 
political actors online (Hindman et al. 2003).
A discussion of the democratic potential of the Internet should also 
take into account the traditional critique concerning the democratic 
defi cit of this medium: the digital divide. In fact, when refl ecting on 
the Internet’s democratic potential, it should be noted that even in 
rich and technologically developed countries a signifi cant part of the 
population is still excluded from access to this medium. As Norris 
(2001) noticed, digital differences emerge in access between differ-
ent territorial levels (not only between rich or poor macro-regions, 
but also between nations with similar standards of wealth located in 
the same macro-region), between different social classes in the same 
nation (penalising groups of citizens who lack economic and cultural 
resources), and between social sectors with different degrees of interest 
in politics (favouring groups of citizens already active and interested in 
politics). A large number of studies demonstrate that people without 
access to the Internet have peculiar socio-demographic characteristics. 
In fact Internet access refl ects a gender divide, a generation divide, 
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an ethnic divide, a wealth divide and an education divide, as the In-
ternet is more likely to be used by young, male, affl uent white, and 
educated people. 
Recent studies have focused on the use of new technologies by 
civil society organisations and individuals, with particular attention 
paid to the Internet. Electronic networks have been considered the 
backbone of new transnational social movements2 which gained media 
visibility from “the battle of Seattle” on (Bennett 2003). Being bi-di-
rectional, interactive and cost-less, they allow for the construction of 
new public spheres where social movements can organise mobilisa-
tions, discuss and negotiate their claims, strengthen their identities, 
sensitise public opinion and directly express acts of dissent (della Porta 
& Mosca 2005a). 
Internet research has been characterised by methodological plural-
ism (Garrett 2006), especially when focused on the organisational level. 
In fact, studies on the individual level have been undertaken mostly 
through online surveys that are generally based on self-selected samples, 
raising problems of reliability (Best & Krueger 2004). At the same time, 
the attention paid to offl ine surveys on Internet use has been limited to 
very basic questions concerning frequency and places of connection but 
generally ignoring the political dimension of Internet use.
As for the organisational level, the online presence of different politi-
cal organisations has been investigated through the content analysis of 
websites (for NGOs see Vedres et al., Bruszt & Stark 2005; for parlia-
ments and political parties see Trechsel et al. 2003; for social movement 
organisations see della Porta and Mosca 2005b); mailing-list analysis 
(Cristante 2003; Kavada 2006); search engine analysis (Zimmermann 
& Koopmans 2003) and with the case-study approach (Pickerill 2003). 
Such research has provided important insights into how these organisa-
tions use the Internet for acting politically by other means.
In what follows, I will address the political use of the Internet 
by the Italian Global Justice Movement (GJM) paying attention to 
both the organisations and the individuals involved in the movement. 
First of all, I will defi ne the meaning of the concept “political use of 
2. Social movements are defi ned as “informal networks, based on shared beliefs and 
solidarity, which mobilise about confl ictual issues, through the frequent use of 
various forms of protest” (della Porta & Diani 1999, 16).
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the Internet” and its operationalisation. Then, I will consider how the 
Internet is used politically by participants in social movements taking 
into account those factors that can explain different styles of Internet 
use. My hypothesis is that offl ine experiences (organisational and 
participatory ones) defi ne the political profi le of individuals that is 
then consistently expressed online.
In this chapter I will present data that was gathered with quantita-
tive and qualitative instruments employed during different researches: 
a survey of participants in the demonstration on the Bolkestein direc-
tive (Rome, October 2005) and a series of interviews with those in 
leadership positions of different organisational sectors of the Italian 
GJM.3 While quantitative data allows for the checking of some rela-
tions among variables concerning the political use of the Internet, 
qualitative data will provide more detailed information on Internet 
use in the everyday life of organisations. 
Concerning the survey, as it is almost impossible to build a casual 
sample of participants in a protest event, I worked with a “non-proba-
bilistic sample” (Corbetta 1999, 343-52).4 The sampling strategy was 
based on previous surveys on participants in Italian social movement 
events like the Genoa G8 counter-summit and the Florence European 
Social Forum (Andretta et al. 2002; della Porta et al. 2006). The sur-
vey was implemented using a “strategy of small samples”, focusing on 
the main organisational sectors of the Italian movement. A sampling 
method of selecting interviewees on the basis of their belonging to 
different organisational sectors was then employed (for more details 
see della Porta et al. 2006). Data was collected through a self-adminis-
tered paper-based questionnaire distributed just before (when different 
groups assemble to organise their presence within the demonstration) 
and just after the demonstration (when people rested and listened to 
spokespersons of the movement) and during a conference on “com-
mon goods” discussing the consequences of the Bolkestein directive 
on public services preceding the demonstration. In order to take into 
3. Both researches took place within the Demos project, focusing on conceptions and 
practices of democracy in the European Global Justice Movements (http://demos.
eui.eu).
4. A probabilistic sample could not be built since for civil society events it is impos-
sible to know exactly the characteristics of the population participating (indeed, 
lists of participants do not even exist). 
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account the different geographical provenances of participants, the 
questionnaire was also distributed on different trains coming to Rome 
(the place were the demonstration was held) both from the South 
(Sicily) and from the North (Lombardy) of Italy. 
The non-probabilistic nature of the sample does not allow strong 
inferences to be made. Thus, I present only descriptive statistics and 
non-parametric correlations in order to give an idea of the strength 
of the relations between variables.5 It is worth underlining that the 
fi ndings provide information on the participants in a specifi c protest 
event but cannot be considered generalisations for the social move-
ment population.
As for the qualitative part of this chapter, I interviewed those in 
leadership positions/ spokespersons of different groups belonging to 
different Italian social movement families6 engaged in mobilisation on 
the issues of globalisation, democracy, and social justice: from political 
parties to unions, from large associations to small informal groupings. 
During the interviews I asked those in leadership positions of different 
Social Movement Organisations (SMOs) to indicate both the strengths 
and weaknesses of Internet communication.
While the fi rst part of the chapter focuses on quantitative fi ndings 
concerning the individual level, the second presents qualitative results 
regarding the organisational level (but still collected at the individual 
level). An attempt to compare systematically the Internet’s limits and 
opportunities for social movements will be presented in the fi nal sec-
tion of this chapter.
5. All results of non-parametric correlations presented in this chapter have been 
previously checked with results obtained through cross-tabulations and other 
descriptive techniques. The signifi cance levels of coeffi cients presented throughout 
the paper are reported as follows: ** means signifi cance at the 0.01 level; * means 
signifi cance at 0.05 level. 
6. The concept of the social movement family has been proposed by della Porta 
and Rucht (1995) to indicate sets of movements of similar type (i.e. new social 
movements, left libertarian movements etc.) sharing a number of values and a 
similar political culture.
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THE POLITICAL USE OF THE INTERNET 
BY PARTICIPANTS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT PROTEST EVENTS
In this section the focus will be on the political use of the Internet 
by individuals taking part in social movement protest events. In what 
follows, I will present some results of a survey of the participants in a 
demonstration against the Bolkestein directive that was held in Rome 
on October 15th 2005.7 Almost 500 questionnaires were gathered.8 
The questionnaire, focusing mainly on conceptions and practices of 
democracy within the GJM, also contained some batteries concerning 
sources of political information and Internet use.
First of all, it is worth considering that the sample includes people 
engaged in social movements which are characterised by an intense 
use of the Internet to organise and carry out political actions (della 
Porta & Mosca 2005a; for similar fi ndings see also Van Laer 2006). 
The issues around which they mobilise are scarcely considered by the 
traditional mass media, and are under-represented in parliamentary 
arenas. Consequently, the Internet is heavily used: 42% of our respond-
ents declared they used it daily, 30% more than once a week, 11% 
once a week and 8% once a month. Overall, less than one tenth of 
the interviewees never accessed the Internet.9 This result is particularly 
signifi cant if we consider that at the time of the survey the percentage 
of the Italian population accessing the Internet was estimated to be 
about 40% (Bentivegna 2006).
As fi gure 1 shows, the Internet is a medium that is entering activ-
ists’ everyday life. In fact, considering the most important means of 
communication used daily to gather political information, we found 
that only newspapers were actually more used than the Internet (46% 
against 42%). This medium was more used on a daily basis by inter-
viewees than other “mainstream” media of communication like the 
7. The survey was directed by Donatella della Porta, and coordinated by Massimili- 
ano Andretta and Lorenzo Mosca. I wish to thank Maria Fabbri, Anna Ferro, 
Egle Mocciaro, Linda Parenti and Gianni Piazza for their help in administering 
questionnaires.
8. We distributed 700 questionnaires and got back 500. Return rate was approxi-
mately 70%.
9. Among those who declared they did not access the Internet, 59% were women, 
84% were undergraduates, 47% were more than 28 years old.
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TV and the radio (around 35%). It is also worth noticing that inter-
viewees use unmediated forms of communication as a primary source 
of political information: almost two thirds of interviewees declared 
in fact that they collected political information by talking politics 
with friends and colleagues daily. Even if they used different means 
of information, face-to-face relationships were considered much more 
important in the formation of their political opinions. 
This data clearly shows that the Internet supplements other chan-
nels of information and serves to allow communication when face-to-
face meetings are not possible but it is not substituting unmediated 
human communication (similar results can also be found in Di Mag-
gio et al. 2001). In a movement that is considered heavily dependent 
on mediated forms of communication, we found that face-to-face 
interactions are still at the core of communicative processes. A similar 
result was found when analysing in depth the forms of communica-
tion employed during the fi rst European Social Forum in Florence 
(Mosca & Teune 2007).
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However, the Internet is not just medium providing alternative infor-
mation. It can also be seen as a resource that supports political par-
ticipation in several ways: by providing a new platform for debate and 
engagement, or by complementing offl ine participation through, for 
instance, facilitating organisation and communication between people 
already involved in social and political networks (see also Introduction; 
Vromen; Gillan and Lehtonen in this volume).
  The political use of the Internet has to be understood as using the 
Internet to gather political information, to discuss political issues and 
to perform acts of dissent. In order to assess if and how the Internet 
is used politically by participants in social movement protest events, 
interviewees were asked about how they use the Internet when online. 
The questionnaire contained indicators concerning different styles of 
Internet political use: to collect and produce political information; to 
exchange political opinions and to communicate with one’s own group; 
and to perform online forms of action (e-petitions, net-strikes10 etc.). 
As can be seen in the Figure 2, 86% declared that they use the 
In ter net to gather alternative political information. Around half of 
the sample had used the Internet not only to collect information but 
also to publish reports of protest events. This data is very interesting 
in that it underlines that interviewees are not just passive receivers 
of information but they also act as active producers posting online 
reports of protest events that they have directly experienced. One of 
the more innovative features of the Internet, that is enabling users to 
take an active role in publishing their opinions online, seems then to 
be fulfi lled by a signifi cant number of interviewees.
Data also shows that the Internet is not only used to (passively 
and actively) inform but also to engage in interactive communication, 
exchanging political opinions in forums/mailing lists/chats (56%) or to 
communicate with one’s own political group (about two thirds of the 
sample). Results are quite different if we consider the last dimension 
of the political use of the Internet that is to practice online forms of 
action. While the Internet is broadly used to support online campaigns 
and petitions (almost three-quarters of interviewees do that), only one 
quarter of respondents participated in online radical forms of action 
10. Net-striking consists of a large number of people connecting simultaneously to the 
same domain at a prearranged time, in order to “jam” a site considered a symbolic 
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Figure 2.  Political use of the Internet by social movement participants 
(such as the net-strike). At this stage it is diffi cult to go behind the 
quantitative result explaining why “radical” online forms of action 
are scarcely practiced by participants in protest events. However, 
other studies (della Porta & Mosca 2005b) led us to hypothesise that 
this seems to be related to two different factors: fi rstly, the fact that 
information on the existence and the functioning of acts of electronic 
disturbance is not widespread among participants and, secondly, the 
fact that such online actions are perceived as ineffective and often dis-
regarded by the targets to whom they are directed. More explanation 
of this will be provided in the second part of the chapter.
Summarising, the data shown demonstrates that the Internet 
is used politically at different rates: mostly for retrieving political 
information, campaigning and petitioning online, and to discuss in 
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ongoing assemblies with one’s own political groups online. To a lesser 
extent, the Internet is used to actively produce information and to 
express political opinions online via forums, mailing-lists, blogs etc. 
Engaging in acts of electronic disturbance (i.e. net-strikes and mail-
bombings) is instead still restricted to a reduced quota of participants 
in protest events.
In order to provide some tentative explanations of the political use 
of the Internet, I created synthetic indexes aggregating various indica-
tors. This applies to the indexes of offl ine participatory experiences, 
offl ine organisational experiences, and political use of the Internet.11 
Even if correlation coeffi cients don’t tell us anything about the direction 
of a relation between variables, I hypothesise that offl ine (organisational 
and participatory) experiences could explain the political use of the 
Internet to gather information, to talk politics online and to perform 
acts of dissent on the Net (fi gure 2).12 
11. The indicators aggregated in the index of offl ine participatory experiences were 
dummy variables concerning the following forms of action: signing a petition/
referendum, participating in a demonstration, participating in an alternative 
form of demonstration (May Day parade, critical mass, etc.), participating in an 
offi cial strike, participating in a wild cat strike, participating in a sit-in, boycott-
ing, occupying public buildings (i.e. schools, universities etc.), carrying out cultural 
performances, subvertising/adbusting. The indicators aggregated in the index of 
offl ine organisational experiences were dummy variables concerning the following 
organisations: political party, trade union, socialist/social-democratic organisation, 
communist organisation (3rd International), Trotskyist organisation (4th Interna-
tional), women’s group, citizens’ committee, environmental organisation, peace 
group, self-help group, voluntary organisation (charity), religious organisation, 
human rights organisation, gay/lesbian/transgender rights organisation, humanitar-
ian/development assistance organisation, international solidarity organisation, social 
centre, migrants’ association, organisation for the unemployed, student group and 
alternative media. The index of the political use of the Internet included the above 
mentioned indicators: look at the website of the European Social Forum; look at the 
websites that provide information on the global justice movement’s protest events; 
visit a website of any source of ‘alternative information’; express political opinions 
in forums/mailing lists/chats; exchange information online within your political 
group; post reports of action online (in mailing lists, forums, blogs, websites, etc.); 
sign online petitions or participate in campaigns through mailing lists; participate 
in a net-strike and/or in other forms of online radical protest.
12. Even if I do not want to disregard the impact of the Internet in shaping ways in 
which politics is perceived and experienced – especially by younger generations 
– it is clear that political socialisation, political culture and the values of the 
interviewees are the product of offl ine processes.
51
It is worth noticing that offl ine experiences, especially participa-
tory ones, and the political use of the Internet are strongly correlated. 
The index of political use of the Internet is in fact associated both with 
organisational experiences (0.270**) and, especially, with participatory 
experiences (0.438**).
Figure 3. Relationship between offl ine experiences and political use of 
the Internet.
This result is interesting in that it seems to support those scholars (i.e. 
Norris 2001) who claim that online participation does not come out of 
the blue but is indeed related to offl ine participation. However, these 
data only refer to politically active citizens and do not tell us anything 
about the political use of the Internet of unengaged citizens. More 
research is needed on the latter because only by focusing on those 
citizens who are not active offl ine can we assess the real capacity of the 
Internet to involve previously unengaged citizens in politics. 
Another interesting result that requires more discussion concerns 
the fact that the political use of the Internet is especially associated 
with what I called offl ine participatory experiences. As we have seen, 
organisational experiences per se are not strongly associated with 
the political use of the Internet while participatory experiences are 
strongly related to it. Data provides evidence that opportunities for 
online engagement offered by the Internet fi t particularly well with 
people already used to engaging in different forms of action offl ine. 














(like that of one of the participants in a protest event) participatory 
experiences matter more than organisational ones in explaining the 
political use of the Internet.
Still, it is interesting to open the black boxes of organisational 
and participatory experiences in order to assess which specifi c forms 
of organisational and participatory practices are more likely to be 
associated with the political use of the Internet. Are experiences in 
different social movement families related to different styles of using 
the Internet politically? More specifi cally, are experiences in new social 
movement organisations or charity groups more likely to be associated 
with the political use of the Internet than those in solidarity groups? 
Are there differences in the political use of the Internet between peo-
ple with organisational experiences in new left and old left groups? 
Do people with diverse repertoires of action make a different politi-
cal use of the Internet? Are innovative or moderate repertoires more 
likely to be related to the political use of the Internet than radical or 
traditional ones?
In order to provide an answer to these questions, organisational 
and participatory experiences have been split into different categories. 
In relation to organisational experiences (table 1), I created fi ve catego-
ries recalling different movement families: old left organisations, new 
social movement organisations, charity groups, solidarity and rights 
organisations and new left organisations.13 The hypothesis behind this 
classifi cation of organisational experiences is that different movement 
families would adopt (and adapt to their needs) the Internet in dif-
ferent ways. Diverse social movement families have in fact different 
13. Clusters of organisational experiences were built on the basis of the score of 
correlation coeffi cients concerning similar organisational experiences. The addi-
tive index “old left” includes the following organisational experiences: political 
party, trade union, socialist/social-democratic, communist (3rd International), 
and Trotskyist organisation (4th International). The additive index “new social 
movements” includes the following organisational experiences: women’s group, 
citizens’ committee, environmental organisation and peace group. The addi-
tive index “charity groups” includes the following organisational experiences: 
self-help group, voluntary organisation and religious organisation. The additive 
index “solidarity/rights groups” includes the following organisational experi-
ences: human rights organisation, gay/lesbian/transgender rights organisation, 
humanitarian/development assistance organisation and international solidarity 
organisation. The additive index “new left” includes the following organisational 
experiences: social centre, migrants’ association, organisation of the unemployed, 
student group and alternative media.
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identities, organisational formulas, repertoires of action, and forms 
of communication etc. that affect their technological choices. Table 1 
shows that experiences in charity groups are not signifi cantly related to 
the political use of the Internet; experiences in old left organisations are 
weakly associated with using the Internet for internal communication; 
participation in the activities of new social movement organisations, 
compared with other organisational experiences, are particularly related 
to supporting online campaigns/petitions; and engagement in new left 
groups is especially associated with the informative dimension of the 
political use of the Internet. Interestingly, all organisational experiences 
(excluding those in charity groups) are associated with the active use 
of the Internet to produce political information (publishing online 
reports of protest events).












ESF website n.s. n.s. 0.114* 0.228** 0.170**
Protest organi-












n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.214**
Communicating 
with own group 0.137* n.s. 0.144* 0.176** 0.195**
Petition/
campaigns n.s. n.s. 0.139* 0.193** 0.173**
Radical online 
actions n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.152* 0.126*
Additive index n.s. n.s. 0.179** 0.266** 0.326**
Note: partial correlations controlled for the following variables: gender, age, education.
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Considering the additive index of the political use of the Internet, we 
fi nd a great variance among organisational experiences in different 
social movement families. Taking into account different organisational 
experiences, we notice that only certain types of experience are not 
associated with the political use of the Internet while others are more 
associated with it: experiences in new left organisations or new social 
movements are more likely to be related to the political use of the 
Internet. In Italy social centers have been in charge of the creation of 
media centers during important protest events (like the anti-G8 sum-
mit in 2001; see Andretta et al. 2002) and have been at the forefront 
of innovative (and confl ictual) use of the Internet (see Freschi 2003). 
Many alternative media and many groups active on immigrants’ rights 
have been born within social centers and developed later as something 
independent. Student groups also rely heavily on Internet communica-
tion, this sector of the population being among one of the most wired 
(cf. Calenda & Meijer in this volume). As for new social movements, 
even if technology has been seen with skepticism by environmentalists, 
most of them have eagerly adopted the Internet (Pickerill 2003, 36). 
Peace groups have particularly used Computer-Mediated Communi-
cation to organise important global days of action like the worldwide 
15th February protest in 2003 (Walgrave & Rucht 2007). The Internet 
has also helped the international coordination of women’s groups, 
playing a key role in the development of the World March of Women 
(Leonardi 2000), though it also caused challenges because of access 
problems in the Global South (Guay 2002).
As for participatory experiences (table 2), repertoires of action 
was divided into four groups: traditional, moderate, unconventional 
and radical.14 Looking at the table below, we again notice that the 
14. Clusters of participatory experiences were built on the basis of the score of cor-
relation coeffi cients concerning similar participatory experiences. The additive index 
“traditional experiences” includes the following participation experiences: worked in 
a political party and took part in a strike. The additive index “moderate experiences” 
includes the following participation experiences: sign a petition/public letter and 
attend a demonstration. The additive index “unconventional experiences” includes 
the following participation experiences: participate in a sit-in, boycott products and 
attend an alternative form of demonstration (i.e. critical mass, May Day parade 
etc.). The additive index “radical experiences” includes the following participation 
experiences: take part in a wild cat strike, occupy public or private buildings and 
practice direct action against property/land.
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association with the political use of the Internet varies a great deal 
depending on different forms of action. 




Traditional Moderate Uncon-ventional Radical
ESF website n.s. 0.135* 0.333** 0.141*
Protest organisation 
websites 0.109* n.s. 0.400** 0.272**
Alternative 
information websites n.s. n.s. 0.413** 0.219**
Publishing protest 
reports online 0.132* 0.186** 0.402** 0.252**
Expressing 
opinions in forums n.s. n.s. 0.326** 0.225**
Communicating 
with own group 0.185** n.s. 0.365** 0.161**
Petition/campaigns n.s. 0.269** 0.399** 0.137*
Radical online actions n.s. 0.134* 0.331** 0.235**
Additive index 0.114** 0.192** 0.542** 0.297**
Note: partial correlations controlled for the following variables: gender, age, education.
While having practiced traditional and moderate forms of action is not 
strongly associated with the political use of the Internet, experiences 
of unconventional and radical forms of action are clearly associated 
with it. However, while unconventional forms are equally associated 
with different dimensions of the political use of the Internet, radical 
ones tend to be associated with Internet use directly oriented towards 
protest. First of all, the low association between traditional repertories 
of action and the political use of the Internet could be explained by 
the fact that the index was built to include forms of action related to 
traditional political actors like parties and unions, not amongst those 
more oriented toward a creative and inventive (political) use of the 
Internet. The interesting result is that more innovative forms of action 
such as participating in sits-in, boycotts and alternative types of dem-
onstration are more associated with the political use of the Internet. 
Alternative types of demonstration such as critical mass and the May 
Day parade against precarious work rely heavily on the Internet and 
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this would help explain the results. Boycotts can also be considered 
an individualised form of action (Micheletti 2003) and this charac-
teristic would fi t very well with the political use of the Internet which 
is largely an asocial activity.
It is worth noticing that data seems to confi rm that participants 
tend to reproduce their offl ine styles of action online (see also Calenda 
& Mosca 2007). In fact, those interviewees that adopt moderate rep-
ertoires of action are more likely to engage in moderate online forms 
of action like e-petitioning and e-campaigning while those more used 
to engage in radical forms of action offl ine are more likely to employ 
online radical forms of action such as acts of electronic disturbance.
THE TWO SIDES OF THE INTERNET: 
PROS AND CONS OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED 
COMMUNICATION FOR SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
After presenting quantitative data gathered on the individual level, 
this paragraph focuses on qualitative data collected through semi-
structured interviews. First of all, we notice that the perception of 
the impact of Internet use by social movement organisations varies 
according to the different targets of their action. The Internet can be 
used both for in-ward oriented communication and for out-ward ori-
ented communication, both for addressing public opinion in general 
and specifi c and peculiar constituencies or groups of citizens, such as 
public decision-makers and politicians. However, our interviewees 
claimed that the Internet is more effective for strengthening specifi c 
types of communication.
In general it does not seem that the Internet favoured more interac-
tions with public decision-makers as such actions made via the Internet 
were often ignored and seldom effective. It is clear that online mobilisa-
tion has more chance to infl uence decision-makers only when such issues 
have a certain visibility in the public discourse through traditional media. 
According to some interviewees, public decision-makers are generally 
neither competent nor interested in these online actions (interview 1). 
As a matter of fact, actions of electronic disturbance such as net-strikes 
and mail-bombings are not often recognised by their targets.
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The Internet seems to be more effective in targeting other group-
ings. For example, it facilitates the movement’s relationship with the 
media because press releases, photos, and documents are published 
on websites that are used by journalists as sources of information for 
their articles. The Internet is also conceived as an important means for 
cross-referencing different media. Thanks to this medium, some groups 
more specialised in information production can act as the live sound 
track of political events (like counter-summits and social forums) as 
they happen (interview 2). The Internet allows multi-media coverage 
of protest events through audio fi les, photos and video, textual reports 
and discussions etc. In addition, when covering an event some websites 
permit their users to upload documents online, thereby generating a 
considerable amount of information collected in different formats and 
by people with different points of view. In the Internet era, awareness 
of the fundamental importance of communication is widespread and 
people become active producers of information. These media-activ-
ists have gained a central role in the coverage of protest events of the 
global justice movement and in the creation of transnational public 
spaces like in the case of the Euromayday parade (see Doerr & Mat-
toni 2007).
Websites are employed to cover the current activities of the move-
ment but also operate as archives and databases. Many interviewees 
refer to them as places of memory, where social movements can narrate 
their history, keep track of their past actions and store their documents 
and materials. This is for example clearly what happened with the ESF 
memory project using the Internet to recover and systematise infor-
mation and knowledge produced within the European Social Forum 
process (http://www.euromovements.info/english/index.htm) 
A clear understanding of the role of different Internet tools emerg-
es from the interviews: different applications are used for different 
aims. If websites are used by SMOs as places to present themselves 
to the general public, other tools like forums and mailing-lists favour 
an ongoing communication and discussion among individuals. As a 
member of the eco-pacifi st network Rete Lilliput stated: 
...“[w]e have carried out our activity for more than one year without 
a website basing ourselves almost exclusively on the mailing lists … 
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linkages between different knots and groups worked well but the lack 
of a website penalised us because … a public website is also visited 
by journalists and by the curious” (interview 4).
Most interviewees stressed the importance of mailing lists in the activity 
of their organisations. These applications, that are greatly appreciated 
and extensively used, are defi ned as “permanent assemblies”. One 
activist of a local social forum in Venice underlined the contribution 
of the Internet in terms of transparency of the organisational process 
(for similar results see also Kavada 2006). Mailing lists are used to in-
clude people that could not attend physical meetings by disseminating 
assemblies’ minutes (interview 3). The very nature and contribution 
of the Internet to grassroots political processes is however contested 
and discussed. While some groups declare an instrumental vision of 
the Internet, other ones underline that it is a political locus in itself. 
According to a member of the national executive of the Young Com-
munists: 
...“[T]he Internet is really a political space. It’s not just an instrument. 
It’s a place where, notwithstanding the great push towards privati-
sation and control, millions of people cooperate to build critiques 
and to attack the private idea that Microsoft and Windows propose 
of the Net. It is also a political space in that it represents a place of 
confrontation and discussion without precedent” (interview 5). 
The symbolic/expressive function of the Internet is stressed by those 
groups declaring that the Internet helped in developing and strength-
ening their identities. This type of function is especially recognised by 
groups like local social forums which generally lack a physical place for 
their meetings. In these cases the Internet is referred to as a “virtual head-
quarters” or a “real virtual community” (interview 1). Being conceived as 
a political space in itself by some SMOs, it is not surprising to discover 
that, beyond the instrumental conception of the Internet, some SMOs 
raise a meta-refl ection discussing the implications of new technologies 
and their relationship with power and politics. Melucci already stressed 
this characteristic of new social movements discussing the self-refl exive 
nature of the organisation. As he observed (1989, 74): 
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...“[i]n contemporary collective action, the organisation has acquired 
a different status. It is no longer considered a means to an end, and 
it therefore cannot be assessed only in terms of its instrumental 
rationality. The organisation has a self-refl exive character and its 
form expresses the meaning (or goals) of the action itself. It is also 
the laboratory in which actors test their capacity to challenge the 
dominant cultural codes”.
The case of Rete Lilliput refl ects very well what Melucci observed. This 
network focuses a signifi cant part of its action on the issue of political 
consumerism; i.e. a peculiar form of citizen engagement in politics with 
the goal of changing objectionable institutional or market practices 
through consumer choices based on attitudes and values concerning 
issues of justice, fairness or non-economic issues (Micheletti 2003; 
Baringhorst in this volume). According to political consumer strategy, 
consumers should conceive themselves as voters and corporations as 
candidates. Following this logic, shopping in a supermarket would 
correspond to voting in an election (Gesualdi 2003). Consumer-voters 
should use their shopping-bag power to (Ceccarini & Forno 2006) 
“punish” corporations-candidates producing goods without respect 
for the environment and workers’ rights, while rewarding fair trade 
producers. Very interestingly, Lilliput is trying to move the idea of 
political consumerism from food and clothes to other areas of con-
sumption, such as technologies. For this reason, the old website created 
with proprietary software was discarded and substituted with a new 
one hosted on a server working with free software (interview 4). The 
adaptation of the logic of political consumerism to new technologies 
was also made explicit by Lilliput in a document explaining that 
...[d]eciding to use free software and to elude the Microsoft monopoly 
is no different to choosing to buy fair trade products, participating 
in boycott campaigns or depositing your money in an ethical bank: 
using free software means consuming critically also in the informatics 
domain” (Glo Internet 2003).
The discussion on technology within social movement networks is 
often associated with a refl ection on internal democracy. Contemporary 
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social movements are making big efforts to democratise their organisa-
tional practices (della Porta et al. 2006) and the Internet is perceived 
as an opportunity for facilitating the spread and share of power within 
an organisation and to widen participation in its organisational life, 
improving internal democracy. The Internet can help to open an 
organisation to rank-and-fi le activists. One of the reasons explaining 
the success of this information and communication technology among 
social movements is its prefi gurative nature (Downing 2001). In fact, 
it fi ts very well with the nature of post-ideological groups concretely 
practicing daily the values and principles of another possible world 
(i.e. radical democracy) and not postponing them to the future.
However, the adoption of new technologies can also produce 
inequalities of power. Websites requiring technical knowledge select 
those with the knowledge to tackle them. Experience has also shown 
that centralised management of information slows down the process 
of dissemination (interview 8). In such cases the webmaster can make 
arbitrary choices and can become a de facto gatekeeper. This is the 
reason why many groups created new websites to limit or get rid of 
webmasters increasing and favoring the participation of non-experts 
(interviews 4, 7 and 8).
 An open publishing system is employed on some websites in order 
to widen participation of their users. Principles such as non-hierarchy, 
public participation, minimal editorial control, and transparency tend 
to inform the websites employing open publishing, though they do so 
to varying degrees (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_publishing). 
Although their adoption and implementation can be problematic, open 
publishing and open management systems are considered antibodies 
to the monopoly of power in the hands of a few technologically skilled 
individuals. One of the fi rst websites close to social movements adopt-
ing open publishing was the Indymedia network. Nevertheless, even 
Indymedia does not completely apply the logic of open publishing 
(Atton 2003). The Italian knot of Indymedia combines open pub-
lishing and the method of consensus. However a shared defi nition of 
the latter doesn’t exist; it should be understood as a decision-making 
method stressing the importance of the decision-making process in 
itself, avoiding decisions made by vote and trying to build a wider 
consensus on decisions through an ongoing discussion. In the case 
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of Indymedia-Italy, until its recent cessation, the right column of the 
homepage was open to contributions by all, but messages with explicit 
fascist, racist and sexist contents could be removed. Decisions on the 
information to be inserted in the central column of the homepage were 
taken through discussion in an open and public mailing list adopting 
the method of consensus. All the decision-making processes had to 
pass through the national mailing list (Italy-list) in order to give anyone 
the possibility contributing to a specifi c decision (interview 6). The 
adoption of the consensual method is however problematic. In fact, 
it was one of the causes of the recent end to the Italian Indymedia 
network. Reasons explaining the (temporary) collapse of the network 
were in fact the decline in participation, the bureaucratisation of the 
project and the consensual decision-making method, thought to work 
only poorly in the mailing lists (Alice 2006).
As many SMOs are aware of the risks deriving from Internet 
communication, some of them try to intervene directly on this issue, 
spreading technological skills within their organisation. As argued else-
where (della Porta & Mosca 2005a), SMOs can play an important role 
in socialising their members to Internet use. Being places where a great 
importance to new technologies is given, practices of media-activism 
and hacking developed within social centres. Most of them host what 
are know as “hacklabs” (hackers’ laboratories), that is laboratories with 
a clear ideological leftist orientation socialising people to informatics 
knowledge, free software, freedom of expression, privacy, digital rights 
and self-management.
Some of the groups I interviewed created groups of people specifi -
cally to deal with Internet issues and to try to diffuse knowledge on In-
ternet use among their participants (interviews 4 and 9). These groups 
are expected to inform and educate in using Internet communication 
in a proper manner as it takes time to learn to use email, fi le sharing 
and downloading, search engines etc. They also raise awareness on the 
alternatives to Microsoft’s proprietary software.
Another issue worth discussing concerns the characteristic dis-
tinguishing the Internet from previous media of communication: 
interactivity. In some cases it can be seen that interactive tools are not 
used by SMOs because they feel that they would require a great effort. 
This concerns especially more traditional organisations such as trade 
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unions which some scholars have called “dinosaurs in cyberspace” 
(Ward & Lusoli 2003). Most of them fear losing control of interac-
tive spaces on their websites. As they don’t have enough resources 
to devote one member of their staff to moderate interactive spaces, 
they just prefer to avoid them (interview 10). However, if on the one 
hand the presence of staff monitoring such spaces is important if one 
wants them to impact on organisational decisions and processes, on 
the other hand the presence of moderators can hinder free expression, 
and even censor inconvenient claims. In those cases while an explicit 
and clear netiquette (online code of conduct) can favour a polite and 
constructive discussion, the presence of moderators could have negative 
effects on the dialogic process (i.e. structuring it around pre-defi ned 
issues) and thus should be kept to a minimum. With some exceptions, 
the tendency of “old” organisations such as trade unions has been to 
use the Internet as previous media of communication, not fulfi lling 
its most innovative aspects (such as interactivity; for this see Rättilä 
in this volume) and using it for top-down forms of communication. 
Findings like this have been highlighted by different studies concern-
ing the websites of political parties (Margolis et al. 1999; Gibson et 
al. 2003) and institutions (Coleman et al. 1999; Trechsel et al. 2003). 
This evidence raises the question of whether old organisations jumping 
online are reproducing on the Internet their vertical styles of commu-
nication. A generation gap within and between “old” and traditional 
organisations/members and “new” and innovative groups/activists 
in conceiving and understanding the Internet is referred to by some 
interviewees (interviews 1 and 11). 
While the generation gap hypothesis needs to be deepened and 
tested with further research, we can see that many interviewees (i.e. 
interviews 13, 14, 15 and 17) tend to underline the importance of face-
to-face relationships, irreplaceable by online communication. Many 
interviewees point to the fact that face-to-face interactions allow the 
construction of relationships of mutual trust, something that cannot 
be generated online (Diani 2001; Kavada 2006). That is, Computer-
Mediated Communication is perceived as being something that can 
effectively complement face-to-face interactions but cannot substitute 
them. As a spokesperson of the World March of Women claimed: 
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...“[I]nternet contacts are important but we are aware that we cannot 
build a movement only with them: we need physical contacts with 
people in order to build personal and political relations otherwise it 
is impossible to grant continuity to our action” (interview 12).
Another important issue that is stressed by most of the interviewees is 
the diffi culty related to the employment of the Internet as a decision-
making tool. It has been suggested that the suitability of the Internet 
for making decisions could be application dependent: “applications 
facilitating real-time communication, such as chat, are better suited to 
decision-making, as they allow for complex negotiations to take place 
more quickly and effi ciently than email and email lists” (Kavada 2006, 
11-12). Still, many interviewees rejected the idea of using the Internet 
for making decisions. Others underlined that moving decision-making 
processes online can create new inequalities because access limitations, 
familiarity with written culture15 and technical expertise give power 
to a limited number of people. Thus, technology can become a new 
source of power asymmetry. Fear of excluding some activists led in 
some cases to limiting the use of new technology while giving value 
to face-to-face communication. (interview 19).
Together with the limits of the Internet for making decisions, our 
interviewees point at the risk of overvaluing the Internet’s effective-
ness in mobilising offl ine protestors. Some criticised the attitude of 
other SMOs and activists to “virtualising” the confl ict and relying too 
much on the Internet as an instrument for bringing people out onto 
the streets (interview 16). According to the spokesperson of a local 
social forum: “we also need to be militant, to draw posters and write 
leafl ets and to have physical contact with the people otherwise we won’t 
change the world! …our struggle needs a visible and physical presence” 
(interview 1). Among structural limitations of Computer-Mediated 
Communication, our activists are also aware of the issue of the digital 
divide. As we have seen, Internet access is still very much restricted 
to well-educated people with high incomes, while women and older 
15.  Being mostly text-based, the Internet (at least in its 1.0 version; for the distinction 
between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0, see the Introduction in this volume) fi ts better 
with people with a background in written culture. Those more skilled in writing 
and used to dealing with the written word would then be more capable of profi t-
ing from such technology especially in interactive and dialogical spaces on-line.
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people generally have lower rates of access. In the Italian case, according 
to different surveys and estimates, only a percentage of the population 
below 50% currently accesses the Internet. The majority of Italian 
people are still excluded by this media. As some interviewees noticed 
“a lot of people still don’t even know what the Internet is” (interview 
13) and “if you want to reach people in the street or in your district, 
you have to adopt different tactics” (interview 18).
SOME CONCLUSIONS: 
CONTRASTING THE TWO SIDES OF THE INTERNET
As the quantitative analysis showed, the Internet is used politically by 
many participants in protest events who employ it to gather alterna-
tive information, discuss politics online and perform different types of 
action online. Secondly, we also found that the Internet is more likely 
to be used by those individuals with previous radical and unconven-
tional participatory experience while organisational experience is less 
important in this respect. 
Thirdly, interviewees tend to reproduce their offl ine styles of ac-
tion online. The qualitative interviews have shown that the Internet 
represents a “double-faced” medium for social movements in that it 
provides new opportunities for practicing politics but it also implies a 
series of risks and challenges. On one side it is horizontal, bi-directional, 
interactive, and cheap, and it empowers resource-poor collective actors 
and individuals. On the other side, the problem of the digital divide 
raises a discussion on the democratic nature of this medium.
While most of the literature focusing on the Internet and poli-
tics tends to assess the positive contribution of Computer-Mediated 
Communication to political processes, this chapter has stressed both 
positive and negative consequences of the Internet for social move-
ments. Some scholars (Garrett 2006; Pickerill 2003) have underlined 
the need to consider also the undesirable effects of the Internet: what 
types of constraint does it pose to collective action? 
The tables below are an attempt to present a systematic compari-
son on different dimensions of the limits and opportunities of Internet 
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communication for social movements. First of all, the Internet is used 
to address different targets in more or less effective ways (table 3). 
Some groups organised online campaigns to exert pressure on public 
decision-makers. However, in many cases politicians disregarded these. 
According to interviewees, this concerns especially the older generation 
of politicians who - because of cultural and/or generation characteristics 
– have not incorporated the Internet into everyday life: most politi-
cians experienced a belated socialisation to the Internet and they are 
forced to use it without a complete understanding of the potential 
of this medium (i.e. interactivity) using it as they would a previous 
media of communication. As a consequence, online actions such as 
net-strikes and mail-bombings are not recognised and understood as 
genuine forms of action.
However, we could also provide a different explanation for such 
phenomena. First of all, public decision-makers refer to the “power of 
numbers” (DeNardo 1985) in order to evaluate these online protests. 
They question how many “fl esh and bones” people are really present 
behind online actions action. Electronic disturbance could in fact be 
the result of a coordinated action of a very small group of like-minded 
people supported by technologies. Second, public decision-makers are 
mainly interested in what their voters think about a specifi c issue but 
they are not very concerned by claims raised by people that are not 
part of their own constituency. As the Internet makes communication 
easier beyond geographical borders, people supporting campaigns on-
line are often geographically dispersed and belong to different electoral 
districts. The border-less nature of the Internet explains the limited 
impact of online campaigns on public decision-makers.




Possibility to organise direct 
pressure campaigns on depu-
ties / representatives
Border-less nature of 
the Internet
Journalists Description bias could be limited
Selection bias is not 
overcome
Public Opinion Disintermediation Digital divide and “googlearchy”
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The Internet is considered by interviewees more effective in addressing 
journalists and in attracting (mass) media coverage. The “description 
bias” of traditional media - relying mostly on press agencies to give 
an account of political events - could be partly overcome. Thanks to 
the Internet there has been a great increase in sources of information 
and journalists now have direct access to SMOs’ websites where press 
releases, mission statements, documents, leafl ets, photos, video, f.a.q., 
etc. are stored. When covered, movements now have more chance that 
their point of view will be taken into account but in the end journalists 
are always those who build up the news, manipulating and modifying 
the movement’s original claims. Besides, movements cannot overcome 
the “selection bias” of the press. Journalists are still the gatekeepers of 
offl ine information and they tend to give greater visibility to institu-
tional actors and processes (Gitlin 1980; Ryan 1991).
Some scholars (Bennett 2003) have pointed to the capacity of 
the Internet to produce a short circuit with traditional media, with 
information fl owing from the cyberspace to the television, reaching 
public opinion. In any case, the Internet allows for a disintermedia-
tion of social and political actors from traditional media. However, 
the possibility of social movements using the Internet to address the 
general public is severely limited by the digital divide, i.e. lack of ac-
cess to Internet communication, especially for older and less educated 
people. The Internet raises the risk of selectivity and exclusion for 
people without access to it. Besides, the great majority of Internet 
users tend to use search engines to orient themselves in cyberspace 
(Koopmans & Zimmermann 2007). As some studies proved, website 
visibility is strongly determined by “googlearchy”, i.e. the tendency of 
search engines to give greater visibility to the main actors in the politi-
cal game. This means that general users, ignorant of the existence of 
social movements, are less likely to be directed to their websites when 
using search engines.
As we have seen, interviewees also underlined how different tools 
serve different functions: websites are mainly used for external com-
munication, while mailing lists and forums are employed for internal 
organisational communication and are conceived by activists as ongoing 
assemblies where discussion goes on and on. SMOs use the Internet 
to address their activists, engaging them in their organisational life 
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and establishing an ongoing relationship with them (table 4).16 Still, 
it risks being a “redundant” and “self-referential” medium in that it 
seems capable of reaching, on the whole, already active and informed 
people. In addition, efforts to strengthen internal democracy through 
the adoption of new technologies can be frustrated by the presence 
of a few technologically skilled individuals who manage and control 
them. That is, technology can become a new cause of power inequality, 
creating new hierarchies. In fact, people with technical skills can exert 
great power within an organisation heavily reliant on Internet commu-
nication. This problem has been partially faced by SMOs developing 
technological tools that can be easily used by non-experts, designing 
more participatory websites and also creating specifi c groups devoted 
to members’ socialisation to new technologies. Some SMOs’ websites, 
inspired by the principle of distributed management system, are not 
managed by a single webmaster but by a group of people. Hence, 
the continuous search for democratising the organisation offl ine is 
mirrored online. This seems to confi rm that Internet use is shaped in 
accordance with offl ine identity (Calenda & Mosca 2007).
Table 4. Strengths and weaknesses of Internet communication for social 
movements
How the Internet affects… PROs CONs
…internal democracy
Activists’ involve-
ment in the everyday 
organisational life
Power inequalities 
related to expertise 
and technological skills
…refl ection on power
Using free software 
to save money and 
to practice politi-
cal consumerism
Lack of expertise hin-
ders a massive adop-
tion of free software
…social relations Multiplies frequency of communication
Its capacity to create 
dense networks (and 
mobilise) is some-
times overvalued
16. Most social movements consider the interactive features of Web 2.0 applications 
extremely important for implementing their democratic ideals. However, when 
the interviews were carried out many organisations declared they had not yet 
employed this kind of application.
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Social movements are self-refl exive actors very concerned with de-
mocracy and linking it to the politics behind technology. Hence, 
technological choices become a new way of practicing political con-
sumerism. Not only does free software allow organisations to save 
important material resources, but its philosophy also challenges the 
monopolies of transnational brands and corporations (like Microsoft). 
Notwithstanding, political consumerism of technologies seems to be 
restricted to a limited number of people since lack of expertise and 
information hinders a massive adoption of free software by activists. 
Moreover, the absence of a critical mass of free software users limits 
the incentives to employ this kind of software.
Last but not least, the Internet is used by social movement organi-
sations and activists as a complement to (and not as a substitute for) 
face-to-face social interactions. Among interviewees nobody thought 
that the Internet could replace face-to-face communication but it is 
much appreciated because it multiplies possibility and frequency of 
communication among dispersed individuals. Besides, sometimes the 
capacity of the Internet to inform and mobilise people in the streets 
is overestimated.
As qualitative interviews have shown, the importance of this new 
medium of communication is very well recognised but activists also 
stressed its limits and claimed that it is a necessary but not suffi cient 
condition for political action: face-to-face interactions are the core 
of political action. That is, the political use of the Internet is just a 
continuation of offl ine politics by other means.
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INTERVIEWS
1 – spokesperson of the Abruzzo Social Forum.
2 – president of the weekly magazine, Carta (paper).
3 – activist of the Venice Social Forum.
4 – activist of the working group on the Internet from the Rete Lilliput.
5 – spokesperson of the Young Communists.
6 – activist of Indymedia-Italy.
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7 – creator of the online magazine, Social Press.
8 – president of the Italian World Shops Association.
9 – activist of the social centre, Bulk.
10 – webmaster of the trade union for metalworkers, Fiom (Federazione 
        Impiegati e Operai Metallurgici).
11 – editor of the communist newspaper, Il Manifesto.
12 – spokesperson of the Italian branch of the World March of Women.
13 – activist of the non-violent group, Casa Pace (House of Peace).
14 – president of the pacifi st online portal, PeaceLink.
15 – spokesperson of the Rete Lilliput.
16 – delegate of the rank-and-fi le union Sin COBAS.
17 – collaborator of the online magazine, Social Press.
18 – activist of the Italian branch of the World March of Women.
19 – spokesperson of the COBAS Confederation
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KEVIN GILLAN
Diverging attitudes to technology and innovation 
in Anti-War movement organisations
INTRODUCTION
From October 2006 a year-long campaign of daily direct action was 
waged against a UK navel base that serves the UK’s Trident nuclear 
weapons system. During the fi rst week of protests I visited a small fl at 
in the nearby town of Helensburgh, in which two members of the 
campaign’s steering group lived: 
This had become the central hub of activities for the fi rst week of the 
campaign and was strewn with the paraphernalia of modern activism: 
in addition to banners and posters around the place, three laptops 
were on and networked, several mobile phones were charging as well 
as the landline and a dedicated campaign phone line. (Field notes, 
Helensburgh, October 2006.)1
The fact that this had become a well-equipped offi ce would feel quite 
unsurprising to visiting blockaders, as simply part of the bustle and 
buzz of a new campaign. During the same trip I visited the Faslane 
Peace Camp, a ramshackle collection of brightly painted caravans, 
mobile homes and improvised sheds that has been inhabited by vary-
1.  This chapter draws on qualitative data from an ESRC-funded research project 
(RES-228-25-0060) with Jenny Pickerill and Frank Webster. The dataset comprises 
transcripts from over sixty interviews with anti-war activists carried out 2006-7, 
fi eld notes from numerous observations of anti-war activity and documentary 
analysis of media sources and movement produced literature. Further information 
on the project is available at www.antiwarresearch.info.
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ing groups of protesters for twenty-fi ve years. A seasoned anti-nuclear 
campaigner, and new resident of the camp, described their plans to 
set up a computer lab with donated equipment and noted that the 
following day they would be having a broadband internet connection 
installed. The only real surprise here is that they’d managed to convince 
a telecommunications company that bills would be paid regularly. For 
contemporary activists, high-tech comes as standard. 
While recognising the familiarity of such developments, however, 
we should not lose sight of the rapidity and scale of change represented 
by the integration of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) into social movement activism. For instance, given that the 
text message has only been a possibility since the mid-1990s, and 
the mobile phone call has been affordable for just a little longer, it 
is remarkable that, as one very experienced interviewee claimed: ‘you 
couldn’t not have them, you’d be stuffed without mobile phones’ (Lindsay 
German, Convenor, Stop the War Coalition). Another respondents 
wondered, ‘its hard to think how it worked before (the internet)’ (‘Fiona’, 
Trident Ploughshares activist). Anti-war groups in the UK, typically 
working on a shoestring budget, have mobilised signifi cant resources 
in order to operate within technologically advanced information net-
works (Gillan, Pickerill & Webster 2008). But that bare fact masks a 
multitude of individual decisions concerning the benefi ts of campaign 
websites, email lists, discussion forums, mobile communications and 
so on. This chapter examines the attitudes that commonly infl uence 
those decisions and their implications for activist groups who adopt 
new ICTs.
Even if ICTs have become nearly ubiquitous in campaign organi-
sations, at least in the UK, this by no means implies a homogeneous 
relationship between activists and technologies. Rather, the particular 
uses to which technologies are put is differentiated by a range of fac-
tors including campaign goals, organisational structures and strate-
gies for change. Additionally, as I will argue below, the attitudes that 
people bring with them to the engagement with technology – what 
Kirkpatrick (2004) calls ‘computational temperaments’ – delimit the 
potential that may result from activists’ adoption of ICTs. We will 
see that UK anti-war groups have mainly displayed a user-oriented 
approach to technology, making use of the manifest functionality of 
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new communication tools, more or less as intended by their inventors. 
Occasionally, however, a more innovative approach to communication 
technologies is evident. This approach, which has some features in com-
mon with computer hacking, is characterised by an irreverent attitude 
to the rules embodied in ICT devices, as individuals stretch and blend 
the functions of different devices and discover new ways to mobilise 
participants, reach audiences and coordinate protest. By examining 
instances where these two approaches have come to the fore we will be 
able to discern more clearly how some kinds of technological innova-
tion can benefi t particular forms of activist organisation. I will argue 
that it is particularly where the pursuit of collective action requires 
horizontal communication structures that the hacker attitude may 
offer signifi cant benefi ts. Alternatively, where the horizontal structure 
of communication is less relevant to the execution of movement tasks, 
the user attitude offers an effi cient articulation with technology.
HACKERS AND USERS: 
ATTITUDES TO TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
The key role of ‘hackers’ in the development of technology has long 
been acknowledged in sociological studies of computing. Turkle’s 
(1984) investigation of programmers working with the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology’s mainframe machines was particularly instruc-
tive in teasing apart the infl uences of social institutions, personality 
traits and subculture on the innovation occurring in that particular 
location. Others have identifi ed hackers more widely, suggesting a 
range of common characteristics such as a shared ‘work ethic’ ap-
propriate to the information age (Himanen et al. 2001), or a political 
world-view centred on the value of total and free access to information 
(Nissenbaum 2004). But depictions of the social or ideational milieu 
of hackers are inevitably contingent on specifi c technical subcultures 
or epistemic networks. What is stable across these accounts, and what 
I will describe as the minimal specifi cation of the hacker attitude, is a 
distinctive relationship between people and technology. 
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The hackers’ approach to technology has usually been described 
through examining what hackers value about their innovations. Jordan 
and Taylor usefully summarise the ‘good hack’ as being masterful, sim-
ple and illicit (2004, 7). These terms require some unpacking. First, 
mastery is displayed by a high level of understanding of a complex 
system, which is a requirement for the hacker to be able to meaningfully 
modify it: ‘Hackers are people who have acquired the expertise required 
to take control of a personal computer and make it do things that are 
not part of the publicised functionality of specifi c, pre-packaged software’ 
(Kirkpatrick 2004, 118). Second, simplicity is displayed through a 
parsimonious approach to system resources. Due to hardware limita-
tions, of both mainframes and personal computers (PCs), this was 
certainly a requirement of the early hackers’ work. While some such 
limitations have been overcome there remains a tendency to admire 
those hacks that make the most effi cient use of the least inputs. Thirdly, 
what Jordan and Taylor refer to as the ‘illicit’ nature of the ‘good hack’ 
may be more broadly described as boundary-crossing or rule-breaking. 
For Kirkpatrick: 
‘the thrill of the hack lies in this getting a machine to do something 
its designers did not intend’ and the hacker is consequently ‘someone 
who is disrespectful of the rules that are codifi ed into the machine 
interface … (who) reaches straight through the lie, into the code and 
protocols that make it possible’ (Kirkpatrick 2004, 117–118). 
Similarly, for Turkle, ‘the hacker is a person outside of the system who is 
never excluded by its rules’ (Turkle 1984, 227). When transposed to the 
overtly political contexts that Jordan and Taylor examine, this charac-
teristic may well imply illicit uses of informational technologies. But 
the rule-breaking described by other authors tends to refer to the rules 
of the technological systems themselves and such behaviour need not 
cross the line into uses of technology that are in some way forbidden 
or unlawful. At minimum, then, the hacker attitude to technology 
displays a desire to learn about a technology, and to use the knowledge 
gained to cross the boundary from prescribed uses to fi nd unintended 
and effi cient new applications.
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The user is typically defi ned in opposition to the hacker. Turkle 
was again instrumental here, pointing out that:
‘A user is involved with the machine in a hands-on way, but is not 
interested in the technology except as it enables an application. Hack-
ers are the antithesis of users’ (1997, 32). 
Users wish to apply the publicised benefi ts of technologies but show 
little interest in reaching beyond the surface. Kirkpatrick uses the 
‘cynically compliant game player’ as a prime example of the user at-
titude. The user is:
‘the reference point for interface designers’ and ‘does not think about 
how the machine works when she is using it. She takes for granted 
that it is able to tell what she wants on the basis of her clicking neatly 
representative icons’ (2004, 117). 
The game player is described as cynical because Kirkpatrick claims 
that it is impossible that they have failed to see through the interface 
and realise that their own actions are programmed by the software, 
but they nevertheless continue to play along, performing a set of 
prescribed mechanical motions. This ideal typical representation of 
the user is important because computer games were used to pioneer 
the development of graphical user interfaces that increase the distance 
between the user and the underlying codes and protocols required 
for genuine mastery over the machine. The resulting ‘user friendly’ 
interfaces make certain prescribed tasks easier to accomplish, but at 
the expense of disempowering the user from utilising the technology 
for a wider range of functions that may not have been conceived of 
by the original designers.
The dominance of, fi rst, the Apple Macintosh, and then computers 
running Microsoft Windows, was based on the continual extension of 
the ‘user friendly’ operating system and so implies the prevalence of 
the user attitude among PC buyers. There are three important devel-
opments in ICTs that may push people’s engagement with technol-
ogy towards the user attitude. First, as ICTs have become embedded 
deeply into ever more sectors of lived experience the demographics 
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of technology use have changed. In reference to the Internet, Nis-
senbaum claims:
‘Technologies of information quickly passed from early obscurity and 
mythological idealism into the mainstream of everyday experience and 
the early demographics of cyberspace ... expanded’ (2004, 201). 
Early adopters of technologies are more likely to have been interested 
in technology per se, and therefore been more likely to experiment 
and push the limits of the technologies available. As it becomes pro-
gressively easier to achieve complex tasks, however, more people are 
drawn to technological solutions simply for their immediate, ad-
vertised benefi ts. The demographic shift in ICT use should temper 
our expectations about the degree of innovative, boundary-crossing 
solutions discovered within non-technical communities. Second, the 
user attitude is encouraged by technology manufacturers who try 
to delimit the possible relationships between user and machine. As 
Woolgar’s (1991) examination of usability trials for a new PC in the 
mid-1980s illustrates, the development of the interface and its sup-
porting manuals is a route through which manufacturers ‘confi gure 
the user’ on the basis of assumptions of what users understood about 
the machines and what software developments the user ought to 
value. Moreover, the ‘user friendly’ approach to software design is 
equally ‘hacker unfriendly’. The dominant graphical user interfaces 
are distributed as precompiled binary code, readable only by machine. 
This is done in order to protect intellectual property and because of 
designers’ assumptions about users’ needs. It is primarily among the 
open source software movement that delving behind the interface is 
really encouraged and consequently the distribution of the human-
readable source code is a central tenet. Unsurprisingly, it is within that 
community that contemporary studies of hackers typically fi nd the 
creative engagements with technology that they seek (Himanen et al. 
2001; also Lessig 2002). Third, the variety of ICT devices available to 
consumers in developed economies has increased rapidly, and many of 
these are built in ways that are even less conducive to hacking than the 
modern PC. For instance, it is generally harder to change the hardware 
provided in a laptop than a desktop computer, so new functions that 
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depend on different hardware confi gurations are further off-limits. 
More fundamentally, both hardware and operating interfaces for mobile 
phones are far less accessible to the would-be hacker. As we will see 
below, mobile phones may be even more important than comput-
ers in the context of activist uses of ICTs. Additionally, digitisation 
of different information forms such as photographs and sound and 
video recordings offer great potential for activists who seek to produce 
their own media (Juris 2005), but the codes and protocols behind the 
relevant devices, and even the patented, proprietary fi le formats on 
which they depend, are still further removed from the experimental, 
rule-breaking hands of the hacker. 
In defi ning the hacker, Kirkpatrick specifi cally points to the actions 
of ‘writing their own code in programming language, or changing code in 
an existing system’ (2004, 118). If we understand hacking in this way, 
then the preceding points indicate that the barriers to hackers have 
been raised. This should not be taken to imply that code-level hack-
ing is impossible within activist circles; Tim Jordan evidences quite 
the opposite in his contribution to this volume. Nevertheless, work 
at the hardware or code levels of modern ICT devices does require 
increasing levels of technical knowledge, access to some of which is 
carefully restricted. But the trends indicated above also open up op-
portunities for different kinds of application of the hacker attitude. 
We might profi tably broaden the notion of the ‘hack’ away from 
its focus on code-level work with computers. Indeed, as Jordan and 
Taylor describe it:
 ‘the essential attribute of a hack resides in the eclectic pragmatism 
with which hackers characteristically approach any technology’ (2004, 
7; original emphasis). 
One of their interviewees uses the apparently trivial example of boiling 
water for tea in a coffee maker and explained that hacking: 
‘pertains to any fi eld of technology … Because you’re using the tech-
nology in a way its not supposed to be used’ (ibid.). 
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In a world where many devices come ‘network-ready’, we should look 
far beyond what is inside the PC case sitting on the desk. Identifying a 
wider system as the potential object of hacking encourages examination 
of linkages between any two devices that can exchange information. 
The minimal specifi cation of the hacker attitude described above is 
equally as applicable to this broader system level as it is to code-level 
software hacking. The central concern is not the precise phenom-
enology of the interaction with a technological device, but rather the 
willingness to explore a system, to learn its characteristics, and to come 
up with innovative ways of using it. 
One danger in broadening the concept of the ‘hack’ away from a 
particular kind of physically recognisable exchange between individual 
and computer is that it may become impossible to distinguish between 
a hack, on the one hand, and a sophisticated use of available technolo-
gies, on the other. The fi rst answer to this is to refi ne our conception 
of innovation, thus allowing a closer reading of what characterises a 
hack. Particular technologies have always offered different blends of 
potentials and constraints. Even the original hardware hackers were 
dependent on prefabricated computer kits to build their computers 
(Kirkpatrick 2004, 26). While the hacker may reconfi gure the com-
ponents in numerous ways and, perhaps, add functionality through 
home built components, they will always run up against hard limits 
that are produced by designers’ decisions. Similarly, software hackers 
are constrained by both their hardware and the code level and lan-
guage they choose to work with. The inclusion of ‘elegant simplicity’ 
as a defi ning feature of the ‘good hack’ fl ows from awareness of such 
limitations among the early hackers. Hard limits indicate the differ-
ence between innovation through hacking and pure invention. The 
hacker uses tools already available to achieve something new. For this 
reason we should examine what can be done with technologies – that 
is, their functionalities – rather than a technical specifi cation of how 
they work. We may consider the advertised, intended uses of a device 
or system to be its manifest functionalities. Manifest functionalities are 
prominent in both advertisements and user manuals, and require little 
creativity or sophisticated understanding on the part of the user to be 
applicable. At the other end of the scale are latent functionalities. These 
are the applications that, while being enabled in some way by a device 
82
or system, are not made obvious to the user and may not have been 
intended by the designer. At the furthest reaches, hackers may fi nd 
a use for a technology that was simply inconceivable to the designer, 
perhaps by adding new hardware or writing new code. Even there, 
the potential must have exited in the system for the hacker to have 
anything with which to work. More commonly, however, new uses 
are closer to the original specifi cation, as in the coffee maker example 
mentioned above. The utility of the distinction between manifest 
and latent functionalities lies in helping to specify what ‘counts’ as a 
hack. A use of any technological device that goes beyond the manifest 
functionalities evidences the hacker attitude, at least in the minimal 
form specifi ed above, because it requires a level of understanding of 
the system and creativity with its potential that takes one beyond the 
manual and beyond the confi gured relationship of user to device.2 
The boundaries between hacker and user, and between manifest 
and latent functionalities, inevitably remain a little fuzzy. This is not 
least because designers sometimes seek to build fl exibility or extensibil-
ity into their systems. In such cases the whole notion of an ‘intended’ 
use for a particular technology is problematic. The second answer to 
the problem of distinguishing between a hack and a sophisticated use 
of technology is, therefore, epistemological. If, like Kirkpatrick, we 
take the user and hacker attitudes as ideal typical analytical constructs 
then we might accept that there is no a priori statement that we can 
make that would answer every borderline case (2004, xi). Rather, 
the analyst must consider both the general context of action and the 
specifi c features of the range of empirical cases available. The value of 
the concepts used here is proven, not by the imputation of the reality 
of our categories, but in the degree to which they aid interpretation of 
the available data; they are valuable just to the extent that they offer 
analytical purchase on empirical facts. In the remainder of this chapter, 
I hope to show that these categories do indeed aid the comprehension 
of a variety of forms of activity that constitute anti-war protest in the 
information age.
2. For further development of the distinction between manifest and latent functional-
ity, see Gillan, Pickerill & Webster 2008, ch. 7.
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 THE USER ATTITUDE: 
FINDING EFFICIENT TOOLS FOR MOVEMENT ACTION
Given the sheer scale of recent anti-war protest, it is unsurprising to 
fi nd that it is a richly diverse movement that has been responsible for 
mobilisations like that of 15th February 2003. Diversity of participa-
tion may be registered on a range of dimensions (Pickerill & Webster 
2006), but what is of relevance here is the different kinds of organi-
sations represented in the movement. Four examples will give some 
indication of the range of group structures involved in contemporary 
anti-war activism. First, the descriptions of ‘everyday’ technological 
sophistication that began this chapter were organised by a core group 
of less than ten activists involved in creating the Faslane 365 (F365) 
campaign, and put at the service of hundreds of individuals who, 
organised into smaller blockading groups, took part in protests at the 
submarine base over the course of a year (interviews, Anna-Linnéa 
Rundberg and Adam Conway, 2006). Second, within the same broad 
anti-war and peace movement are also found much larger and more 
formal organisations such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(CND), which has had a democratic structure of individual members 
and affi liated organizations providing a steady income stream since 
the 1950s. As a result, CND can maintain offi ce space in central 
London with a small core of full time staff supported by a larger 
group of volunteers. Third, the Stop the War Coalition (StWC) who 
co-organised the UK’s biggest anti-war demonstrations with CND, 
rely primarily on individual donations to fi nance their activities. Their 
ability to mobilise has been dependent on dozens (and for some time 
hundreds) of local anti-war groups composed entirely of volunteers 
(interview, Kate Hudson, CND Chair and StWC Offi cer). Finally, 
Justice Not Vengeance (JNC) produce regular newsletters offering 
high quality analyses of recent political events, making use of publicly 
available, ‘establishment’ sources of information such as broadsheet 
newspapers and government reports. Occasionally, JNV have organised 
small protests, such as a public reading of the names of UK soldiers 
killed in Iraq, that have garnered coverage in mainstream news. JNV 
is largely run on the basis of individual donations, by three volunteers, 
with a wider group of supporters who meet occasionally and a much 
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larger group of email supporters (interviews, Maya Evans and Milan 
Rai, JNV activists).
Despite the variety of organisational forms these groups do, of 
course, have a number of goals and political beliefs in common, and 
it is this feature that generally defi nes a group of organisations and 
individuals as a movement (della Porta & Diani 1999, 15-25). Central 
to this chapter, however, are the features they share as collective actors. 
Collective action requires groups to engage in a set of informational 
and communicative tasks, which, for present purposes, we may divide 
into representation, decision-making and coordination. In the fol-
lowing paragraphs I present instances of some of the most common 
responses from over sixty interviewees who were asked in depth about 
their use of information technologies in activist work. As we will see, 
ICTs have been widely adopted for their manifest functionalities, and 
are now deeply embedded each area of activity.
Representation
The representation of ideas, critiques and rationales for action have 
always formed a central component of social movement activity, which 
is an idea captured in the wealth of literature on interpretative framing 
(Johnston & Noakes 2005). Control of the media of representation 
has frequently been sought by movement groups as is evident from, 
for instance, the important role played by newspapers in far left or-
ganisations in the UK, who have often owned their own printing 
presses (Allen 1985). In this respect, internet technologies offer clear 
benefi ts to movement groups as low cost means for the dissemination 
of alternative analyses of political events. These representations may 
be aimed at the general public, or at a closer group of supporters and 
email subscribers. One campaigner at the Religious Society of Friends 
(Quakers) noted that storing information on the web offered savings 
in both fi nancial terms and in the amount of work required of the 
central offi ce: 
‘postage mainly, paper… it means it’s more accessible, and we would 
expect less requests from our volunteer people’ (interview, Steve 
Whiting). 
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The speed of dissemination is also clearly important, with another 
interviewee stating that
‘it’s astonishing how quickly so many people become au fait with the 
arguments’ (interview, Lindsey German).
For some groups, the representation of ideas is the core function: 
JNV’s primary purpose is collating and distributing arguments and 
factual materials deemed potentially useful for other peace activists. 
For others, the point of informing supporters and the general public is 
to mobilise participation in protest events. Kate Hudson distinguished 
clearly between a ‘campaigning’ and ‘information organization’. CND’s 
website, she explained, while ‘as accurate and up-to-date as possible’ 
does not set out to be ‘the last word in scientifi c information’. It rather 
aims to be ‘the last word in campaigning effectively on nuclear weapons’ 
(interview, Kate Hudson).  StWC’s use of their website is also focused 
in this way:
...[i]f something big breaks on one day, then on the homepage I might 
quickly write a short piece to do with that, and links to do with that. 
Nearly always, given the type of campaign we are, it will be links to 
some activity that we’re involved in, which is the main function of 
our website – to actually support activity (interview, StWC offi ce 
manager and website developer.)
As will be discussed below, many anti-war movement groups are focused 
primarily on protest events. While these certainly require detailed plan-
ning, information sharing and decision making to carry out, this focus 
also means that groups’ websites, understood as presenting the public 
face of the organisation, seek to encourage action above all else. 
It was commonly recognised among interviewees that the Web is 
a ‘phenomenal resource, absolutely phenomenal … [for] the resources, 
the information you can access’ (interview, Steve Whiting). Milan Rai 
described his previous campaigning against sanctions in Iraq during 
the 1990s, wherein 
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...[h]aving the text of the UN Security Council resolutions was crucial 
…  and the only way we could get those was from the UN informa-
tion offi ce in London, which had to request them from New York… 
it would be weeks of delay before we got these Security council 
resolutions… foundational documents like that suddenly became 
immediately accessible. And it did make a really big difference to 
our work. (interview, Milan Rai)
It is unsurprising then, that with a positive experience of using such 
resources, anti-war activists increasingly see a part of their work as 
the creation of electronically available information sources. Whatever 
their particular goals and modes of action, both the creation of group 
websites and the distribution of mass email messages offer anti-war 
groups a speedy route through which to represent their analyses and 
inform potential supporters about opportunities for protest. 
Making Decisions
Decision making was another everyday task for which interviewees 
from a wide range of groups praised the utility of ICTs. Email discus-
sions, usually utilising listserv software attached to particular subscrip-
tion-based groups, were utilised by many as decision making forums. 
Typically, interviewees enjoyed the ability to work together without 
the need to organise a time and place to meet, so that ‘decision mak-
ing can happen where people don’t have the same schedule’ (Jesse Schust, 
Voices in the Wilderness UK). The asynchronous nature of email 
communication means that ‘you can all work at your own pace and 
your own timescale ... and across time-zones as well’ (Jane Tallents, 
Faslane 365; cf. Häyhtiö & Rinne in this volume), thus making the 
best use of available human resources. This is particularly important 
since most anti-war activists juggle their political commitments with 
many others. Even where an organisation has offi ce space and paid 
workers: 
[Email] makes for ease of decision-making.  Our Offi cer team is the 
centre of the decision making process, there are fi ve of us, we meet 
less frequently physically because we’re in email communication… 
And for things like getting agreement about leafl ets, for example … you 
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can agree the whole thing in fi ve minutes, whereas previously it would 
have taken much longer (interview, Kate Hudson).
Furthermore, some interviewees also felt that the text-based nature 
of these communications also helped improve the quality of deci-
sion making because ‘you consider your position more carefully, writing 
something compared to when you’re speaking’ (interview, Tom Shelton, 
CND Offi ce Worker). Similarly, this is: 
‘an important way for people to share views, who might not be con-
fi dent enough to do it in person. I fi nd it easier if I’ve got a problem 
or want to describe how I’m feeling to actually write it down and 
amend it a bit, so you actually know what you’re saying’ (interview, 
Anna Liddle, CND Education Worker). 
Anna added that ‘you can actually research the facts and send what you 
mean, you can even add references from a website’. However, almost 
every interviewee who discussed the benefi ts of email in this sphere 
also emphasised that more complex or politically loaded decisions 
worked less well over email. Without careful planning of the timescale 
of decisions, discussions had a tendency to revolve around a number 
of contentious points without resolution. The lack of spontaneity was 
also a frequently cited problem: ‘electronic resources are really important 
in organising.... But also it’s equally important to come to meetings... where 
we see each other face-to-face, because it’s really hard to bounce ideas off 
each other through emails’ (interview, Maya Evans). Where a high level 
of awareness of the limitations of computer-mediated communications 
is present, this aided the deployment of ICTs in a manner that offered 
signifi cant effi ciency gains in their organizational tasks.
Coordination
As noted above, while groups such as JNV defi ne their activity squarely 
in terms of information, most use informational tools in work that 
is driven by protest events. Whether small-group, high-risk actions 
like F365’s blockades of a very high security naval base or CND and 
StWC’s joint-organised demonstrations of hundreds of thousands 
marching in the capital, protest events tend to be unpredictable. It 
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is in the coordination of such events that the ‘anytime, anywhere’ 
nature of the mobile phone comes to the fore (Castells et al. 2006). 
One interviewee indicates the strategic benefi t of the mobile phone at 
demonstrations where police sought to block protesters’ movements. 
This common tactic involves the creation of police cordons that block 
groups of protesters into side streets. Armed with their mobile phones, 
those in the cordon can phone others to update them on police tactics, 
so they ‘can then organise in another place... there’s more spontaneity and 
fl exibility’ (interview Steve Whiting). But the gains from ‘perpetual 
contact’ are not limited to these more radical forms of action. In rela-
tion to the more orderly national march:
...[w]e don’t have the hassle any more like we used to. At the fi rst 
Stop the War demonstration someone had to walk up and down the 
whole length of the Embankment to try and fi nd the fl ipping bus 
- it was a pain you know. Whereas now we can coordinate people 
to get back on the buses a lot more easily with mobile phones and I 
think that makes a difference to people coming because they’re not 
so likely to get lost (interview, Chris Goodwin, Leicester Campaign 
to Stop the War).
Activists’ mobile phone use relates clearly to what Ling and Yttri 
describe, in a study of everyday mobile phone users in Norway, as 
‘micro-coordination’: ‘largely a functional and instrumental activity’ 
(2002,139). Clearly it is not just activists that enjoy the greater fl ex-
ibility and speed of making arrangements with friends and colleagues; 
rather this is the core purpose of the mobile phone and has simply 
been transposed into the context of protest events. 
The brief presentation above focuses on the practical benefi ts of 
technologies that have been most frequently described by interviewees 
from a wide range of anti-war groups in the UK. At this level we see 
a quite straightforward adoption of ICTs by users taking advantage 
of manifest functionalities. The capacious store of information avail-
able on the Web is utilised by activists to inform themselves. They 
also see potential in the speed and relative cheapness of publishing 
for representing their own groups in that sphere. The asynchronous 
and place independent characteristics of email communication come 
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to the fore particularly in simpler decision making processes and 
planning of events. And the ability for spontaneous communications 
with permanently connected friends and allies through the mobile 
phone has proved invaluable at all sorts of events. Anti-war activists 
therefore relate to ICTs with the ‘user attitude’, taking ‘off-the-shelf ’ 
technologies and picking up applications of interest.
This is not to say, however, either that these benefi ts come with-
out any drawbacks or limitations, or that the practical benefi ts are 
the only consequences of technology adoption. In relation to the 
former, activists’ concerns about accessibility, surveillance, limited 
relationships with audiences through the Web and the diffi culties of 
creating trust through CMC have been documented (Pickerill 2003, 
Gillan forthcoming). In relation to the latter, it is clear that ICT’s 
offer social and emotional benefi ts too. One interviewee described 
email discussion lists as:
 
‘just so good … it is a relief to be able to talk to like minded people. 
It is also very helpful to be kept in touch with what is going on both 
within the Society and in the world in general’ (focus group, Quaker 
activist). 
Similarly, another described the importance of staying connected 
through the Web: ‘if you’re an activist and you’re not connected to 
the relevant websites in your area... its possibly a lot more isolated, 
and there’s issues of morale and maintenance which websites can help 
overcome’ (interview, Milan Rai). Another explained that one benefi t 
of attending national demonstrations was being able to reconnect with 
friends who lived far away, and that mobile phones were very impor-
tant in being able to make plans and fi nd each other (interview, CND 
employee). These complicating features may have heightened relevance 
in the activist context. The quotations from the Quaker activist and 
Milan Rai, above, are particularly sensitive to the need for activists to 
fi nd other ‘like minded’ people, lest they face ‘isolation’; recognising 
the diffi culties of maintaining a position outside of the mainstream. 
Limitations, as well as benefi ts, are tied to the particular context. This is 
clear, for instance, in relation to concerns about surveillance which can 
be vital for groups planning protests that the police wish to stop.
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Despite the particular areas of emphasis that may fl ow from the 
specifi c context of technology use, the limitations adumbrated above 
are inherent features of the technologies in their standard confi gura-
tions. And the social benefi ts arising from ICT adoption are really a 
result of human interaction, per se, rather than the medium through 
which it takes place. What remains, therefore, is the fact that the 
practical purposes to which anti-war activists put new ICTs are just 
those purposes to which the designers of these technologies had in-
tended. This highlights the similarity, at the level of informational and 
communicative needs at least, between activist groups and any other 
purposeful organisation, whether they are businesses, voluntary sector 
associations or government agencies. Technologies designed with those 
other organisations in mind are highly pertinent for activist groups too, 
and so benefi ts arise from engaging with a user attitude, making use of 
suitable applications without trying to alter the technologies they use. 
This attitude is rarely made explicit, but the evidence above suggests 
that it does inform the interaction between people and technologies 
in the context of the anti-war movement. 
THE HACKER ATTITUDE: 
REIMAGINING TECHNOLOGIES, RESTRUCTURING COMMUNICATIONS 
Politically motivated hacking has been well documented among cer-
tain groups of activists, such as movements directly concerned with 
technology or media and those opposing neo-liberal globalization. Key 
examples display a high level of sophistication in code-level work with 
computers in order to write software programmes that may be used 
in a variety of forms of action against identifi ed political opponents 
(Jordan & Taylor 2004; see also Jordan and Hintikka in this volume). 
But such activities are largely absent from the discussions of technol-
ogy offered by our interviewees from across the UK peace and anti-
war movements. As suggested in the fi rst subsection of this chapter, 
this is to be expected given the widespread uptake of ICTs and the 
increasing level of knowledge required for innovative engagement with 
them. But the minimal specifi cation of the hacker attitude is intended 
to enable a focus on creative uses of technology that do not take the 
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form of code-level work, but nevertheless display the key attitudinal 
characteristics. The following material presents a series of vignettes 
that illustrate the application of the hacker attitude in the activist 
context. Examples are drawn from a somewhat broader examination 
of contemporary activism than the interviews cited above and, for this 
reason, two methodological caveats apply. First, the statements below 
are necessarily less suitable for generalisation, either to the anti-war 
movement or to wider trends in protest. Nevertheless, the purpose 
here is to explore the further horizons of activist uses of technology 
without any implications about whether such forms are likely to spread 
or to meet with success. As we will see, this exploration will enable 
further refl ections on the implications of the attitudes that activists 
bring to technology. Second, in examining secondary sources of data 
it is noteworthy that the ‘behind the scenes’ work of organising and 
mobilising often becomes obscured as commentators – scholars as well 
as journalists – typically focus on the public activities of movement 
groups. As above, I will use divisions of organisational work as repre-
sentation and coordination. Underlying processes of decision making 
are, unfortunately, rendered invisible in most secondary sources and 
will not be considered in detail below. Under ‘representation’, we see 
the representation of ideas as an end in itself; that is, communication 
becomes the main purpose of the action. Under ‘coordination’, we 
will see communication as a means, with effi cient, effective protest 
as the ends. 
Representation
A striking illustration of the application of the ‘hacker attitude’ in 
representing political views occurred around the Republican National 
Convention (RNC) in New York in 2004. These protests were a cri-
tique of George Bush ahead of the US presidential election the same 
year. The range of political messages brought by protest participants 
was very wide but, for many, this was an anti-war demonstration and 
thus motivated by many of the same concerns as much of the activity 
described above (Democracy Now! 2004). In preparing for the dem-
onstration, a graduate engineering student, Joshua Kinberg, designed 
and built a ‘dot-matrix graffi ti bike’. This was a pedal cycle mounted 
with computer-controlled chalk aerosol cans that could spray messages 
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onto the pavement. Kindberg’s website, Bikes Against Bush, enabled 
visitors to write short message that could be transmitted directly to the 
‘printer’ via his mobile phone and bicycle-mounted laptop. Messages 
could thereby be submitted from anywhere with Internet access and 
almost instantaneously sprayed as graffi ti onto the pavements outside 
the convention. Kindberg demonstrated his technology, but was never 
able to use it in protest since in the lead-up to the demonstrations he 
was arrested, and his equipment was seized, by the New York Police 
Department (Singel 2007).
Regardless of the impact of the protest, Kindberg’s design is il-
lustrative in two ways. Firstly, it clearly represents an application of 
the hacker attitude. In order to piece together the website, his mobile 
phone and his home made ‘printer’, Kindberg needed a sophisticated 
understanding of modern systems of ICTs. Moreover, he clearly made 
an innovative use of the technologies he had access to; even though 
the potential for these connections existed in the devices he owned, 
he brought latent functionalities to the fore in a way that was certainly 
outside of the expectations of their inventors. Second, the system 
designed in this way was novel specifi cally in relation to the commu-
nication structure it created. The mobile phone is, of course, intended 
to be a one-to-one communication device but in this system is placed 
as a single node mediating an ad hoc many-to-many communication 
system. That is to say, by hooking the phone to his website, Kindberg 
stretched its capabilities to allow many-to-one communications and 
by hooking it up to his graffi ti printer he produced one-to-many 
communication. The result was a horizontal structure that encouraged 
people unable to attend the demonstration to represent their views 
through a system that was technologically mediated but, nevertheless, 
transparent with regards to meaning. The intention, if not the result, 
was to widen participation at the RNC demonstration by enabling 
those not present to take part.
Where the communication of ideas is a form of protest, we must 
consider both the originators of protest messages and the audience 
for them. While the example above shows potential in reaching new 
originators, the audience for Kindberg’s relayed graffi ti would have been 
identical to that of the placards typically carried at such events. Another 
case, however, shows some potential in reaching new audiences. Joseph 
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DeLappe, a Professor of Art at University of Nevada Reno, spent sev-
eral hours a week for most of 2006 reciting the names of US soldiers 
killed in Iraq in the context of an online, multiplayer computer game 
(Clarren 2006). The game, America’s Army, was developed by the 
US army and features team combat missions set in the Middle East, 
with players armed with standard US military equipment. The game 
is explicitly a recruitment tool, and is given away for free and heavily 
promoted among those sought to join the US military. Repeatedly 
logging in to the game under the name ‘dead-in-Iraq’, DeLappe simply 
dropped his weapon and used the chat interface of the game to give 
the name, age and date of death of all US military personal killed in 
the invasion and occupation. These messages were seen by all other 
players logged into the same game at the same time. 
The recital of names of war dead is hardly a unique form of protest 
and memorial; indeed, Maya Evans of JNV was arrested in October 
2005 for doing so outside Downing Street in London. But DeLappe 
is clearly reaching a new audience, utilising both the technological 
structure of the game, and the social structure within which it is set, 
to target people likely to be sympathetic to the US military. Salon 
columnist Rebecca Clarren (2006) quotes DeLappe as arguing that 
‘online spaces like “America’s Army” are a critical place to interact 
with the world: 
“I’m going to where these impressionable kids are spending their 
time,” he says. “If you get them where they live, and this causes them 
to think, even for an instant, then I think it’s effective”’. 
Another interviewer quotes DeLappe saying ‘you have a fantasy about 
killing and being in the military, but nobody dies, there are no consequences. 
It’s a complete fabrication’ (DeLappe, quoted in Kuo 2006). Moreover, 
DeLappe’s action is self-consciously rule-breaking: We come into these 
games to do A, B, and C, not C, D, and F. My response is to say, who says 
you’re only allowed to do those things in these spaces?’ (ibid.). 
The two stories presented above are very different. Kindberg used 
his technical understanding to produce a horizontal, many-to-many 
communication structure that enabled wider participation in public 
protest. DeLappe, conversely, produced a vertical, one-to-many com-
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munication structure in which, notwithstanding the abusive replies he 
received from other game players, he dominated. But at the same time, 
he used his understanding of the structure and context of a particular 
computer game in order to communicate with a highly pertinent 
social group rarely reached by the messages of protesters. What both 
examples have in common, therefore, is the application of elements 
of the hacker attitude in imagining new purposes for particular ICTs, 
utilised in order to bring something new to the representation of 
political ideas.
Coordination
Returning to the RNC demonstrations of 2004 highlights further ex-
amples of the use of ICTs. Indeed, technological innovation was such 
a strong theme there that one Village Voice commentator claimed:
‘Thanks to this week’s protests … the streets of Manhattan have 
become an outdoor gallery for the latest trends in the fusion of art 
and digital technology’ (Dayal 2004). 
One of the most popular systems in use was TxtMob: a method of 
distributing text messages on a large scale. The system was designed 
by Tad Hirsch with a group called the Institute of Applied Autonomy 
and required individuals to subscribe to groups they were interested in 
through entering their mobile phone number on a website interface. 
Once at the demonstration, any subscriber could send a text message 
to one number which, via Hirsch’s own server, would be forwarded 
to all other subscribers. The system was used frequently by a range of 
groups, such as: protesters keeping track of location and behaviour 
of police, ‘critical mass’ bicycle riders staying informed of traffi c fl ow; 
and volunteer medics in order to attend areas where violence had 
broken out or teargas had been used (Di Justo 2004; Hirsch & Henry 
2005). Like Kindberg’s graffi ti bike, the key to innovation here was 
to combine the web and the mobile phone in order to create a many-
to-many communication structure, except here communication was 
utilised as a means to more effi cient and effective protest rather than, 
as in the Kindberg case, as an end and a protest in itself.
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Both the TxtMob and the graffi ti bike systems suffered a highly 
signifi cant drawback, however, since both were centralized through 
one key point in the system. Kindberg’s ambition was ultimately 
thwarted when the NYPD seized his equipment before the start of 
the demonstrations. TxtMob suffered problems because some mobile 
phone networks stopped passing its messages either because of net-
work overload, spam protocols or police action (Castells et al. 2006, 
202-204). Perhaps more importantly, after legal wrangles between 
protesters and New York City over large numbers of arrests, the city 
administration has served a subpoena on Hirsch, demanding the text 
of hundreds of messages and the phone numbers of their senders 
(Moynihan 2008). 
There have been several well-documented cases of the use of text 
messages without an intervening, centralised point of relay. Most 
notable is the use of such messages in coordinating protests against 
Philippine President Joseph Estrada, who was ultimately forced from 
offi ce in early 2001. Mobile phone use was prominent not just during 
demonstrations, but also, throughout 2000, in propagating anti-Es-
trada messages such as news related to government corruption, hostile 
slogans and satirical jokes (Katz & Aarkhus 2002, 2-3). The ability 
to communicate without a single intervening node increases both the 
security of the communication network and level of trust between 
those using it. It would hardly be surprising if the police were among 
the subscribers to TxtMob groups at the RNC demonstrations, nor, 
indeed if they had used the network to spread disinformation (cf. 
Dwyer 2005). Security benefi ts fl ow from changes the structure of 
communications. While the RNC case evidences the creation of a 
many-to-many structure, in the Estrada case we see something that 
may be best described as ‘few-to-few-to-few…’. Messages were simply 
forwarded on to friends and acquaintances and this increases trust in 
the network because there is a closer fi t between this particular infor-
mation network and pre-existing social networks. Furthermore, such 
communications likely benefi tted from the long-established ‘strength 
of weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973).When text messages are passed on 
through social networks by named individuals, to the extent that the 
message seems to be true and important to the receiver, it is likely that 
it will be passed on beyond the densely networked clusters of friends 
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and allies from which it originates, into the wider (mobile phone 
owning) society. 
One fi nal example returns us to anti-war activism in the UK. In 
the most technologically sophisticated intervention by the StWC to 
date, we can see an example that mixes different modes of communica-
tion to achieve both the coordination of action and the representation 
of a particular view. In early 2007, the StWC promoted an anti-war 
single by a band constructed as a spoof of Tony Blair’s university rock 
group, Ugly Rumours. They produced a cover of the anti-war song, 
‘War (What is it Good For?)’ which was made available as a download 
only release (Moran 2007). The intention of the group was clear, to 
attempt to embarrass the Prime Minister and gain attention and sig-
nifi cant funds for StWC. Success depended on enough people buying 
the single in the same week, to push it as high into the singles charts, 
and therefore into the national media’s attention, as  possible. And for 
the individual protester, buying the single counted as both a symbol of 
dissent and an active way to support a key anti-war organization. 
The song was released shortly after a change in regulations relating 
to the offi cial singles charts that allowed songs released as ‘download 
only’ to be counted, as well as those distributed on CDs. Beforehand, 
the costs for physical production and distribution would have made 
it impossible for a protest group to successfully promote a single. 
However, the single sold well, achieving a top-ten position in the mid-
week charts and thus gaining publicity from a wide range of media. 
Success was produced partly by organisers spotting a relevant change 
in the regulatory structure governing the use of particular technolo-
gies. As such, it represents a wide understanding of the system, and 
its application to protest is, from the point of view of regulators, an 
unintended possibility. The mode of promotion and distribution 
used to generate the sales offered further evidence of technological 
understanding and creativity. The band performed on two high profi le 
national demonstrations in London and Glasgow in the week of the 
single’s release. An arrangement had been made so that participants 
at the demonstrations could purchase the single simply by sending a 
text message to an automated service that enabled the sender to subse-
quently download the song from an online distribution outlet. During 
Ugly Rumours’ performances, instructions for buying the single were 
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given repeatedly and shown on a large outdoor screen (fi eld notes, 
London, February 2007). Both at the demonstration and on ordering 
the single, protesters were encouraged to send the message on to eve-
ryone in their phone’s address book – recalling the potential power of 
integrating a political message with social networks. A humorous video 
for the song was also produced and made available through YouTube. 
It seems, therefore, that StWC had picked up some of the techniques 
of ‘viral marketing’, getting their message into a wide range of outlets 
in a form that was likely to be passed on through social networks. 
Doing so required piecing together a number of different modes of 
communication in a novel confi guration in order to both represent a 
protest message to a wider audience and to coordinate participants to 
help promote the single.
In each of the above examples we can see the application of key 
aspects of the hacker attitude to activists’ interactions with technol-
ogy. In relation to the technologies utilised each case illustrates some 
novelty in the communication structures created, especially in adopting 
the mobile phone in ways that enable communication among larger 
groups than the device was intended for. Given the inherently collective 
nature of social movement activism, which stems both from their aims 
to promote particular ideas among a wider population and from the 
necessity to organise and coordinate around events, it is logical that 
innovative uses of ICTs would take this direction. The one example 
that doesn’t increase the number of communicants is DeLappe’s inter-
vention into the US military computer game in which he reverses this 
process, taking a mode of communication intended for group discus-
sion an using it for his personal, political broadcast. For this reason, 
it is perhaps unsurprising that that DeLappe’s messages were reacted 
to with hostility. This echoes Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi’s use, 
in the 2004 regional elections, of 13 million ‘personal’ text messages 
to voters, which faced an indignant popular reaction (Castells et al. 
2007, 211). In these cases the messages were uninvited and essentially 
one-way, since any response would reasonably be presumed to be inef-
fective. The comparison between the intervention in America’s Army 
and the other innovations described above is instructive, moreover, 
because it highlights divergent concerns with participants and audience. 
One purported benefi t of Internet communications is in broadening 
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the audience for radical media sources but the website designers and 
media offi cers among the interviewees for this research were concerned 
that it was impossible to know who the online audience was. There 
is certainly a general suspicion that people coming to the website will 
already have some sympathy, or at least familiarity, with the group’s 
arguments and that different strategies are therefore required for wider 
outreach (Gillan, Pickerill & Webster 2008, ch. 3). DeLappe’s case was 
different because he self-consciously sought a new audience whereas the 
other examples described above are all more concerned with widening 
the number of participants, rather than the number of spectators. The 
more common innovations, then, demonstrate a concern with increas-
ing the quality of information fl ow and engagement among protest 
participants and the social networks to which they belong.
Conclusions
This chapter began with a reminder of the familiarity of engagement 
with technologically sophisticated information systems in everyday 
social movement practice in the UK. This mirrors developments in 
wider society in a country where internet penetration had reached 
around 66 per cent in 2007 (ITU 2007). As in wider society, activists 
bring different attitudes to their engagement with technology, varying 
particularly around the willingness to experiment with technological 
tools in order to create new functions from those already available. No-
tions of the hacker and user attitudes help us understand the different 
forms of ICT activity we see evidenced in political activism.
The hacker attitude, in its minimal specifi cation set out above, 
indicates a commitment to the discovery of latent functionalities 
enabled by any technology, which allows the application of technolo-
gies to new tasks. Whatever the precise behaviours evidenced by a 
particular hack, it should demonstrate a good level of understanding 
of an information system that enables the creation of relatively simple 
new uses that somehow break the rules codifi ed into the devices being 
used. In all the cases described above the rules being broken concerned 
the communication structures within which particular devices were 
designed to operate. Most commonly we saw the insertion of the mo-
bile phone into more horizontal structures of communication, which 
enabled information sharing or political claims making among groups 
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of activists, thereby stretching the benefi ts of perpetual contact beyond 
the one-to-one communications typical of the phone. 
The user attitude, in contrast, is evidenced where activists make 
use of the manifest functionalities purposively designed into techno-
logical systems; adopting, without adapting, technologies that may 
have been primarily intended for uses in other administrative contexts. 
Since movement groups have always needed to perform many of the 
same informational and communicative tasks as any other organisation 
it makes sense for them to adopt technologies in this way. The web 
is cherished as a vast store of information and seen as a new sphere 
in which one ought to be represented; email allows for asynchronous 
communication, valuable in both information sharing and decision-
making; and the mobile phone allows perpetual contact which has 
great utility for micro-coordination around events. It is these sorts 
of activities that have led activists to embed technologies deeply into 
their everyday action.
The costs of innovation, in terms of expertise required and the 
time taken to develop new applications and encourage their wider 
adoption, make the hacker attitude relatively uncommon. At least in 
anti-war activism, where the urgency of action has tended to outweigh 
the potential benefi ts of experimentation, straightforward adoption 
of ICTs is the norm. Activists’ practices are not unrefl exive – indeed, 
there is evidence presented above that suggests the careful application 
of manifest functionalities that take account of the political nature 
of decision-making, the potential social benefi ts and drawbacks of 
ICT use and the security concerns related to electronic communi-
cations. (Such evidence is amplifi ed in Gillan, Pickerill & Webster 
208, ch. 7.) The positive implications here clearly relate to effi ciency. 
Conversely, it is where social movement groups’ activities differ from 
those organisations in the private and public sectors for which most 
ICTs are primarily intended – such as where rapid but deliberative 
communication across horizontally organised networks is desirable 
– that innovation is particularly valuable. It is particularly in these 
areas, therefore, that the benefi ts of applying the hacker attitude may 
be most keenly felt. 
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ARIADNE VROMEN
Political change and the internet in 
 Au str alia: introducing GetUp
 
INTRODUCTION
“We can give people an opportunity to say stuff, be heard, to channel 
their opinions to decision makers… We are trying to take that movement 
stuff, social movements and political movements, and take it online, again 
it gets translated offl ine as well at the end of the campaign, but we are 
putting stuff online so it is giving people an opportunity to be effective, 
where they haven’t been able to be effective through some of those little 
offl ine campaigns” (Interviewee 2). 
This chapter explores how the internet can be used in innovative ways 
to challenge established relationships of contact between citizens and 
their parliamentary representatives. The distinction between “conven-
tional” and “non-conventional” individualised forms of participation is 
problematised by focusing on the use of the internet to facilitate collective 
action by new communities of political actors who set their own political 
agendas. I argue that existing understandings of social movement action 
as being distinct from interest group activities are questioned by these 
new forms of well resourced, internet-based participation that disrupt 
established power relationships. I will especially engage with, and expand 
upon, the arguments presented by Andrew Chadwick (2007) on internet 
mobilisations representing novel forms of “organisation hybridity” that 
utilise instances of “repertoire switching”. These ideas will be applied 
to an in-depth case study of a new, Australian, primarily internet-based 
organisation called GetUp that emerged in 2005.
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
– THE INTERNET AND INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
The Internet provides new ways of participating in political processes, 
and thus merits distinctive analysis. The rapid uptake of mobile phones, 
digital television and the Internet have all occurred in the last decade 
and Stanyer argues that this has created opportunities for an increase in 
individualised political expression and participation (2005, 21). These 
individualised forms of participation include traditional modes such 
as voting, writing letters to MPs, donating money and non-traditional 
modes that are facilitated by new technology, including online petition 
signing, boycotts, blogging, chat rooms, email chain letters and SMS 
(e.g. to media and politicians). Non-traditional modes of individualised 
participation are often quicker, require little time commitment and 
are often convenient for expressing a political viewpoint (see Stanyer 
2005, 22; Chadwick 2007, 287; Xenos and Bennett 2007, 49; Häyhtiö 
& Rinne and Rättilä in this volume). 
In terms of thinking more specifi cally about the internet as a 
political space for participation we can see that it has three individu-
alised, primary uses: 
1. as an information source: whereby sites provide information about 
political issues, existing political groups and campaigns (Karakaya  
 Polat 2005, 436; see also Montgomery et al 2004). 
2. as a communication medium, in four distinctive sub-types: con
versations that are one to one dialogue, such as email; the ag-
gregation of information where many people communicate with 
a single agency, such as online voting, and online petitions; as 
a form of broadcast from one centre to many people, such as 
personal websites and blogs; and as group dialogue where there is 
interaction among a large group of senders and receivers, such as 
in forums and online chat (Christopher Weare cited in Karakaya 
Polat 2005, 446).
3. as a virtual public sphere: here internet sites are ‘providing a plat-
form for rational critical debate rather than simple registration 
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of individual views through information aggregation tools such 
as polls or surveys’ (Karakaya Polat 2005, 448). The focus is on 
the processes involved in opinion formation and sharing, rather 
than chiefl y on how opinions are expressed. 
Lincoln Dahlberg (2001) has provided a related typology for analysing 
internet based communication and participation. He categorises sites 
as either liberal, communitarian or deliberative, based on the forms of 
democratic process that it creates. Liberal sites assist the expression of 
individual interests, enabling individuals access to government informa-
tion and means to communicate with institutionalised political actors 
(Dahlberg 2001, 619-620). Many e-government initiatives would fi t 
here as they represent a top-down consumer model of politics and 
often simply provide electronic access to government offl ine services 
(see Geiselhart 2004, 87). Communitarian sites enhance communal 
values and build communities of interest, in effect serving to connect 
people with similar values and concerns. The focus in communitarian 
sites is the exchange of information through decentralised interaction 
(Dahlberg 2001). Other internet analysts liken this community build-
ing to a form of trust and bonding social capital found in like-minded 
communities (Chen et al. 2006)
Dahlberg’s third type of site is labelled as Deliberative, and is 
based on a normative, Habermasian ideal whereby the Internet is the 
means for an expansion of the (non-exclusive, centralised, relevant to 
all) public sphere for rational-critical citizen discourse. Discourse on 
deliberative sites is refl exive and respectful, reaching collective agree-
ment for the public good. To be classifi ed as deliberative by Dahlberg 
these sites need to be autonomous from state and corporate power 
(2001, 616). This kind of deliberative focus has the potential for some 
authors (see Chen et al. 2006) to create a superior form of bridging 
social capital that, potentially, transcends essential community differ-
ences through debate. 
There are two major elements missing from these typologies. 
The fi rst is how to evaluate sites that primarily use the internet as 
an information sharing conduit based on user-generated content to 
then facilitate offl ine participation. The approach of these kinds of 
sites needs to be considered as more communitarian and expressively 
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oriented than the information collection and aggregation elements 
of Dahlberg’s liberal sites. The second is central to this chapter and 
is a complex understanding of social movement oriented disruption, 
or protest, as a function of internet use. Both deliberative and com-
munitarian views see a focus on commonality and consensus building 
in political exchange. Peter Dahlgren suggests that we should value 
people’s desire to participate and that online political engagement is 
allowing people to engage in democratic practice (2005, 158-159). 
However, he critiques the Habermasian position that the deliberative 
value of discussion determines its democratic value as this privileges 
elite modes of communication. Dahlgren sees that online public spheres 
are important mainly because of how they draw in a wider array of 
people to form communities and thus subsequent mobilisation and 
debate becomes more signifi cant than deliberative consensus (2005, 
155-157; see also Cammaerts & Audenhove 2005). Thus these clas-
sifi cations based on individual political engagement do not allow for 
the internet to be understood as a site or tool for the collective expres-
sion of contention and dissent. For this kind of analysis we need to 
turn to specifi c literature that looks at the uptake of the internet by 
social movements. 
FROM INTEREST GROUPS TO SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS USING THE INTERNET
 
There is now a well established literature that look at how existing of-
fl ine interest groups and social movement organisations have successfully 
harnessed the internet as a campaigning tool (for example, see Pickerill 
2003; Meikle 2002; Dahlgren and Olsson 2007; Calenda & Mosca 
2007 and Mosca in this volume). This literature tends to look at how 
the internet is used as a campaign tool for offl ine events such as the 2003 
anti-war protests (e.g. Carty and Onyett 2006), or by established and/or 
new offl ine organisations to reinforce their activist position (see Rolfe 
2005). For example, Pickerill (2003) researches diverse environmental 
organisations, from radical direct action protesters to the political lobby-
ing of Friends of the Earth, and demonstrates how they use the internet 
to broaden campaigns, forge new identities and create social change. 
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The literature looking at the interplay between the internet and 
social movements is broadly infl uenced by ideas of radical democracy 
and contentious social movements, and moves away from the consensus 
and deliberative orientation of much of the normative political partici-
pation literature cited in the previous section. Utilising ideas based on 
agonistic, radical democracy derived from the theorising of Chantal 
Mouffe (2000) it is easier to interpret the internet as a space for protest 
and disruption that challenges existing power relationships. Types of 
internet based action that fi t here include email protests, communica-
tion disruptions, spam attacks, site graffi ti and “cyberparody” such as 
culture jamming (see Dalhberg & Siapera 2007, 9). Lincoln Dahlberg 
(2007, 56) criticises deliberative approaches and alternatively offers 
three internet functions seen through the lens of radical democracy. 
First, that the internet provides space for members of groups who have 
marginalised opinions and ideas to develop “counter-publics”; second, 
the interactivity through the internet makes it possible for “politically 
diverse and geographically dispersed” groups to fi nd shared points of 
identity and create shared “oppositional discourses”; and third, the 
internet is able to support both online and offl ine counter-publics to 
contest dominant ideas and discourses “and hence the contestation of 
the deliberations of the mainstream public sphere” (See also Paltemaa; 
Jordan in this volume) . 
When these arguments are coupled with the nascent literature 
that looks at emergent forms of (mainly) internet only collective action 
some authors now argue that we ought to alter our entire perception 
and analysis of contemporary forms of collective action and social 
mobilisation (see Flanagin et al. 2006; Carty & Onyett 2006; Clark 
& Themudo 2006). 
My research is concerned with an Australian organisation, GetUp 
that ‘mimics’ social movement action but is based online and uses 
liberal mechanisms to channel citizens opinions to decision-makers. 
Its obvious counterpart is MoveOn in the USA; an online organisa-
tion that has social movement origins and has been characterised 
as “attempt(ing) to combine net activism with meaningful political 
engagement” (Carty & Onyett 2006, 243). Andrew Chadwick (2007) 
has developed two useful concepts with which to analyse MoveOn: 
“organisational hybridity” and “repertoire switching”. The concept of 
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organisational hybridity is used to demonstrate that MoveOn can not 
be classifi ed simply using traditional organisational labels to understand 
collective action and mobilisation: 
“MoveOn sometimes behaves like an interest group, sometimes like 
a social movement, sometimes like the wing of a traditional party 
during an election campaign. Such organizational types could not 
work without the internet because the technologies set up complex 
interactions between the online and offl ine environment and the 
organisational fl exibility required for fast ‘repertoire switching’ within 
a single campaign or from one campaign to the next” (Chadwick 
2007, 284). 
The focus on strategic repertoires is central to social movement theo-
rising and Chadwick argues that the political use of the internet can 
represent uniting of “democratic experimentalism” with “non-hierarchi-
cal” social movements (Chadwick 2007, 285). The idea of “switching” 
mainly pertains to the blend of institutionally focused actions with a 
movement and broader public (or, “entrepreneurial”) focus. It can also 
be seen in the blend of both offl ine and online strategies (ibid., 286). 
Chadwick also suggests that internet-based organisational hybridity 
enables mobilisation of citizens new to participation, especially young 
people, and that traditional and hierarchical participatory forms will 
be challenged to change their practices (ibid., 297). 
In sum, it will be important to assess in this chapter whether, fi rst, 
in analysis of GetUp’s strategic repertoire we can confi rm both liberal 
and radical democratic elements (as Chadwick would expect) in its 
use of the internet campaigning, while it largely sidesteps consensus-
oriented communitarian and deliberative internet functions. Second, 
to illustrate whether organisational hybridity is operationalised though 
GetUp and whether there it represents a mobilisation of citizens new 
to political engagement and participation. 
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METHODOLOGY
The study employed a mixed qualitative and quantitative methodologi-
cal approach and included four research techniques: semi-structured 
interviews, website analysis, media analysis (both traditional and new, 
ie. blogs) and original survey data with GetUp participants, conducted 
in August 2006. In detail these were:
 Interviews with three initiators and/or major creative infl uences 
on the organisation. They were either paid staff or Board mem-
bers. These interviews were conducted in-person in mid 2006, 
they were recorded and mostly transcribed. This part of the re-
search had Human Research Ethics approval, and the interviewees 
are anonymous for the purposes of this chapter. The interviewees 
ranged in age from 25 to 35, and were two men and one woman. 
Direct quotes from the interviews are used to illustrate analysis 
throughout.
 Site analysis involved an in-depth examination of the types of 
interactivity found on the site, and a listing of all political cam-
paigns from mid 2005 to mid 2007. 
 Mainstream media analysis was used to identify the agenda set
ting roles and recognition of GetUp. This mainly meant col-
lecting newspaper articles on the organisation and the individu-
als involved from the Factiva media search engine, from mid 
2005-mid 2006. However, also included here are discussions of 
the organisation on high profi le blogs and in broadcast media 
transcripts. 
 Survey results from a questionnaire that was sent to all site users 
in September 2006. I co-designed the questionnaire with GetUp 
staff and board members and was able to include questions of 
interest to me such as on the participatory backgrounds of the 
individual site users. Only the results on demographic and par-
ticipatory backgrounds are discussed here. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF GETUP, CAMPAIGNS AND STRATEGIC REPERTOIRE
 
GetUp is an overtly political, campaign-based website. It is auspiced 
and funded by donations from individuals and the Australian union 
movement, and acts in coalition with progressive NGOs. It does 
not provide direct services. It represents itself as acting on behalf of 
‘progressive Australians’ over issues currently being debated by the 
federal government.
GetUp was established in early-2005 by Jeremy Heimans and 
Dave Madden, two young Australians who had been working in the 
USA on similar internet based campaigning through Moveon.org. For 
the set-up they worked in close association with union groups such as 
Unions NSW. While their ongoing total revenue is unclear an article on 
Workers Online stated that GetUp had raised $1.5 million by August 
2005 from a variety of unions and individuals who identifi ed with 
progressive politics (see http://workers.labor.net.au/275/news6_getup.
html), another radio interview transcript report has GetUp’s executive 
director stating that they were able to fundraise $500,000 between July 
2006 and July 2007 (see http://www.abc.net.au/sundayprofi le/stories/
s1972998.htm?backyard). GetUp interviewees stated that they do not 
accept funding from political parties or government agencies, and that 
most of their funding is from individual supporters. They were also 
adamant that funding does not “buy” campaigning priorities. 
One interviewee described the original vision of GetUp as a 
movement of movements: 
“The initial intentions were to build alliances between the liberal 
middle class and the working class as political constituencies that 
have often been pitted against each other, yet they can be brought 
together in a political movement. And the thought was that if we 
had some sort of consistent organisation, where people who are 
politicised by individual movements can join something that would 
sustain their political engagement more broadly, then that would 
be a really important element of civil society activity in Australia” 
(Interviewee 1). 
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The organisation is structured around a small core of paid staff, led 
by Executive Director Brett Solomon who has a long history of paid 
work in non-government organisations such as Oxfam and Amnesty. 
There is a volunteer program and individuals are often recruited to 
work on particular campaigns, especially when offl ine work is needed. 
The Board, according to interviewees, advises on funding, community 
profi le and strategic development. Initially the Board was purpose-
fully constructed as multi-partisan, including activists who were also 
members of the Australian Labor Party (ALP), the Australian Greens 
and the Liberal Party. The sole Liberal, former federal party leader 
John Hewson, left soon after launch; and more recently two ALP 
Board members, Bill Shorten and Evan Thornley, left as soon as they 
were pre-selected for parliamentary seats. It is unclear who has joined 
the Board as replacements or even how the Board have an ongo-
ing role setting strategic direction for the organisation now that the 
number of paid staff has grown. It is very diffi cult to obtain current 
accurate information on staff or board composition, or revenue total 
and sources. This non-transparent position, which is not unlike that 
of many political campaigning organisations, has nevertheless created 
controversy for GetUp (see Milne 2007).  
There were 27 GetUp campaigns in its fi rst two years of opera-
tion. They covered a broad diversity of progressive issues ranging from 
international issues such as climate change and the War in Iraq; to more 
Australian specifi c campaigns such as the repatriation of David Hicks 
from Guantanamo Bay, funding of the national media broadcaster 
(ABC) and indigenous health; to a very infrequent local area campaign 
target such the saving of ancient rock carvings in western Australia. 
There are varying ways of interpreting the success of these cam-
paigns. GetUp itself seems to measure success in terms of whether it 
achieves its legislative outcome. Thus some of the thresholds for the 
campaigns are set reasonably low. That is, rather than the “Politics 
out of Medicine” campaign outcome being set as changing govern-
ment policy to fully legalise abortion in all circumstances and with 
all internationally available means the campaign focused on creating 
legislative change that would see the feasibility of introducing RU486 
in Australia taken out of the hands of the federal Health Minister 
(Tony Abbott, an avowed conservative Catholic) and given to the 
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government medical regulatory agency, the Therapeutic Goods As-
sociation (TGA). Subsequently, this campaign was recognised as both 
a successful and interesting campaign by GetUp insiders and by the 
media (see Khadem 2006)1. This was especially important to GetUp 
itself because of the relationship it formed with other activist groups 
who specialise in this issue, mainly Reproductive Choice Australia the 
peak umbrella group. These relationships with expert issue groups are 
seen to legitimise and augment the campaign with each actor playing 
a signifi cant role:
“In a sense it was the perfect partnership, we had the infrastructure 
and the membership base, they had the expertise and the credibility 
and by combining those elements we were able to produce both a 
high level lobbying campaign directed by them and a broad based 
mobilisation campaign directed by us”. (Interviewee 3). 
Success can also be measured by a high profi le, especially through main-
stream media, of an eventually successful campaign. One interviewee 
acknowledged what the selectivity in campaign choice and prospects 
for success were based on: 
 
“Winnable campaigns are in the media, where there is current discus-
sion, where there’s awareness of some of the issues, (then) we can really 
be a ‘value add’. More so than necessarily raising an issue that’s not in 
current debate and where its much more diffi cult” (Interviewee 1). 
An example of this kind of campaign was the long but very high pro-
fi le campaign to have Australian citizen David Hicks released from 
Guantanamo Bay, “Defend Australian Rights”. GetUp’s campaign was 
multi-faceted as seen in the types of both online and offl ine action 
pursued, listed in Table 1. Mainstream media championed the agenda 
setting role GetUp played in this campaign and suggested that their 
1. Interestingly this is the main campaign I have been involved in as a participant. I 
sent an email to my local member (from the ALP) to urge him to vote yes for the 
right to consider RU486 by the TGA; and I sent a congratulatory email to the 
leader of the historically signifi cant, cross party, all women coalition (Lyn Allison 
of the Democrats) that was driving the yes campaign within parliament. I have 
since been added to e-newsletters of both parties! 
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campaign was able to broaden the issue of David Hicks beyond Al 
Qaeda and terrorism to focus it on domestic legal issues: “This is not 
really about David Hicks at all; it is about justice and about the fact 
that our Government and the US Government have systematically 
denied the rights of an Australian citizen to a fair trial.” (Brett Solo-
mon GetUp Executive Director quoted in Stewart 2007). The GetUp 
campaign was both praised (see Stewart 2007) and denigrated (Bolt 
2007) for its re-framing of David Hicks through visual imagery as a 
“mischievous boy”.
Success of a campaign can also be understood by the sheer large 
numbers that are able to be mobilised within the campaign. When 
the information is made available there seem to be about 30,000 
of the members involved in each campaign. This supports the idea 
promoted by the organisation that people will only become involved 
when it is a campaign that is important to them. Or it could mean 
that these 30,000 are the same people and are active on all campaigns? 
The campaign that has successfully mobilised the most people was  the 
“No Child in Detention” campaign that obtained 100,000 signatories, 
with successful visuals of a television ad with a well know Australian 
actor, Jack Thompson, and used skywriting of ‘Just vote no’ above 
parliament house (Cica 2006). It was also a successful campaign as 
after the broad pressure the government dropped the bill to do with 
offshore processing of asylum seekers, rather than let it be defeated 
by the vote in the Senate. 
There are two interesting example of failed campaigns where the 
GetUp leadership chose to run on issues of central importance to them 
but had much less resonance with the broader public, the media, poli-
ticians of both major parties and possibly even GetUp’s membership 
itself (especially in comparison to broader and well supported issues 
such as workplace relations and climate change). That is, the hoped for 
legislative change was not achieved and to a certain degree was stymied 
by bipartisan neglect of the issue. These campaigns were the recent 
“Equal before the law” campaign for example, in a local gay and lesbian 
newspaper, Sydney Star Observer, article the executive director suggests 
that it was diffi cult to ensure internal support to run this campaign 
(see http://www.ssonet.com.au/display.asp?ArticleID=6713) and the 
diffi culty of shifting bipartisan intransigence on gay and lesbian rights 
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(see Schubert 2007). Their fi rst campaign “Put communities fi rst” 
about voluntary student unionism is another example of where the 
lack of traction of what was portrayed as a privileged students’ issue 
stalled any success (see O’Keefe 2005).
GetUp’s primary tactics are focused on using the internet to take 
action rather than, at this stage, creating communitarian online or 
offl ine space for forums, discussion or deliberation. Similar to other 
political campaigning organisations GetUp focuses largely on media 
work: creating advertisements for the internet and television (e.g. using 
the high profi le Australian actor Jack Thompson for a television ad 
on children in detention), doing broadcast and print interviews, and 
funding photograph-worthy stunts (e.g. sky message over Federal Par-
liament on legislation on offshore processing of asylum applications). 
This approach exemplifi es the type of “repertoire switching” described 
by Chadwick (2007). It also demonstrates that GetUp is probably most 
similar to an offl ine organisation such as Greenpeace that is similarly 
top-down in its management style and focuses on movement–oriented 
campaign actions, rather than on building a democratic and delibera-
tive political space. Nevertheless, the building of online and offl ine 
political relationships, as well as their distinctive approach to campaign 
issues, are seen as fundamental to the organisation: 
“The online creates a network and offl ine provokes discussion. It’s like 
the media in a way, the online puts issues on the agenda, and offl ine 
they are debated and discussed and people maybe are politicised. 
And the beauty of having a multi issue thing is even if the issue of 
refugees isn’t the thing that activates you, it might be ABC funding, 
or it might be the rights at work campaign” (Interviewee 1). 
Once GetUp has decided upon an issue they seek out experts in the 
fi eld and gain assistance in running the campaign. Interviewee 2 
described these relationships as providing intellectual capacity to the 
organisation and giving GetUp greater legitimacy, with organisations 
bringing the brand name and the expertise, and GetUp reframing 
the issue and creating action. Background information is provided 
on issues and members are advised to either write an email, letter or 
make a phone call to either their local MP, MPs and Senators relevant 
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for the particular issue, or individuals such as, recently, conservative 
but sometimes dissenting minor party Senators: Barnaby Joyce (of 
the National Party) and Steve Fielding (of Family First). There is very 
little prescription by GetUp of the exact content of emails so as to 
not appear as chain mail. 
Most of the campaigns have been based on facilitating communi-
cation between MPs and their constituents, through the information 
aggregation capacity of websites to send emails and petitions. Where 
these campaigns differ from offl ine forms of individualised action, 
such as petitions, is in their sometimes disruptive, protest and large-
scale orientation. For example, one interviewee characterised it as an 
alternative form of protest organisation that has a larger reach: 
“The number of people who participate in a rally or organise a rally is 
certainly different to the membership base of GetUp, which is much 
broader, because its got a very low threshold for participation. You 
don’t need to know the right organisation or to have been involved 
in the student movement for years or have an activist identity to get 
involved in GetUp. You just need to have a very broad concern and 
probably get introduced to the organisation on the web or through the 
media, or through a common interest concern.” (Interviewee 1). 
GetUp also prioritises the internet as it provides timeliness and ease 
of access for doing politics rather that for creating community specifi c 
space. The interviewee quoted below emphasised that participation in 
the mainly online actions undertaken by GetUp provides a more time 
convenient and fl exible alternative to being an “activist”:
“GetUp has a role in developing more fl exible modes of participa-
tion that enable a broader group of people to become involved by 
lowering the barriers for political engagement. …in today’s structure 
of work and life people need more fl exible opportunities for politi-
cal participation, not everyone wants to be an activist, but a lot of 
people want to be involved on a less regular and a more informal 
basis” (Interviewee 3).
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There has been substantial mainstream media interest in the organisa-
tion and a lot of debate about its legitimacy as a political actor. GetUp 
has been characterised as providing a ‘hi-tech political campaign’ with 
a ‘new internet lobbying tool’ (Farr 2005); and also a ‘highly organised 
and well-funded lobby group’ (Dodson 2005). There have been fi ery 
and hostile reactions from Coalition politicians (as befi ts disruptive 
movement oriented politics), and suspicion from existing progressive 
groups (mainly through on-line blogs, see Bahnisch 2005). For exam-
ple Liberal MP Andrew Robb described their actions as ‘irresponsible 
and it’s spam’ (Kelly 2005); Senator Eric Abetz stated that changes 
in campaigning style from emails to TV ads were an admission by 
GetUp that their ‘spam campaign’ had been ‘ineffective’ (Karvelas 
2005). Abetz also unsuccessfully referred the organisation to the AEC 
to force it to disclose its donors by claiming that it was an Associated 
Entity of the ALP (AEC 2005).
The participatory role of members in directing the organisation 
toward, and the type of action taken on, specifi c campaigns is minimal. 
Interviewee 3 sees a place for more interactive online engagement, 
gaining member input on issue creation, and increasing a sense of 
involvement. In late 2006 the organisation conducted its fi rst poll of 
site users to establish future campaign priorities. The poll asked the 
users to rate their priority level for about 15 campaigns, but climate 
change was overwhelmingly seen as the issue to be followed for GetUp’s 
next major campaign and was subsequently developed. It was also the 
fi rst campaign that started to try and build offl ine community groups 
by creating climate change action groups in local areas. It is too early 
to evaluate the success of this move to offl ine action for this specifi c 
campaign agenda. However, interviewee 3 also suggested that being 
more interactive and member-oriented must fi t with the organisation’s 
mandate. Some form of top down structure will need to remain, as 
GetUp does not intend to become ‘another online community of 
interest’. 
“I think that it’s an enormously useful tool and it’s a powerful new 
medium, but I don’t think the internet is going to redefi ne the way 
politics takes place in contemporary society. I think it’s obviously go-
ing to become people’s fi rst source of information about politics, as 
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its people’s fi rst source of information about most things these days, 
but I don’t think it’s actually going to completely reform political 
participation in its image” (Interviewee 3). 
It is clear that Chadwick’s (2007) notions of organisational hybridity 
and selectivity in strategic repertoires are seen in GetUp’s practices as 
they move between traditional interest group activities of lobbying 
parliamentarians to more disruptive practices and media work more 
often used by social movement organisations. It would be incorrect 
however to characterise GetUp as a fl at, grassroots organisation. The 
hierarchy and decision-making structure within the organisation is 
central in its day to day operations. Campaign topic and strategic 
repertoire decisions are made among the small core of paid staff in 
the organisation rather than by the membership. One of Chadwick’s 
criteria for organisational hybridity is the tendency for internet based 
groups to confl ate the idea of supporters and members (ibid. 2007, 
288; see also Mosca and Calenda & Meijer in this volume). In this 
reassessment members are now no longer formal, paid-up subscribers, 
as in traditional political forms such as parties, but can simply be those 
who have signed up to a particular web campaign. This is the case with 
GetUp in that they claim to have nearly 200,000 ‘members’ but very 
few of these contribute funding to, or volunteer for, the organisation 
nor necessarily have a formal ongoing allegiance to it. 
Referring back to the initial typology GetUp is best classifi ed as 
a liberal site using the internet for both individual focussed conversa-
tion and information aggregation functions through targeted email 
and petition campaigns and blogging. Most other liberal sites tend to 
be top down e-governance initiatives that enable citizens to contact 
decision-makers. GetUp, however, has a broader movement orienta-
tion that is more akin to highly organised, direct action campaigns 
undertaken at the grassroots (similar to media savvy Greenpeace stunts). 
Thus we can also see a radical democracy underpinning, described by 
Dahlberg (2007), in trying to create a ‘counter-public’ that challenges 
the dominant discourse of conservative politics in Australia. The 
organisation sets up a campaign agenda and its coordinated input at 
a large scale is often unwelcome and disruptive, as was seen in some 
media and political commentary above. Its creators are wary of facili-
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tating an inward looking communitarian focussed site, and are more 
interested in a broad based movement for change rather than online 
space for deliberation and consensus building. 
The next section will use original survey data to unpack whether 
GetUp’s ‘counter-public’ is actually mobilising citizens new to political 
participation and engagement. 
SURVEY ANALYSIS
The survey was sent out to GetUp members using the online survey 
tool Survey Monkey in September 2006. Some of the questions were 
on future campaigns and strategies to be used by the organisation but 
due to confi dentiality agreements are not reported here. The results 
reported on here, however, gives us a sense of the backgrounds of 
respondents and their previous experiences of political participation. 
There were 17,500 legitimate responses. The survey notifi cation was 
sent out to all email addresses (approximately 140,000 at the time) 
in the GetUp member database and was available to fi ll in on-line 
for at most two weeks. This mass mail out was not ideal for achiev-
ing a representative response rate, but it can be surmised that those 
who fi lled the survey in were those who were most committed to the 
ideals of GetUp. Further, if the argument above is accepted, that the 
routinely active component of GetUp subscribers probably ranges 
from 30-50,000 individuals, then this is a very large and potentially 
representative sample size. 
Only simple descriptive analysis of the results is included in this 
chapter. The demographics and Tables below demonstrate that the 
respondents are generally a distinctive, highly educated and politicised 
(and left wing) sub-section of the Australian population. 
 59% of the sample were women, and 36% men, 5% didn’t an
swer the question. In the general Australian population 51% of 
the population are female (ABS 2007). 
 The median age of the sample is in the 35-49 age group; and the 
mode is 50-64. 25% of the sample is under 34; 30% aged 35-
49; 33% are 50-64 and 12% are 65+. In the general Australian 
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population the median age is 37 (ABS 2007). This suggests that 
GetUp participants are older then the general population and 
thus the organisation is not mobilising signifi cant numbers of 
young people at this stage. 
 The sample is highly educated as only 10% have no post-school 
qualifi cation. 76% have a diploma, bachelors or postgraduate degree 
from university. The Australian population has at most 29% who 
have a tertiary qualifi cation (Tiffen and Gittins 2004, 118). 
 Only 28% of the sample have children aged under 18 living in 
their household, and this probably refl ects the overall older profi le 
of the survey respondents.  
 75% of the sample was born in Australia; with a further 11% 
born in the UK; 64% of the respondents mothers were also born 
in Australia and the next largest country of birth was the UK 
(15%); 60% of the respondents fathers were also born in Australia 
and the next largest country of birth was also the UK (16%). Less 
than 1% of the sample was from an indigenous background. In 
the general Australian population 2.3% are indigenous. Similarly 
to the sample, 22% in the Australian population  were born 
overseas (ABS 2007). 
 The vast majority of the sample access the internet at home (86%); 
50% access it at work as well; a small group (10%) have internet 
access at university or school. In the general population 36% of 
households do not have an internet connection (ABS 2007). 
The members were asked about what other organisations they were 
a member of, as seen in Table 1 below. Overall GetUp members are 
more likely to have been a member of a collective group (especially 
environmental, charity, professional groups and political parties) than 
the general population. However there are several notable fi ndings in 
that there is a larger proportion of the general population who are in 
a sporting groups and trade union membership is the same among 
GetUp members and the general population. Unsurprisingly, given 
the progressive agenda of GetUp, you will fi nd more farmers and busi-
ness organisation members in the general population than in GetUp. 
Overall only 22% of GetUp respondents were not members of any 
of these organisations; 24% were a member of just one and another 
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24% were a member of two organisations; the remaining 30% were 
a member of three or more organisations. 
Table 1. Pressure group involvements 

































( source: Australian population fi gures from 2004 Australian Election Study). 
The members were also asked about what types of non-GetUp based 
forms of participation they had engaged in over the last fi ve years. This 
table shows that among GetUp members there are more or less no 
individuals who have not participated in any kind of political action 
before. This is in distinctive contrast to the general population who 
have had much less participatory experience in the last fi ve years. The 
distinctiveness of the GetUp population is seen through their prior 
engagement with web-based petitioning, as in contrast only a very 
small section of the population has done this. The other notable differ-
ences are in protest and contacting a politician, with GetUp members 
much more likely to have done these in the last fi ve years. This shows 
a diversity in political experience of both traditional interest group 
strategies lobbying, coupled with the social movement strategy of 
protest attendance. This prior experience of the respondents probably 
facilitates the “repertoire switching” an organisations such as GetUp 
is able to engage in. 
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(Source: Australian population fi gures from 2004 Australian Election Study). 
The next few tables show, unsurprisingly, that GetUp as a self labelled 
progressive organisation attracts individuals with both a progressive 
party and leftwing identifi cation. The party they identify with is ei-
ther the Australian Labor Party (ALP) or the Australian Greens. The 
number of those with no professed party identifi cation is very similar 
in the general population; and there is not a large difference in general 
strength of party identifi cation either; however the general population 
are slightly more likely to have a very strong identifi cation than GetUp 
members. Only 4% of respondents did not answer this question. 
Table 3. Party identifi cation and GetUp members























Table 4. strength of party identifi cation 
Strength of 













(Source: Australian population fi gures from 2004 Australian Election Study). 
Furthermore, as shown below GetUp members are also more likely 
to place themselves further to the left on a left (=0)-right (=10) scale 
than the general population. The median point is 2, and the average 
is 2.6. Only 7% did not answer this question. 
Scale:     0        1        2     3        4        5        6        7         8        9     10
GetUp:     9%     16%    30%    23%    9%    9%  2%    1%      1% -       -
Oz pop:    2%       1%      4%      9%  10%   38%  9%   10%     9%    3%    5%
(Source: all general Australian population fi gures used for party and left-right identi-
fi cation are from the Australian Election Study 2004) 
These survey fi ndings contradict Chadwick’s supposition that new 
internet organisations like GetUp (and very similar to MoveOn) are 
mobilising sections of the population new to participatory engagement. 
Instead, it seems that GetUp is a new progressive internet-based space 
that reinforces the existing offl ine practices of a progressive and highly 
politicised subsection of the population. 
CONCLUSION
GetUp is a progressive internet based organisation that focuses on 
creating actions for political change. It is a largely top-down organisa-
tion that mobilises members around specifi c institutionally focussed 
campaign agendas. It does not, despite the existence of a blog, to a 
large extent successfully engage in the community-building, consensus 
Table 5. left–right position
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building or deliberation found on other internet sites focussed on 
inculcating democracy. 
Characteristic to most of GetUp’s campaign are six factors: they 
are focused on creating institutionally-based political change; they 
build relationships with offl ine NGOs; they pick campaign targets 
and outcomes that are seen as winnable rather than based on broader 
idealistic concerns; they re-frame political debate and often set the 
agenda on particular issues; the numbers of people they mobilise, like 
any protest movement, are important to seeing success; and they will 
use celebrity fi gures when appropriate to enhance their campaign ac-
tion. Confi rming Chadwick (2007) it is this conscious use of repertoire 
switching and organisational hybridity that makes GetUp novel and 
innovative. That is, it undertakes social movement-like mobilisations 
in online political spaces, prioritising new and varied technological 
means of information distribution and communication. 
The issues GetUp campaigns on, however, are rarely specifi c to 
the online world and are connected with simultaneous offl ine action 
run by (and sometimes with) other campaign groups. Thus they are 
joining with these group to facilitate an activist ‘counter-public’ in 
discursive opposition to Australia’s conservative political environment. 
GetUp does not create this space alone but in tandem with other 
NGOs as part of a broad progressive social movement. The survey of 
GetUp members also reveals that despite the claims of many commen-
tators this type of on-line organisation does not really mobilise new 
participants. Instead it serves as a convenient mechanism to reinforce 
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a complement to good legislation?
“The centuries-old method of lawmaking by legislature requires 
debate and deliberation, takes opposition views into account, crafts 
compromises, and thus produces laws that are regarded as legitimate 
even by people who disagree with them. Politics did not work well 
when kings ruled by fi at and it does not work well when the people 
do the same.”  F. Zakaria (2003, 196).
INTRODUCTION
Though implementation of ICTs within public institutions has co-
incided, at fi rst, with process restructuring and department- or serv-
ice- level reorganisation, a growing awareness has gradually emerged 
concerning the potential value of ICTs for an increased (e-)Participation 
of constituencies in the political decision-making process. Require-
ments for this do not only include the establishment of mechanisms 
for the expression of a “separate judgement” by interested people (with 
respect to their elected representatives), but also the settlement of 
conditions for a timely, informed and responsible judgement, that are 
defi nitely harder to achieve. However, the potential contrast between 
“representative” and “participatory” democracy needs to be further 
clarifi ed, in several respects:
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 to set the stage for a “reasoned” juridical survey of the national 
legislation allowing, in each EU country, more or less advanced 
forms of stakeholders’ involvement in the defi nition and evalu-
ation of policy targets and initiatives;
 to explore the technological, social and institutional conditions 
enabling the current “best practices” of e-Democracy at EU level 
to be turned into stable components of a Participatory Legisla-
tive Process;
 to comment on the potential links between public administration 
performance and the participation of citizens, not just in politi-
cal decision making, but in a broader effort for a better quality 
of life.
In recent times, most EU-25 Member States have experienced three ba-
sic trends of institutional and operational change (see EU CoR 2004):
 A (legislative and/or administrative) devolution process from 
central Government to the regional and local levels focusing on 
socio-economic imbalances and divergences between different re-
gions of the same country, and thus on decentralised responsibility 
in the management of local economic and social development;
 A long wave of Public Administration reforms (e.g. Wollmann
2004), aimed at modernising or “reinventing” Government on 
the basis of “business-like” criteria such as quality of service and 
value for money, i.e. effi ciency, effectiveness, and economy. This 
also responded to a call for greater transparency and accountability 
of Government bodies in the management of public resources 
and the fulfi lment of collective interests and goals;
 The launch and piloting of projects, both centrally and at regional 
and local levels, for the computerisation of Public Administra-
tion, by means of a wider and more intensive use of Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICTs) “as a tool to achieve 
better government”, in line with the OECD (2003a) defi nition 
of e-Government (see OECD). This has helped to deliver ef-
fi ciencies across the public sector, through the combination of 
ICT investment with organisational change of the back-offi ce 
and the acquisition of new skills, as well as a reduction in the 
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cost of administrative transactions and regulatory compliance for 
Government “customers”.
While the implementation of ICTs in public institutions had been 
basically related to the trends mentioned above, a growing awareness 
has gradually emerged concerning the potential value of ICTs for an 
increased (e-)Participation of constituencies in the political (decision-
making) process (cf. Introduction and Lehtonen in this volume).
Incentives to democratic participation have taken the initial form 
of the generic provision of online information to citizens through 
Government’s telematic portals, responding to the elementary axiom 
that without an increased transparency on the public administration 
operation, there can be no real progress towards e-Democracy (see 
OECD 2001). Then there have been the following: the fi rst open 
and/or (un)moderated e-panels and online discussion fora, some elec-
tronic vote trials, up to the special concertative procedures connected 
with the drafting of new legislation or the evaluation of economic 
and social policies.
Trying to summarise these developments, Ann Macintosh (2004) 
developed a simple taxonomy to evaluate the actual “level of democratic 
(e-)Participation” in a political context:
Figure 1. The evolutionary process towards e-Democracy
At the fi rst level, technology is seen as the enabler of people’s par-





availability/“understandability” of the information provided by Gov-
ernments to citizens.
At a higher level, ICTs can be used to involve (engage) citizens in 
a top-down consultation process, aiming to support legislation drafting 
or consensus decisions on policy issues.
Finally, citizens empowerment occurs whenever active participa-
tion and the emergence of bottom-up ideas and proposals are facilitated 
and allowed to infl uence the political decision making agenda; in our 
increasingly knowledge-based societies, this could also be seen as a 
way to stop or reverse the “dismal” tendency of people to disengage 
from the political process and the formal democratic (i.e. elective and 
representative) institutions.
In the UK, an independent inquiry by an experts’ commission, 
published in February 2006 after 18 months of investigation con-
ducted across the Country (see power inquiry), has put in evidence 
the strong contradiction between the growing popularity of charities, 
NGOs and other similar forms of community life and social work, on 
the one hand, and the falling rates of participation in political parties 
and democratic elections, on the other.
 
“The cause is not apathy. The problem is that we don’t feel we have 
real infl uence over the decisions made in our name. The need for a 
solution is urgent. And that solution is radical. Nothing less than 
a major programme of reform to give power back to the people of 
Britain...”
The inquiry concludes with three major recommendations that would 
be tantamount to shifts in current political practice, not just in the 
UK, but also in other democracies of the Western World:
 A rebalancing of power away from the “executive” and “unac
countable” bodies towards the “elected” and “accountable” ones 
(i.e. Parliament and local Government); 
 Introducing “greater responsiveness and choice” into the electoral 
and party systems; 
 Allowing citizens “a much more direct and focused say” over 
political decisions and policies.
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The underlying argument looks quite clear: disengagement is seen as 
the result of a perceived “ineffectiveness” of deeper personal involve-
ment in public life. 
However, we must be careful with causal relations in social sci-
ences. Evidence about political (and civic) disengagement is confi rmed 
by other independent sources, some of them commented on in a 
famous book by Robert Putnam (2000), who correlated the decline 
in democratic participation (elections and political parties) in the US, 
with a long term cultural shift from social and civic engagement to a 
more personal (selfi sh or small-groups-oriented) attitude of American 
individuals and households.
But clearly through this same evidence, the argument above might 
be reversed: because of political disengagement, “the few” and not 
“the many” do exercise the most successful pressure over the political 
agenda, making the marginal contribution from a single willing person 
totally ineffective.
As an example, a negative correlation has been detected by some 
scholars – like J. T. Hamilton (1995) - between the location of hazard-
ous waste plants and the level of political engagement in local com-
munities. Holding other factors constant, it is less likely that a plant 
of such a kind would be located in a neighbourhood where families 
own their homes and people vote in the elections, than in the case 
they mostly rent and rarely vote. The reason is straightforward: neither 
will local politicians run the risk of losing the next term by taking an 
unpopular decision, nor will a company decide to spend time and 
money on convincing an “aggressive”, self-defendant local populace. 
Another recent trend of modern democracies (especially from 
Southern Europe and the Far East, but with contaminations in the 
US as well) is known as plebiscitarianism or TV-based politics. Leaders 
emerge from the political arena and exploit the power of mass-media; 
they sometimes manage to get visibility and consensus, in spite of 
their often generic and contradictory agenda. By focusing on very 
narrow issues, referring to business-like decision making practices 
and invoking the need to “revitalise” the slow paced rituality of “old 
fashioned” legislatures, these plebiscitary leaders put Governments 
and representative democracy institutions under tight pressure with 
quite a solid argument: that further efforts are needed to improve the 
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effi ciency and performance of Public Administration, as well as its 
“accountability” towards the citizens. However, citizenship is not a 
spectator sport:
“TV-based politics is to political action as watching ER is to saving 
someone in distress. Just as one cannot restart a heart with one’s re-
mote control, one cannot jump-start republican citizenship without 
direct, face-to-face participation” (Putnam 2000, 341). 
As a matter of fact, some are tempted to see electronic voting as the 
real challenge for enhancing people’s control over policy makers. In 
contrast, it seems worth mentioning here the puzzling results of on-
line voting in the state of California, as reported by Fareed Zakaria 
(2003). In one single year, the people of California were asked to vote 
electronically on more than 200 pieces of legislation, but this instead 
of opening up a new perspective to participatory democracy, has sim-
ply turned out in the creation of “a jumble of laws, often contradictory, 
without any of the debate, deliberation, and compromise that characterize 
legislation” (see Zakaria 2003, 194). In short, “if California truly is the 
wave of tomorrow, then we have seen the future, and it does not work” 
(ibid., 191 – Echoes of this standpoint will be bouncing back again 
in section 3 when I will discuss the “paradox of scale”).
Can e-Democracy be the response to such complex and urgent 
needs? Will the use of ICTs help to reverse the trend towards disen-
gagement and allow citizens new forms of participation in the policy 
making and legislative process, more or less the same way the Internet 
is radically changing the forms of communication and interaction 
between the “connected” people? Though this perspective may look 
very appealing, many cast doubts on it.
For instance, a well known OECD report (2003b, 9) drew the 
following lessons from the current experience of “online citizens’ in-
volvement” throughout Member Countries:
1. “Technology is the enabler not the solution”: the idea of adopting 
ICTs as drivers of (e-) Participation can be misleading, if not 
paralleled by some relevant institutional change in the Public 
Administration(s) involved; in other words, widely used terms like 
133
“e-consultation”, “online conference” or “discussion fora”, apart 
from the euphemistic commitments of some policy makers, do 
not necessarily imply that an underlying legislative framework 
exists to make room for goal-oriented discourses into the nor-
mative or administrative workfl ow, thus ensuring their potential 
impact on decisions. 
2. “Quantity does not mean quality”, with respect to the prior in for-
mation provided online to citizens by the Government(s); in a 
framework of e-Participation, the quality requirement must be 
assessed with respect to conditions like accessibility, relevance 
and utility to the citizens wishing to participate in, or simply to 
be informed on, public policy making; 
3. As a result, the main barriers to e-Democracy should be seen as
“cultural, organisational and constitutional not technological”, i.e. 
related to the introduction of new processes, methods and tools in 
the political and administrative practice, rather than the develop-
ment of more innovative or tailored ICT solutions.
In this chapter, I am providing a non-technical perspective on the 
current, intense work being carried out by IT experts and scholars 
in the topics of e-Democracy. I will start discussing the theoretical 
meaning of the term “participation”, going deep into three well known 
paradoxes that can arise out of a seamless application of the concept to 
the real practice of legislation in modern societies. Then I will make 
reference to an ongoing experience, namely the one of the Region of 
Tuscany (in Central Italy), to show an alternative pathway towards 
citizens’ involvement that is not undermining the fundamentals of 
representative democracy. My current standpoint is that we should not 
rely too much on e-Participation as a goal in itself, rather as a policy 
tool, enabling an increase in the transparency and accountability of 
(especially local) Governments.
Finally, I will examine the potential of the Living Labs concept, an 
innovative approach set forth in Northern Europe, through which all 
stakeholders potentially involved in a product, service or application 
development actively participate in its implementation as a seamless 
by-product of their “ordinary life” activities. Recent methodology re-
fl ections conducted within public sector reform processes have led to 
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a growing attention on systemic change and the evaluation problems 
thereof. It is my intention to show here that the Living Labs paradigm 
can be very helpful in reviving and consolidating the underpinnings 
of a citizens-focused, participatory performance measurement system 
that is more coherent with the increasingly “networked” confi guration 
of modern public administration and thus with the delicate equilib-
rium to be found between budget restrictions and quality assessment 
of “government reengineering processes”.   
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: the next section (2) 
provides a “working defi nition” of participatory legislation and related 
concepts and processes. Section 3 shows what are known in literature 
as three paradoxes of e-Participation and, more generally, of collec-
tive action. Echoes of those paradoxes are to be found in the OECD 
report as well as Zakaria’s analysis, but the power of my proposition 
is (apparently) to show in which directions these might be more eas-
ily solved. It will be shown that several potential links exist between 
Public Administration performance and participation of citizens, not 
just in political decision making, but in a broader effort for a better 
quality of life. In section 4 I have included a brief description of the 
Tuscany case while in section 5, a strong argument will be made in 
favour of the implementation of Living Labs into participatory con-
texts. Conclusions are drawn in section 6.
PARTICIPATION IN LEGISLATION
Generally speaking, a Participatory Legislative Process (henceforth: 
PLP) is defi ned as occurring whenever a public administration, either 
at national, regional or local level, is obliged (by an imperative norm) 
or committed (by voluntary mechanisms) to involve citizens’ partici-
pation in the process of legislation.
Recent refl ections conducted at EU level (see European Com-
mission 2006) have clarifi ed that the issue of participation can arise 
within four distinct stages of the legislative process: 
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1) policy formation (agenda setting and prior analysis); 
2) discussion of draft legislation; 
3) implementation of legislation; 
4) amendments and follow-up.
At all stages, requirements for a PLP do not only include the estab-
lishment of mechanisms for the expression of a “separate judgement” 
by actively interested people (with respect to their elected representa-
tives), but also the settlement of conditions for a timely, informed 
and responsible judgement, that are defi nitely harder to achieve. For 
instance, it is not that obvious that by allowing people to press a “yes 
– no” button on their remote control, as in the experience of traditional 
referenda, we should have fulfi lled the conditions for their responsible 
judgement. On the other hand, “adverse selection” mechanisms, very 
well known to economists, would apply in the case of the submission 
of a lengthy and complex online questionnaire to fulfi l the clarifi ca-
tion requirements of people’s ideas and preferences towards future 
legislation or issue management. There would be very few responses, 
usually provided by the most conscientious and educated, not neces-
sarily those primarily interested in that specifi c question.  
The evidence on e-Participation good practices collected by the EU 
e-Government Good Practice Framework (see http://www.ePractice.
eu) shows a great variety of activities – nationally, regionally and locally 
– which have in common a growing sense that there can be a “better 
way” of managing Government affairs and the relationship between 
citizens and Public Administration, enabled by ICTs (for some early 
examples see the table 1). 
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Table 1. European best practices in e-democracy
Country Topic Link
Denmark
A common platform 
for public debates 
















A multifunction Internet 
portal including news 
and discussions groups, 








Allowing citizens to cast 
their vote in any polling 

















A wide range of 




An e-panel composed of 
several hundred citizens,  




However, the wide variety of experiences shown here should not 
hide the “vicious circle” that is probably lying behind some (if not all) 
of them: with the due exceptions, as soon as they consist of partial 
trials and temporary experiments, no real, long-term impact will be 
produced; if we decided to turn the current “success stories” into stable 
practices of participatory legislation, other kinds of issue than solving 
the “technology viability” question would soon emerge. 
To clarify the issues at stake, and as a suggestion for future, inter-
disciplinary research, it would certainly be benefi cial to cross-read the 
European best practices of e-Democracy with a juridical survey of the 
legislation allowing, in each Country, more or less advanced forms of 
stakeholders’ involvement in the defi nition and evaluation of policy 
targets and initiatives.
For instance, since 1995 in France the «Barnier Law» on the topic 
of the environment, replaced in 2002 by Law No. 276 on «grassroots 
democracy» and the Decree No. 2175 on the organisation of public 
debates (“débats publics”), have established a National Commission with 
the specifi c purpose of managing huge stakeholders’ consultations on 
new projects of public works, well before the fi nal decision has been 
taken about them, i.e. at a moment where it is still possible to with-
draw them. These debates are supported by basic ICT services (like 
dedicated websites – e.g. http://www.debatpublic-iter.org) and other 
forms of publicity and usually involve citizens, associations, experts, 
public entities, etc. in supplying the widest information and allowing 
the maximum extent of evaluation and approval on the general and 
specifi c characteristics of the new project.
In short, a primary issue seems to assess the compliance of the 
e-Participation mechanism with the current institutional settings. 
To what extent are Governments already set to “listen to the voice of 
the people?” Which parts of the legislative process would need to be 
amended to make room for a “clear and real” contribution of external 
forces to public policy making? And how could implementation of a 
suitable ICT infrastructure could get to this contribution the dignity of 
a “timely and useful” participation by informed and interested people, 
so as to move a step ahead towards real citizens’ empowerment in the 
knowledge society? 
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The risk of “incremental decision making” (Lindblom 1959), if 
not “loosely coupling” with the principles of participatory democracy, 
can also be very signifi cant also in the most enlightened constitutions. 
Take the following example:
“Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic 
life of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly as possible and 
as closely as possible to the citizen” 
It’s art. 45-3 of the EU Draft Constitution. Should this mean (especially 
the fi rst paragraph) that the Community has adopted the model of 
participatory democracy, or is it just a matter (especially in the second 
sentence) of more “transparency” and “subsidiarity” (i.e. closeness to 
citizens) in the decision making process? It is not my intention to 
undermine the highest value of these themes for an enlarged Europe’s 
political agenda, but as we all have in mind the practice and results of 
some public consultations promoted by the European Commission, 
it is hard to share the view that they may have gone far beyond the 
strictest circle of the “already involved” and “more knowledgeable” 
stakeholders.
Of course there are good reasons to proceed in that way, one of 
which is to select (and thus restrict) the number and quality of the 
technical contributions to topics that often appear very specifi c and 
more often too complex for an ordinary person. This potential confl ict 
between “representativeness” of public opinion and “effectiveness” 
(or effi ciency) in the administrative process is another form taken by 
the “paradox of representativeness”, which I will examine in the next 
section of this chapter. 
Another crucial issue to explore is the social acceptability of a 
complex construction like the one that is implied by a truly effective 
(e-)Participation process. As long as we abandon the abstract and 
collective concept of “citizens” and start dealing with “individual” 
respondents (or contributors) to any specifi c consultation, a number 
of additional problems emerge. 
First of all, are we so sure that those we want to leave the fl oor to 
are the most likely “connected” and “available” to participate? Usually, 
they belong to the most affl uent sector of modern societies, if not also 
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to the most radical one (in either direction of political extremism, 
cf. Mosca in this volume). As a matter of fact, the seminal work of 
Mancur Olson (1971) has paved the way for several refl ections on the 
incentive that small sized, issue-based groups have to act politically in 
the presence of a passive majority having little to lose on an individual 
basis from a change in the public priorities agenda. Though Olson’s 
argument, which looks plausible at fi rst sight, did not stand up to 
close technical analysis (see Oliver & Marwell 1988), can a democracy 
based on such practices be considered as really democratic in the end? 
James Madison and other American Founders warned a lot about 
the “tyranny of the few”, blaming the so-called mischiefs of faction. 
This can seem a little bit strange in the current US experience, that 
is so dominated by the lobbying power of organised pressure groups; 
however, it is a well known fact from the theory of groups that while 
the many keep silent, the few can make enough noise as if they were, 
in fact, the majority. 
Secondly, and almost paradoxically, widely used terms like “e-
consultation”, “online conference”, “e-panel” or “discussion forum” 
do not mean that there is a methodological concept behind them that 
facilitates goal-oriented discourses and the provision of results poten-
tially impacting the public policy making process. Sometimes this is 
nicknamed as concertation; a particular decision making process that 
has been very popular in recent years in several Western Europe PAs, 
including the European Commission itself. Through concertation, it 
is possible to enact and fi nalise a law’s or group of laws’ provision, by 
means of the reciprocal mediation of public and private interests that 
would certainly be confl icting, were it not for the mutual composition 
realised in the name of a superior purpose or entity. Curiously enough, 
there has been no systematic attempt until now to formalise and rep-
resent the concertation workfl ow by means of ICT-based solutions. A 
good, yet local, exception seems to be the FA.SI. (Fare Sistema) project, 
run by the Provincial Administration of Massa-Carrara, Italy, and I am 
also aware of a similar initiative in the Hamburg Region, Germany. 
Apart from that, the most advanced parliamentary IT systems only 
include dedicated Intranet servers for collection and archival of draft 
laws and their attachments, with demilitarised zones and possibly SSL- 
secured transactions. In this scenario, but also in the simpler one of 
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purposefully circulated draft documentation through the stakeholders 
involved in the concertation process, one of the challenges for ICT 
research is to ensure the creation of a shared workfl ow environment, 
with a navigable information and knowledge repository for organis-
ing, storing, searching for and exchanging electronic-based content, 
to simplify the inherent complexity of concertative interactions and 
to ensure a deeper comprehension of new proposals’ implications by 
law-makers, enterprises and citizens alike. 
By integrating with existing IT infrastructure and web facilities in 
the Public Administration, this new system should ensure improved 
access to citizens (front-end) and civil servants (back-end) to drafts 
of legislation and their supporting documentation (e.g. foresight, 
impact analysis, costs and benefi ts, etc.). Besides its content manage-
ment functionalities, the new platform should allow the conducting 
of moderated online discourses on legislation proposals, involving 
policy makers, members elected, citizens, associations and other socio-
economic groups. Moderated online discourses enable interactive and 
asynchronous communication between large numbers of participants 
(see Introduction in this volume). The threshold to participation is 
quite low: users can contribute anonymously and spontaneously, they 
can participate actively or as observers, they can write contributions, 
take part in polls, ballots and surveys or communicate with other us-
ers on a peer-to-peer basis. Furthermore, people can form coalitions 
by getting in touch with like-minded people effortlessly and discuss 
certain topics or subtopics of mutual interest. These discourses are 
a promising approach for different target groups and frameworks. 
They can be set up for a broad public debate with a high number 
of yet unknown, anonymous people, as well as for discussions with 
representatives, stakeholders or delegates. Online discourses are not 
dependent on known and already committed participants. They are 
able to cope with a higher level of fl uctuation of participants like e.g. 
virtual working groups and at the same time are able to come to specifi c 
results. The basic idea is that the people are attracted by the ongoing 
discussion and their commitment to the particular community will 
have to develop during the course of the debate.
However, are we so confi dent that an ICT-based consultation or 
concertation system can reverse the long term slump in civic and politi-
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cal participation that has been identifi ed as “the” problem of our times? 
Many scholars cast doubt on this (e.g. Putnam 2000). Even the Power 
inquiry mentioned in the previous section could not avoid quipping: 
“Disengagement is not primarily the fault of politicians – the problem is 
systemic not personal”. Which means that it might not necessarily be 
technological either! As James Fishkin (1995) clearly stated: 
“The (real) problem of democratic reform is … how to bring people 
into the process under conditions where they can be engaged to think 
seriously and fully about public issues”. 
THREE PARADOXES OF PARTICIPATION: 
REPRESENTATIVENESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SCALE
Thomas P. (“Tip”) O’Neill, the long time Speaker of the US House of 
Representatives, asked if he thought the quality of people elected to 
Congress over thirty years had been better of worse, after a minute’s 
refl ection replied: “The quality is clearly better, much better. But the results 
are defi nitely worse”. This anecdote - quoted from Zakaria (2003), 165-
166 – well illustrates the apparently shared view that (e-)Participation 
can lead to better results in terms of “quality” of the legislation process. 
But what do we mean by “quality” in this case? I suppose this must have 
a lot to do with participation, or at least sharing of goals, views, actions 
and results with the more interested and informed stakeholders. That 
was, for instance, the opinion of the OECD (2001,  9) experts.
Experiences like the French “débat public” mentioned above and 
the participatory budget (or the less known collaborative urban plan-
ning) in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre, are there to show us that 
through increasing citizen’s participation one can think of substantially 
improving the social acceptance of fi scal policy (or spatial planning), 
before any fi nal decision is made. However, in this context, a potential 
confl ict arises between representative and participatory democracy, 
which I call the paradox of representativeness. Take the following 
defi nitions of (e-)Participation:
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“The daily possibility to monitor and contribute to policy and deci-
sion making at all levels (local, national, European)”
       (taken from http://europa.eu.int/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=24086),
 and:
“New opportunities for Governments to receive feedback from, 
and consult with, individual citizens directly during policy making, 
without the mediation of elected politicians or civil society organisa-
tions”
        (taken from http://www1.oecd.org/publications/e-book/4201131E.PDF). 
Both the EC and OECD seem to adhere to the view that the essence 
of (e-)Participation lies in what is called elsewhere direct democracy, a 
sort of continuous and unmediated interaction between “the people” 
and “the policy makers”. But which role is left to “the elected” in this 
case? And are they satisfi ed or not with that role? This leads me to 
describe what I will call the accountability paradox.
Accountability in itself is quite a tricky concept, with several dif-
ferent nuances, that partly overlap each other. According to Robert 
Behn (2001), three basic meanings are to be tracked in the ordinary 
life of public institutions: accountability for fi nances, accountability 
for fairness and accountability for performance. These are presented 
in the following table:
Table 2. Main defi nitions of accountability
Accountability 
for fi nances




The responsibility (or the obligation) of public offi cials to treat 
all citizens absolutely fairly.
Accountability 
for performance
The responsibility (not the obligation) of public offi cials to 
cover the expectations of the citizenry in the provision of 
public services.
A common element of the fi rst two kinds of accountability is that they 
are mostly oriented to quality of the Government process, while the 
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third one to quality of the results. The two former are mostly dictated 
by the law(s), while the latter is more a political commitment, quite 
deprived of effective sanctions, especially towards “the appointed”, 
with respect to “the elected”, there is at least the potential risk of being 
“voted out of offi ce”. 
Remember the fi rst recommendation of the Power inquiry: in 
order to enhance participation, we should rebalance the power away 
from the “executive” and “unaccountable” bodies towards the “elected” 
and “accountable” ones (like Parliaments and local Government). 
Additionally, advocates of New Public Management argue that decen-
tralisation, among other things, improves performance. 
Unfortunately, as Clint Bolick (2004) observed, while the deci-
sions that most affect the lives of people are taken locally, local Gov-
ernment is still largely unaccountable. Decisions referring to urban 
planning, trade licenses, social services, etc. are made at local level, 
but very few citizens know who takes these decisions or how they are 
taken. Yet those are the decisions that have the greatest impact on the 
quality of life of people, arguably more so than the issues on which 
politicians campaign at more or less half-decade intervals. 
Still more seriously, Lydia Segal (1997) reported on corruption 
of public offi cials as “an important, unintended consequence of politi-
cal decentralization” if coupled with increasing discretion and with 
decreasing oversight. 
Finally, political accountability is reduced by the “networked” 
nature of modern Governments (outsourced functions, Public Private 
Partnerships, public utilities etc.) and their inherent control/coordina-
tion/concertation needs with respect to other Public Administrations, 
business associations, NGOs etc. that are often part of the same process 
of “practical” legislative implementation (e.g. Verhoest & Bouckaert 
2005).
Less provocative than Bolick’s and Segal’s but still more widely 
accepted is the argument set forth by the New Public Management 
theorists in favour of the “accountability towards the community” 
concept, a sort of new kind of “political business cycle”, starting with 
goal setting and closing with verifi cation of results. Unfortunately, the 
voters hardly remember the past performance of their Governments 
when they go to the polls, and one has rarely seen an incumbent 
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Mayor losing the elections because of too wide a gap between initial 
ambitions and fi nal achievements. Thus, the paradox of accountability 
becomes twofold: fi rst, the concept looks more virtual than real, more 
“declared” than “actual”; second, it turns out to be largely ineffective 
in “binding” the rules of behaviour of the policy makers.
However, as some scholars have recently pointed out, the concept 
of accountability could also be reversed, from the civil servants to the 
civil society. For instance, a well performing street cleaning service 
also requires that citizens are careful not to throw litter in the streets 
(see Löffl er 2002). This shifts the quality focus from Government to 
governance, a new concept that transcends organisational borders and 
goes into a multi-stakeholder environment that quite conforms to ac-
tual evidence. What seems to happen in real life is that politicians and 
constituents alike pay lip service to quality management initiatives, but 
are very concerned about quality of life issues which are only partly (if 
not badly) represented by the performance of a single administration. 
To approach these issues properly, innovative concepts and tools are 
needed, like social and democratic dialogue, and the extensive partici-
pation of citizens/customers in the accountability mechanism.
This leads us to the third paradox, namely the paradox of scale, 
quite confi rmed by the evidence collected in California and already 
mentioned in the introduction. How far should the people be engaged, 
perhaps through the Internet and use of the ICTs? Fishkin (1995, 
80) argues that “a room of one million creates the conditions for rational 
ignorance”; in other words, too many voices amount to noise, not to a 
shared public opinion. Yet an active role of citizens would be needed 
to engage, advice and control Governments, and to take part in a 
quality legislative process.
In my opinion, all the three paradoxes can be solved in the context 
of e-Participation. First of all, Participation should be transformed from 
“a political goal” to “a policy tool”; not an aim in itself, but something 
that is instrumental in other goals of the Public Administration, in 
a way that becomes compatible with the principles of representative 
democracy. Take the following example: art. 12 of the Porto Alegre 
Manifesto calls for the “democratisation” of international institutions 
with reference to “human, economic, social and cultural rights”; this is 
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much different (and more utopian) than invoking their representatives 
to submit to the risks and uncertainties of the electoral cycle! 
On the other hand, if we don’t want representative democracy 
to fall prey to “the mischiefs of faction”, or e-Participation be limited 
to “the connected”, “the affl uent” and “the most educated”, it is safe 
to run the risk of a very popular, “deliberative” version. This way, 
the paradox of scale can be reversed: (e-)Participation is promoted 
because it does not necessarily lead to real infl uence, but allows for a 
richer/more “noisy” debate and (perhaps) a broader fact representa-
tion. Remember the Power inquiry: engage and motivate citizens 
by allowing them “a much more direct and focused say” over political 
decisions and policies…
Finally, the accountability paradox, more than thirty-fi ve years ago, 
Peter Drucker (1969), the famous management guru, advocated the 
building up of “an independent agency … independent of pressures from 
the executive as well as from the legislature” to play the role of “perform-
ance auditor”, that is, to convert people’s expectations into policy goals 
and to compare them to the results obtained, much in the same way as 
the Accounting Offi ce, or simply the Courts, do protect and enforce 
the accountability for fi nances and accountability for fairness. The idea 
of an agency has not taken place so far, but modern regulation theories 
admit in its place the establishment of rules, procedures and standards, 
like quality management principles, helping to make Governments 
more accountable for their performance towards citizens. 
In fact, according to the latest ISO (2005) guidelines, quality 
implementation in local Government should be preceded by a self-
assessment test based on 39 “reliability” indicators. If one or more 
than one of those indicators show a weak performance level, this is a 
sign that the public entity considered is operating “below the reliability 
line”. As a result, conformity to ISO 9001:2000 standards (or focus 
on customer satisfaction) must not be regarded as the fi nal objective: 
once a local Government has achieved an acceptable level of reliability, 
“it should look beyond conformance to performance”, aiming to improve 
its overall effi ciency through the utilisation of ISO 9004:2000 and/or 
other excellence models.
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THE TUSCANY CASE: E-DEMOCRACY AT WORK
Tuscany is the fi fth largest region in Italy (22,997 sq. Km.), with a total 
population of 3,547,604 in 2001. Wedged deeply like a triangle in the 
heart of Italy, it is a transitional area between the highly industrialised 
North, and the principally agricultural South. It stretches over the 
Western side of the Apennines and includes the islands of the Tuscan 
archipelago. Its Northern borders are clearly defi ned, less evident are 
the Eastern ones, crossing the ridge of the Tusco-Emilian Apennines 
and taking in the upper Val Tiberina. Still more uncertain are the 
South-Eastern and Southern borders – the so-called Tuscia, now in 
the Lazio region – that seem justifi ed only for historical, linguistic and 
generally cultural reasons.
The population of Tuscany is not uniformly distributed: high-den-
sity areas sharply contrast with others where urban density is markedly 
lower than the national average. Its mountain or rural areas, especially 
after the Second World War, have suffered a population drain towards 
the industrialised areas or lowlands: the provinces of Grosseto, Siena 
and Arezzo have been the most affected ones. Currently, the popula-
tion is heavily concentrated along the Tyrrhenian coastline – the so-
called “Area Vasta” – and in the lower Valdarno, from Florence to Pisa, 
where density is about 500 persons/sq.m and a concentration of ICT 
industries has given birth to the so-called “Arno Valley”.
The standard of living in Tuscany is generally a little bit higher 
than the national average (also the unemployment rate is lower than 
the national average), though there are some differences among inner 
areas. The total population employed was 1,437,000 in 2001, of which 
54,000 in the agricultural sector, 492,000 in industry and 891,000 
in other activities (services). In 2001, a very signifi cant share of the 
population fell under the age categories 25-44 (1,067,056) and 45–65 
(945,536) years old, with an elderliness ratio of 189.8%, quite a bit 
higher than the national average.
The following picture – borrowed from the BISER (IST-2000-
30187) Project “Benchmarking the Information Society: e-Europe 
Indicators for European Regions”, together with the related comments 
– shows the performance of the Tuscan society in relation of the ICTs, 
and highlights a “trend in motion” towards an informed use of the 
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web. Respondents seem to place a lot of trust in a further increase of 
Internet usage; this expresses the awareness in the population of the 
innovative and constructive importance of this instrument.
Figure 2. ICT indicators in Tuscany
The BISER average refers to 28 selected EU Regions, thus is not rep-
resentative of the whole EU territory in a statistical sense. However, 
it has been checked that the sample is very similar to the EU average 
with respect to the key socio-demographic and business sector vari-
ables. Values above the EU average are found both in the attention 
to web services and the search for more regional information on-line: 
this can also be explained by the intense tourism activity, which calls 
for on-line sponsorship of the tour operators, so as to guarantee year 
round incomers.
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Tuscany is, indeed, one the Italian regions which are most active 
in e-Government projects. Apart from the State-funded initiatives in 
the area of ICTs, a good share of which belongs to the Tuscan Public 
Administration, it is also worth mentioning here the following:
 1995-now: building up and maintenance of a region-wide telemat-
ic infrastructure, called RTRT (fi rst example in Italy), linking all 
the main public entities of Tuscany and a signifi cant representation 
of the private sector (both profi t and non-profi t);
 2001-now: conception and implementation of the “e-Toscana” 
initiative (the Action Plan of the Regional Administration), 
including a long list of 50 specifi c projects for ICT solutions 
development in the business area, the deployment of e-Govern-
ment services and the further promotion of e-Inclusion in the 
Regional Information Society, with an overall investment of more 
that 100 million Euros
 Ongoing activities for dissemination of free and open source 
software and experimentation and testing of broadband and other 
innovative infrastructure solutions in the remote and rural areas 
of the Region.
Another example of public intervention in the fi eld is the 5,7-million 
(euro) investment plan funded by the Regional Administration over 
the past three years, in order to spread 298 “PAAS” – this acronym 
may be translated from Italian as “Point of free-of-charge, Assisted 
Access to Services” – in 327 physical locations, hosted by 180 Tuscan 
Municipalities, in cooperation with non profi t entities and voluntary 
associations. Each PAAS was built with a minimum fi nancial contri-
bution of 15 000 Euros and is now up and running at least 12 hours 
a week (50% of the time between 6pm-10pm, at least once per week 
on Saturdays or Sundays), under the supervision of an NGO’s and/or 
Municipality’s staff.
The latest statistical record available for the PAAS network (as of 
February 2008) is the following:
 254 access points running (298 forecasted)
 265 associations involved (344 registered)
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 160 municipalities involved (180 forecasted)
 22.712 registered users (64% below 14, 4% up to 18, 8% up to  
      25, 14% up to 40, 8% up to 65, 2% over)
 194.485 accesses so far (Source: Tuscany Regional Administra- 
 tion)
In this specifi c instance, public intervention was motivated by the 
awareness of a delay accumulated by Tuscany with respect to its “com-
peting regions” and of the opportunities that investments in the area 
of ICT could create both for citizens and businesses. However, with 
21st-century hardware and software installed at each PAAS, and an old 
tradition of meeting and teaming up in their off-duty activities, a side 
effect of this operation was to start looking at the Tuscan population 
as a potential testbed for an ICT-supported participatory legislation 
process.
Not surprisingly, the starting point was a proposal for institutional 
change. The Regional Cabinet, led by President Claudio Martini, 
appointed Mr. Agostino Fragai as delegated member to the reform of 
the political decision making and “cooperative governance system”, 
derived from the European “Open Method of Coordination”, with a 
specifi c focus on citizens’ involvement in the legislative process. The 
political will was then to go beyond the plain concertation with Re-
gional stakeholders and try to gain the further benefi t of a longstanding 
“cultural” tradition of civic engagement in Tuscany. 
To set the stage, in January and May 2006, two big public events 
were organised, to collect and discuss the international evidence on 
(e-)Participation in Europe and worldwide. A specifi c website (ht-
tp://www.regione.toscana.it/partecipazione) was launched, with over 
100,000 hits in the fi rst few months. More than 50 public meetings 
were then held throughout the Tuscan territory, including some “focus 
groups” and other forms of structured interactivity. The idea was to 
start a collective discussion around a draft Regional law on citizens’ 
participation – the fi rst known example of such a kind in Europe - by 
using a “bottom up approach”, i.e. to identify the core issues and the 
possible guidelines of this legislative effort, without starting from a 
predefi ned text, but rather recognising the participation experiences 
already on course in Tuscany. 
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On 18th November 2006 in Marina di Carrara, the Region held 
the second experience in Italy (after the City of Turin in September 
2005) of an electronic Town Meeting; a participatory method allow-
ing the involvement of large audiences, where participants carry on a 
simultaneous discussion in small groups, individually expressing their 
opinions through an electronic polling system. 
In a large pavilion of one of the most important exhibition areas of 
Tuscany, Carrara Fiere, almost 500 people – equally representative by 
gender, and belonging to all social and professional groups, including 
immigrants, religious minorities and policy makers of the 10 provinces 
of the Region – were gathered for one single day throughout three 
different working sessions, dealing with:
1) How to improve citizens’ participation in a specifi c public project  
 (e.g. participatory budget, urban planning, etc.).
2) How to manage the impact of major public works on the com- 
 munities involved (similar to the French débats publics).
3) How to get more information on public policies and create a  
 “culture of participation” within the Tuscan polity and society.
Fifty tables were set up, each seating ten people. Every table was 
equipped with a laptop computer, connected to the others by means 
of a wireless network, and was presided over by a facilitator who con-
ducted the discussions; each facilitator also had a remote control for 
voting. The discussion on each topic of the three sessions was briefl y 
introduced by several domain experts, and supported by a Discussion 
Guide circulated before the meeting. The participants at each table were 
allowed some predefi ned time to discuss and send their comments to 
a central workstation. A main group of experts (the “Theme Team”) 
was in charge of summarising the comments received and of sending 
questions back to the groups for a fi nal vote on each of them. Much 
of the day’s organisation was ensured by almost 100 volunteers, who 
not only carried out several important logistical tasks such as reception 
and participants’ orientation, but also the delicate role of facilitators 
and members of the “Theme Team”, thus constituting the supporting 
structure of the whole process of interaction.
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ensure the widest possible 
impact. The results of this 
experiment were fed into 
the law making agenda of 
the Tuscan Cabinet and Re-
gional Council, as follows. 
In March 2007, the 
Regional Council held a 
fi rst discussion round and 
confi rmed the validity of 
the work performed until 
then, by approving a set 
of recommendations to the 
Cabinet; this issued a fi rst 
draft of the law on (e-)Par-
ticipation and opened several 
consultations with the stake-
holders of the Tuscan “coop-
erative governance system”, 
including the table facilita-
tors and the participants in 
the Electronic Town Meeting 
of November 2006. In paral-
lel, a coordinating group was 
created at the Department for Public Administration of the National 
Government, with the presence of several Regions, to enlarge the 
discussion about the same topics at a multilateral level. The Regional 
law concerning the participation of citizens in the decision making 
process of Public Administration was fi nally passed as No. 69/2007, 
going into force in early 2008.
The activities of the 
electronic Town Meeting 
were disseminated through 
webcasting on a national 
TV channel (MTV) and to 
the nodes of the PAAS net-
work mentioned above, to 
Figure 3. Moments of Toscana’s electronic 
Town Meeting
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This experience of the Tuscany Region is worthwhile in two 
respects:
 On the one hand, it tackles the issue of participatory legislation in 
a “self-mirroring” way, as it started with the drafting of a par-
ticipatory law on the topics, procedures and methods that can 
ensure further integration of citizens ‘will’ in the future decision 
making process;
 On the other hand, it provides an intelligent and measured way 
to integrate the citizens’ “informed judgment” into the existing 
constitutional setup, without imposing limitations on the law 
making competence of elected bodies (the Regional Council and 
Cabinet), nor reducing the supplementary role of consultations 
with the economic and social stakeholders of the Region.
However, the essence of this trial, to paraphrase the title of a book by 
James Surowiecki (2005), is that in some cases the many can be wiser 
than the few. Which cases? Certainly not those where some kind of 
“prior selection” of the panel members has been made according to 
education, race, wealth or other discriminatory parameters. This would 
only amount to renew, in a more subtle way, the effects of Madison’s 
“mischiefs of faction”. On the contrary, the selection made by the Tus-
cany Region was basically on a motivation basis, integrated with prior 
and parallel moments of training (by means of the Discussion Guide 
and the role of table facilitators within the electronic Town Meeting) to 
allow participants a full knowledge of the “rules of the game” and their 
real empowerment to democratically infl uence – through informed 
judgement, consensus and voting – the nature and the quality of the 
following choices to be made by the Regional legislators.
THE LIVING LABS EXPERIENCE
This idea of “empowering people” to assess innovation in a highly 
contextualised environment echoes the Living Labs concept, an in-
novative approach set forth in Northern Europe, through which all 
stakeholders of a product, service or application actively participate in 
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its development process. A Living Lab is a Public-Private Partnership 
where fi rms, public authorities and people work together in creating, 
prototyping, validating and testing new services, businesses, markets 
and technologies in real-life contexts (such as cities, regions, rural areas 
and collaborative virtual networks between public and private play-
ers). Stakeholders can be public authorities, civic communities, SMEs 
and large industries, academia, content providers etc. An underlying 
methodology enables innovation to be created and validated in a col-
laborative, multi-context, real-life environment, where focus is on the 
person and the person is continuously monitored in all his/her social 
roles as (e.g.) a citizen, user, consumer or worker. 
Living Labs refer to a setting that is created with specifi c targets 
and has a clear structure, but at the same time deals with the uncon-
trollable dynamics of daily life. Therefore, the targeted service holds 
an open character, not that of a usability lab, but an environment in 
which technology is shaped out of specifi c social contexts and needs 
and where users are seen as co-producers. 
Researchers within Living Labs are restricted to monitoring what 
is going on from the inside. On the other hand, researchers are part of 
a Living Lab themselves and are able to intervene in order to contrib-
ute to a better implementation of technological innovations in social 
practices and deal with the unpredictable processes by refl ecting on 
and consequently adjusting their initial methodology.
This human-centric, experience-based perspective does not only 
ensure a user-driven design and development of products, services or 
applications, but also better user acceptance. The idea here is to reach 
a more sustainable innovation by taking advantage of the ideas, experi-
ences and knowledge of the people involved with respect to their daily 
needs, in their every day lives, encompassing all their societal roles. 
The real-life and everyday-life contexts both stimulate and challenge 
research and development, as public authorities and citizens do not only 
participate in, but also contribute to the whole innovation process.
As the European Commission (2005) put it, “Innovation takes place 
when knowing what the market wants is brought together with know-
ing how to do it, in a new context”. The Living Labs concept is about 
moving out of laboratories into real-life contexts. This idea started 
at MIT Boston with William Mitchell, MediaLab and the School of 
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Architecture and City Planning; its early experiments spanned from the 
US to Singapore, from Finland to Norway, from Sweden to Germany, 
from the Netherlands to Denmark. In the past few years, a growing 
number of national experiences can be identifi ed across Europe, and 
more recently, an integration effort has been set out in a pan-European 
perspective (see http://www.eu-livinglabs.eu).
On November 20th, 2006, the Finnish EU Presidency launched a 
European Network of Living Labs for the “co-creation of innovation in 
public, private and civic partnership”. This is the fi rst step towards a new 
European Innovation System, entailing a major paradigm shift for the 
whole innovation process. From a market and industrial perspective, 
Living Labs offer a research and innovation platform over different 
social and cultural systems, cross-regionally and cross-nationally. This 
is a natural move for ICTs, life sciences and any innovation domain 
that deals with human and social problem solving and people’s every-
day lives. However, this novel approach to research for innovation is a 
challenge for research methodologies, innovation process management, 
public-private partnership models, IPRs, open source practices, the 
development of new leadership and governance and fi nancial instru-
ments. Complexity increases remarkably with the international nature 
of a European Network of Living Labs, implying a set of large-scale 
experimentation platforms for new services, business and technology, 
market and industry creation within an ICT environment. 
The essential feature of a Living Lab is the consideration of us-
ers’ feedback and experience as an integral part of the test bed itself. 
European research has recognised the operational value of Living Labs 
methodology in 3 main areas so far:
1. Bringing laboratory based technology testbeds into real-life, user 
 focused validation environments;
2. Developing mobility services for citizens in a real-world early 
adapter community with existing and close to market technolo-
gies;
3. Studying the collaborative working environments of the future 
 from a pan-European perspective. 
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In all cases, the main focus has been on a user centred, context sensi-
tive, multi-site and multi-stakeholder co-design or co-creation process, 
supported by mutual trust and implying the joint consideration of 
policy, market, societal and technological aspects with equal weight, 
as shown in the following picture, based on Eriksson & Nitamo & 
Kulkki (2005):
Figure 4. Human Centric Systemic Innovation Approach
The problem faced by current Living Labs is that, although similar 
services and products are usually developed, a coherent framework 
for cooperation inside a Living Lab is missing. Thus every new Living 
Lab has to start (almost) from scratch to develop support tools for the 
selected environments.
Following Jo Pierson and Bram Lievens (2005), we identifi ed fi ve 
different phases of a Living Lab trial’s confi guration process:
a) contextualisation, meaning a prior exploration of the technologi
cal and social challenges implied by the technology or service 
under investigation in the trial; 
b) selection, implying the identifi cation of potential users or user 
groups, by means e.g. of non probabilistic or purposeful sam-
pling; 
c) concretisation, implying a thorough description of the current 
characteristics, everyday behaviour and perceptions of the selected 













d) implementation, meaning the behavioural validation and opera
tionally running test phase of the Living Lab - from a user-oriented 
and ethnographic viewpoint; 
e) and feedback, consisting of two main steps:
 An ex post measurement based on the same techniques of the 
initial measurement, to check if there has been any evolution 
in the users’ perception and attitude towards the introduced 
technology or service, to assess the changes over time in eve-
ryday life in relation to the technology use and to detect the 
transitions of usage over time. 
 The provision of technology recommendations from the analy-
sis of data, gathered during the previous implementation phase. 
The outcome of the feedback phase will be used as a starting point for 
a new research cycle (“trial”) within the Living Lab; in this way, the 
iterative feature of this approach can be made operational.
The aim of TELL-ME, a market validation project currently 
ongoing under the eTEN Programme 2006 (see http://www.tellme-
project.eu), is to further improve over this promising state of the art, 
by providing a methodology and toolset for a pan-European deploy-
ment of Living Labs in the areas of e-Government, e-Democracy 
and e-Services, thus creating new opportunities for networking and 
best practice exchange between public entities, citizens, industry and 
academia. 
Through the replication of an operational service already es-
tablished in Germany as the result of a previous FP5-IST project, 
DEMOS (see http://www.demos-project.org for further information), 
we established an Internet-based platform, supporting moderated 
online debates and participatory decision making at local and regional 
level and also the networking and repeated interaction of Living Lab 
participants during the development and implementation of innova-
tive projects. 
The TELL-ME methodology for pan-European Living Labs con-
sists of the integration between:
 A fi ve-stage implementation workfl ow for a successful Living Lab  
 trial confi guration, as described above;
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 A three-step discussion process for consensus reaching (“the 
DEMOS process”), unifying three well-proven social research 
tools, namely the Survey technique, the Delphi approach and 
the Mediation method.
The functioning of this discussion process is shown in the following 
diagram:
In the fi rst (“broadening”) phase the online debate is initiated and 
information is gathered from as many sources as possible about the 
topic of discussion, the initial situation and the interests, ideas, and 
positions of the involved stakeholders. The TELL ME platform sup-
ports this phase with tools helping moderators cluster and structure 
the contributions received and visualise the relationships among them. 
The result of this phase is an outline and summary of the discussion 
thus far. 
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The second (“deepening”) phase has the main task of addressing 
the issues previously selected in more depth. There, several thematic 
“sub-forums” of discussion are opened (their number is neither pre-
defi ned not limited). The TELL ME platform supports this phase by 
helping participants break up into sub-groups, take part in online 
surveys / polls and collaborate on the formulation of joint position 
statements. 
The task of the third and fi nal (“consolidating”) phase is to ag-
gregate the upcoming results from the thematic sub-groups and to 
summarise and visualise the main points of the discussion in a fi nal 
document. In certain cases, users can also grade and rank the different 
concepts and proposals by means of a rating mechanism in order to 
fi nd the best draft solution.
This fl exible framework supports the management of nearly every 
discourse conducted by on-line moderators. Since 2003, many differ-
ent e-Participation projects have been deployed throughout Germany 
with as many as several thousand participants, for example in the 
cities of Hamburg, Munich and Freiburg. Additional trials have been 
performed in the regions of Thessaloniki (Greece), Massa (Italy) and 
Alston (UK) focusing on concrete draft pieces of legislation.
In sum, TELL ME can be thought of as a “turnkey solution” 
for Municipalities and other fi nancially autonomous public entities 
(including private or voluntary sector organisations), willing to build 
up and maintain a Living Lab for involving citizens in public deci-
sion-making. 
The essence of the Living Lab approach is to ensure:
 A clear focus on the process (joining on- and off-line preparation  
 activities)
 Stakeholders commitment and involvement (especially of policy  
 makers)
 Citizens satisfaction and sharing of results.
The fi nally adapted and market-validated service will be a socio-techni-
cal system for moderated and goal-oriented discourses involving citizens 
and political institutions as well as project developers and investors, at 
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national and European level. An open question is whether this system 
can also support:
 The migration towards (and diffusion of) more Participatory Le-
gislative Processes, by the reduction in the complexity of their 
current workfl ow, through the application of content management 
and e-collaboration techniques in the preparation and discussion 
of legislative drafts;
 An active involvement of citizens and/or organised interest groups 
in the Participatory Legislative Process, by the visualisation of 
arguments, antecedents and potential impacts of a new law and 
the proposition of amendments to the existing one. This could 
help to fulfi l the conditions for the expression of that “timely, 
informed and responsible judgement” by interested people (with 
respect to their elected representatives), that is crucial for quality 
decision making and a non-contradictory functioning of demo-
cratic legislatures.
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I have explored the technological, social and insti-
tutional conditions enabling the transformation of the current “best 
practices” of e-Democracy at European level into stable components 
of a truly participatory legislative process.
Based on the evidence collected in the OECD and other reports, 
I have tried to show that the “limits of technology” are only a weak 
excuse for those who would rather keep the ongoing experiences 
of (e-)Participation in the area of simple experiments. I have also 
provided reasons to integrate the current list of European “best prac-
tices” in this topic area with a “reasoned” juridical survey of national 
legislation allowing, in each Country, more or less advanced forms of 
stakeholders’ involvement in the defi nition and evaluation of policy 
targets and initiatives.
Moreover, three main paradoxes of collective action (namely, rep-
resentativeness, accountability and scale) need to be further clarifi ed, in 
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order to ensure the execution of a quality legislative process, whenever 
this implies an active engagement of individual citizens, besides the 
generic abstraction of “civil society” and through more effective forms 
of participation in decision making than the ordinary delegation of 
elected members of Parliaments and Councils.
By commenting on two current experiences in e-Democracy 
and e-Participation; the electronic Town Meeting of the Region of 
Tuscany and the pan-European Living Labs concept, I believe I have 
set the stage for future research on the potential links between people’s 
empowerment, the outcome of legislation and an improved Public 
Administration performance, not just in political decision making, 
but in a broader effort for a better quality of life.
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LEHTONEN PAULIINA
Civic expression on the Net: 
 Different faces of public engagement 
INTRODUCTION
The continuously increasing use of interactive media, global publish-
ing and user-generated content has generated much discussion on the 
future of journalism and roles of citizens in a contemporary society 
fi lled with new digital innovations (see Gillmor 2004; Bowman & 
Willis 2003; Lievrouw & Livingstone 2006). By equipping citizens 
with a chance to easily bring topics to public discussion without 
intervening mediators like journalists, the ICTs challenge traditional 
practices of knowledge and information production in mass media 
(Gillmor 2004; see also Inroduction; Jordan, Lappalainen and Bar-
inghorst in this volume). Blogs, wikis and other diverse user-generated 
content on the Net witness the invasion of citizens even in global news 
production (e.g. McNair 2006). Recently, media houses have started 
to adapt this participative turn by inviting citizens to create media 
content with newsrooms.
The rapid changes within communication practices will also set 
many challenges and create potential for ‘citizen-oriented media’. We 
can ask; what kind of role it may have in the media environment where 
convergence, ever growing competition and commercialisation are 
gaining ground? How issues in citizens’ media are represented when 
compared to mainstream media? Or how the old question of the com-
municative and informative task of media is now considered? On the 
one hand citizen-oriented media is often produced on a small-scale 
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and with a low-budget and based on voluntariness. On the other hand, 
big news corporations have more resources to cover various themes, 
make more in-depth stories and attain larger audience than alterna-
tive media. But does this make journalism in big media houses more 
multidimensional? 
In this article I approach the question of the role of citizen-oriented 
media by analysing civic action and its potential impacts on social 
learning by taking a look at a local case of grass-roots level action. The 
initiative of a web portal called Manse Square1 serves as an example of 
citizens’ media or citizen journalism. This local case of an alternative 
media was created and produced by the University of Tampere with 
local citizens and citizen groups in the city of Tampere2 in Finland. In 
this article I discuss the civic action from two viewpoints: 1) collective 
civic action as social participation which might lack direct affi liation 
to political aims, and 2) collective action as political participation 
that was initiated in the Manse Square environment more rarely than 
communally oriented forms of participation. The article leans on 
research material that consists of theme interviews (taken in 2004), 
a web survey (in 2003–2004) and data gathered by participatory ac-
tion research methods,3 as I closely participated in the Manse Square 
project during 2001–2006. The interviews were conducted with and 
the survey implemented among the active participants of this online 
initiative. 
The survey called forth different vantage points of the use and the 
role of Manse Square as a part of the local public sphere. The survey 
was sent to 153 citizens and 73 responded (response rate 48 %). The 
sample of 153 respondents was gathered by approaching people who 
had at that time been involved in Manse Square or participated in 
its actions. The number of responses is representative of the number 
1. The prefi x “Manse” stems from a phrase that the city of Tampere is the Manchester 
of Finland and it is a common nickname for Tampere. Some combining features 
can be found between these two towns as they both were previously industrial, 
working class cities. The suffi x “tori” means square in English.
2. The city of Tampere with over 200 000 inhabitants is one of the biggest cities 
in Finland. This largest inland city in the Nordic countries has its roots in the 
cotton and paper mill industry which is still refl ected in the cityscape, as former 
industrial buildings and factories appear now as examples of the regeneration 
process in the city centre. 
3. For information concerning action research, see Stringer 1999.
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of active individuals at Manse Square because this group is relatively 
small. The survey data was analysed with SPSS software. The small 
sample imposed restrictions on the analysis so mainly frequencies, a 
few cross tabulations, correlations and chi-square tests could be used 
to analyse the data. 
To discuss some topics of the survey more thoroughly I did theme 
interviews with active citizens because I wanted to get more in-depth 
information about their participation experiences. I interviewed seven 
people who had participated in Manse Square’s activities for at least one 
year and had lived in their current neighbourhood for some time. The 
interviews helped to locate the social context that exists in collective 
action (cf. Jankowski et al. 2001, 107). 
Next I introduce the case of the Manse Square project and its 
background. Then I briefl y discuss the relations between citizens and 
the media and proceed to analyse the civic action of the case and the 
aspects of social and political action attached to it.
THE CASE OF MANSE SQUARE 
– ORDINARY PEOPLE CREATING A PUBLIC SPACE
The Manse Square project was initiated in 1998 in Tampere to enhance 
local civic discussion and to develop new participatory tools.  Manse 
Square (http://www.mansetori.fi , Mansetori in Finnish) has acted as 
both a virtual and a real life meeting place for local citizens, citizen 
groups and decision-makers. It has aimed at offering a free forum for 
alternative views on current issues, problems and interesting topics 
of discussion. 
Currently Manse Square’s portal consists of two independent 
websites; Manse Communities and Manse Media (see picture 1). At the 
Manse Communities section local neighbourhood communities and a 
cultural community of the Roma4 maintain their community sites. As 
4. The Roma are an ethnic minority group with their own specifi c culture and lan-
guage. According to estimates there are 10 000 Roma people living currently in 
Finland and about 10–15 million living in Europe. Despite the long history of the 
Roma in Finland they still face many societal problems and prejudice. One aim of 
co-operation with the Roma participating in Manse Square was to develop digital 
communication competence and to support the empowerment process of this 
minority group (see Sirkkunen & Kotilainen 2004).
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of May 2008 some 35 districts of Tampere have their neighbourhood 
sites at Manse Square.5
Manse Media is a section for local news that relies on user generated 
content. Manse Media functions as a citizens’ web magazine providing 
an alternative voice with stories produced by local “neighbourhood 
correspondents” as citizen reporters (see picture 2). These volunteer 
reporters are local people who are interested in reporting publicly 
about activities in their neighbourhoods. 
5.   There are approximately 80 districts in Tampere.
Picture 1. 
The front page of 
Manse Square in 
November 2007.
Picture 2.
The Front page of 
the Manse Media 
section in Septem-
ber 2006 introducing 




– THE NOVELTY OF NEW MEDIA SET CHALLENGES IN 1998
The Journalism research and development centre in the University of 
Tampere created the portal of Manse Square in research projects6 . The 
aims of the projects focused on creating and maintaining a space for 
civic publicness, developing social innovations and communications 
technology and studying the processes of the emerged public action 
(Sirkkunen & Kotilainen 2004).
In 1998 when the project started, the information society was 
not as diffused as nowadays.7 The price of computers, software and 
digital cameras set limitations on civic action on a totally different 
scale than nowadays when digital cameras, open source technology and 
broadband connections are part of everyday life in many households. 
The novelty of the new media occurred at the beginning in several 
ways; for instance people did not have Internet connections at home 
and they had neither software nor technical skills for photo editing 
or web publishing. 
At the beginning the project organisation borrowed digital cam-
eras and offered offi ce space at the university where citizens could 
use computers to write and publish their stories: to learn digital com-
petences. They tried to overcome digital divides by educating active 
citizens in web publishing and encouraging people to publish stories 
by teaching them (see Heinonen et al. 2001). The university also 
provided free server space for communities’ use. First the university 
had to encourage and invite local communities to utilise the Internet 
as the idea of improving communication in neighbourhoods with 
6. The projects were funded primarily by the Finnish Funding Agency for Technol-
ogy and Innovation. The projects collaborated among others with MIT Media Lab 
Europe. The fi rst project around Manse Square “Locality in the global net” was 
implemented in 1998–2001. The second project “Evolution of e-communities” 
continued the work in 2002–2004. 
7.  The use of ICTs has developed in Tampere since the turn of the millennium when 
Manse Square was initiated. For instance 80 % of the inhabitants of Tampere had 
an Internet connection in 2005 (Infocity research 2005). This shows an increase 
from 74 % in 2003 and from 65 % in 2000. In 2000 53 % of the inhabitants used 
the internet daily or almost daily and in 2005 this number had increased to 74 
%. According to a survey that was implemented among users of Manse Square in 
2004 47 % of the respondents had an ADSL connection and 19 % had a modem 
(Seutuverkkojen käyttäjätutkimus 2004). 
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ICTs was not commonly recognised earlier. This project required a 
lot of effort and commitment from residents but also from research-
ers who educated residents in using computers and methods of web 
publishing (ibid.). 
At fi rst there were only a few neighbourhoods that started to 
publish their own neighbourhood web sites at Manse Square. Step 
by step the portal became more popular and the number of sites 
increased. At the beginning Manse Square consisted of two sections; 
one was a neighbourhood web site - Manse Communities and the 
other was Manse Forum, which acted as an open arena for public 
debate on current and locally controversial issues. Manse Forum was 
divided into thematic sections that dealt with various themes such as 
housing, sustainable development, urban planning and general wel-
fare. Furthermore, Manse Forum distinguished itself as an initiator 
of public discussion by organising encounters between citizens, civil 
servants and elected offi cials (see Hokka et al. 2004). Manse Forum 
was an essential part of Manse Square until 2006 when it was closed 
down during the transfer of maintenance and co-ordination of Manse 
Square from the university to the city.
The university co-ordinated Manse Square until November 2006 
when the portal was transferred to the city of Tampere. The purpose of 
this transfer was that the Journalism research and development centre 
considered the city to provide better resources to secure the continuity 
of Manse Square.8 By approving this task the city of Tampere wanted 
to emphasise the importance of the civic action originated at Manse 
Square. This transfer turned out to be a turning point in the portal’s 
history.
During the university’s fi rst project the emphasis was on teaching 
ICT skills to citizens and inviting them to act publicly on the Net. 
When the second project started, the basic infrastructure of Manse 
Square was functioning and the researchers could focus more on 
developing new tools of web participation. For instance, during the 
second project the Manse Media section was added to the portal and 
the development of an open source publishing system was initiated. 
8. The Journalism research and development centre functions on private funding. 
When Manse Square was no longer maintained as a research project of the centre 
after 2004, the realistic solution was to hand over the responsibility of co-ordinat-
ing Manse Square to the city of Tampere. 
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The years 1998–2004 were the most active period at Manse Square. 
During this time there were several people participating in organis-
ing meetings, seminars and encounters with local communities, civic 
groups, elected offi cials, civil servants and other interest groups. The 
research projects at Manse Square ended in 2004 which inevitably 
meant a decline in resources. During 2004–2006 there were only one 
part-time co-ordinator and one part-time technical administrator at 
Manse Square to support citizens in their activities and questions. In 
this period the action slowly started to decrease, partly because the 
research project ended and the active input from researchers ceased.
TRANSFER TO THE CITY IN 2006 BROUGHT CHANGES
During 1998–2004 regular face-to-face meetings with active citizens 
were held. Different sections had their own monthly group meetings 
and a meeting group for the whole of Manse Square assembled a few 
times per year. After 2004 the various detached groups were united 
into one meeting group of Manse Square. This group continued regular 
monthly meetings until Manse Square was transferred to the city of 
Tampere in the end of 2006. After the transfer the action has been 
co-ordinated by one civil servant. The density of social encounters has 
reduced as the city now organises meetings with Mansetori’s activists 
only few times a year.
The change after the transfer to the city is visible not only in 
the diminishing number of face-to-face meetings with residents but 
also when viewing the use of the portal. According to user statistics 
only a short period after the transfer in January 2007 there were 47 
312 visits to Manse Square and in December 2006 the number was 
36 709.  An average of 9200 users visited Manse Square monthly in 
2003, compared to approximately 12 800 in 2004 (Kokkonen 2004). 
These fi gures show a positive increase. Partly the increase in user visits 
can be explained by the fact that the number of neighbourhood sites 
has increased during Manse Square’s existence. Naturally this widens 
the scope of its users and audience.9 However, when taking a look at 
9.  The present situation in April 2008 according to the user statistics shows there   
 were 39 687 visits to Manse Square.
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the number of published stories at the website, the activities show a 
decrease. For instance, after the transfer citizen reporters published 10 
new stories at Manse Media during 12 months10. The current situation 
in May 2008 shows similar features as reporters have published only 
three stories this year in Manse Media. Before the transfer, for instance 
in August 2006 there were 11 stories written in a period of only one 
month. These fi gures show a clear decrease in the content production 
on Manse Square’s Manse Media section. 
A rough estimate of the amount of active people during the ac-
tive period of Manse Square was about 70–80 persons but this group 
started to reduce after Manse Forum was closed and Manse Square was 
transferred to the city, when some of the citizen reporters continued 
their civic expression elsewhere. However, even if Manse Square has 
become more well-known, the activity of citizens shows some impli-
cations of decline. 
Above I have given a brief overview of this local case of citizen 
media. The case of Manse Square refl ects a period when ICTs were 
rapidly expanding in Finland and administration simultaneously had 
started to diversify practices of citizen participation. This progression 
appears clearly in the endeavours of Manse Square which were infl u-
enced by the objectives of the university’s research projects. However, 
the core of the action was local people who created and shaped the 
platform to portray their view of citizen media.
To touch more upon the typical features of citizen-oriented media 
I briefl y discuss the mutual relations between citizens and the main-
stream media and the challenges ICTs have presented to the media 
environment. Then I continue to discuss the practices of civic action 
at Manse Square, mainly during the period when it was co-ordinated 
by the university and analyse the civic action from communal and 
political points of view. 
RELATIONS BETWEEN CITIZENS AND THE MAINSTREAM MEDIA 
The participatory development of media in which citizens are no 
longer just passive receivers or consumers but independent producers 
10.  The number of stories counted on 25th of October 2007.
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who publish and share content online (Gillmor 2004) is often referred 
to by the terms “web 2.0” or “social media” (see Introduction in this 
volume). A typical example of social media are weblogs which are online 
postings functioning as an open space for publishing views outside 
mainstream media. Wikis such as Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia 
on the Net, are an example of online social content production that is 
available for everyone to edit. On the background of this development 
is the global trend of utilising easy-to-use web publishing tools for 
information and content sharing; citizens becoming active participants 
in the creation and dissemination of news and information (Bowman 
& Willis 2003).
This tendency of citizens gaining ground in media production 
originates partly from the aim of creating more multivoiced media 
which is not a new phenomenon. Various alternative media have 
previously tried to challenge the dominance of mainstream media 
and its ways of depicting citizens (e.g. Rodriguez 2001; Downing 
2003). The pressures of the mass media to situate itself closer to its 
audience have in part derived from this activity of alternative media 
and the international trend of fragmenting audiences (Deuze 2006, 
264). Moreover, the rapid development of communication technology 
has acted as an incentive for mass media to reformulate its practices. 
People who independently publish content on the Internet do not fi t 
the traditional defi nitions of the audience or users of mass media. 
Notably,  the idea of public or civic journalism has emphasised 
relations between journalism and its audience (e.g. Rosen 2000).  This 
reform movement has aimed at media having a role in activating peo-
ple to take part in society and to produce informative journalism that 
could act as the basis for decisions. Placing the discussion of democratic 
practices and concern over the role of media in democracy (Haas & 
Steiner 2006; Sirianni & Friedland 2001, 231) as a starting point, 
civic journalism calls forth the importance of citizens’ experiences 
when making news and stories. 
Despite civic journalism’s concern for the intensity of citizens’ 
voice in mainstream media it nonetheless places people in a certain 
frame that journalists create. In addition, in civic journalism journal-
ists still hold on to decisions over the form and content of published 
articles as well as the way people are represented in texts. 
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The topics and approaches of citizen produced stories differ from 
the texts written by journalists. It seems that the idea of what is news 
is not the same for citizens and journalists (e.g. Heikkilä & Lehtonen 
2003). For instance in citizen produced content the threshold for 
published stories does not ascend to the same level as in mainstream 
media where elite sources such as specialists and decision-makers often 
get a voice. Also, in professional journalism the view on citizens is 
different; when citizens are considered more as readers and subscrib-
ers of newspapers, i.e. consumers. However, the situation is now 
changing with the participatory turn, especially in online versions of 
mainstream media.
The practices of mainstream media have been guided by the de-
mands of news production and economic pressures; the most profi table 
stories for news rooms in an economical sense are often themes that 
include confl icts or scandals that sell papers instead of, for example, 
small and pleasant events from neighbourhoods that are important 
topics in the stories published by citizens in the case of this article. 
Furthermore, mainstream news rooms are more bound to strategies, 
standards and policies of media companies that set the frames; strate-
gies to survive in the competitive world of gaining enough readers by 
satisfying them – producing the kind of stories readers want to read 
–  and maintaining a certain, previously defi ned level of quality. I do 
not argue that the quality of alternative or citizens’ media would be 
poorer than that of the mainstream media but to address the issue 
that citizens’ media is not usually fi xed by any previously determined 
guidelines that would affect how and for whom texts are written. On 
the contrary, I consider alternative media to have more freedom of 
action to provide multiple strains of voices and ways of expression 
than mainstream media.  
 
EXPRESSIONS OF COMMUNAL ACTION AS SOCIAL LEARNING
The consumption of media is connected to public participation and civic 
engagement in democratic practice. Nick Couldry, Sonia Livingstone 
and Tim Markham (2006) call the public engagement with a notion 
public connection. With this they refer to the basic orientation towards 
a public world:
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 […] most citizens share a basic orientation towards a public world 
where matters of common concern are, or should be, played out. We 
call that basic orientation ‘public connection’. Orientation is not the 
same as continuous attention – everyone’s attention rises and falls – but 
orientation underlies the possibility of attention, and without that 
basic orientation, there is no point improving the quality of public, 
including political, communication, because people will already be 
turned to face the other way.
People’s capabilities of acting as citizens in the information society 
play an important part in the process of public or civic engagement. 
These capabilities can be called civic competences that are regarded as 
supporting the “making of good citizens” (see Dahlgren 2008). Apart 
from being able to understand and interpret media texts, citizens are 
expected to adopt, fi lter and communicate masses of information 
coming from various sources. This often long-term process, can be 
understood as a social learning process. Learning emerges in two-way 
interaction and according to Pieter Glasbergen (1997), social learn-
ing can happen when actors learn about each other during responsive 
communication. Learning takes place when actors are engaged in 
social practices and refl ections in which they are able to evaluate, 
understand and negotiate opinions, views and shared meanings (see, 
Wenger 1998, 10). 
I consider civic learning as social practice in a similar way to that 
in which Colin Lankshear and Michele Knobel (2007, 4) describe new 
literacies: “Literacies call us to generate and communicate meanings and 
to invite others to make meaning from our texts in turn.”  I understand 
their view on new literacy as one component of social learning. By 
practicing digital literacies citizens can develop their civic competences 
(see Dahlgren 2008; Buckingham 2003) which may enhance social 
learning. The case of Manse Square indicates some examples of social 
learning through communal action. 
The starting point for analysing civic action at Manse Square 
builds strongly on everyday life (e.g. Sirkkunen & Kotilainen 2004). 
According to the theme interviews I conducted, it seems that the 
benefi ts of the kind of everyday politics in the development of citizen-
ship (i.e. in the process of enhancing public connection) emerge on 
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ordinary occasions and during current events. With everyday politics 
I refer to decisions, conduct and networks that act as guidelines of 
daily practices. It has been recognised in the studies of social capital 
that daily social contacts increase and support the development of 
horizontal civic trust and reciprocity (Putnam 1993, see also Dahlgren 
2008). Daily social relations have also provided an asset in community 
building in the publishing neighbourhoods; the interviewees described, 
for instance, the importance of local associations and civic groups 
when organising activities.
At Manse Square the aims and starting points of participative 
communities have infl uenced the employed means of civic action. 
Drawing on the various research material, civic action in publishing 
neighbourhoods and communities has rested mainly on 1) improving 
the image of neighbourhoods and increasing their attraction, and 2) 
developing internal communication. The new technology is adopted 
by people to suit their specifi c needs and practices. At Manse Square 
the active citizens do not necessarily have the urge to develop civic 
participation practices in administration, but the emphasis is moreo-
ver on gathering positive public attention for local neighbourhoods 
(Sirkkunen & Kotilainen 2004, see also Hollander et al. 2002, 23). 
In the survey that I implemented among Manse Square activists 86 
% of the respondents said they had participated in Manse Square to 
attempt to gain publicity for neighbourhoods.
Although Manse Square has provided general information, for 
instance, concerning the use of ICT in participation and offered online 
connections to city offi cials, citizens valued their own neighbourhood 
sites (Manse Communities) to be the most important part of the portal. 
87 % of the respondents of the survey used their own neighbourhoods’ 
sites. According to the research data local people feel neighbourhood 
websites and discussion boards  are arenas for discussing “minor” mat-
ters like selling things on an electronic fl ea market, offering help to 
neighbours for example, in gardening, in childcare, in renovation, or 
trying to get a cash machine to one’s neighbourhood etc. Neighbourhood 
discussion boards in the Manse Communities section were, therefore, 
much livelier than the rational and serious topics raised at the Manse 
Forum discussion board. See the following citizen interview extract 
which illustrates that the content of Manse Square was based strongly 
on the ideas and interests of participants:
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...[I] think that it always resembles the people who are active there 
and it depends on the moment when it is done, and how active 
people are, and what issues become topics […] For instance people 
who have their own houses, they are interested in issues concerning 
renovation and all those kinds of things. 
Within civic action at Manse Square, there can be seen to be social ef-
fects, both on the development of local communities, and individuals. 
For instance, Manse Square has succeeded in widening social networks 
and interactions among residents in communities, which can be con-
sidered as one signal of the improvement in neighbourhood commu-
nication. According to the survey respondents 90 % have established 
new social relations when participating in Manse Square. For instance 
52 % of the respondents stated that they had become acquainted with 
1–5 new persons during this action and 20 % of the respondents with 
6–10 new social contacts. 60 % of these new acquaintances live in the 
same neighbourhood as the respondent. Some signals of the develop-
ment of individuals’ civic competences can be reported, such as better 
ICT skills and improved interaction skills (especially when contacting 
administration). Participation and co-operation with the administra-
tion have taught them about the practices of bureaucratic institutions. 
When decision-making processes and administrative practices have 
become more well-known and opened slightly, people have acquired 
relevant knowledge for their institutional expertise. 
Although the citizens who participate and maintain web sites 
at Manse Square have been active before, expanded activeness can 
be reported. People have previously been more interested in issues 
concerning their living environment. According to the citizen inter-
viewees they now follow more issues happening in the whole city. One 
cannot argue that this has happened only due to the participation at 
Manse Square, but probably the active participation has encouraged 
and strengthened individuals’ public orientation:
...[I] believe that I follow now more actively than before everything 
connected to housing and living. I think that I have become much 
more active. 
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It has increased my activity a little, although I have always been ac-
tive. It is an extra tool. When you notice something, you can write 
a story about it. Sometimes I have written similar stories for Manse 
Square and for some other places such as to our neighbourhood as-
sociations’ paper. 
People’s motives and interests in using Manse Square as an alternative 
media engage on individual and communal bases. Manse Square is a 
place where local people can learn skills for web publishing, writing 
stories, conducting interviews, image processing, and photographing 
and designing websites. Communal interests include acting on behalf 
of one’s  neighbourhood, for instance reporting on current questions, 
paying attention to issues that need to be developed or repaired or 
drawing positive attention to the neighbourhood to attract new resi-
dents. This shows in the next quote of one citizen interview:
...[I] have sometimes thought that when I have borrowed a camera 
and then when I have had the camera with me, I have thought that 
something could happen now so I could be right there and make a 
story of it. 
During participation processes people have also indicated some signs 
of adopting a media critical perspective. Citizens have noticed the 
frames in which journalists often place them in interviews. See the 
following extract where an interviewee talks of his experiences when 
been interviewed by journalist:
...[E]ven if they [journalists] try to do a newspaper story truthfully, 
still it often changes a bit and ordinary people do not see that there 
is this kind of change or distortion. 
In the interviews it occurred that the media’s way of presenting citizens 
and city-authorities in opposite, often confl ict-related positions has 
elicited the feeling of contradictory and diffi cult co-operation. This 
negative way of presenting the relations of city authorities and residents 
affects both the preconceptions that people create of decision-making 
and citizens’ role and the possibilities of having an infl uence on local 
matters; e.g. their eagerness to participate. 
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THE POLITICAL ASPECT IN CIVIC PARTICIPATION
Although the community context of an alternative (citizen) media is 
important (Jankowski & Prehn 2002), citizen-oriented media pub-
licness is also fi rmly connected to an individual perspective. In the 
citizens’ media of this article, Manse Square, individual and commu-
nity views emerge in published stories. Story subjects range from the 
birth of kittens to the renovations of houses. The stories are based on 
personal experiences and this might give an impression of this website 
acting only as a means of individuals’ self-expression. However, several 
stories have had a broader connection to issues and events of local 
neighbourhoods or the whole city. 
Civic action at Manse Square could in some parts be classifi ed 
as social participation with little emphasis on political action. This 
is partly true, but according to research data there is evidence that 
functioning social networks enable the formation of political civic 
action. The fi ndings suggest that functioning social networks can be 
a prerequisite for political participation (cf. Putnam 1993; Mosca, 
Gillan and Vromen in this volume). The signifi cance of trust and sup-
port from one’s community may be an essential factor for developing 
courage for public action and justifi cation for one’s participation in 
public discussion. This might have even bigger emphasis in Tampere 
where participation in decision making processes has been considered 
complex and diffi cult (see Laine & Peltonen 2005). 
I understand political civic action broadly as choices and inter-
pretations that citizens make in their everyday lives and in processes 
they participate in. Political action does not necessarily relate only to 
party politics but can appear as choices or defi nitions that are made for 
instance in an urban planning process (see Introduction in this volume). 
I consider political action as a process where participants negotiate and 
re-negotiate decisions or defi nitions of questions and actively try to 
raise issues to the level of public discussion. The development of citi-
zenship is partly a political process; when people participate they face 
different interests and values and are required to understand relations 
and aims that are derived from different backgrounds. In this sense 
the participation process can embody features of social learning. The 
internet has been recognised as a means for new political action and its 
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potential may rest in individuals’ experiences; considering the Internet 
as a public space for experience (Lappalainen in this volume).
The expressions of political civic action at Manse Square have 
intertwined most clearly in topics of urban planning. One example 
of this was a dispute concerning a city’s plan in which a vehicle bridge 
was planned to cross culturally-historically important scenery in the 
centre of Tampere. I refer to this debate as “Koskenniska bridge”11. 
Other examples of more political topics were a struggle concerning 
conservation of an old dye-house “Värjäämö” near the centre of Tam-
pere and discussion over whether vast football grounds should be built 
on a popular recreation area. Also various smaller events connected 
to issues at a neighbourhood level, such as routes of bus services were 
ventilated. 
In the case of the Koskenniska bridge active citizens clearly indi-
cated  features of political action: 1) they created web sites for the case 
at Manse Square’s Manse Forum section, 2) they actively encouraged 
public discussion on the Net at discussion boards, 3) they implemented 
enquiries to civil servants and elected offi cials and published the results 
online and 4) they created visual illustrations of what the environment 
would look like after the bridge and published this material on the Net 
(Bamberg 2005). In this case the Internet offered a new dimension 
for political discussion and negotiations and challenged the traditional 
ways of participation.  
In the Värjäämö case, Manse Square mainly served as a place for 
information. The sites dedicated to this old dye-house offered alterna-
tive views on planning the specifi c area. The sites presented alternative 
options and architectural drawings of the area that would preserve the 
dye-house as a counterpoint to the city whose plans would demolish 
the majority of the dye-house. 
The more political topics at Manse Square have attached to issues 
concerning the whole city; such as culturally-historically important 
places around the Koskenniska bridge or the old dye-house. These have 
emerged as vast questions whereas smaller disputes in neighbourhoods 
have not succeeded in entering public discussion at the same level as 
the cases which included a more common interest.
11.   See more Ridell 2001; 2005, and Bamberg 2005.  
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In the case of the Koskenniska bridge Manse Square also served 
as a place to illustrate spatial information in a historical perspective. 
It constructed a public civic memory by recording different stages of 
processes and making this information publicly available. For example, 
opinions of civil servants and city offi cials were recorded and pub-
lished on the web site and then these statements were updated as the 
process developed (Ridell 2001; Bamberg 2005). However, creating 
civic memory does not necessarily require political perspective but it 
can also develop continuously through everyday politics when local 
neighbourhoods build and maintain their websites.
Previous examples have illustrated that political action was con-
nected clearly to urban disputes, but Manse Square also tried to con-
tribute to public discussion with “non-confl ict” methods, by organising 
encounters, seminars, and discussion series and online surveys (see 
Hokka et al. 2004). Manse Square was for instance, one participant 
in organising an event on the theme of globalisation. The aim was to 
bring this concept to the level of everyday life; what does globalisation 
mean in daily practice and how can citizens approach it. By means of 
this event, organisers also wanted to offer an alternative view on glo-
balisation which in mainstream media was often discussed from a very 
general viewpoint (ibid., 218.). Moreover, Manse Square organised, 
in co-operation with a local citizen group called Tampere-Forum,12 a 
discussion series called “City maintained through co-operation”. The 
goals of this debate series were 1) to test different forms of public 
discussion, 2) to combine different media to achieve public attention 
and 3) to enhance activity and co-operation at Manse Square portal 
(Hokka et al. 2004, 219). The topics of the series concentrated on 
various means of civic participation and problems experienced within 
participation practices as well as provided improvement suggestions.
Manse Square has acted both as 1) means and 2) a space for public 
discussion and political action. It has served as an arena for different 
topics but it has also enabled political civic participation by network-
ing various civic actors. In these co-operative projects different actors 
12. Tampere Forum is a loose citizen group that encouraged public discussion in 
Tampere for several years. The group consisted mainly of individual citizens but 
included also representatives from the city administration and the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Tampere. The group acted in close co-operation with Manse 
Square but lately it has not been active.
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have encountered and shared interests and aims. In this respect one 
can argue that Manse Square has succeeded in encouraging political 
action through social and communal participation. 
I think we should not set the frames of civic action too strictly. 
We should understand that civic activity develops through learning 
in different ways that not always need to be serious or rational. The 
stories in the Manse Media section show that public action can happen 
in multiple ways; for instance with cheerful and lighter means such 
as tales, poems, photos and pictures etc. Still, citizens do recognise 
the opportunity to use the media publicness of the Internet to try to 
have an effect on issues when necessary. This clearly indicates social 
learning. For instance discussions on the Manse Square website have 
increased when there have been disputes over urban planning in the 
city. Although the important role of the Tampere Forum group and 
the project researchers should not be forgotten; the more political 
endeavours required much effort from these groups who helped to ar-
range facilities such as meeting rooms and other necessary equipment 
and participated in planning the various encounters. 
However, a different question is whether Manse Square has suc-
ceeded in having an effect on attitudes towards the effi ciency of civic 
participation. The orientation of people towards citizen participation in 
decision making processes appears to be rather pessimistic. The citizen 
interviewees have often adhered to prevailing settings; the juxtaposition 
between residents and the city administration. The interviewees often 
felt that civil servants view active citizens as a burden and that it is 
almost impossible to have an effect on issues unless one has powerful 
enough resources to support one’s cause:
...[W]ell, this is one of the eternal questions, of course they consider 
[your opinion] if you go and take massive enough “guns” with you 
and make them consider it. 
...I think the word “have to” is pretty essential in this. (one inter-
viewee talking about why the city organises participation; because 
the law obliges)
181
...If you are persistent enough, then I think you can [have an effect 
on issues] but usually it is pretty diffi cult. The best way to have an 
effect is to do stuff yourself, do something small and also do it the 
way you would like others to do it. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 
At Manse Square people act as fellow-residents who follow and take 
care of the current errands of their neighbourhoods. They can be seen 
as local “messengers” and the neighbourhood websites as arenas to 
communicate important and topical questions to residents in the area 
as well as to residents of the whole city. Besides this civic interest that 
is connected to a really local level – to the neighbourhood –  other 
overlapping and intertwining interests can be seen which emphasise 
the use of alternative media in order to focus public attention on issues 
that get no foothold in the mainstream media (see Gillmor 2004). In 
this sense people regard it as their duty to use their own channels to 
bring important subjects to the public arena:
...[I] consider it valuable that there exists at least one forum [talks 
about Manse Square] where alternative views on the cultural scene 
are registered even if they do not achieve publicness but at least they 
are written down somewhere. 
[When an issue is published at Manse Square] It gives more offi cial 
status to this action when it is noticed somewhere, because the news 
media are not interested in this kind of action. It has been a tool 
where you have control over the issues that get publicity. 
This feature of an active citizen who follows media and local happen-
ings is also connected to the position of citizen reporter in general. 
Citizen reporters have some features that resemble local journalists 
but of course on a different scale; they do not regard Manse Square as 
“serious” journalism but as a lighter way of talking about the everyday 
life of the city compared to the mainstream media. A distinction from 
professional journalism is the very strong spatial connection of citizen 
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reporters; stories are located in their living surroundings. Stories may 
include historical information, tell about local tales and events such as 
art exhibitions, outdoor fl ee-markets or introduce inhabitants.  Some 
topics have been covered both at Manse Square and in the local news 
media. Even then, some citizen reporters have tried to bring in a dif-
ferent angle to the story than the mass media. These features show the 
endeavours of the citizen reporters in trying to create distinguishable 
publicness.
Although the various civic actors at Manse Square all connect 
strongly to their own neighbourhoods, they share a common interest 
towards spatial interaction. The citizen interviewees often emphasised 
the importance of face to face meetings with other activists at Manse 
Square as a motivating factor:
…[o]f course it is also important that you meet people. When you do 
things on the web it feels somehow abstract. So it feels, it is important 
that you belong to a group and you meet people and exchange opin-
ions, not necessarily regarding the stories but any subjects at all. 
...[O]f course it always motivates you when you have people around 
you that are active, it makes you also feel like”yes, I’m gonna fi nish 
the story now”. 
Due to the community driven civic action at Manse Square the gap 
between story producers and “audience” is not very broad. Naturally, 
this derives from the fact that Manse Square is a place for neighbour-
hood communication, but probably also the earthiness of the published 
stories has narrowed the distance. However, close connections between 
audience and producers have not been self-evident generally within 
alternative media (Downing 2003).
Individual engagement on civic action depends on personal mo-
tives and capabilities that citizens develop during their participation 
experiences; for instance capacities for critical literacy. When talking 
about critical literacy in the context of media education, David Buck-
ingham addresses the fact that the aim is not purely to learn user skills 
or technical skills but to promote a more in-depth understanding of 
how media operate as well as to support more refl ective ways of using 
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media (Buckingham 2003, 181). Although Buckingham deals with 
the media education of children and young people, the same principle 
can be used when employing research on adult learning. 
CONCLUSIONS
As stated before, I consider participation and civic action as a learning 
or development process that can strengthen the capabilities of citizens 
to actively take part in society and improve their level of public orienta-
tion (see Kotilainen 2004; Heikkilä & Lehtonen 2003; Dahlgren 2008; 
Buckingham 2003). The case of Manse Square shows some evidence of 
participants practicing civic competences and digital literacies which 
encourages the process of social learning. However, the Internet still 
rarely remains as the main channel for public argument or debate for 
active people. Manse Square web sites act more as channels for com-
municating and delivering information to neighbourhood residents 
and to people interested in local issues. The potential of community 
communication and civic engagement lies in local grassroots networks. 
Despite growing individual interest, people may utilise their personal 
networks and skills in favour of a certain cause, as happened for instance 
in the dispute over the Koskenniska bridge in Tampere. But Manse 
Square has not performed generally as a place for political messages 
or campaigning for something. 
At Manse Square the sense of belonging or the sense of spatial 
identity has increased among the persons and groups who have man-
aged neighbourhood websites. Unfortunately, enabling larger spatial 
identity in neighbourhoods has remained unreachable. According to 
the citizen interviews the sense of communality has grown more be-
cause of the concrete actions taken by local actors and groups such as 
neighbourhood associations. Activities regarding the maintenance of 
websites still remain distant for the majority of residents in neighbour-
hoods. People are still more likely to participate in local events such as 
concerts, outdoor markets or other various neighbourhood events.
Like any human action citizen participation is also fi lled with dif-
ferent motives, agendas and values which have also affected the civic 
action at Manse Square. In mainstream media the interests of news 
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corporations can sometimes be rather visible, which has been argued 
to prevent mainstream journalism creating multi-voiced publicness 
(see Ridell 2005, 32). In the case of Manse Square the interests have 
not focused on the general principle of Manse Square in a sense that 
they would have set action frames for the whole of Manse Square but 
emerged in specifi c cases of civic action. Thus, certain interests were 
shown for example in the dispute over the Koskenniska bridge and 
other agendas in the discussion of changes in bus services. 
In this changing media environment citizens are continuously 
put in the position of being citizens, consumers, customers or audi-
ences (Livingstone 2005). As the consumer position is considered to 
be strengthening, citizenship can be regarded as a private affair instead 
of public orientation. Mojca Pajnik (2005, 355) writes about the de-
velopment of citizenship in a more consumer emphasised direction 
so that “it is not as much a matter of community as of the individual”. 
However, people can practise their citizenship in different positions. 
For instance people who critically observe media can be regarded as a 
critical audience which approaches the position of consumers. These 
positions of audiences or consumers are usually distinguished from 
the characteristics of citizens, although critical viewing can be an 
active and rational act. Furthermore, when people actively produce 
content on the Net they act as citizen producers which I believe is more 
generally accepted as an act of citizens because when producing new 
content they trigger topics for debate and in that sense participate in 
public discussion.
Topical issues related to free content production are questions 
regarding the trustworthiness and reliability of knowledge. For instance, 
Wikis have proved that user control over online content and its reliabil-
ity can succeed even if a user community is worldwide. In Wikipedia 
the users’ community maintains sites, traces false information and edits 
it. Still, recent development shows that citizens need more capabilities 
and means of digital literacy to evaluate media content. I wonder if 
mainstream media experiences a bigger responsibility in producing 
truthful and reliable information than citizens’ media, which can be 
regarded as more experimental. One of the strengths of citizens’ “do-
it-yourself ”-media is the originality of the content and layout, and the 
visual originality. Also, the organisational structure of citizens’ media 
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often differs from mass media which might infl uence the employed 
means and practices. For example the case of Manse Square builds 
on horizontal relations that Putnam (1993, 87–91) considers typical 
for citizen communities in which people help, honour and trust each 
other. These non-hierarchical features may indicate respect for diverse 
and equal civic expression 
One could state that when initiated in 1998 the experiment of 
Manse Square was a bit ahead of its time. The current period would 
probably be more favourable for implementing this kind of project 
especially in the light of technical development and diffused access to 
the Net. This case has depicted civic action and the use of ICTs during a 
certain time period and naturally the results have to be interpreted based 
on these circumstances. Hopefully, not only has it been a development 
process for citizens but for representatives of the city administration and 
other partners as well. Learning should not be constrained by only paying 
attention to changes in individual competences, but also by approach-
ing learning from the angle that recognises the conditions, resources 
and social practices affecting the whole process of co-operative action.
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LAURI PALTEMAA
These bytes can bite – Chinese politics of 
technology and the controlled Internet
INTRODUCTION
The nearly global breakthrough of the Internet and wireless personal 
communication technologies at the turn of the millennium as mature 
and increasingly affordable consumer technologies has also created an 
avalanche of policy commentary and research on the possible impact 
of these new technologies to politics and political systems, democratic 
and authoritarian alike. The Internet in particular has been at the centre 
of this attention and in the 1990s the hopes and expectations of its 
emancipatory and empowering role were high. Some commentators 
even saw that the Internet provided people living in liberal democra-
cies with a possibility of realising a democracy that would be more 
participatory in its nature than any other political system since the city 
states in classical Greece (Rodan 1998; see also Molinari; Lehtonen; 
Lappalainen; Rättilä and Introduction in this volume). Others saw 
that it would bring the demise of illiberal regimes worldwide (Abbott 
2001, 99-100; McKedzie 1997 chapter 2; see Kalathil and Taylor 
2003 with a critical reminder on making too hasty conclusions about 
such ends.)
The views on the emancipatory role of the new communication 
technologies (NCT) in authoritarian systems can be derived from the 
assumptions that unimpeded exchanges of views and information on 
politics increases people’s possibility of forming a critical conscious-
ness and oppositional organisations, even to the degree that they can 
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form a Habermassian “critical public sphere”. (Buchstein 1997; cf. 
Introduction; Lappalainen; Baringhorst and Rättilä in this volume) 
The Internet especially, has often been regarded as a technology that 
is diffi cult to control by the authorities in this regard (Hom 2004, 1; 
Boyle 1998, 178). At the same time these technologies are regarded 
as essential for modern economic growth and development. Some 
scholars view that this poses authoritarian systems with a “dictator’s 
dilemma” between the mutually exclusive aims of the need to import 
and apply new technology for economic development and upholding 
autocratic order. (McKedzie 1997; see Hachigian 2002 for a critical 
discussion of the view.)
However, as the information revolution has progressed and ma-
tured the anticipated swift crumbling of authoritarian regimes around 
the globe has not materialised even though they have embraced the 
NCT. Therefore, this view has came under increasing criticism (Warf 
& Grimes 1997, 261; George 2004; Harwit & Clark 2001, 377-
382; Kalathil et al. 2003, chapter 6). According to this view, most 
authoritarian regimes that engage in Internet censorship, such as the 
People’s Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, and 
Saudi-Arabia, have been able to a varying degree, to create a controlled 
environment of Internet usage. Their governments may therefore be 
able to avoid paying the ultimate political price of regime collapse while 
being able to reap to a variable degree the tangible economic benefi ts 
that the NCT produce. (Hachigian 2002; Kalathil et al. 2003.) 
Here we will concentrate on China, which not only has enormous 
size, a rising economy and political importance, but also the most 
sophisticated Internet control policies in the World. China therefore 
forms the most important contender against the emancipatory view of 
the NCT. Moreover, its active policies to adapt internet to authoritar-
ian constraints form an excellent subject of study on the relationship 
between politics and the Internet. The same debate on the impact of 
the Internet on authoritarian systems has been played over also con-
cerning China. In the one end of the spectrum of the debate many 
observers note that China may well prove the notions of the Internet 
as an emancipatory and democratising technology wrong (Goldsmith 
et al. 2006; Hom et al.. 2004; Shie 2004; Lagerkvist 2005, 121-122; 
George 2004, 520), while others maintain that her authoritarian 
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political system is unable to withstand the challenge the free fl ow of 
information that these technologies promise (Chang 2001, 90-93).
An intermediate view has also been offered. According to that 
view, with the present state of technology and controls even a control-
led Internet brings opportunities for non- and even anti-Communist 
Party citizen groups in China, but it is also hard to predict the future 
course of such developments, and the road to a free and empowered 
civil society through the Internet is probably a long one for China. 
According to this view, the impact of these technologies is therefore 
still unclear. (Yang 2003; Chase et al., 2002.) 
In this article the author employs what can be called a socially 
determinist, or human-centred, view of the politics of technology 
concerning the Internet in China. (For these labels and a discussion 
on the approaches they stand for in science and technology studies 
see Rappert (1999), Sussman (1997) and Hong (1998).) This means 
that the political impacts of technology are seen as results of conscious 
political decisions made about it by the authorities and their opponents. 
At least in the short and intermediate term, political initiatives and 
decisions, both by the government and its opposition, do explain the 
technological development of the Internet in China and these deci-
sions also aim at bringing about deliberative political consequences 
by shaping the way the Internet is used by the Chinese. This means 
that studying Internet politics in China becomes studying Chinese 
politics of the Internet because, to a far greater extent than in the 
West, the technology itself is much more under political control and 
its confi gurations are more open to political decision making. If we 
therefore do not keep human actors in the centre of this analysis, we 
lose the prime movers of the development of the Internet in China 
from the sight. This view can be argued to be quite relevant in China, 
also from a historical point of view, where totalitarian and post-totali-
tarian governments have traditionally had a strong say in technology 
politics and the way people have been allowed to use and develop 
various technologies (Suttmeir 1989, 375-376).  
The fi nal verdict on the role of the Internet in Chinese politics 
is therefore, still out, and in this article the author will argue why this 
will probably remain so for a while in the future, too. This chapter 
undertakes to analyse the measures the Chinese authorities have taken 
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thus far in bringing the Internet under their control and countermoves 
taken by civil activists to undo them. What will take shape in the text 
is, hopefully, a picture of a contested fi eld of the politics of technology 
where an authoritarian regime defends its position through attempt-
ing to adapt both Internet technology and user patterns while these 
policies are constantly challenged by civic activists and opposition 
groups. Politics and the Internet are, therefore closely interconnected 
in China.  
THE POLITICS OF CONTROLLED INTERNET IN CHINA
In China the economic reform policies since 1979 have created tre-
mendous economic growth that has attracted wide attention and 
admiration. This development has been intimately connected to the 
importation and adaptation of foreign technologies, including com-
puter and communication ones. Indeed, developing modern computer 
technology, including networking, has become one of the manifested 
policy goals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the late 70s 
(Simon 1989; Baum 1989). From the beginning of the 90s this has in-
cluded importing and adapting Internet technology. Since 1992, when 
the commercial Internet was fi rst introduced in China, the number 
of net users has increased steadily from about two thousand to over 
210 million at the beginning of 2008 (Internet World Stats 2008). 
Although high as an absolute fi gure, this is still only about 15 % of the 
population of this giant country, and is still rising steadily, making the 
above citation already out of date when this article is published. Such 
a rapid increase in Internet users means that China will emerge as the 
largest Internet user nation in the World some time soon. 
In this situation, however, it is good to remind oneself that the 
introduction of the Internet to Chinese society was originally a state-
led undertaking in China. In this matter China followed the Western 
example. After having shown increasing interest in it as early as the 
80s, the CCP designated the IT sector in the economy as a strategi-
cally important sector in the beginning of the 90s and decided on 
a policy to actively promote the building of the required network 
infrastructure, increasing the number of connections available and 
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thereby the number of Internet users. This was done for example, 
through the deregulation of the markets, increasing competition of 
Internet service providers, investments in infrastructure, and thereby 
lowering the prices of using the new technologies and making them 
more accessible to the population, at least in urban centres. (Harwit 
et al. 2001, 384-391.)
These developments have contributed greatly to the situation 
where many Chinese, especially those in relatively privileged urban 
areas, have the chance and means to go online in their work or during 
their leisure time. However, these pro-internet policies have stopped 
short when it has come to liberating content production and using the 
Internet for political activism. The paradox of the Internet in China is 
therefore, that while the Party has actively promoted the availability of 
the Internet, the Party at the same time tries to constrain and control 
the free use of this technology in communication. This it does through 
manipulating the technology itself as well as infl uencing user patterns 
through legal and social means. 
The Chinese Internet is therefore a controlled version of its 
Western counterpart. To achieve this the Chinese authorities employ 
what George (2004) terms as ‘promiscuous’ methods of control over 
Internet content and users. Promiscuity denotes the way the authori-
ties do not limit their control of the Internet to computerised means 
and technologies only. Instead, additionally, the old and time-proven 
methods of censorship and police surveillance and repression are used. 
Alternatively, Chase et al. (2002) and Mulvenon term these methods 
as ‘high tech’ and ‘low tech’ means, where low tech means include 
classical means of police control and suppression including numerous 
regulations on the usage and allowed content of the Internet, arrests of 
the suspect wrongdoers, and even the physical unplugging of unwanted 
servers. High tech means include the closing down of unwanted web-
sites, blocking access to them through search engines, fi ltering e-mails 
and chats and censoring them through other means as well as spearing 
the Party-approved contents like news through the offi cial web pages 
and news sources. It also includes hacking the unwanted servers and 
websites abroad. (Chase et al. 2002, 49-50, 63.)
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MANIPULATING INTERNET TECHNOLOGY
The high tech approach is embodied in the “Golden Shield” surveil-
lance system on the Internet. As Navarria (2005, 1) defi nes it:
 “The system [Golden Shield] is intended to be a state-of-the-art 
online database combined with a unique and complex surveillance 
network that incorporates the whole realm of digital technology, from 
speech and face recognition, to credit card records, CCTV, as well as 
advanced internet fi ltering technologies.” 
The last refers to the so called “Great Firewall of China”, which is a 
major part of the Golden Shield. Unlike in some other authoritarian 
countries, such as North Korea and Cuba, where the authorities’ strat-
egy is to try to prevent Internet access altogether from ordinary citizens 
(Hachigian 2002), in China the CCP has decided that the economic 
benefi ts of a controlled Internet outweigh any problems it may create. 
The original idea in the early 90s, however, was to create a China-wide 
intranet (“China World Web”), but the economic benefi ts of allow-
ing exchanges between China and rest of the world via the Internet 
outweighed the benefi ts of isolation. Therefore, the authorities opted 
for building the Great Firewall of China that was designed to prevent 
citizens’ entry to unwanted foreign websites. (Shie 2004, 531.)
This policy is still in force and blocking activities are directed at 
sites that the authorities deem subversive or otherwise objectionable. 
Not surprisingly, the authorities have been unable to block all “sub-
versive” sites, but blocking has been assessed as fairly advanced and 
effective by international comparison. The combination of the Great 
Firewall and other surveillance and control technologies are considered 
to be the most extensive and sophisticated of their kind in the World 
and the authorities’ ability to block politically sensitive sites has been 
rated relatively high in empirical tests on site (Chase et al. 2002, 66; 
OpenNet Initiative 2005, 1-2 and 29-34). Also the effi ciency of chat 
room censorship has been tested as relatively high. Most of the sensitive 
comments on for example, democracy or the independence of Taiwan 
are either blocked beforehand or remain on the sites for relatively short 
periods of time (OpenNet Initiative 2005, 50).
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Technically the Great Firewall of China has been comparatively 
easy to set up because the state-run companies own the main physical 
networks, including their backbones. Foreign companies have also 
lent a helping hand in constructing the needed fi rewall technology. 
For example Cisco has been reported to be the company behind the 
design of at least the early versions of the hardware needed for the fi l-
tering. Also individual net users can be monitored using programmes 
designed by foreign companies. (Shie 2004, 534-535, OpenNet Ini-
tiative 2005, 7-8.) These companies are also involved in enforcing 
the Internet censorship regulations, as the examples of Microsoft and 
Yahoo have shown. Microsoft is known to fi lter online conversations 
in its chat rooms in its Chinese servers and Yahoo! for example came 
under criticism in 2005 after its Hong Kong branch handed in user 
information to the mainland authorities on the identity of a dissident 
writer on the net. The writer was subsequently arrested based on this 
information (Amnesty International 2008, 13-14). 
INFLUENCING USER PATTERNS
In China, the authorities also possess a wide variety of low tech options 
to suppress unwanted Internet activism. Over ten offi cial organisa-
tions have jurisdiction over different aspects of Internet surveillance 
and censorship. For example, the China Publication Administration 
and Radio and TV Administration are responsible for supervision of 
Internet content, The Ministry of Information and Industry supervises 
operation licenses and the physical infrastructure of the Internet, the 
Public Security Offi ce (Gonganju) is responsible for the supervision 
of Internet content and users. The Party’s Publicity Department’s 
Internet Bureau and the State Council’s Internet Propaganda Admin-
istrative Bureau direct the propaganda and media censorship effort in 
Internet-Media by issuing regulations on acceptable content and also 
by producing it itself. In principle, both users and content providers 
are regulated closely. The regulations are designed to make it easy for 
the authorities to access all relevant user information, including their 
physical locations and user history. Also the surfers in numerous net 
cafes should register their true identities and contact information. The 
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cafes must also have their operation licences and unlicensed cafes face 
being shut down, which has occurred frequently. (OpenNet Initiative 
2005, 8-10; Harwit et al. 2001, 388-389; Shie 2004, 535-536; Tao 
2007, 4-6.)
As noted, there is a major commitment on the part of the au-
thorities to supervise Internet content in China. It has been estimated 
that internet surveillance requires a workforce of some 30000 - 50000 
persons as “cyber cops” (Hom et al. 2004, 2; the high end fi gure 
given in Hogge 2005, 1). The main principle of control is producer 
responsibility. That is, whoever publishes on the Internet is also legally 
responsible for it. These regulations cover both the users and content 
providers, who all must avoid producing the wrong kind of content. 
Also the service providers have to actively censor unwanted materials 
from their servers and report infringements to the authorities. Con-
tent that is classifi ed as unwanted, and thus illegal, includes, inter 
alia, matters pertaining to state security, national unity, materials that 
are anti-government or threaten social stability (OpenNet Initiative 
2005, 13-14), but in the Chinese censorship system censoring almost 
everything is in principle possible (Esarey 2006).
A part of the CCP’s Internet strategy has also been to go on the 
offence and fi ll the Internet with offi cially approved news content (Shie 
2004, 534). The principle is to deny any private gathering or editing 
of news from otherwise private Internet media. These must offer only 
offi cially permitted news and use only supervised sources. These regu-
lations have also been extended to e-mails and SMS messages, which 
has provoked criticism from the Western press that called China the 
“leading Internet censor in the World”. (Tao 2007; Reporters Without 
Borders 26.09.2005; South China Morning Post 26.09.2005; The 
New York Times 26.09.2005.)
On the other hand, self-censorship is rife, too. The awareness of 
possible surveillance, even if this would not be occurring in reality, 
can make one wary of going to sites deemed too sensitive or produc-
ing materials that can be deemed subversive by the authorities. Some 
observers actually deem this as the most effective means of all in 
the Chinese censor’s gamut (Hachigian 2002, 48). In this, Chinese 
Internet surveillance also continues the long-tested tradition of self-
censorship of public speech and action in China (Hom et al. 2004, 
197
2). Censorship is also known to get tighter during certain sensitive 
dates or events. These include Party conferences and anniversaries 
of events that the Party leadership regards as not deserving of being 
remembered too much, such as the Fourth of June, which is the date 
of the 1989 Beijing massacre when the army violently cracked down 
on a popular mass demonstration in the capital and many other major 
Chinese cities (Laqerkvist 2005, 123). 
HOLES IN THE NET
The combination of the means of high and low tech repression has been 
regarded as a relatively effi cient strategy of controlling the Internet and 
its users in China. But no control is total and there are always holes 
in the net, so to speak. As noted in the introduction, the develop-
ment of Internet technology is a politically contested realm in China. 
Groups and individuals, who want to circumvent repressive methods 
and use the Internet for the ends that the Party defi nes as subversive 
or unwanted, have developed various kinds of means to this end. 
For example the most well known opposition force in contemporary 
China, the Democracy Movement, uses proxy servers that can hide 
their identity of its webpages from the Great Firewall (Chase et al. 
2002, 68-69; Navarria 2005 on various software developed specifi cally 
to this purpose), and such sites can also be accessed through various 
anonymising services. E-mail seems to be relatively diffi cult to monitor 
and e-mail fi ltering is reasonably easy to circumvent through avoiding 
certain keywords or, for example, altering the word slightly (OpenNet 
Initiative 2005, 45). However, using such methods requires some level 
of sophistication and can in principle be traced, which probably makes 
people less willing to use them (Abbott 2001, 104).
One important means of circumventing control is also to use 
mass e-mailing, or junk mail / spam as it is better known. The receiv-
ers of such messages can always deny that they wanted them even if 
this would not be the case. The messages can contain news and com-
mentary from democracy groups, whose mailing lists can reportedly 
contain over one million e-mail addresses (Chase et al. 2002, 29-34 
and 84). It also appears that the Chinese authorities are also not very 
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systematic in their e-mail fi ltering practises. Instead, they often resort 
to the low tech of physical infi ltration of the activist networks in order 
to get information about their activities and membership. However, 
when an activist becomes targeted, monitoring his or her e-mail and 
Internet traffi c may actually help the police to collect evidence against 
the suspect and his or her contacts (ibid., 49-50). 
Even under repressive circumstances the Internet has become a 
means to organise protest inside China. As some well-reported cases 
show. As early as 1998-1999 a democracy activist group called The 
Chinese Democratic Party tried to set up a country-wide organisation 
and register with the authorities. This was conducted partly through 
the Internet and even after the authorities cracked down on the group, 
its activities continued virtually (Wright 2002). In another case, the 
demonstration in downtown Beijing in 1999 that triggered the crack-
down against the Falun Gong sect was partly organised through e-
mail. Numerous local protests in the countryside have been mobilized 
through SMS and e-mail (Tanner 2004, 141-142). In cities numerous 
student demonstrations from 1996 to the autumn 2005 anti-Japanese 
protests as well as the 2008 nationalist protests against Tibetan activ-
ists and their Western supporters have featured on the Internet and 
in campus chatrooms. It is generally noted that e-mail and chatrooms 
have become the basic arena of organisation and mobilisation of vari-
ous NGO’s, although these are predominantly not anti-Party, or even 
overtly political, in nature. Further means through which the Internet 
has been used to infl uence politics have been various net petitions, such 
as the one by the group named Tiananmen Mothers, who demand 
rehabilitation of their children who lost their liver in the tragic evens 
in 1989 (Chase et al. 2002, 10-24).
Not surprisingly, the Internet has also made it harder to control 
the fl ow of news that people fi nd relevant and interesting. A good 
example was the SARS epidemic in 2003, when the Party was forced 
to change its policy on news blackouts when it became obvious that it 
could not control the fl ow of information, and rumours, concerning 
the events that had began to circulate on the Internet and through 
SMS. There are also examples of murder cases where the Internet 
has spread the news all over the country even if the authorities have 
wanted to cover up the cases. ( Hom et al. 2004, 3.) It has also been 
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reported that popular opinion on the Internet has infl uenced some 
court decisions and the content of the news in the mainstream media 
(Lagerkvist 2005). In some cases citizens have been able to expose cor-
rupt offi cials through the Internet and thus launch investigations into 
matters (Yang 2001, 69). Based on these signs, some observers see that 
the Internet makes the formation of public opinion more prominent 
in China (Lagerkvist 2005; Weigui 2003; Yang 2006). It is clear from 
these examples that total control of the Internet has been impossible 
to achieve even in China where the authorities have taken up the task 
seriously. However, at the same time the Internet is more controlled 
and constrained than in liberal democracies. How can we assess the 
importance of this phenomenon for Chinese politics?
THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROLLED INTERNET
A study of the Chinese Internet reveals a contested fi eld of the politics 
of technology, where Internet technology is being constantly developed, 
spread, used, and reconfi gured to serve both repressive and emanci-
patory ends. Furthermore, the CCP also seeks to bring Internet user 
patterns under its control through providing disincentives to what it 
deems as deviant behaviour. This means that politics of technology on 
and in the Internet has became one of the dimensions in the CCP’s 
struggle to uphold its authoritarian regime, others being, for example, 
its strategy to co-opt the new middle classes and newly emerged NGO’s 
in society (Dickson 2006). In all these cases the Party has allowed 
for more individual and independent initiatives to emerge from the 
nascent civil society, but acts as the ultimate referee on what kinds of 
activities it allows to exist in the end. In this vein it also tries to control 
what kind of communication technologies are developed and used as 
well as how they are used. However, its policies have been challenged 
from within and without China.
This explains how in China the Internet has both been bent to 
serve repressive functions and still also remains a means of increasingly 
free communication. If the Internet had been installed in China from 
the West on an “as is” basis with no state interference, it might have 
indeed contributed greatly in bringing down the CCP’s monopoly 
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on power. However, this has not been the case right from the begin-
ning, and therefore the right analytical question in China never was 
will the Internet cause its authoritarian political order to collapse? 
But rather how successfully will the Party be able to control the use 
the new technology? The answer for the time being is that it has been 
suffi ciently, but not completely, successful.  
Indeed, while it is easy to agree with the proposition that the In-
ternet has not brought freedom of speech to China (Shie 2004, 539), 
the Internet has nevertheless made it possible for numerous protest 
groups and even the Democracy Movement to organise and commu-
nicate with its members and potential audiences throughout China. 
It is also clear that the authorities are now less capable of covering up 
negative national or international news and that their capacity to con-
tain social protest has been weakened because of the wide reach of the 
Internet and other NCT. However, the Internet has not brought any 
large scale social movements with it to China, or allowed for general 
oppositional mobilisation.
The writer therefore agrees that the Internet poses a threat to 
one-Party rule in China, although this threat is not immediate. The 
free fl ow of information and communication is always dangerous to 
authoritarian regimes, because freedom of speech makes it possible 
to organise an opposition, the formation of a critical consciousness, 
the mobilisation of popular and foreign support, and testing of the 
authorities’ willingness to engage in repression if needed. The Internet 
creates virtual “free space” (Johnston 2005, 108-110) for the latent 
activist networking and organisation of protest in a much more effi cient 
way than other means of communication. In this way the Internet 
remains a potential threat to one-party rule in China, even if its full 
empowering potential has been blocked. 
At the moment it seems that whether this potential will be realised 
depends on other factors than Internet technology itself, that is, the 
development of the general political environment in China. As long 
as there is the political will to keep up the reconfi guration of Internet 
technology and censorship, and no one is able to develop a cheap (or 
free), easy-to-use, and totally uncontrollable communication technol-
ogy based on the Internet, its potential to serve as a means of free com-
munication and organisation will not be realised. However, if media 
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censorship stops, which happened for instance for a short period of 
time in 1989, the full potential of the Internet will most probably be 
untapped in China too. The function of the Internet should, there-
fore, be assessed against the general ability of the authoritarian rule 
to function and keep up its repressive policies. If this ability weakens, 
for example due to internal strife in the Party, the easy availability of 
the Internet as a means of mass communication  will contribute to 
a further weakening of the one-party system. The Internet therefore 
increases the potential volatility of the Chinese political system as it 
is, but will not bring it down on its own.  
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DAVIDE CALENDA & ALBERT MEIJER
Digital encounters and ‘easy’ politics 
– Results of a web survey among young 
people in three European countries
 
INTRODUCTION
Many new aspects of politics today are concerned with long-term 
transformations such as the decline of political ideologies and ‘big 
narratives’, the globalisation of culture and economy and the progres-
sive individualisation of society. These transformations together have 
enlarged the  scope for the widespread diffusion of more narrow, cus-
tomised, ‘liquid’ and differentiated representations of politics and forms 
of political participation. It has been said, for instance, that political 
identities develop more and more around informal and less-predictable 
paths, which include mundane encounters with politics, engagement in 
informal groups but also dispersed and multiple networks. The Internet 
contributes in a specifi c way to shape this transformation (Bennett 
2000; Castells 1996; della Porta and Mosca 2005; see the discussion 
in Webster 2001; DiMaggio 2001; on young people see Coleman et 
al. 2006, Livingstone 2007, see also Introduction in this volume). 
Evidence from large scale surveys and qualitative research made 
in recent years, led several scholars to argue that the Internet facilitates 
the rise and widespread diffusion of less institutional, less visible, more 
individualised forms of sociability and political participation (Wellman 
& Hampton 1999, Wellman 2001, Castells 2001). Given this context, 
the Internet presents a space where frequent innovative practices of 
information, communication and participation take place. Most of 
these innovations are produced by individuals and collective actors that 
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move and interact on selective, voluntaristic and non-deterministic 
bases, though their identities can be rooted in traditional political 
cultures. These actors own and develop self-organisation and relational 
capacities; the Internet contributes by giving meaning and by providing 
instrumental resources for the development of their actions. 
Events such as the electronic disturbance actions that supported 
EZLN’s protest in 1996 (see Castells 1997) or the massive participation 
in the online petition for the campaign organised by Oxfam during 
the G8 Conference and Live8 rally in Edinburgh (July 2005) have put 
in evidence the capacity of hundreds of organisations and thousands 
of individuals around the world to self-organise and mobilise around 
common targets. Probably, during these events, thousands of single in-
dividuals have experienced the meaning of becoming signifi cant actors 
in the political processes around the world. The immediate returns of 
Internet-based participation may also facilitate the circulation of trust 
in this medium. Furthermore, though we don’t dispose of longitudinal 
research, many sources seem to indicate that the integration of the 
Internet in everyday life may facilitate a cultural displacement of young 
people’s political engagement (see the discussion in Loader 2007). The 
Internet gives an opportunity for individual development and selection 
of different playgrounds of political participation; by doing this, the 
medium can contribute to changing their political involvement (see 
Lappalainen; Lehtonen and Introduction in this volume).
These debates on the transitions of politics are important but need 
to be founded upon thorough empirical analyses of Internet practices 
and perceptions of politics. Many fi ndings are based on studies of 
exceptional cases such as the EZLN protests or the Live8 rally. These 
exceptional cases provide interesting but unbalanced insights (see 
Baringhorst in this volume). These fi ndings do not tell us whether 
these extreme cases are the forefront of general changes or whether 
they are outliers. To position conclusions about extreme cases in a 
broader perspective, a wider overview of changes in political practices 
and perceptions of politics is needed.
The study presented here aims to contribute to the understanding 
of these aspects by using material from an empirical research focused 
on a specifi c group of the population: university students. Our as-
sumption is that the students are at the forefront of technology use 
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because they are young and well educated. They have integrated the 
Internet in their everyday lives and they use this medium as normal 
technology to do many things, including political practices. The fol-
lowing research questions have guided our research:
1. What is the impact of the Internet on the political participation  
 of young people?
2. How does the Internet in the perception of young people change 
 political institutions?
3. What is the impact of the Internet on the participation of young  
 people in the public sphere?
We want to fi nd out how extensive the political use of the Internet is 
and we want frame this descriptive analysis within an interpretation 
schema that includes data on national differences and students’ trust 
of this new medium as a means of empowering political citizenship. 
Indeed, our individuals are placed in cultural and social contexts and 
we want to observe whether national differences exist and how these 
differences shape students’ encounters with politics.  
RESEARCH CHARACTERISTICS
In this chapter we present and discuss some fi ndings of a large scale 
cross-national research project carried out in 2005. 2224 question-
naires were collected through a web questionnaire. For the analysis 
presented here, we decided to focus only on a homogeneous sample 
of young people aged between 18 and 25; thus we worked on 1865 
students. Such a large data set enables us to assess the impact of the 
Internet on political participation and perceptions. Generalising the 
fi ndings is problematic since the survey was self selected: students 
could choose whether they wanted to fi ll in the questionnaire. This 
may have resulted in two biases: more students with high Internet use 
and more students with an interest in politics. This means that we 
cannot generalize our fi ndings with regard to the whole populations 
of students in the three countries. Comparison was one of the aims 
of the research and we will report these differences in other papers. 
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The chapter presents our overall argument and aims to enhance our 
understanding of online participation in general. The general trend 
was confi rmed in all three countries. 
The questionnaire was hosted on a website of the University of 
Florence. It was presented in four languages (Italian, Spanish, Catalan 
and English). There was no time to translate the questionnaire into 
Dutch but Dutch students are generally fl uent in English (and none 
of the students indicated that fi lling in the questionnaire in English 
presented a problem to them). Students in Florence, Utrecht and 
Barcelona were asked to fi ll out a questionnaire and this was acces-
sible from September to December 2005. The questionnaire was 
marketed through university web sites, mailing lists, paper-based 
information and ‘word of mouth’. The access to the questionnaire was 
ruled through a login procedure (for Barcelona and Florence students) 
and through tools of IP identifi cation (for Utrecht students). This 
assured that only students belonging to the three universities fi lled in 
the questionnaire.
We managed to get a good response to the questionnaire (n.2224). 
The response was especially high in Barcelona but Utrecht and Florence 
also got a fair response. We collected 276 questionnaires from Flor-
ence (12.4%); 1278 from Barcelona (57.5%) and 670 form Utrecht 
(30.1%). 68 per cent of the respondents are women; 79.5% are aged 
between 18 and 24. The study’s fi elds of respondents: social sciences 
(37.6%), humanities (24.0%), engineering and computer sciences 
(8.5%), bio-medicine (8.1%), natural sciences, physics and mathemat-
ics (7.1%), economics (6.7%), other (8.9%); missing (1.1%). 
The questionnaire touched on several social and political aspects 
related to the integration of the Internet in everyday life. In this paper 
we will focus on the questions that dealt with political participation 
and perceptions of politics. Our goal was to extend our knowledge 
about students’ opinions on the role of the Internet in the democratic 
arena. The following questions were asked in the survey:
1. What is the impact of the Internet on political participation of  
 young people?
What is the impact of the Internet on the quality of your politi-
cal participation?
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What is the impact of the Internet on the possibility of expressing 
what you think?
Has the time you spend on talking about politics increased since 
you started using the Internet?
Do you use the Internet to talk about politics?
Have you ever expressed an opinion regarding public issues 
through an online survey?
Have you ever participated in a political campaign made through 
Internet?
Do you receive email messages with political contents?
Have you used Internet for fi nding information about the last 
European election campaign?1
2. How does the Internet in the perception of young people change 
 political institutions?
How do you think the Internet will change the relation between 
citizens and government?
This dimension was operationalised as follows:
Recently, more and more governments provide online information 
and services to citizens. Do you think that this trend will reduce, 
not infl uence or increase .... the citizens’ chance to control how 
public administration works?
the citizens’ chance to condition the local government choices?
the citizens’ chance to condition the National Government 
choices?
3. What is the impact of the Internet on participation of young
 people in the public sphere?
Do you use Internet to get information on public issues?
Why do you choose the Internet for fi nding information on 
public issues?
 How many times do you read online newspapers, during a week?
 Do you listen to the radio via Internet?
 Have you ever discussed a public interest issue in a chat, blog or   
 forum?
1. We referred to the European Elections in June 2004; in the Italian version of the 
questionnaire we also referred to local elections that took place in the same period; 
in the Spanish version we also referred to the general election that took place in 
March 2004.
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The results were analysed for general trends and for differences be-
tween the three countries. We used a Two-Independent-Samples Test 
(Mann-Whitney U Test) where a dichotomous variable was crossed 
with an ordinal variable and the Kendall’s Tau b for correlation. In 
the article, ‘n.s’ means non signifi cant.
POLITICAL ACTIVITY ON THE INTERNET
The fi rst set of questions referred to the way young people use the 
Internet for political activity. Political behaviour varies from discuss-
ing politics on the Internet to searching for online information and 
participating in online political campaigns.  The survey showed that 
many students already use the Internet for different kinds of politi-
cal behaviour. Using the Internet for politics has become ‘normal’. A 
substantive group of students has actively looked for information about 
political parties to decide how to vote in the European election (41% 
rarely, 14% often). Expressing their opinion in online surveys is normal 
for students: only a quarter of the students have never expressed an 
opinion in an online survey ‘regarding public issues’.  Participating in 
a political campaign is for students not as normal as expressing their 
opinion in online surveys. However, this item scores high: nearly half 
of the students have participated in a political campaign.
How do students evaluate the impact of these uses of the Internet 
for political participation? The results of questions about political 
behaviour are presented in table 1.
Table 1. Internet impact on political activity (by percentage)
What is the impact of Internet on..?
the quality of your political participation (n.1669)
decrease no infl uence increase
Italy 4.1 63.4 32.5
Spain 2.6 66.5 30.9
the Netherlands 2 55.6 42.4
the possibility of expressing what you think (n.1751)
decrease no infl uence increase
Italy 2.5 34.2 63.3
Spain 1.5 30.6 68
the Netherlands 3.5 50.9 45.6
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The table shows that about a third of the students are positive about 
the impact of the Internet on political participation and a very small 
fraction of the students indicate that use of the Internet decreases 
the quality of political participation. Most students indicate that the 
Internet has no impact. One could explain this position by supposing 
that these students stress that the quality of political participation does 
not depend on the type of medium that is used.
The table also shows that NL students are less positive about the 
infl uence of the Internet on ‘the possibility  of expressing what you 
think’ than IT and SP students. A hypothesis is that the Internet is 
more important for compensating for a lack of opportunities to express 
what students think in IT and SP than in the NL. However, a deeper 
exploration of this data has also led to a consideration of other fac-
tors. We observed that students living with families (this is especially 
the case with Italian students) score signifi cantly higher than students 
living on their own or with friends and a partner (correlation score: 
0.129**). The Internet is also used by these young people as a medium 
to increase their autonomy and develop their personal identities away 
from family constraints (see also Calenda 2006). 
Now let us look at some of the other indicators to extend our 
understanding of the political use of the Internet by students. Al-
most 300 students (17%) reported that they have talked more about 
politics since they have been using the Internet. These students are 
interested in politics (the correlation score is 0.305**) and the Internet 
use reinforces their interest. Only 4% say that the time they spend 
talking politics since they have been using the web has decreased. No 
relevant national differences were found. This data suggests that the 
Internet reinforces political interest. The data also shows that one 
should not expect miracles from the Internet. The Internet does not 
seem to have much infl uence on the students who have little interest 
in the Internet. 132 students reported that they are not interested in 
politics at all (7.6%). From this group, only 3 students say that their 
time talking about politics has increased since they started using use 
of the Internet.  
The results from the question about themes of political campaigns 
indicated that students are more interested in issues that do not directly 
affect their situation (human rights, solidarity, ecology) than in issues 
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that are directly related to their own situation (i.e. study rights). This 
could be interpreted as an indicator of a post-materialist orientation: 
civil rights, human rights, immigration, etc. (37.9%); solidarity, in-
ternational cooperation, etc. (25.8%); ecology, environment, bio eth-
ics, etc. (21.5%); social rights, work, income, pension, study rights, 
etc. (14.4%); Internet related issues (8.7%). This post-materialist 
orientation is an aspect of non-traditional politics (see Lappalainen; 
Baringhorst and Introduction in this volume).
In their participation, ease of use is important. Signing online 
petitions is relatively easy; participating in online discussion groups is 
more complicated. This consideration is based on fi ndings which have 
emerged when we asked students to select which means they have used 
to participate in political campaigns: signing online petitions (38%); 
writing and forwarding emails to friends and colleagues (34%); online 
protesting forms (10%); participating in online discussion groups 
(6%). This data shows that politics also takes place along the lines of 
informal contacts (friends and colleagues). Students mostly get mes-
sages with political content from friends and colleagues. This provides 
evidence of ‘informal politics’.
Informal networks are the main channels of political communica-
tion. This is confi rmed by data related to the question ‘Do you receive 
email messages with political content?’: 41% sometimes, 11% often 
and 5% very often. Most of the students receive emails from friends 
(42%) or colleagues (34%), followed by non-party associations and 
organizations (12%) and parties (9%). Findings from sub questions 
asking about the provenance of messages, content and formats, also 
show interesting aspects of informal politics but also differences be-
tween countries. We used the following questions: (1) ‘The content of 
the messages regard mainly...(political parties, political leaders, political 
movements - non parties).’ And (2) ‘Messages mostly regard… (support 
or criticism  of political leaders, political parties or coalitions, political 
satire)’. Data on the content of messages refl ect differences between the 
countries. IT students mostly receive emails about leaders, indicating 
the progressive personalisation of Italian politics and the presence of 
leaders’ effect on the web (i.e. Silvio Berluscioni who was addressed 
by big web campaigns in recent years, see Bentivegna 2006). Italians 
score very low in party membership (only 4% are members or have 
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been members of a political party) while more are engaged in voluntary 
associations (18%). SP students mostly receive emails about parties, 
though only 5% of students are associated with political parties (they 
score low in all forms of membership). NL students mostly receive 
emails from political movements, but they are also those students that 
score highest in party and ecology associations.  These fi ndings seem to 
refl ect differences in political orientations in these three countries.
The score on ‘messages with political satire ‘ is high in IT and SP 
and lower in the NL and images are often more important than text. 
These scores may indicate a lack of trust in the political system in IT 
and SP. According to a Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2005 (Eu-
robarometer 2006), only 19% of Italians trust political parties, 27% 
of Spanish and 34% of the Dutch. A similar trend is observed when 
looking at National political institutions: Italians score lowest.  Cross-
national research on young people (Euyoupart 2005) confi rms this 
trend, though Spain and Holland were not included: Italians mistrust 
the National political system much more than young people living 
in other countries – i.e. France, UK and Germany. In Italy students 
prefer laughing about satire to discussing issues. The level of cynicism 
seems higher in IT than in the other countries. 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPACT 
OF THE INTERNET ON POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Participation can be meaningful but only results in effects if it infl u-
ences political institutions (cf. Introduction in this volume). The second 
set of questions referred to young people’s perceptions of changes in 
political institutions induced by the Internet. Does the political arena 
in which young people participate change through the Internet? Can 
young people more easily exert infl uence over public offi cials and 
public bodies? Is it easier to let their voices be heard? The answers to 
the questions concerning expected impacts of the Internet on political 
institutions are presented in table 2.
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Table 2. The Internet’s impact on citizens’ control (by percentage)  
Recently, more and more governments provide online information and services to 
citizens. Do you think that this trend will reduce, not infl uence or increase....
the citizens’ chance to control how public administration works? (n.1570)
Decrease no infl uence increase
Italy 2.1 32.3 65.6
Spain 4 45.2 50.8
the Netherlands 4.5 45.4 50.1
the citizens’ chance to condition the local government choices? (n.1555)
Decrease no infl uence increase
Italy 1.1 69.4 29.6
Spain 3.7 54.8 41.5
the Netherlands 2.8 47.4 49.8
the citizens’ chance to condition the National Government choices? (n.1539)
decrease no infl uence increase
Italy 1.1 76.3 22.6
Spain 4 64.8 31.2
the Netherlands 2.2 52.1 45.8
Most students think that the Internet will enhance the citizens’ chances 
to control how public administration works. A substantial group of 
students, however, expects little effect of the Internet on public ad-
ministration. IT students are more positive about this effect than the 
SP and Dutch students. This could refl ect a wish to have more control 
and this refl ects an offl ine situation with too little control. A possible 
explanation is that transparency and effi ciency may be regarded as a 
bigger problem in IT than in the NL and SP. Therefore IT students fi nd 
control important and hope for the opportunities the Internet offers. 
Another possible explanation is that the Italian public administrations 
have made a signifi cant effort to improve electronic governance; in this 
case data can be interpreted as a sign of trust generated by innovation. 
We believe that both explanations can be used together to interpret 
this data, though the fi rst expectation looks more consistent with the 
general picture provided by several studies on political effi ciency and 
citizens’ trust towards political institutions in Italy. 
On average, students see a positive effect of the Internet on citi-
zens’ chances to condition local and national government choices but 
most students expect no infl uence. In these variables the situation is 
reversed: now the IT students are less positive than NL and SP students 
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are. This data may confi rm the lack of trust by Italian young people 
towards the political systems; they feel that little power can be exercised 
on the political system, especially at the National level. Indeed, local 
government scores higher than national ones: in general, students 
feel that the Internet can help in conditioning political processes at 
the local level. The better performance of local governments could 
be explained by their proximity to local affairs but it can also suggest 
that local governments have used technology to open the participation 
process more than national governments have done.
These fi ndings contrast with the scientifi c literature on changes 
in public administration. Many authors stress that the transforma-
tional nature of the electronic governance concept is often reduced to 
electronic administration practices (i.e. Norris 2001; De Rosa 2006). 
At the same time, electronic democracy experiences, promoted by 
institutions, are often embedded in a rigid ‘institutional format’, and 
this can hardly  increase the chance of citizens  becoming signifi cant 
actors in the political process (see the Introduction and Lappalainen in 
this volume; cf. Molinari and Lehtonen in this volume). A study made 
by OECD (1999) on the eight most developed countries concluded 
that, though governments have made important efforts  concerning 
information access and service  delivery, they failed in facilitating  more 
direct participation through the use of the Internet (see Norris 2001; 
for a discussion, see Barney 2004). In spite of these critical assessments, 
many students in the three countries are hopeful about the changes 
that the Internet will bring to political institutions.
The data about perceptions of the impact of the Internet on 
political institutions refl ects the quality of political institutions of 
the three countries. The Netherlands is characterised by modern and 
quite effi cient institutions; in this country we have ‘long’ traditions 
and good practices of e-governance. In Italy the lack of transparency, 
the predominance of bureaucratic and authoritative models of public 
institutions and the lack of political effi ciency lead to more pessimistic 
views of students regarding the improvement of civic empowerment. 
Spain stays in the middle. 
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PARTICIPATION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE
The third set of questions widens up our perspective on political 
participation to position it within changing practices in the public 
sphere. Does the Internet have an effect on how young people get 
information on public issues? Do they read other newspapers? These 
questions aim to provide an insight into changing practices in the 
public sphere which forms the basis for political participation.
A majority of the students (59%) use the Internet at least pretty 
often to get information about public issues: pretty often (40.5%) 
and very often (18.4%). Students were asked to indicate the reasons 
why they use the Internet to get information. The ease of access is 
the most important reason for using the Internet. The argument that 
the Internet offers additional information is considered important 
by substantial minorities. More IT students and SP students use the 
Internet to obtain information on public issues than Dutch students. 
This could either refl ect a greater interest in public issues or a lack of 
other good sources of information about public issues. We only could 
check the fi rst hypothesis: we correlated the item with the indicator 
of ‘interest in politics’ (0-3 scale) and we found a strong association 
(0.327**). This provides support for the hypothesis that students with 
a greater interest in politics use the Internet more to get information 
about public issues.
We analysed the answers of the students to fi nd out what level of 
government they obtain information through the Internet. In their 
Internet use, SP students are more interested in local issues than in 
national issues. This is not surprising: they are probably more inter-
ested in Catalonia than in Spain. NL students show less interest in 
local issues. IT students are in between these two groups. A possible 
explanation is that mobility in the NL is higher and thus interest in 
local issues declines. These preferences directly refl ect the preferences 
in the use of traditional media. 
As for the relationships between media, several fi ndings were 
made. The questions about specifi c media use for public issues shows 
that online newspapers are not exceptional but have – even in student 
populations – not yet beaten paper newspapers. A large majority read 
on-line newspapers at least one day per week; 20% do it two-three days 
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per week and 16.5% do it every day. There are no signifi cant national 
differences. Reading printed newspapers is common among students: 
only 12% of students report that they never read newspapers; 32% 
do it everyday. No relevant national differences were found. A large 
majority states that online newspapers do not infl uence whether they 
buy newspapers. A second medium considered was Internet radio. Most 
students never listen to the radio via Internet. However, a substantial 
minority listens at least once a week. Internet radio is no longer a ‘rare 
technology’. More students listen to national radio than to radio from 
other countries. The latter group, however, is substantial. And one 
should note that international radio is an addition to the radio sta-
tions that are normally available. This shows that a group of students 
becomes increasingly focused on international media. 
Finally, we observed a relevant national difference on the item 
‘watching TV-news’: consistently with other surveys (i.e. Euyoupart 
2005), Italian students score very high (73% do watch TV every day), 
much higher than the Spanish (31.3%) and the Netherlands (53.2%). 
Television in Italy still represents the most important media through 
which people keep informed. 
The use of chat rooms and blogs concerning political issues is 
limited. 68 % (consistent over all countries) have never accessed a 
chatroom or log concerning political issues. Only 5% of the students 
discuss public issues in a blog or chat room often or very often. The 
Internet seems to be more important for information and exchange 
communication rather than as a discursive community.
As for participation in online discussion concerning public issues, 
25% of students did. Regarding the reason why they participated, the 
item ‘to take a position on an argument’ scored highest. As highlighted 
above, people prefer to use the Internet to confi rm their preferences in-
stead of challenging them. This is connected to the fact that friendship 
networks are the main channels of communication: students mainly 
want to communicate with people that have the same opinion. 
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CONCLUSION
On the basis of our survey we have presented a rich overview of 
emerging political practices on the Internet and changing percep-
tions of politics. We will conclude this paper by using the fi ndings to 
answer the research questions. What have we learned about political 
participation on the Internet (research question 1)? Using the Internet 
for politics has become a normal practice for the students in all three 
countries. They use the Internet for a wide variety of political activi-
ties since the Internet makes participating ‘easy’. The fi ndings showed 
that students are positive about the impact of the Internet on political 
participation but also stress that the impact is limited. The Internet 
mostly seems to reinforce pre-existing patterns of political participa-
tion. One of the key fi nding was that encounters with politics are 
not mediated by organisations, rather, a signifi cant role is played by 
informal (e)networks and groups. Informal channels form the main 
channels of political communication. Politics on the Internet could be 
qualifi ed as ‘informal politics’. Another key-fi nding was that politics 
on the Internet is mostly post-materialist politics. 
We also found some interesting differences between the three 
countries when it comes to political participation on the Internet. 
A fi rst observation was that Spanish and Italian students value the 
contribution of the Internet to express what they think much higher 
than Dutch students. This fi nding seems to refl ect the living condi-
tions of these students: more Italian and Spanish students live with 
their families and therefore value the Internet as a means to enlarge 
their space of autonomy. A second observation was that the political 
orientations of the students in the three countries vary: Italian students 
mainly focus on political leaders, Spanish students on political parties 
and Dutch students on political movements. These differences argu-
ably refl ect offl ine differences between the countries. A third difference 
was the strong focus on messages with political satire in Spain and 
especially Italy. This focus seems to refl ect the high level of political 
cynicism in Italy.
What have we learned about the impact of the Internet on the 
perception of political institutions (research question 2)? Many stu-
dents expect a positive effect of the Internet on political institutions 
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although most students expect no substantial effects. The positive ex-
pectations of students contrast with the scientifi c literature on changes 
in public administration that stresses that the transformational nature 
of the electronic governance concept is often reduced to electronic 
administration practices. Students are more positive about citizens’ 
chances to control how public administration works than about their 
chances to condition (local and national) government choices.  This 
difference seems to refl ect the opinion that processes will be carried out 
differently but government choices will still basically be conditioned 
by the same interests.
We also found signifi cant differences between the countries. IT 
students are more positive about the chance to control and condition 
the national government. The main explanation for this difference is 
that IT students fi nd control important because of effi ciency and trans-
parency problems in Italian government and hope for the opportunities 
the Internet offers. In contrast, IT students are less positive than NL 
and SP students are about citizens’ chances to condition government 
choices. This data seems to refl ect the fact that IT students feel that 
little power can be exerted on the political system. These fi ndings 
refl ect the overall perceptions of the quality of political institutions 
in the three countries. Dutch political institutions are seen as modern 
and quite effi cient institutions and the Internet only contributes to 
further improvement of these institutions. In Italy the perceived lack 
of openness and political effi ciency leads to more pessimistic views of 
students regarding the improvement of electronic civic empowerment. 
Spain stays in the middle: SP students are moderately positive about 
the impact of the Internet on political institutions.
   What have we learned about the impact of the Internet on 
participation in the public sphere (research question 3)? The most 
important fi nding was that, even though the Internet has not yet 
beaten the mass media, the use of the Internet for participation in 
the public sphere is ‘normal behaviour’. A majority of the students 
uses the Internet at least pretty often to get information about public 
issues. They are increasingly interested in international issues. We 
found support for the hypothesis that students with a greater interest 
in politics use the Internet more to get information about public 
issues. The use of chatrooms and blogs concerning political issues 
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is limited. Additionally, only 25% of the students participated in 
online discussions around public issues. The Internet seems to be 
more important for information and exchange communication rather 
than as a deliberative community. Friendship networks are the main 
channels of communication: students mainly want to communicate 
about public issues with people that have the same opinion.
Again, changing behavioural patterns refl ect differences in pre-
existing patterns in the three countries. The refl ection of pre-existing 
patterns is clearly highlighted by the level of student interest in the 
public sphere. SP students are more interested in local issues than in 
national issues, NL students show less interest in local issues and IT 
students are in between these two groups. These preferences directly 
refl ect the preferences in the use of traditional media where SP stu-
dents mainly focus on local (Catalonian) issues whereas NL students 
are relatively more interested in international issues.
Where do these fi ndings take us in our search for understanding 
politics in a digital era? We feel that the question whether the online 
politics replaces offl ine politics Internet is not a central one. Conversely, 
the key aspect is the integration of political participation media. We 
found, for instance, that students make an integrated use of media to 
inform about politics. A large majority states that online newspapers 
do not infl uence whether they buy newspapers; also Internet radio is 
no longer a ‘rare technology’. 
Overall we see that national aspects sometimes shape opinions 
and use of the internet, especially when we look at the variables that 
are concerned with political institutions and the quality of the public 
sphere etc. However, the similarities between the countries are mostly 
more prominent than the differences. The Internet may play a role 
in this trend but should certainly not be seen as the dominant factor 
since there are other large trends such as globalisation, Europeanization 
and individualisation which have an impact on political behaviour 
and perceptions.
Our data confi rms the hypothesis that the Internet is an exten-
sion of people’s lives. The effects are not as dramatic as some of the 
well-known examples we mentioned in the introduction suggest. The 
Internet does not mobilise people who are not interested in politics; 
however, its use leads to encounters with politics and the public sphere 
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and contributes to increased expectations of young people about 
political changes. Students tend to trust this medium and are likely 
to think that it can empower people, especially against government’s 
power. One should not expect political miracles from the Internet but 
it does seem to provide an important contribution to strengthening 
new forms of politics by making politics ‘easy’.
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The Internet as a forum 
for multiple styles of political activities
INTRODUCTION  
What would passive observers of the news think if they themselves 
could write it? What would they think if they could comment on the 
news at the same time as they looked at it on their computer screen? 
Many South Koreans, especially Oh Yeoun-ho, can answer these ques-
tions. Oh himself established an Internet publication called OhmyNews 
in 2000 which may change traditional journalistic practices consider-
ably. OhmyNews is a medium whose editorial processes are open to 
everyone looking for new issues, is ready to write about them and to 
distribute their information. It had 727 editors at the beginning but 
there were already 35000 of them by the year 2005. However, although 
all the stories that are offered are not published; more than 70 per cent 
of the news is written by the collaborators. 
Oh Yeoun-ho established the new publication because he had had 
enough of the one-dimensionality of the main-stream media.  He had 
written articles in the radical marginal journals for years but his ideas 
were not published. His views were silenced or the traditional media 
stole them and took all the credit for themselves. Oh wanted to have 
alternatives to the communication of the conservatives which has had 
the dominant position.  He has probably succeeded in his aims. The 
liberal politician Roh Moo-hyun was elected the president of South 
Korea in the 2002 election in spite of the wide resistance of the con-
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servatives. Support of Ohmy News was regarded as a partial reason for 
the surprising choice. (Helsingin Sanomat 8.1.2005.) 
What could parents do if the waste incineration plant located in 
their neighbourhood puffed so many poisons into the air that they 
caused a serious illness in their children? What could they do if the 
authorities responsible for the matter did not care about the problem 
at all? If the questions were addressed to Sherri and Stan Lasco living 
in Ohio, the answer would be obvious. Use the Internet! The Lascos 
found a huge amount of information about the poisonous emissions 
from the Internet and they received support through it from others 
that facilitated the battle against the company in question. Without 
the widespread cooperation organised with the help of the Internet the 
plant would probably never have been closed. The contest made the 
Lascos believe that the Internet is a huge resource for people needing 
help in everyday life. They argue that they gained courage by network-
ing to also put pressure on local politicians. The Lascos’ success in their 
contest inspired them to continue computer-mediated action with 
other activists around the world. (White 2000, ch. 5.) 
These cases tell us about the power of the Internet in people’s per-
sonal lives. They can raise everyday problems in public discussion with 
it, that is, due to the Internet people can act politically in a new way. 
A veteran of computer-mediated communication Edward Schwartz 
tells us in an interview, that he perceived years ago how powerful the 
online medium is: communication from many to many is the hard core 
of all political activity. No other technology preceding the Internet has 
given room for such a local, national and transnational assembling. 
(Schwartz 1997, 2.)
The Internet offers an opportunity for the type of subpolitical 
action meant by Ulrich Beck. It can strengthen such an art of self-or-
ganising characteristic to the political. Subpolitics differs from “offi cial” 
politics in two ways. Firstly, the outside actors of the traditional political 
system are allowed onto the stage of social infl uencing and secondly, 
the signifi cance of individuals is highlighted when they are competing 
for political infl uence (Beck 1995, 38-39). I have called this kind of 
a study of subpolitical action or citizens’ spontaneous political action 
a study of micro level politics (Lappalainen 2002). 
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A researcher of micro politics can learn something from the mi-
cro historian. He/she should pay attention to inconsistencies, latent 
exceptions and irregularities instead of the regularities having become 
natural or unquestioned (Alapuro 1995, 317). The micro historian 
is interested in typical exceptions and seemingly insignifi cant details. 
This offers a new point of view for a researcher to formulate a new 
theory. (Peltonen 1999, 21, 26.) In political life typical exceptions are 
novelties or events breaking routines, that is, an exception is intensive, 
spontaneous action but not habitual, ‘natural’ or regulated political 
behaviour.   
A new form of micro level action is net activism.  Information 
technology has quickly spread within civil movements which is why 
new types of political actors, communication activists, have appeared 
on the political scene. They work for “better” or “alternative” use of 
modern information technology. A network activist interviewed by 
Wayne Rash refers to his own experiences and tells that “the net is 
a robust established mechanism for a very cheap, very fast exchange 
of information, broadcast, and facilitation of organisations. (…) It is 
particularly useful to the voluntary groups. That is the real and honest 
grass-roots level activism.” (Rash 1997, 94). The Internet is very useful 
when grass-roots political action is constructed.
Concentrating on citizens’ opportunities to utilise the Internet 
can be justifi ed because the Internet is above all a forum and tool of 
political action of new civil movements (see Mosca; Gillan and Vromen 
in this volume). Political actors using the Internet must have new arts/
skills because networked political activity deviates decisively from the 
earlier one. Due to this new phenomenon conceptions concerning the 
forming of social relations and defi nitions of political activity must be 
reconsidered. I am very aware of the discussion concerning the digital 
divide but I exclude this aspect in this chapter and analyse the issue from 
the perspective of a civil actor capable of utilising the Internet. 
The Internet opens up opportunities for the citizens and their 
activities because its content can be produced by the ordinary citizens 
but not only by the media experts. For example, television broad-
casts require expensive equipment, studios and expert knowledge 
(Slevin 2000, 74). It is thus productive to pay attention to the civil 
movements because they especially, use the new technology for the 
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intensifi cation of their own activities. They consider the Internet as a 
free market place of ideas which is why other political actors also are 
very interested in it. 
Newsgroups, in particular are the origins of the network commu-
nities and their activities. They are laboratories of new ideas of modes 
of activities. They are able to use a new electric medium in a way which 
gives them an advantage never seen before. Information technology 
provides the necessary conditions for the materialisation of innova-
tions in practical activities – if the hidden properties included in the 
technology are realised (Walch 1999; Rash 1997.) Attention should 
be paid to the new forms and opportunities of use of the technology, 
that is, to the social innovations (Mattelart 2003, 157). I will try to 
analyse the opportunities for activity given by the new technology 
to the citizens but not to the dogmatists of the technology. My most 
important objective in this paper is to show that the Internet is a forum 
enabling the citizens to act with multiple styles.  
A central objective in developing the citizen-oriented net has been 
to strengthen citizens’ activities, like possibilities for independent pub-
lication and for self-expression. They have also developed the practice 
of the open and reciprocal civil discussion. In that case the citizens 
will be considered as the actors producing the content and participat-
ing in the public discussion and in local decision-making (Sirkkunen 
2004; see also Lehtonen in this volume). Increasing the resources of 
the citizens with the help of the Internet is also a subject of attention 
in this chapter. This subject of interest is closely connected with the 
opportunities of innovative activities offered by the Internet.
Activities utilising the Internet are connected with the theory of 
refl exive modernity emphasising some essential properties of the Inter-
net. I mean new opportunities for activity and the constant growth of 
the power of the actors and the individualisation of people in respect 
to the political structures. The basic idea of the theory is that when 
societies become increasingly modern, actors or subjects will have the 
ability to refl ect on their own social existence and to change it at the 
same time (Beck 1995, 236). 
The chapter departs with the concept of experience which I regard 
as a basic element of political action. After that I briefl y introduce the 
idea of political style as a way for political actors to stand out from 
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other actors. Here politgenicity of action is the most essential aspect 
(see more closely Lappalainen 2005). After these defi nitions I move to 
a style of political activity the Internet enables, that is, public involve-
ment. It is a distinct alternative to political action which is analysed in 
the context of the Internet. The Internet is a forum of opportunities for 
multiple political styles; it enables contingent action beginning anew. 
The last section is a summary concentrating on political activities in 
the Internet from the perspective of the idea of style. 
POLITICAL ACTION BASED ON EXPERIENCE
Before defi ning the concept of style more exactly it is necessary to look 
at the question from which political action is constructed. In my view, 
intentional, intense and often spontaneous political action is based 
on experience. As is very well known, the idea of experience has an 
essential role in John Dewey’s theory of action. His work The Quest 
for Certainty (originally published in 1929) is a defence of practical 
action and arts/skills.
Experience is based on the practical reasoning available to every-
one. It is not possible to teach what experience is. Every person has the 
art to experience and the art to learn. It is easy to agree with Dewey’s 
famous phrase “learning by doing”. For Dewey the starting point of 
scientifi c research is experience. I would like to argue here that po-
litical action is also based on experience. It begins with the issues we 
experience in our environment, that is, it begins with the issues we see, 
deal with, use, which we enjoy and from which we suffer. Interaction 
between individuals and the environment is characteristic of experi-
ence. That is why people’s values are inherent aspects of political life. 
These experiential issues are challenges of refl ective thinking. They are 
questions but not answers (see also Collingwood 1939). 
Experience, in particular, means the strong and phenomenal state 
of mind formed in the here and now. Thus experience is in a way 
analogous to a departure on a journey to an unknown destination, that 
is, to an uncertain future. (Kotkavirta 2002, 16; Niiniluoto 2002, 11). 
This dimension of experience is the exact meaning of political action 
defi ned by Hannah Arendt. For her, action means starting something 
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new, launching a process never seen before. Individual’s ability to act 
means expecting the unexpected which is why it is always directed 
against certainty. When taking action, people create something which 
at present seems quite unlikely. Action never has an end known in 
advance, and thus it is not possible to predict the result of action with 
any certainty. By nature, action breaks all barriers (Arendt 1958, 178-
190). Taking action is for Arendt an example of events characterised by 
breaking routine processes. Such events are miracles in a way (Arendt 
1961, 168-170). Action as such, as distinct from routine behaviour 
following cultural conventions, is something exceptional. In my view, 
an intensive style and quality is a natural part of all action in the sense 
Arendt uses the concept. 
Let us think of civil movements whose very nature is the Arend-
tian idea of action. That is why they have to pay attention to the style 
of action. In order to succeed they must stand out from the existing 
political actors. The formation of new action has always implied 
some sorts of stylistic elements. Every beginning of new political 
action requires an original and independent style. It is not sensible 
to form a new movement if its action does not stand out from the 
existing movements. New radical movements especially, always battle 
with the contemporary actors. Movements utilising the Internet have 
to pay attention to the stylistic dimension of action because of the 
enormous number of sites. They have to fi nd original ways of using 
the Internet and how to construct sites standing out from the mass. 
Not only do the new movements have to stand out from others, but 
also the renewing and thus restyling political actors have to re-refl ect 
their traditional styles. 
The results of experiences are always uncertain; they cannot be 
known in advance. They are full of threats and they are unpleasant 
in nature. This kind of uncertainty often creates impatience and the 
will to act immediately (Dewey 1999, 195). The idea of uncertainty 
is applicable, for instance, to the rise of spontaneous citizens’ move-
ments, which are devoted to creating a future but not fascinated with 
the past and its mystifi cation. They attempt to solve the problems they 
have experienced without trusting traditional “normal institutionalised 
politics”. In other words, they try to act in a style clearly differing 
from earlier known styles. 
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Dewey argues that thinking has been the method by which indi-
viduals have attempted to escape the dangers of uncertainty. However, 
everyday life is full of unfulfi lled hopes, destroyed expectations and 
contingent catastrophes. The empirical world we face is rough and 
hard. Thus my essential argument is that in practical everyday life there 
are continuously emerging problems. Political action is thus bound 
closely to the problems we experience in existing in the environment 
in which we interact. When people act politically they thus defi ne 
some issue or situation as the problem and try to solve it. 
When politics is regarded as problem-oriented action it subsumes 
experience, which is exactly what political action is based on. Political 
action and experience are connected to each other; they imply each 
other. Without experience there is only political behaviour, that is, po-
litical activities following on from habitual conventions. This refers to 
the automatic compliance to doctrines and orders and routinised and 
ritualised performance in general. It is typical for political behaviour 
that style has withered away from it or the dimension of style is very 
weak in it. 
POLITGENICITY OF STYLE 
Style is restricted expressly to activities. Style is explicitly a standpoint 
on concrete activity and this is why I categorically reject the notion 
that style is but a worthless surface of politics behind which the true 
contents of political activity can be found (cf. Nelson 1998, 169-171). 
The concept of style has something to give for a study which concen-
trates on the new political actors and on those attempting renewal. 
In order to succeed, the new political actors must be able to stand out 
from the existing political actors and the renewing political actors must 
be able to stand out from their own old styles. The forming of new 
activities as such and the renewing of the traditional activities has always 
involved some kind of dimension of style. All kinds of beginnings of 
new political activities require carefully considered style attempting 
to be original. This kind of activity requires a new kind of art, that is, 
the art of political style.
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Above I paid attention to the political actors’ attempt to stand 
out from others as a starting point of the analysis of political styles. 
One of the main points of my article is the idea that it is much more 
fruitful to use John Nelson’s expression form-with-content, that is, the 
inseparable unity of form and content. The other thing Nelson stresses 
is politics as virtuous speech-in-action. Only in this way can politics 
become sound and vital action (Nelson 1998). I want to emphasise 
the concrete form-with-content of action as in the research on the 
style of activities. The art of political style means merging form and 
content in an original and innovative way. This must be done again 
and again, situation by situation. 
The art of political style means just the original and innovative 
merging of form and content (Lappalainen 2002). The art of merging 
form and content can be illustrated with an analogy taken from fi lm 
theory. Marcel Martin argues that modern fi lms are based on primi-
tive direct charms, imitating voices and images of nature. However, 
he emphasises that these signs should be more artistically/skilfully 
arranged. Creating fi lms in other words requires the art of arrang-
ing signs so that the images of fi lms do not only go simply on the 
screen one after another but the images have – as Martin calls it – a 
substance. I myself, consider this to be the resonance element of the 
fi lm, awakening a genuine experience and not a mere mental image. 
In that case “the fi lm gives us something more from the events than the 
events themselves” (Martin 1971, 25). For this reason photogenicity 
can be talked of. Marcel argues as a conclusion “that the contemporary 
fi lm is neither language nor show but it has become style” (Martin 1971, 
255). In the fi lms which have original style “the division into form and 
content becomes impossible and absurd (…) and language is ennobled to 
a substance” (Martin 1971, 257).
Creating the form-with-content of political action requires that 
the art and the political form-with-content must be original, like the 
one in the fi lms. If the political actor will create this kind of form-
with-content, he/she must be able to act appealingly and convincingly. 
The event constructing the form-with-content of political action must 
be somehow more than is constructed of photogenicity in the fi lms. I 
call this process the construction of politgenicity of action. The more 
independent the politgenicity of political action is the more artfully 
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the form and the content have merged in each other. In this case politi-
cal action has more intensive style, in other words, it is created with 
imagination and creative ability but not with prejudices. 
When outlining the approach of researching political styles John 
Nelson emphasises the expressive elements of action. His contribu-
tion to the discussion of theme is above all the concept of trope. By 
concept of trope Nelson means the turn of a speech and action. The 
other characters of the trope are movements, dynamics and changes 
in the direction of action or a turn in the course of events. Every turn 
creates the forms of action, that is, the fi gure, (Nelson 1998, xv-xvi, 
170). According to the dictionary of foreign words the prefi x tropo 
means turning or change (Nurmi et al. 2001, 471). I add here the 
connotation, the convincing way to stand out. The concept of the 
trope-fi lled action in a way specifi es the concept of form-with-content. 
It describes the form-with-content itself and the way of constructing 
it. As a result of the construction of form-with-content politgenicity 
of action is formed. 
I have called the trope-fi lled, original and discerning form-with-
content the politics of trope (Lappalainen 2002). Trope-fi lled action is 
analogous with art “which is proud of originality, novelties and innova-
tions” (Shusterman 1997, 25). The fi eld of art is constantly growing 
and art entails inherently looking for something new. This kind of art 
is analogous with the style-intensive politgenic action beginning ever 
new and working up its form-with-content. 
Any given politics of tropes is not automatically style sensitive, 
but always requires the art of political judgement. It requires a certain 
kind of art to perceive alternatives, to create fresh alternatives to the 
existing fi gures of politics. Political action, including the intensive 
dimension of style, requires inventing new issues, new tropes, original 
stories and ‘odd’ ways of political communication. A politician aim-
ing at intensive style does not bind her/himself to a certain alternative 
at all but plays with options. She/he invents new images from old 
ones and generates strange compositions from familiar arrangements. 
She/he creates surprising spectacles, beginnings, failures and futures. 
Style intensive politics is expressive poetic politics (see Nelson 1998, 
160, 169-171). 
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Trope-fi lled style refers to any given deviation from the contextual 
norms. Personal expressions being opposites of clearly objective ones 
must be examined. The concept of style can also be used differently. It 
can mean the usual way of speaking and acting. Impersonal scientifi c 
writing or certain actors’ statements capable of prediction are exam-
ples of this sort of non-intense political activity. This is just normal 
political behaviour having become routinised. Only distinguishing 
itself from the setting of activity utilised earns the value of politgenic 
action. In other words, intensiveness as such, is a condition of this kind 
of style (cf. Wallace 1992, 16). I consider the exception and creative 
resistance to be the method of constructing trope-fi lled signifi cances. 
The political actor does not break rules in order to act in a unique 
way but to fi nd new information and to perform it in a new way (cf. 
Wallace 1992, 17). 
    THE INTERNET AS A FORUM OF POLITICAL 
BEHAVIOUR: PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 
The utilisation of the Internet in the development of democracy is a 
popular theme in the scientifi c discussion of the topic. It may open 
possibilities for better democracy if it is used skilfully. Net democracy 
can be a real alternative to the plebiscite democracy of today in which 
the citizens are required to submit themselves to the choices of the 
competing elite (Walch 1999, 13; Slevin 2000, 78). Governments have 
used the Internet in several countries for the improvement of transpar-
ency and for listening to the wishes of their citizens. Net democracy 
or teledemocracy is often organised by inviting citizens to participate 
in political discussions (see Slevin 2000, 47 and also Introduction; 
Molinari and Lehtonen in this volume). The aim of national states is 
to create political mechanisms in which the problems of uncertain-
ties of late-modern societies, as unpredicted action, could be solved 
(Slevin 2000 20-21). As Beck argues, the authorities have to get ready 
for possible resistance to their plans, for example, the building of new 
motorways, nuclear power and chemical plants. The citizens are heard 
because the authorities want to know in advance if they consider the 
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building of the new institutions harmful. One wants to get ready for 
citizens’ spontaneous subpolitical action in this way. 
These kinds of arrangements created above can be called public 
involvement (Lappalainen 2002, see also Introduction in this volume). 
It refers to a willingness of the authorities to involve various interest 
groups, for example in the planning of a motorway. Consultation of 
the critical actors is considered important. They are groups supplying 
all-round expertise and new views to the discussion. It is essential to 
involve the groups which may disturb the planning process or may 
make execution of the plan more diffi cult. The very aim of the involve-
ment is to prevent confl icts; the key concept is cooperation between 
the authorities and regional and local interest groups and other actors 
(see Loikkanen et al. 1997, 16). 
It is important to notice what public involvement is not. It is an 
alternative for infl uencing the grass-roots level, for demonstrations, 
and for spontaneous contacts with the authorities. Such public in-
volvement may become a trap for the political actors in the sense that 
it can tame intensity of action. Public involvement is not an experi-
ence in the same sense as action is because it is organised from above 
and because it is consultation.  However, taming of action is not an 
automatic process as a consequence of involvement but it depends 
on the actors themselves. Action can also exist in the arrangements of 
public involvement.  
Public involvement utilising the Internet is apparent, for example, 
in a report by the city of Tampere. The report suggests channels to 
improve the participation of the inhabitants of Tampere (hereafter the 
IPI-report). It states that participation means close interaction between 
the inhabitants, the offi cials and the elected representatives. A reason 
for developing participation is a concern about a decreasing level of 
political activity on the part of the citizens.  The citizens neither par-
ticipate in party activities nor vote as actively as earlier. 
One crucial objective of participation is to commit the inhabitants 
to the strategy of the city. The group admits that it also examines par-
ticipation from the perspective of the city administration. It connects 
participation with the strategy of the city which considers the model 
of decision-making in Tampere as an essential critical factor of suc-
cess.  The model refers to a quick and correctly timed decision-making 
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ability. An important aspect of public involvement is apparent in the 
report when the group tries to include the expertise of the inhabitants 
when the services of the city are being planned.
The electronic forms of participation the IPI group proposes are 
tools for gathering the opinions of the inhabitants. The city adminis-
tration needs to know the views of the inhabitants before the decision 
making process begins. Such arrangements are elements of public in-
volvement organised from above; the aim is to call on the inhabitants 
to join in the discussions. The Director of Communications of the city 
of Tampere argues that the Internet supports the present process of 
democratic decision-making because the citizens get more information 
and can better express their opinions. Thus there are “more cookies 
in the decision-making process” (Seppälä 2002b). However, it is not 
evident that these cookies are eaten. It is very obvious that the offi cials 
making the preparations as well as decision-makers use the arguments 
presented by the citizens selectively so that they can use them to justify 
their own views. On the other hand, the IPI group is clearly aware 
of the fact that electronic participation also enables publishing of the 
themes of the inhabitants based on their own experience. For example, 
it proposes the possibility to send an electronic civil appeal. 
The group proposes the establishment of the preparation forum 
on the home pages of the city. Strong elements of public involve-
ment are apparent in it. The group regards the preparation forum as 
“controlled and regulated activity”. It would operate so that in the 
fi rst phase the offi cials take one issue from the agenda and put it on 
the home page of the city when the agenda is published. The offi cials 
make a summary of the issue to which a feedback form is connected. 
The comments will be recorded on the discussion pages if the inhabit-
ants want it. However, the IPI report does not tell for which reasons 
this issue in question is brought up. Thus the offi cials have to make 
choices which all the inhabitants may not like. This kind of selection 
can ignore some other matter which can be much more signifi cant for 
some inhabitants. The matter chosen as the subject of the discussion 
can also be presented in a certain light when the summary is written. 
In other words it is easy to direct the net discussion to some certain 
issues by skilful rhetoric. 
239
During the second phase the signifi cance of the organiser of 
the discussion becomes greater. The group proposes that the persons 
preparing the signifi cant issues produce a package of information on 
the Internet before the agenda is published. The package of informa-
tion must be made on the basis of choices and that is why it of course 
cannot be a totally objective picture of the issue. It is obvious that 
at this phase a struggle is formed concerning the question of whose 
information is most relevant and most convincing. During the third 
phase the preparation documents are available for the inhabitants on 
the Internet “as widely as is considered necessary”. 
THE INTERNET AND THE FORMATION 
OF A NEW SPACE OF POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 
I argued in the fi rst chapter that the Internet changes political activities. 
The signifi cance of the change is described by the fact that building 
of the electronic networks in the early 1990’s can be compared with a 
railway network built in the western parts of the USA  (Jordan 1999, 
173). The change is really profound if one can show that the electronic 
break-through either facilitated the fall of the Soviet Union or was a 
factor accelerating the process of democratising and that the 1996 U.S 
presidential elections signifi ed the death of the traditional political 
system and the formation of the new digital nation (Katz 1997, cited 
in Jordan 1999, 163). 
The change is signifi cant indeed if “the Chinese authorities con-
sider the information spreading through the Internet as a threat” (…) 
and “if the Internet network changes the basis of the state of China una-
voidably” because the authorities are not able to prevent the spread of 
information on it (Helsingin Sanomat 15.7. 2002; cf. Paltemaa in this 
volume). The spread of information technology does not necessarily 
overturn undemocratic systems but can support groups and individu-
als working for transparency necessary to democracy (cf. Walch 1999, 
116). The Internet also changes traditional representative political 
systems and bureaucracies; it is a new tool to make and to distribute 
immaterial commodities such as ideas (Jordan 1999, 165). The pro-
found change caused by the Internet also means the formation of a 
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new space of experience. The Internet gives people innumerable new 
opportunities to experience the environment. 
The Internet as an inseparable element of everyday life is a re-
markable change because a new way of utilising information is formed 
(Walch 1999; Slevin 2000). The most important service offered by 
the Internet, WWW (World Wide Web), makes the Internet a huge 
library, a gigantic picture gallery and a worldwide notice board. From 
the perspective of civil society the Internet extends public space hugely. 
The new publicity created by the network is a dialogic space, that is, 
a new space of experience (cf. Sassi 2000 178). It has been proposed 
that the users experience cyberspace as a special space consisting of 
information. Cyberspace is in particular a space full of information. 
With the help of the Internet people can extend their information 
capacity (Jordan 1999 59, 85-86). Gordon Graham defi nes the In-
ternet as follows: 
“To get some grasp of what the internet is, we need to imagine a 
combination of library, gallery, recording studio, cinema, billboard, 
postal system, shopping arcade, timetable, bank, classroom, newspaper 
and club bulletin. We should then multiply this by an indefi nitely 
large number and give it unlimited geographical spread” (Graham 
1999, 23-24). 
This kind of a horizon enables the most manifold opportunities for 
experiencing. The Internet changes people’s experiences also for the 
reasons that its basic property is speed, accelerating all activities (Sassi 
2000, 52). The power of the Internet is based particularly on its speed 
(Lebert 2003, 209). A good example of the speed of the Internet is 
a discussion after the bomb explosion of 11.10.2002 in a shopping 
centre in the city of Vantaa. The discussion started only half an hour 
after the explosion on a real-time arena. The discussants found out 
the identity of the author of the bomb attack before the police and 
the media (Helsingin Sanomat 17.11. 2002). The acceleration is due 
to the fact that the Internet is able to utilise and to process various 
digital materials in real time. The Internet is able to connect materials 
of different types endlessly and to deliver them fast (Sassi 2000, 64). 
It is easy to organise the store of information enlarging every day, in a 
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way one wants. Electric cutting and pasting is becoming a new mode 
of art (Schwartz 1996, 70). 
The typical user of the Internet is a person having an art of ex-
perience meant by Dewey. He/she is an active hunter of information; 
he/she has a strong interest in the environment (cf. Rash 1997, 40). 
Interactivity emphasised by Dewey is a very important aspect included 
in the Internet. Thus there is life on the Internet in a very strong sense 
(see Graham 1999, 24). A new political community, net-polis, is indeed 
being born. The character and outlines of this political community 
are taking shape. It has been aptly proposed that “the Internet resembles 
an ocean on which we have been thrown alone and without the exact co-
ordinates we need to follow” (Sassi 2000, 95). 
The will to interact with the environment appears as the partici-
pants’ way of talking more frankly and equally in the conferences using 
information technology in the same way as people discuss events face 
to face (see Jordan 1999, 82-83). Interaction in cyberspace is inten-
sive in this way because users of the Internet have a liking of strong 
arguments needed in the Internet discussions (Rash 1997, 40). In 
other words, the various forms of interaction on the Internet require 
exceptional techniques of argumentation. 
Some researchers argue that the users of the Internet can break and 
reconstruct traditional social borders and develop alternative means of 
creating communities. No authority is recognised in the news groups 
of the Internet and new social conventions are invented in them. The 
citizens can communicate with other citizens without the gate-keep-
ers of communication technology (see Slevin 2000, 100-105). The 
users of information technology create special cultures which have 
new norms and models of performance of their own (Walch 1999). 
Slevin emphasises the following one: 
“We need to look afresh at how individuals might actively draw on 
the Internet to promote new kinds of relationships which assist rather 
than obstruct their attempts to make sense of a world in which the 
most intimate and the most distant have become directly connected” 
(Slevin 2000, 113).
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Slevin often emphasises the Internet as this kind of a new mechanism 
of connection.  Slevin’s conclusion signifi es a new space of experience 
and new forms of interaction formed by the users of the Internet. 
Slevin draws an essential conclusion from a perspective of this paper: 
the Internet is “a medium of practical social activity” and not only 
“a medium of new opportunities for creating new forms of human as-
sociation” (Slevin 2000, 113). The Internet can create a new space of 
experience and thus can activate people in a new way. In other words, 
it can promote spontaneous innovative political action, that is, style-
fi lled political action. 
 
THE INTERNET AS A STIMULANT OF POLITICAL ACTION  
The Internet enables new spontaneous action. For example, looking 
for materials from the web pages activates; thus its use deviates from 
passive observing of the traditional media (television, radio and printed 
matters) (see Rash 1997, 51). The political actors utilising the Internet 
face a challenging situation. In order to succeed they must make people 
visit their web pages and in order to become popular they must stand 
out from the huge mass of web pages. That is why they must perform 
as original and inventive actors. In other words, the art of creating 
politgenic action is required. 
A form of experience and action is politicising, that is, a constant 
challenging of existing normalities and habits. The Internet can facili-
tate the process of politicising signifi cantly. Different types of special 
publicity forming on the Internet can give impulses, can bring out 
important questions, can begin new discourses and activities and can 
challenge (symbolic) hierarchies (cf. Sassi 2000, 72; see Introduction 
and Baringhorst in this volume). The discussion arenas of the Internet 
offer the participants new ways to argue about political ideas. Use of 
the Internet is a form of self-realisation and active self-empowerment 
but not mere empowerment. Thus the Internet develops the arts em-
phasised by Dewey (cf. Slevin 2000, 107-117).
As is well-known various networks can be created with the help 
of the Internet. It can be used to co-ordinate many types of political 
actors. This refers not only to a growing productivity and effective-
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ness of the actors but also to synergy. The sum of activities is greater 
than the total activity of separate parts. The Internet is also a tool for 
fi nding. It facilitates individuals and groups having a common inter-
est in reaching each other and thus of acting together (Walch 1999, 
74; see also Mosca, Gillan and Vromen in this volume). It enables 
the formation of constantly changing political coalitions acting with 
various styles. 
Small political groups in particular use the Internet for searching 
for other similar groups. The change took place in the years 1995-
96 due to the invention of search engines covering the whole world. 
Searching is facilitated by the way the small groups make links on 
their web pages. Many national and international political actors 
who deviate from the mainstream could not exist in their present 
forms without the Internet. They have often been closed out of the 
traditional media and their stands have not often been taken seriously. 
Many small groups have allied with like-minded groups with the help 
of the Internet and have distributed their messages more publicly than 
earlier. A cheap, quick, and effi cient communication channel is avail-
able to them. Without it they could not organise effi ciently in order 
to succeed. Thus communication between the like-minded groups 
becomes more active (Rash 1997, 21, 97). 
The Internet has become the natural environment of many ex-
ternal groups out of the mainstream, that is, it has become a space of 
experience. Some civil movements claim that electronic communica-
tion, sending of information and feedback itself are powerful factors 
causing changes. These new ways and areas of exchange of communica-
tion and information have been enabled due to the new information 
technology. These forms of high technology are new arenas of activi-
ties of movements (Rash 1997, 90; Walch 1999, 63, 152, 156). The 
communication activists establish communities having special ethics 
and styles of conducting issues. For example, Amnesty International 
regards the ICT “as dominant strategic tactics” and not simply as an 
infrastructure of activities. E-mail, in particular has had very important 
signifi cance at all levels of the organisation (Lebert 2003, 210). 
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THE INTERNET AND POLITICAL ACTION: SOME EMPIRICAL CASES
Citizens’ spontaneous action and the disturbing of traditional power 
structures caused by it were perceived in the Home-street project (in 
Finnish: Kotikatu-projekt). The Finnish Association for Local Culture 
and Heritage, Helsinki Neighbourhoods Association and Helsinki 
University of Technology launched the Home-street project in au-
tumn 1997. The project rejected traditional activities for local culture 
and heritage and made a new innovation. The digital environment 
of activities, that is, the regional home pages serving inhabitants was 
constructed on the Internet (Rantanen 2003, 11). The project was not 
an experiment having aspects of public involvement because it was 
established by the inhabitants. The objective of the project was to utilise 
information networks especially in planning the living environment 
of the inhabitants. The information networks were also used for the 
promotion of communication, supplying information and participa-
tion. Various interactive methods of planning were also tested in the 
project (Rantanen 2002, 130). 
The inhabitants themselves looked for new modes of activities in 
planning their living area. For example, the inhabitants of the Maunula 
district created exceptional action when they planned a shopping cen-
tre. The planning project published on the Internet challenged the city 
planning authorities to a new type of discussion about principles and 
means of planning. At the beginning there were diffi culties in react-
ing to a new kind of participation by the inhabitants. The offi cials of 
the department of city planning considered it too active and too early 
(Rantanen 2002, 133). However, their attitude later became very posi-
tive and local activism affected the fi nal result of planning at least in 
some way. The project researcher concludes that “a totally new culture 
of action was created in the Maunula district” (Rantanen 2003, 11). 
A transparent and public planning process like this, made possible by 
the Internet, has changed planning practices. The signifi cance of the 
Internet is remarkable in increasing the transparency of the administra-
tion and the planning processes (Rantanen 2002, 133). 
The IPI-group has also paid attention to the aspect of action 
relating to the arrangements of public involvement. It has also con-
centrated on the expectations of the inhabitants to improve oppor-
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tunities of participation.  It has discovered that the inhabitants want 
to get information about the issues to prepare early enough and in an 
understandable form, and to have the possibility of affecting the issues 
at the preparation phase. It emphasises the changing and various needs 
of the inhabitants who are considered as the experts because they have 
experience of life and knowledge of local practises. The Home-street 
project assumes that locally comprehensive information is crucially 
important. The local inhabitants create a kind of a database in their 
world of experiences which the public administration and planning 
offi cials should utilise. According to the experiences of the inhabit-
ants, some places, (for example, children’s play grounds, buildings and 
landscapes) are especially important (ibid., 131).
The IPI-group wants to exclude authoritative enlightening and 
compulsion of the inhabitants in urban participation. It points out 
that the inhabitants participate when they consider it necessary but 
not when and how the administration expects. The Director of Com-
munications of the City of Tampere has concluded that the interactive 
form of participation connected to near, concrete and current mat-
ters seems to succeed well (Seppälä 2002a, 128).  In other words, the 
inhabitants act when they experience it to be necessary. For example, 
they may launch a planning process. The inhabitants are expecting 
quick feedback and transparency on the part of the administration in 
such subpolitical situations. The municipal organisations should be 
capable of reacting fl exibly and fast. When the documents relating 
to the planning process are published on the Internet it is possible to 
effectively disperse the feeling that planning is secretly performed (cf. 
Rantanen 2002, 135).  
The Evolution of eCommunities project carried out by the De-
partment of Journalism and Mass Communication of the University 
of Tampere constructed a participation site (The Manse square) aim-
ing to support civil activity. The purpose of the Manse square was to 
challenge the assumption that the public is the passive receiver and 
consumer. (See Lehtonen in this volume.) It also tried to develop the 
site so that civil groups could edit the site as they wished. It had been 
discovered earlier that innovativeness and social learning are often 
demonstrated in projects of this kind. The project was indeed able 
to strengthen civil innovativeness. It fulfi lled the most important 
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criterion of the movement of social inspiring, learning with the help 
of communal activity. The movement requests actors to question, to 
argue, to act and be committed to them. It also emphasises learning 
based on experiences which starts from concrete action and ends in 
observation and refl ective discussion. (Kotilainen 2004.) 
The aim of the Manse forum which was a part of the Manse square 
was to add and strengthen interaction with the surrounding society. 
For example, the citizen based system of the initiative was constructed 
on the Manse forum. There the inhabitants were given instructions on 
how to launch initiatives. It was possible to comment on the initia-
tives in the discussion area and thus to develop them. The personal 
experience of the writers was a characteristic of the texts published on 
the Manse forum (Hokka et al. 2004). 
Action which took place in the Manse forum shook the frozen 
practices of the local political discussion and decision-making proc-
ess. The citizens have been inspired to take part more actively than 
before and to use the Internet – especially as a tool of participation. 
Action-oriented activity and spontaneous publicity challenged the 
traditional representative municipal democracy and the passive role 
offered to the citizens. The researchers who analysed the discussions 
on the Manse forum conclude that people are ready to compare their 
views and to discuss constructively when an opportunity is provided 
to them (Hokka et al. 2004). The dialogic culture of discussion and 
the role of the citizens, that is, deliberation have strengthened. 
A new spontaneous form of civil action, civil journalism, was 
experimented in the project. The project searched for new aspects of 
local communication utilising the net. The idea was applied so that cor-
respondents who wrote stories on the online magazine established with 
the support of the project were searched for from different districts. 
The most important question of the experiment was, what kinds of 
issues are important and worth reporting according to the inhabitants 
(Martikainen 2004). The project was supposed to fi nd the answer from 
the activities of the inhabitants which were considered as an alternative 
to hearing from the decision-makers and other offi cial quarters belong-
ing to traditional news journalism. The learning by doing method 
formulated by Dewey is thus a dimension of civil journalism; people 
themselves write the stories. In that case it is supposed that they write 
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about their own experiences. In the course of this process they learn 
to express themselves and to listen to others (cf. Ibid.). 
The researchers found out in the empirical studies that very many 
of the correspondents’ stories were personal and not only informative. 
They clearly had an ability to express themselves, in other words, they 
had the personal, that is, an approach based on experience of the issues 
of which they wrote. They also had alternative views to the themes 
compared to the mainstream media. The originality of the stories was 
due to the fact that they were not based on the notices or bulletins. 
It is worth mentioning in this context that the correspondents did 
not just inform but also shared information with others and the net 
journal did not become a journal of whatever but the writers commit-
ted themselves to their e-journal. That is why they were responsible 
for it. (Ibid.)
A researcher of the project concludes that the Internet can be-
come a part of the citizens’ medium and that the Internet will contain 
small-scale journals of various districts produced by the inhabitants 
themselves in the future. They will probably not have a large number of 
readers but will tell of important and interesting matters of inhabitants’ 
immediate surroundings. (Ibid.) Thus it is a question of strengthening 
spontaneous subpolitics based on experience.  
THE INTERNET AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
The internet is a tool and space for new political activity and politicis-
ing. The Internet offers new opportunities to act with multiple styles. 
The artful and fl exible use of the Internet can transfer political proc-
esses to the micro level; in other words, can enable a new kind of civil 
activity. I have used the verb enable often in this paper, because the 
actors willing to utilise the net must themselves obtain the arts needed 
in its utilisation. The actors have to be active in order that they can 
utilise the opportunities the Internet offers. Thus the Internet is an 
art-intensive tool and space. Thus the Internet inspires an appraisal of 
a society of opportunities. I mean by this phenomenon the spontaneous 
and independent action the Internet offers citizens.  
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The Internet is a forum of interaction. It enables the actors to 
interact with the environment in a new way, that is, on a wider scale, 
more intensively and in a more multi-faceted way than before. Be-
cause the Internet enables versatile interaction, it also enables the 
most different kinds of experiences. There distances disappear and the 
only limit of movement is imagination. I would like to emphasise the 
meaning of experience and the new space of experience in research 
of the Internet. 
Political actors can interact on the Internet with a speed and create 
local, national and transnational action never seen before. On the net 
the actors can fi nd other like-minded actors from different parts of 
the world with whom they have common political problems to solve. 
It can be used for the creation of new political linkages and coalitions 
of activities which can reach from one continent to another. Citizens 
are capable of politicising faster, more easily and more fundamentally 
than before. For example, local problems can easily be raised as the 
subjects of global struggle. In other, more general words, the Internet 
breaks down traditional borders, e.g. the borders of nation-states.
It has been very diffi cult for citizens to publish spontaneously in 
the traditional media. The Internet has changed this situation essen-
tially because there is also plenty of open public space for them. The 
attempts to censor the Internet do not seem to succeed; information 
removed from the net emerges somewhere else in the world. Because 
the actors can spread unfi ltered information spontaneously on the 
net, their possibilities to pursue power improve. The phenomenon 
called de-medialisation is obviously in a very early phase; nobody 
knows which styles the political actors will still develop on the net 
(see Introduction in this volume). 
When the open access to most versatile information is remembered 
in addition to that stated above, the new types of “forms-with-contents” 
of political action can be developed with the help of the Internet and 
on the Internet.  The net is a huge resource of information which is 
worth utilising when exceptional political action is created and justi-
fi ed. In other words, the political action of tropes can be constructed 
limitlessly with the help of the Internet. This “only” requires innova-
tiveness on the part of the actors. 
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My most important conclusion is that the Internet is fundamentally 
a space of politics of tropes; it can be used for generating an enormous 
amount of political action of tropes – also in offl ine space. I call this state 
of affairs a new degree of political action of politgenity. The Internet 
does not engender political action of tropes automatically, but it re-
quires the art of political innovativeness from the actors. The Internet 
is a kind of open, borderless, and (mostly) unmonitored democratic 
laboratory where new political styles of action can be invented and 
experimented upon. The concept of politics of tropes developed by me 
always contains the aspect of style. It contains the well-known aspects 
of contingency, the unpredictability of the future and the possibility 
of matters existing in any way. Thus the actor of the politics of tropes 
always has to judge how the degree of politgenity of action can be 
increased in a credible and convincing way. 
The Internet can also be used for creating interaction which refers 
to the traditional meaning of the concept. I mean an opportunity to 
participate in municipal or national decision-making offered by the 
public authorities or hearing from citizens on the issues concerning 
traditional political communities. In that case it is not a question of the 
citizens’ experience causing action but a call to participate presented by 
the authorities, in other words, it is a question of public involvement. 
Such interaction does not mean symmetry between the decision-makers 
and the citizens but a strengthening of the frozen structures of power 
(cf. Ridell 2001). However, action based on experience is not an ex-
cluded possibility in this context. In other words, the citizens called to 
participate can act in the structures of involvement.  In that case the 
citizens invite the offi cials and the elected representatives to the public 
space of the net to tell and discuss their own views (cf. Heinonen et 
al. 2001). In that case the border line between public involvement 
and action is very vague. 
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    TIM JORDAN
The politics of technology: 




Asking a question about the relationship between the Internet and 
politics requires some consideration. 
Are we talking about the effect of the Internet on politics? This is a 
problematic formulation because it leaves the Internet itself unmarked, 
rather focusing on the presumed effects of the Internet. Despite this, 
such arguments are familiar. The most frequent example is the ‘Internet 
treats censorship as damage and routes around it’ slogan, coined by 
online activist and hacker John Gilmore. Most internet analysts will 
also have, at one time or another, also heard or read the myth that the 
Internet was designed to survive nuclear war. The latter being a myth 
in the full sense that, whatever its truth, the real function of retelling 
it as a story is to teach the listener the moral that the Internet has an 
inherent politics of the type Gilmore sloganeered. (Jordan 1999a, 
35-36.)
Though familiar, and often containing a grain of sense, such 
formulations leave the Internet untouched by analysis and also assume 
that the Internet is one thing that can have a politics assigned to it 
that also affects offl ine spaces. Such arguments may now be seen to 
characterise, particularly, early studies of the Internet as analysts tried 
to come to terms with this new communicative medium that seemed 
(and still seems) so much more than a fancy system for sending let-
ters. However, these days we should be cautious about taking up such 
a position, we know the Internet is a complex technical and cultural 
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system whose ability to create a clear dividing line between online and 
offl ine spaces is complicated and disputed.
Another formulation of the question would be: Are we talking 
about a new ‘cyber’ politics that the Internet is producing? Subtly dif-
ferent to the previous formulation, here the Internet is analysed for 
any novel or innovative political forms it might be associated with. 
Rather than leaving the Internet unmarked this takes the Internet as a 
subject of analysis, then pushes the analysis towards political spheres. 
At a higher level of analysis we might think of Himanen’s and Wark’s 
contrasting theories of the hacker ethic and its putative wide social 
effect as an example of this expectation that an ‘internet politics’ will 
reorder society (Himanen 2001, Wark 2004). Both Wark and Himan-
nen, however, still locate their analysis within a blanket notion of ‘the 
Internet’. 
Again, though of value, such an orientation produces a particular 
take on the Internet and politics. Most particularly it fails to introduce 
the key complexity of exploring political effects in relation to  particular 
internet technologies; we need to be aware that the effects of Myspace 
and YouTube are different to those of Instant Messenger and email. It 
is only from such more nuanced understandings that we would be able 
to put together a theory of an overall ‘cyber’ or Internet politics.
Yet even within a more complex analysis that substitutes ‘internet 
technologies’ for ‘the Internet’ there remains a similar structure to the 
fi rst approach in which a particular internet technology has social and 
cultural effects on a wider society. This more complex understanding 
still argues for or implies a causal relationship between an internet 
technology and social or cultural factors, even though it does not 
also assume or argue that different technologies add up to the one 
cyber-politics. Though we should not rule out internet technologies 
having such consequences, we know enough now to be cautious about 
imputing effects to internet technologies that are not also mediated by 
effects back on such technologies by users and other technologies. A 
subtle, persistent (and not always misleading) technological determin-
ism is in this way threaded through such ways of putting the question 
of politics and the Internet. 
There is an almost directly inverse reaction to that just outlined, 
that was also perhaps more prevalent early in studies of the Internet. 
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This is a reaction which claims that nothing fundamental has changed 
following the emergence of the Internet simply because the Internet and 
internet technologies result from and reinforce existing social forces. 
Kevin Robbins’ early work on the Internet reacted strongly against 
claims of an entirely new world created from virtual social relations, 
yet his own responses were marked by his oppositional stance. Rob-
bins often fails to take account of the particularities of social relations 
dependant on internet technologies, instead opposing them wholesale. 
(Robbins 1999.) Miller and Slater’s ethnography of Trinidadian use of 
the Internet took a similar tactic but worked at a micro level to argue 
that the Internet brought little difference in communicative practices 
of Trinidadians (Miller & Slater 2000). Such accounts tend to reverse 
technological determinism and strip internet technologies of their 
specifi cities, in the process failing to engage with the social and cultural 
effects that are embedded in and produced by Internet technologies. 
Such approaches offer strong correctives to overly enthusiastic accounts 
that impute only good social and cultural effects from the Internet, 
but they are also heavily marked by this opposition and often remain 
captured by the fundamental model of an Internet that does or does 
not have social effects.
Such approaches that explore politics and the Internet by arguing 
over whether the Internet has changed anything or not, can also all 
too often rely on what are fundamentally trivial formulations. Such 
trivial approaches also often derive an appearance of urgency by seem-
ing to ask important questions. For example, has the Internet changed 
capitalism? Manifestly not, if we mean the fundamental structures of 
capitalism, but that does not mean the Internet, or particular internet 
technologies, have not been part of important social changes relevant 
to shifting forms of capitalism. Or, from an opposite viewpoint, has 
the Internet changed personal communication? Manifestly yes, if we 
mean there are different forms of personal communication available, 
though the signifi cance of new communication technologies like email 
or IRQ for signifi cant social change is arguable. Between the failure to 
enter into a more complex relationship with technological determin-
ism and the potentially trivial nature of many questions posed even 
though they often claim to lead to the analysis of signifi cant social 
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changes causally related to the Internet, exploring politics associated 
with internet technologies has at times been poorly formulated.
The two inverse processes of arguing for or against causal relations 
between the Internet and social change have, I believe, a tendency to 
remove internet technologies, and their specifi c social and technical 
processes, from discussion. In so doing they can produce blindness 
to the kinds of social divides, inequalities of power and oppressions 
and subjections which may or may not be specifi c to social contexts 
in which internet technologies are active. Such issues seem to me to 
be the centre of an engaged political analysis which pays attention to 
the specifi city of any politics that is found in the context of particular 
internet technologies. From such a basis I also wish to open up general 
conclusions about the Internet and politics, though without dislocating 
myself from the need to analyse the complexity of social, technical and 
cultural factors that are involved in internet technologies.
I will attempt to do this by exploring a number of related politics 
that could not have existed without the existence of a range of internet 
technologies. From these politics I will then draw general propositions 
that will, in the conclusion, be inter-related for a tentative and hopefully 
complex view on the Internet and politics. These are all, drawing on 
my previous research on activist forms of politics. This is not because 
I think such politics are primary but simply because they are my areas 
of expertise. I feel someone could come to the kinds of propositions I 
defi ne by starting with very different political interventions and I will 
tentatively indicate some such directions as I explore the implications 
of activist uses of the Internet.
In addition, this approach does not presume the Internet, or ac-
tions enabled by internet technologies, exist in isolation from some-
thing we might call the ‘real’ or ‘physically co-present’ world. Rather, 
the activisms under analysis are ones that could not have existed unless 
the relevant internet technologies existed. While this identifi es some 
activisms as intimately tied to internet technologies, it should not be 
read as a presumption that the online and offl ine are fundamentally 
different, let alone mutually exclusive and causally related. Instead, 
possible differences between online and offl ine activisms will need to 
be traced and their nature justifi ed on the basis of analysis.
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I will outline three fi gures of virtual politics, three types of what is 
more and more frequently being called ‘hacktivism’: (1) mass embodied 
online protest; (2) internet infrastructure and information politics; and, 
(3) communicative practices and organisation (cf. Gillan and Hintikka 
in this volume). Through these three types I hope to exemplify some 
of the complexity of politics that has collided with the Internet and, 
by the end, make some proposals for more general conclusions. The 
applicability of such fi gures for exploring the Internet and politics 
derives from the impossibility of their actions unless the Internet 
existed. We can for this reason be sure that the politics I will explore 
are connected to the Internet and internet technologies.
MASS EMBODIED ONLINE PROTEST
The emblematic mass embodied online protest was run by UK-based 
hacktivist group the Electrohippies against the computer network 
servicing the 1999 Seattle World Trade Organisation (WTO) meeting. 
The organisers claim this online protest, which ran simultaneously 
as the famous street protests in Seattle, attracted 450,000 protesters. 
This mass action ran in this way. The Electrohippies set up a website 
with explanations and justifi cations of their action. From a particular 
page someone could choose either high or low bandwidth protests. 
Once the protester clicked on a link they were led to another page 
that automatically downloaded and ran a small java script on the 
protester’s computer. This script automatically directed a browser to 
access particular pages on the computer network servicing the WTO 
conference and to constantly reload those pages. The low bandwidth 
version targeted three pages simultaneously while the high bandwidth 
version targeted six pages. Enough protesters equalled enough requests 
for information to the WTO server to impair or stop it. (Jordan & 
Taylor 2004, 74-79.)
The theory behind such attacks emerged in the mid-1990s and 
argued for the importance of implementing forms of electronic civil 
disobedience. (CAE 1994; 1996) We can also immediately see the 
parallel between classic civil disobedience tactics such as street protests 
and the Ehippies action. Bodies are placed into channels in order to 
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block whatever fl ows down that channel: for the Ehippies information 
blocked information, for those in the street physical bodies blocked 
other bodies trying to enter the WTO conference building.
Attacks in which a targeted server attached to the Internet is bom-
barded with so much information in such a short space of time that 
it fails are well known on the Internet. They are usually called ddos 
(distributed denial of service) attacks and are normally launched by 
one or a few people, utilising the multiplicative powers of the Internet. 
For example, someone can infect a range of computers around the 
Internet with a particular programme, often called a zombie. Once 
this is done, the controller can order all the zombies to simultane-
ously start demanding information from one targeted site, leading to 
that site disappearing from the Internet because it is overloaded with 
information requests and can no longer respond. With methods like 
this such sites as amazon.com, cnn.com and others have been removed 
from the Internet for short periods. The electrohippies vociferously 
distinguished their action from ddos attacks in the following way:  
What the electrohippies did for the WTO action was a client-side 
distributed DoS action. The electrohippies method of operation is 
also truly distributed since instead of a few servers, there are tens of 
thousands of individual computer users involved in the action. The 
requests sent to the target servers are generated by ordinary Internet 
users using their own desktop computer and (usually) a slow dial-up 
link. That means client-side distributed actions require the efforts of 
real people, taking part in their thousands simultaneously, to make the 
action effective. If there are not enough people supporting then the 
action it doesn’t work. The fact that service on the WTO’s servers was 
interrupted on the 30th November and the and 1st of December, and 
signifi cantly slowed on the 2nd and 3rd of December, demonstrated 
that there was signifi cant support for the electrohippies action.
(Electrohippies Collective 2000; emphasis in original.)
The legitimacy of an Ehippies’ action is achieved by the implied de-
mocracy of enough people being willing to commit themselves to the 
blockade. Democracy here is not one vote and one body but is the 
civil disobedience democracy of masses of bodies expressing a popular 
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will. A number of things are needed to ensure this. There must be 
some way of defeating any accusation that these are not ‘real people’ 
but are zombies spewing out information; the protest is only effective 
if it is the result of the ‘efforts of real people’. The Ehippies do this 
by limiting their ability to multiply the bodies who sit at computers 
to three, if the body has clicked on the low bandwidth link, or to six, 
if the body clicked on the high bandwidth link. As we can now see, 
the client side model the Ehippies utilise is a particular formation of 
Internet technologies designed to produce a mass demonstration only 
if there are many real people demonstrating.
This approach is viewed by some as perverse such that a spokesman 
for another hacktivist group accused the Ehippies of creating a tactic 
that was the equivalent of a duck pecking an opponent to death when 
there was dynamite available for the job (Jordan & Taylor 2004, 167). 
The Ehippies effort though was to avoid precisely the elitism inherent 
in one hand throwing one stick of dynamite and to ensure their protest 
carried with it a certain legitimacy. This legitimacy was a democratic 
one, familiar to all of us through over a century of protest and violent 
and non-violent direct action threading through such campaigns as 
that for Indian independence or the Civil Rights campaign in the 
USA. The politics of the Ehippies is an avowedly old, formulated in 
the offl ine and populist one.
Yet, despite this lineage, the Ehippies’ attempt was not simple. 
Unlike the street protests in Seattle, which took tremendous feats of 
organisation but which posed minimal, if any, new political or organi-
sational questions, the Ehippies had to fashion not just the organisation 
which drew people onto the virtual streets but they had to fashion 
the very possibility that virtual streets could be populated by virtual 
bodies that had referents to real bodies. The Ehippies had to reform 
Internet technologies—in this case essentially a combination of web-
pages and javascript—while relying on other technologies—packet 
switching, routing, dns—in order to produce the possibility of an 
online, mass, embodied demonstration against the the WTO meeting 
in Seattle. The virtual bodies had to be built and the virtual streets 
conceptualised as a place of civil disobedience for the possibility of 
electronic mass action to occur.
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Having produced the possibility of an online demonstration by 
coding java and embedding this in web-pages, the Ehippies could then 
go about the familiar task of calling for participants. The Internet also 
helps with this, given its well known communicative technologies. It 
is also easier for participants to go to an online demonstration, as it 
requires a click on a hyper-link rather than travel over road, rail, air 
or sea. But what distinguishes the Ehippies civil disobedience was that 
they had to create the possibility of disobedience rather than set about 
organising that disobedience.
There is an interplay here between political ambitions, forged 
and defi ned in offl ine, pre-Internet worlds, and their realisation in the 
context of the Internet. Some things are held solid and others are made 
fl uid for the bodiless to allow bodies. The basis for such interventions, 
and thus the very basis for electronic civil disobedience, lies in the ex-
pertise to manipulate Internet technologies so that a particular politics 
is made possible. The ethics and philosophy of civil disobedience that 
the Ehippies used, along with others such as the Electronic Distur-
bance Theatre, pre-exist the Internet. The existence of a philosophy 
and practice of civil disobedience allowed some activists to ponder 
how this philosophy could be brought to the Internet and their path 
leads them necessarily to the manipulation of internet technologies: 
programming, understanding packets and routing, being able to set 
up networks of computers connected to the Internet and so on. 
The political landscape of the Internet sketched before us by mass 
embodied online action is one in which the ability to mobilise expertise 
underpins the creation of particular political moments. This ability 
is not akin to that of mobilising cars to carry activists but is two-fold 
for it is, fi rst, the ability to create the possibility of a particular type of 
political action and only second comes the ability to make a political 
moment happen. This point can be provisionally summarised this as 
a proposition;
Proposition One: The possibility of an Internet politics is created by the abil-
ity to mobilise expertise in the manipulation of Internet technologies.
I will return to this proposition later but I would like to point out im-
mediately that it does not allow of an online/offl ine distinction. The 
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mobilisation of expertise in internet technologies is an inextricably min-
gled process. One anecdote illustrates this. The Electrohippies gradually 
withdrew from mass protests in the early 2000s. For a time their focus 
shifted to directly contesting anti-terrorist initiatives, most particularly in 
the UK against anti-terrorist legislation that seemed to defi ne any form 
of cracking or computer misuse as terror. But not long after engagement 
with these issues the Ehippies pretty much ceased activism.
In discussion, the reason given for this change was that the technical 
expertise that fuelled the Ehippies had been provided by a number of 
IT professionals, some based in the USA and others elsewhere. These 
professionals had remained in the background, keeping their identities 
relatively secret and allowing a UK-based activist to operate as their 
public face. Several of the Ehippies had decided that it was time to pull 
back from such activism until the war on terror’s effect on activism and 
the Internet became clearer. This is not a story specifi c to the online, 
rather it resonates far more widely through the alter-globalisation or 
global justice movement; for example, it is noticeable that following 
the Genoa protest and before 9/11 there was serious discussion within 
the alter-globalisation movement about moving into different activisms 
than its characteristic large scale protests against globalisation organisa-
tions like the WTO.
I am not suggesting a simple cause and effect in which 9/11 scared 
off activists, rather that it (and many other factors such as the nature of 
the Genoa event) was a generalised political moment, owned by nothing 
we might refer to as online or offl ine, at which activists refl ected. Some, 
like some technicians in the Ehippies, demobilised while others, such 
as mass hacktivist group the Electronic Disturbance Theatre, took this 
as a key moment to continue in changed circumstances.
INTERNET INFRASTRUCTURE AND INFORMATION POLITICS
A different way of approaching how politics works in the age of the 
Internet, or how the Internet and politics inter-mesh, is to focus on a 
politics that is about the Internet itself. I wish to distinguish within the 
range of politics that only exist because the Internet exists, a specifi c 
grassroots politics that devotes itself to the Internet. Within such a 
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politics we will fi nd further complexities emerging from the politic-
technical complex that arises with the widespread use of internet 
technologies.
Seemingly new forms of politics often emerge from the inter-sec-
tion of existing politics. For example, the politics of mass embodied 
online protest emerged from the intersection of the alter-globalisation 
movement, internet technologies and the ethics and tactics of civil 
disobedience. Infrastructure and information politics of the Inter-
net emerged from the inter-section of net.cultures, open source and 
globalisation. Net.cultures contributed a strong political sense of the 
desire for free fl ows of information, both in terms of freedom to ac-
cess any information and freedom to do so securely. (Silver & Massani 
2006.) From Open Source came the model of collaborative software 
production utilising the communication and distribution capabilities 
of internet technologies (Weber 2004). From globalisation came the 
recognition of the importance of the Internet to a rapidly changing 
world and the political opportunity offered to those with open source 
and net.cultures to effect political change in ways consonant with their 
ethics (Castells 2000). Having looked at direct action built from civil 
rights philosophies that leads to a politics that, in some ways, runs 
counter to the potentialities of internet technologies, I wish to turn 
to this second form of internet-based direct action.
In this type of action we meet hacktivists generating coding projects 
that try to implement in the infrastructure of the Internet a politics that 
valorises free secure fl ows of information. Some of the better known 
projects address ways of overcoming national fi rewalls, such as those the 
Chinese and Singaporean governments run to fi lter all Internet traffi c 
in and out of their national boundaries. For example, CameraShy offers 
a way of hiding information within graphics fi les that can be displayed 
over the Internet (Sourgeforge.net: CameraShy 2006). The hidden 
information is then available to anyone with the modifi ed CameraShy 
browser and the password. Another example is ScatterChat, an anony-
mous, secure instant messaging client (ScatterChat 2006). In both these 
and other similar projects the focus is on the ability to anonymously 
and securely pass any information that can be appropriately digitised. 
Let me explore this a little more closely with the example of the Tor 
Network (2006). 
264
Like the software innovations just mentioned Tor aims to create 
anonymity and security for fl ows of information. The fi rst point is that 
such free fl ows in total cannot be secured by any one application. Tor 
breaks the Internet down into one aspect, that of the packet of data 
which fl ows from the sender to the receiver and back. Packet switching 
breaks any data object sent over the Internet into a series of packets that 
are then routed across different pipes and nodes to their destination. 
Each such packet consists of two parts; the data payload and the header. 
The data payload is the ‘content’ (music, email, video, instant message, 
etc.) while the header contains data about the source, destination, size, 
timing and other such necessary information to transport the payload. 
The diffi culty is that a great deal can be learned by tracking someone’s 
traffi c and analysing the headers, even if the data payloads are themselves 
encrypted and unavailable to a spy. This potential breach of anonymity, 
this identifi cation of information patterns that can lead to a free fl ow 
of information being stabilised and connected to someone’s identity, 
has been addressed by the complex technical innovation known as the 
Tor network.
Tor works by passing requests for information from one computer 
through a network of Tor servers. Each hop the request makes from 
one server to the next is encrypted and is only known to the two com-
puters immediately connected to each other. By linking a request for 
information through a series of Tor servers, the chain of identifi cation 
is broken and no observer can tell where the information is coming 
Picture 1. 
How Tor works: 1.
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In addition to protecting against traffi c analysis for users, producers of 
information are able to hide various kinds of services such as web servers 
or instant messaging services. For example, a web-site can be set up that 
it is impossible from traffi c analysis to tell who has set it up.
The risk takers in Tor are not meant to be the users but the providers 
of servers, particularly those who provide the servers with the initial 
Picture 2. 
How Tor works: 2.
Picture 3. 
How Tor works: 3.
from or going. Once a series of servers has been linked a private net-
work is in operation and information can fl ow anonymously, though 
subject to other tracking techniques.  Each circuit lasts for a minute 
or a little more, any requests falling outside this time period initiate 
a new private network.
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database that is accessed at the beginning of the creation of a virtual 
Tor network. In effect, political risk and danger is placed, by technical 
design, on those perceived as being at less political risk because they 
are activists in ‘liberal democracies’. Those using the network who may 
be at risk from authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are, it is hoped, 
much better hidden than the servers’ owners. What we might call the 
collective imagination of those producing the Tor network embeds in 
the technical structure of Tor a particular political ethics based on an 
assessment of risk to differently located activists.
Let us review the specifi city of Tor. First, it deals only with cer-
tain internet technologies. For example, Tor guidance says that ‘Tor 
only works for TCP streams and can be used by any application with 
SOCKS support’ (Tor: Overview 2006). Second, it is essentially a 
change to the infrastructure of the Internet. The ongoing existence of a 
Tor network alters what it is possible to do or not to do using internet 
technologies and it is, in this sense, a direct intervention into the nature 
of the online. Finally, there are three kinds of human actors making Tor 
work. First, production is a matter of harnessing expertise in coding 
and understanding Internet traffi c. Second, enough contributors with 
access to computers and bandwidth must install and run Tor routers, 
not as complex as coding but more complex than many computer users 
are used to. Finally, potential users must be alerted to the existence of 
the network and how to install and use Tor browsers.
In contrast to embodied mass virtual protest, information politics 
works with the grain of the Internet. It values the ability of internet 
technologies to propagate and distribute data packages in ways that 
far exceed previous technologies both in amount and in global con-
nectivity and it positively glories in the connection of digitisation with 
internet based production and distribution. The politics here revolves 
around a commitment to free, secure fl ows of data packets that builds 
on net.cultures that developed simultaneously with the development 
of computer mediated communication. Finally, this politics mobilises 
a mass in the masses needed to create the server ‘cloud’ (by September 
2006 active routers numbered around 800).
We should note that this mass of routers, and the activists behind 
the routers, is a conceptually quite different mass to that created by the 
Ehippies’ action and more generally aimed for in mass embodied virtual 
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protests. In Tor the legitimacy of the action does not revolve around 
the numbers of people who participate, rather the legitimacy derives 
from an argument about the desirability of a society that integrates free 
fl ows of information. It is a secondary and tangential consequence that 
the participation of many people proves that there is a democratically 
legitimated demand for secure free fl ows of information. The paradox 
of Tor is that it may appear to be imbued with a democratic ethos 
because, technically, the system will not work unless there is a mass of 
Tor routers. However, while it is true that without a critical mass of 
routers the ability to anonymise is undermined to the point of failure, 
this is a matter of success or failure of the technical system and is not 
a matter of political demand. The technical demands of Tor require a 
mass but this mass is not a political requirement 
The dominant potential that needs to be mobilised for internet 
infrastructure and information politics to exist is expertise, along with 
some access to resources. Expertise is multi-part here involving the ex-
pertise to code appropriate software and the expertise to set up a server 
(though this is far less than coding requires, it is a skill not necessarily 
easily available). Like mass protests, there is also a need for publicity to 
ensure people participate. I have so far rather slid by the nature of the 
politics produced within such innovations as Tor, terming it generally 
as ‘free secure fl ows of information’. A few further aspects of the Tor 
network help us to pick apart this informational politics that is integral 
to these technical innovations in Internet infrastructures.
First, Tor has its origins in funding and ideas generated within 
and between the Offi ce of Naval Research, USA (2006) and the the 
Free Haven project (2006). The USA Navy has an interest in com-
munications that cannot be spied upon, as do nearly all military 
organisations. The Free Haven Project was explicitly set up to explore 
Tor and other similar networks. For advocates of free secure fl ows of 
information the use of Naval, and other military, funding to create an 
anonymity network might imply contradictions, a point I will return 
to when discussing anti-state libertarians and internet politics, but 
such implications are in fact irrelevant in terms of production and 
deployment.  What the congruence of activists like the Free Haven 
Project (whose short biographies reference connections to the hack-
ing community), the USA military and those like the Hacktivismo 
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group (whose concerns are civil rights activists in totalitarian socie-
ties) point to, is the way this politics of information eliminates any 
concern with the content of information passed. Within this politics 
data is data is data, there is no differentiation between kinds of data 
being transmitted.
This point is reinforced by the second example which is that in 
2006 a number of Tor servers were impounded by German police. 
These were ‘exit servers’, that is the point at which the handing on 
from Tor router to Tor router fi nishes and the desired information is 
accessed. Initially there was concern this might be a crackdown but 
it appears clear that this was because the IP numbers of these servers 
had shown up during an investigation into the distribution of child 
pornography over the Internet. (Jardin 2006.) Such a use is clearly an 
implication of anonymous networks, while activists couch much of 
their language in terms of civil rights the reality is that the networks 
are data neutral and must be so or the activists would transgress their 
principles in relation to free fl ows of information. Paul Taylor and I 
pointed this out in relation to what we called ‘digitally correct hacktiv-
ism’ when we quoted the Hacktivismo faq:
Q: Do you think all information should be accessible?
A: No.  That’s why we talk about ‘lawfully published’ information 
in the Hacktivismo Declaration. Essentially that cuts out things 
like legitimate government secrets, kiddie porn, matters of personal 
privacy, and other accepted restrictions.  But even the term ‘lawfully 
published’ is full of landmines. Lawful to whom? What is lawful in the 
United States can get you a bullet in the head in China. At the end of 
the day we recognize that some information needs to be controlled. 
But that control falls far short of censoring material that is critical of 
governments, intellectual and artistic opinion, information relating 
to women’s issues or sexual preference, and religious opinions. That’s 
another way of saying that most information wants to be free; the 
rest needs a little privacy, even non-existence in the case of things 
like kiddie porn. Everyone will have to sort the parameters of this 
one out for themselves.
(Cited in Jordan & Taylor 2004, 168-69.)
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The Hacktivismo Declaration and its associated faq was a militant ‘call 
to arms’ of information hacktivists and it seems a remarkable abnega-
tion within such a moment that over a key question responsibility 
is abandoned. This points to a failure of nerve within informational 
hacktivism to be willing to accept that they are totally data neutral 
and so their necessary bed fellows include the USA Military and child 
pornographers; in fact, anyone who needs secure anonymous com-
munication. 
We can understand such an information politics as a politics of 
the production of differences and we could theorise this as a version 
of the kind of politics that result from the work of Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari (Deleuze & Guattari 1988; Jordan 1995). Deleuze 
and Guattari theorise a rhizomatic politics that evades state controls, 
forever seeking the creative moment in which something new or dif-
ferent can be produced. The result of such a theorisation is a politics 
whose primary concern is the creation of differences, not the nature 
or content of differences. This politics resolves into a concern for the 
engine of difference-production rather than exploring the consequences 
of making certain differences. Such a politics is blind to the vast array 
of political concerns we often think of as constituting the political fi eld 
but is focused on the ability, the need, to continue the production 
of differences. In short, such a politics, paradoxically, evacuates the 
nature of differences for a concern with the mechanics of difference-
production. (Jordan 1995.) We can see Deleuze and Guattari’s joint 
work as, in this sense, providing a theory of informational politics that 
delineates the consequences of such a politics, perhaps more clearly 
than hacktivists are sometimes willing to. The desire of informational 
hacktivists is for fl ows of information to keep fl owing and this neces-
sitates ignoring the nature of any particular bit of information. 
The innovation of this information politics is to evacuate the 
content of information while valorising the demand that information 
be able to move freely and that people be secure in moving informa-
tion. Like the politics of difference it is highly creative and places at 
its centre the mechanics of difference production, in this case the par-
ticular differences that are produced are all in the form of information 
that can be digitised. However, while a kind of politics relevant to our 
informational age, it is also a politics that has some uncomfortable 
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implications for those who propound it. We have already seen the 
unease that child pornography causes, particularly because there are 
wider spheres of the wild reaches of society than just child pornography 
that will have need of secure anonymous communication.
Whether internet information and infrastructure hacktivists are 
comfortable with it or not, theirs is a data-neutral politics. Whatever 
can be digitised becomes of equal value within this political form, whose 
real object is the processes by which data is transferred so that access 
to information is freely, widely and securely available. This provides 
some explanation of the importance of expertise within this politics 
because the focus is on the means of transferring digitised informa-
tion utilising internet technologies and affecting such means requires 
expertise in internet technologies. 
In summary, two things come out of this discussion extending 
our appreciation of the Internet and politics. First, there is the recur-
rence of the fi gure of the expert and the necessity to mobilise expertise 
to create and prosecute Internet-enabled politics. Second, the radical 
politics of the Internet itself resolves into a particular informational 
politics entirely consonant with the technical structure of some in-
ternet technologies that, largely, ignore the nature of the data packet 
in favour of the production, transport and delivery of anything that 
can be digitised.
Proposition Two: Expertise allows intervention directly into the social, 
cultural, economic and political infrastructures created by internet tech-
nologies. 
Proposition Three: Informational politics is a politics of difference-produc-
tion and not content-production.
There is a third form of grass roots political action that is depend-
ent on internet technologies that should be explored before pulling 
together the series of propositions I am articulating. This form shifts 




The arguments about the politics of the Internet advanced so far have 
been focused primarily on those who seek to take direct action and 
whose direct actions were impossible without the Internet. From this 
defi nition, two types of hacktivism have been explored, allowing the 
identifi cation of issues concerning the Internet and politics. There is 
a third type of hacktivism that has so far been set aside but that is also 
important because there are hacktivists who are not focused on taking 
direct action but in making political action possible. Here we meet the 
use of the Internet’s communication capabilities for political purposes, 
with the most famous and obvious example being Indymedia. 
Indymedia is based on the politicisation of the ability some in-
ternet technologies provide to radically extend the possibilities for 
user-generated content to be made widely available . I will not offer an 
extended history of Indymedia because it is well known but, in short, 
software designed for community building in Sydney was utilised to 
set up a news sight parallel to the Seattle anti-WTO protests. This 
software allowed an open publishing format; that is anyone could 
upload a news story or a link, including audio and video. (Atton 2004; 
2003.) This style spread quickly with Indymedia sites becoming closely 
involved in the then burgeoning alter-globalisation movement and a 
number of Indymedia sites emerged most of which were nationally 
based but some issues based, such as the Indymedia biotechnology site. 
The nature of Indymedia has been through changes, with some of the 
most important debates revolving around the openness of Indymedia; 
given the posting of false information, hate speech and irrelevancies 
(like advertisements) some editorial control has usually been asserted 
on Indymedia sites. This has occurred most famously in the moving 
of some posts from the main Indymedia feeds into other sections. 
For example, the UK Indymedia site allows someone to click ‘view 
all posts’ to see what has been hidden from the main newsfeeds. The 
guidelines for this site also note that only in rare circumstances will 
anything be deleted, mentioning pornography and personal details 
as the only examples. 
In this regard, the recent explosion in user provided content on the 
Internet, for example on YouTube, could be seen as a depoliticisation 
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of an Internet style Indymedia helped to pioneer. Where Indymedia 
derived its energy and focus from its close association with the alter-
globalisation movement, YouTube derives its energy and focus from 
pirated fi lm clips, home movies, home-grown animations and a distinct 
absence of any political focus. However, this manifest content, which 
should not be passed over lightly, also relates to the latent content 
carried by a style of publishing that underpins both YouTube and In-
dymedia. This latent message is also political and suggests that some, 
at least, of the politics of Indymedia are not carried by the political 
content of its messages but by the sheer fact of people making and 
posting their own news which can then be distributed and consumed 
widely; whether that content is another episode of YouTube classic 
‘will it blend’ (in which objects are put into blenders) or is a record 
of police behaviour at a demonstration. The politics here is not so 
much alter-globalisation as the changed relations the Internet creates 
in the production, distribution and consumption of media objects. 
(Atton 2004, 17; see also Introduction; Gillan; Lehtonen and Rättilä 
in this volume.) 
Both Indymedia and YouTube demonstrate that it becomes pos-
sible for far more people to become journalists, documentary makers 
or movie makers. The barriers between production and consumption 
have been altered by the combination of digitisation, which radically 
redistributes the ability to make media objects, and the ways internet 
technologies allow distribution of digitised media objects. Many have 
also jumped to the conclusion that these changed relations necessarily 
imply a liberation. For example, it is possible for many people now to 
make moving pictures and to distribute them globally, whereas previ-
ously signifi cant fi nancial investment was needed for both. For radical 
journalists, this means that relatively inexpensive digital cameras now 
allow a grassroots record of events (see Rättilä in this volume). And 
there is some truth to such claims; however like many of the early claims 
about the revolutionary nature of internet technologies it seems rather 
that we cannot be certain of the liberatory nature of such changes. 
Instead, we need to consider what the profusion of information means 
and how it is altering political relations. What we can say is that what 
seems to be the key political effect of these internet technologies is 
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again contentless; that is, any content is subject to the revision of 
boundaries between producer, distributor and consumer.
One area of the politics of organisation and communication af-
fected by internet technologies, then, is exemplifi ed by Indymedia and 
YouTube and relates to altered relations between producers, distributors 
and consumers of media objects. These changes imply many things, 
most obviously the potential for a democratisation of media, but they 
also reinforce the contentless nature of many political actions made 
possible by internet technologies. Expertise remains relevant to this 
change, for example Indymedia has had specifi c software written to 
enable its open publishing format. However, this expertise is often 
embedded in systems and, while it remains determining for many us-
ers, it also releases users to utilise technologies in ways that produce 
redrawn boundaries between produces, distributors and consumers of 
media-objects and sometimes provides platforms that release creators 
of digital media objects from technical constraints.
Beyond the changes exemplifi ed by Indymedia and YouTube, there 
is a second important type of use of Internet technologies by hacktiv-
ists in relation to communication and organisation. If the fi rst type of 
change we have looked at points to differences in the way the media 
is made and read, the second directly addresses signifi cant changes 
in forms of organisation and communication. The work of  Jenny 
Pickerill demonstrates the interest of radical groups in communication 
based on internet technologies and the ways that these alter forms of 
organisation. Pickerill’s analysis of three UK-based environmental 
groups concluded:
It has been illustrated that it is possible to mobilise those who are 
already within the movement networks (or those who cognate), using 
CMC without face-to-face contact. CMC is simply a quicker, cheaper 
and more global method of utilising these networks. More people can 
be contacted more quickly than through traditional forms of com-
munication such as word of mouth and underground publications, 
and this contact is also on a much larger scale. (Pickerill 2001, 164.)
Pickerill’s work also points out limitations, with movements retaining a 
high demand for face-to-face contact, though she notes that her fi ndings 
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might relate to a specifi c historical moment because there has been a 
greater spread of computer-mediated communication since she com-
pleted her project. There can be little doubt that internet technologies 
shift forms of communication within political groups, and it may be that 
this shift is most easily accomplished by groups that are already commit-
ted to less hierarchical or de-centralised organisational forms. It seems 
that more mainstream political organisations have taken considerably 
longer to fi nd uses for communication via the Internet, perhaps relating 
to their greater reliance on hierarchies. (Chadwick 2006,114-143.)
Despite a potential affi nity between anti-hierarchical (dis)organisations 
and communication based on internet technologies, we should be clear 
that these effects are not necessarily specifi c to particular political 
ideologies. The effects are also ones that have been documented for 
almost as long as computer mediated communication has existed. 
For example, Sproull and Kiesler’s 1986 research demonstrated that 
computer mediated discussions induced greater participation, fl attened 
hierarchies and produced more honest discussion, while at the same 
time making decisions harder to reach and inducing greater levels of 
abuse (the now familiar fl aming) (Sproull & Kiesler 1986; 1993). 
These are familiar aspects of online communication which are open 
to everyone from Greenpeace, radical anarchism or radical Islamism to 
communities based on leisure interests such as model train fanatics.
The general political point about internet technologies at stake 
here is, again, that in terms of communication the Internet produces 
its own informational politics which is effectively contentless when 
viewed against many of the major political ideologies of this and the 
last century. The two existing political ideologies that come closest 
to the anti-hierarchical and distributed communicative possibilities 
based on internet technologies are libertarianism and anarchism. 
The shared positions here are only partial, referring particularly to 
distributed political identities that are each taken to be the locus of 
political responsibility. The anti-statism of radical, particularly USA 
based, libertarianism is supported here but not the often concomitant 
belief in free markets and capitalism, which certainly has resonances 
but could easily be argued against with co-operative forms of social 
organisation. Similarly, and in a mirror image, anarchism is not whole-
sale at home with the communicative powers of internet technologies, 
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but the image of small scale, self-managed communities is resonant, 
though any presumption of the primacy of co-operatives falls to the 
same problem as the free market fancies of libertarians; things could 
be done differently.
Communication and organisation based on internet technolo-
gies and in activist groups resolves and confi rms something that has 
been implicit throughout this chapter: there is a politics that results 
specifi cally from internet technologies.
Proposition Four: There is a politics of internet technologies.
We also gain some further indicators of the nature of this politics in 
its affi nity for libertarian and anarchist ideologies. The prevalence of 
libertarianism among US internet activists and anarchism among Eu-
ropean internet activists obscures, beneath profound rhetorical differ-
ences, equally profound substantive similarities in the two positions in 
relation to the internet. We can now see this in the way communicative 
practices based on internet technologies imply both libertarianism and 
anarchism but only partially so; that libertarians import free market 
ideologies and anarchists import class war ideologies lies not in the 
social consequences of internet-based communicative practices but in 
a category mistake by anarchists and libertarians.
Proposition Five: Internet technologies produce communicative practices 
that imply positive ethical value should rest in distributed political identi-
ties that are the locus of political responsibility.
CONCLUSION
Three fi gures of resistance, three types of political action on the In-
ternet, three insights into general political processes on the Internet; 
three types of hacktivism have been explored and propositions about 
the Internet and politics derived from that exploration. It now remains 
to pull together these propositions into one list and then to explore 
if they can be refi ned.
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Proposition One: The possibility of an Internet politics is created by the abil-
ity to mobilise expertise in the manipulation of Internet technologies.
Proposition Two: Expertise allows intervention directly into the social, 
cultural, economic and political infrastructures created by internet tech-
nologies. 
Proposition Three: Informational politics is a politics of difference-produc-
tion and not content-production.
Proposition Four: There is a politics of internet technologies.
Proposition Five: Internet technologies produce communicative practices 
that imply positive ethical value should rest in distributed political identi-
ties that are the locus of political responsibility.
These are specifi c ideas that come from exploring issues of politics in 
the context of internet technologies through the lens of popular politi-
cal actions. Of course, popular political actions are not the only way 
to approach politics and the Internet, I mentioned more mainstream 
political parties in passing above and it seems that such organisations 
are becoming more involved with the kinds of political innovations 
internet technologies make possible. We should in this context note 
the importance of mobilising expertise which for grassroots politics 
often relies on volunteers. This may make internet-based political in-
novations more easily dominated, in the long run, by governments, 
political parties and corporations with the resources to fund the control 
of expertise; though here we would also need to consider the meaning 
of the Free Software/Open Source movement. (Weber 2004.) Such 
considerations point us toward a re-ordering of the propositions I have 
outlined, to produce a complex yet coherent defi nition of a politics 
based on internet technologies. It could not be claimed that this politics 
has been defi nitively established; rather that it offers a basis for future 
analysis, research and argument.
Proposition Four is the blanket statement. While I have derived 
a politics that seems particular to internet technologies, it remains 
the case to establish this formally, something likely to require com-
parative research. To those researching the Internet such a claim of 
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the specifi city of political innovations based on internet technologies 
might seem obvious; after all, not only are the effects of the Internet 
widespread they, in examples like Indymedia and YouTube, seem to 
produce obvious novelty. Yet the claim that there is a specifi c politics 
that is only produced when internet technologies are involved is the 
kind of statement that needs testing against ‘real world’ politics. It is 
certainly also a statement that should not be taken to mean that the 
Internet is an entirely separate place to something we call offl ine life. 
Rather, the claim would be that when internet technologies are in-
volved then a particular political formation comes into play, how that 
formation operates will depend on its relations to other formations that 
are present in particular political moments. Offl ine and online here 
become convenient shorthands for political formations which need 
to be untangled and separated to be better understood, the present 
argument should not however be understood as an argument for an 
ontological separation.
Within this overall framework, the remaining propositions seem 
to me to cohere into a defi nition of the specifi city of a politics that 
operates within social and cultural norms that are dependant on in-
ternet technologies. When exploring the defi nition offered below, a 
conclusive disproof of it does not consist in pointing out that many 
of the elements of it might be found in non-internet contexts. Rather 
what is key is the weight and quality of these elements rather than a 
determinedly negative, and ultimately intellectually futile, reading in 
which, for example, it was claimed because there is expertise at work in 
politics both in online and offl ine that there is no difference between 
the two. If we look back at the arguments and examples offered above 
the specifi city being claimed here is not that expertise is important 
in internet politics and is unimportant in non-internet politics but 
rather that internet politics is dependent on expertise and this exper-
tise enables intervention into the infrastructure of the ‘world’. This 
is not a matter of political events but of creating the very possibility 
that certain types of events are capable of occurring: expertise is in 
this sense central to the politics I am outlining. My conclusion is that 
exploring radical politics that is consonant with internet technologies 
leads to the following understanding:
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There is a politics specifi c to social worlds built on internet tech-
nologies. This politics:
 is created, altered and maintained by the ability to mobilise   
 expertise in the manipulation of internet technologies;
 is able to intervene directly into the infrastructure that enables   
 social worlds dependant on internet technologies;
 is one of difference-production, it is a modular and tactical 
politics available for use by all ideologies except an ideology that 
restrains the production of further differences, and;
 presumes, produces and valorises distributed political identities   




Atton, C. 2004. Alternative Media. London; Sage
Atton, C. 2003. Reshaping Social Movement Media for a New Millen-
nium, Social Movement Studies 2(1), 3-16.
CAE (Critical Arts Ensemble). 1996. Electronic Civil Disobedience and 
Other Unpopular Ideas. New York: Autonomedia.
CAE (Critical Arts Ensemble). (1994). The Electronic Disturbance. New 
York: Autonomedia.
Castells, M. 2000. The Rise of the Network Society; second edition. London: 
Blackwell.
Chadwick, A. 2006. Internet Politics: states, citizens, and new communica-
tion technologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. 1988. A Thousand Plateaus: capitalism and 
schizophrenia. London: Athlone Press.
Electronic Disturbance Theatre. 2006. http://www.thing.net/%7Erdom/
ecd/ecd.html. (Accessed 11.9.2006).
Free Haven Project. 2006. http://www.freehaven.net/. (Accessed September 
11, 2006).
Hacktivismo. 2006. http://www.hacktivismo.com/. (Accessed September 
11, 2006).
Himanen, P. 2001. The Hacker Ethic: a radical approach to the philosophy 
of business. New York: Random House.
Jardin, X. 2006. TOR: German police are not cracking down on Tor, Bo-
ingBoing, 11/09/2006.  http://www.boingboing.net/2006/09/11/
tor_german_police_ar.html. (Accessed  Decempber 6, 2006).
Jordan, T. & Taylor, P. 2004. Hacktivism and Cyberwars. London: 
Routledge.
Jordan, T. 1999a. Cyberpower: the culture and politics of cyberspace and the 
Internet. London: Routledge.
Jordan, T. 1999b. New Space, New Politics: the Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation and the defi nition of cyberpolitics. In, Jordan, T. & Lent, 
A. (eds) 1999. Storming the Millennium: the new politics of change. 
London: Lawrence and Wishart, 80-107
Jordan, T. 1995. Collective Bodies: raving and the politics of Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari, The Body and Society, 1(1), 125-146.
Lessig, L. 1999. Code: and other laws of cyberspace. New York: Basic 
Books.
Miller, D. & Slater, D. 2000. The Internet: an ethnographic approach. Lon-
don: Berg.
280
Pickerill, J. 2001. Weaving a Green Web: environmental protest and com-
puter-mediated communication in Britain. In Webster, F. (ed.) 
(2000) Culture and Politics in the Information Age: a new politics?, 
London: Routledge.
Robbins, K. 1999.Against Virtual Community: for a politics of distance, 
Angelaki 4:2, 163-170. 
Scatterchat. 2006. http://www.scatterchat.com/. (Accessed September 
10, 2006).
Silver, D. & Massani, A. 2006. Critical Cyberculture Studies. New York: 
New York University Press.
Sourceforge.net: CameraShy. 2006. http://sourceforge.net/projects/cam-
erashy/. (Accessed September 10, 2006).
Sproull, L. & Kiesler, S. 1993. Computers, Networks and Work. In Har-
asim, L.(ed.) 1993. Global Networks: computers and international 
communications. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 105-120
Sproull, L. & Kiesler, S. 1986. Reducing Social Context Cues: electronic 
mail in organisational communication, Management Science 
32(11), 1492-1512. 
The Offi ce of Naval Research. 2006. http://www.onr.navy.mil/. (Accessed 
September 10, 2006).
Tor Network. 2006. http://tor.eff.org/. (Accessed 10.9.2006). 
Tor: Overview. 2006. http://tor.eff.org/overview.html.en. (Accessed Sep-
tember 10, 2006).
Wark, M. 2004. A Hacker Manifesto. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press. 




The political empowerment of citizen 
consumers – opportunities and problems of 
anti-corporate campaigning on the net
 
JONAH PERETTI’S EMAIL EXCHANGE WITH NIKE
 – A CYBERMYTH OF POLITICAL CONSUMERISM? 
On January 5, 2001, Jonah Peretti, then assistant adjunct professor at 
New York University, wrote an email to Nike corporation in response 
to the company’s invitation to consumers to express their lifestyle 
identity by giving the company design recommendations. “..(A)ll they 
were really doing was sending instructions to cheap labour in developing 
countries” (Peretti 2004, 128), Peretti thought and ironically ordered 
a pair of Nikes with the word “sweatshop” stitched onto them. By 
using the same online service that Nike used to strengthen its brand 
image for creating an illusion of consumer participation and personal 
freedom he tried to redirect the company’s PR-tools against itself. 
The following dialogue with the customer service of Nike ended with 
Peretti’s mocking request: “Could you please send me a colour snapshot 
of the ten-year-old Vietnamese girl who makes my shoes?” He emailed 
his little culture-jamming discussion to about twelve friends who 
emailed it to their peers and like a snowball virus, the exchange was 
soon replicated a million times (ibid., 129). At the end of January 
2001, the fi rst traditional media outlet, the San Jose Mercury News, 
published a report of the humorous story and soon afterwards, Time, 
Village Voice and The Wall Street Journal and even several European 
papers like The Guardian, La Repubblica and Liberation followed 
suit. The show NBC Today invited Peretti to discuss corporate social 
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responsibility on national US television with a representative from 
Nike (ibid., 136). 
The symbolic attack of the culture jammer and netizen consumer 
Jonah Peretti on the self  proclaimed corporate citizen Nike Corpora-
tion has not only received much mass media resonance. His brave and 
successful confrontation of a giant corporation is also widely referred 
to in academic literature when the potential of the internet for the 
mobilisation of political consumerism in general is discussed. On 
the one hand, I will argue in this paper that his provocative action is 
rightly quoted that often, as it represents many aspects of a new kind 
of political action that is politicising the sphere of consumption as 
part of a wider global justice movement. On the other hand, however, 
I will show that taking the resonance of his email exchange as rep-
resentative for cyberactivism and the dynamic interrelation between 
micro, middle, and macro media (Peretti 2004) in the fi eld of political 
consumerism in general would be mystifying the actual realisation of 
the participative potential of net communication. In terms of average 
use of the interactive possibilities that net technology offers, empirical 
evidence is – at least as far as the analysis of websites of German-speak-
ing anti-corporate protest actors shows – far less impressive than the 
often praised example of Jonah Peretti suggests. 
The chapter comprises three parts: First, some general elements 
of political consumerism are characterised based on the case of Jonah 
Peretti. After that, the politicisation of consumption is contextualised 
and explained as a new form of political participation. In that respect 
several systemic and cultural changes are examined that can be re-
garded as structural and cultural opportunity formations of political 
consumerism as a social movement. The third and main part of the 
chapter discusses the internet as a new and ambivalent technological 
opportunity structure for the political empowerment of consumers. On 
the one hand, it has provided companies with sophisticated new means 
of online branding and mass customisation1 leading to an illusion of 
participation and the empowerment of consumers, as the case of the 
1. Mass customization in marketing, manufacturing, and management, is the use 
of fl exible computer-aided manufacturing systems to produce custom output. 
Those systems combine the low unit costs of mass production processes with the 
fl exibility of individual customization. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_cus-
tomization)
283
aforementioned service offer of Nike has shown. On the other hand, 
new ICTs have provided consumers with new effi cient means for the 
collective production of knowledge that can be used to enhance the 
market power of consumers as well as their infl uence as civil society 
actors. While contrary to traditional mass media the internet allows 
for many-to-many communication and thus provides a signifi cant 
media infrastructure for the strengthening of network-based partici-
patory politics, it is argued that the logic of political campaigning, 
most of all determined by the need to arouse mass media attention, 
limits a full realisation of this potential. Netizen consumers are far 
less engaged in discursive cultural practices than the communicative 
structure of new media allows for. Apart from that, NGO-centred 
action networks still outnumber direct activist networks merely based 
on internet communication.
CHARACTERISTIC ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL CONSUMERISM
To what extent is the Nike sweatshop email exchange characteristic of 
the new movement of political consumerism in general? 
 Mobilising for political aims by appealing to the power of con
sumers lacks strong and complex grand narratives and corresponds 
with a general tendency of deideologisising politics in general as 
protest politics in particular (Bennett, 2004; Micheletti, 2003). 
The anti-sweatshop movement that Peretti’s action is related to 
as well as campaigns against price dumping and the exploitation 
of employees of discounters like Walmart in the US, Tesco in the 
UK, or Lidl in Germany or the boycott of genetically modifi ed 
food do not draw their legitimacy from fi xed grand narratives 
but from normatively rather general discourses on the violation 
of global social rights. In social movement research, framing of 
consumerist action is called ideologically “relaxed” (Bennett) and 
based on “fl exible identities” (Tarrow & della Porta 2005). Given 
a rather broad understanding of global social rights a very wide 
range of issues of new and old social movements are connected. 
Their diversity ranges from human rights issues, women’s issues, 
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issues of fair trade and collective organisation of workers to issues 
of ecological sustainability(cf. Introduction; Häyhtiö & Rinne in 
this volume). In its focus on social dumping and workers’ rights 
political consumerism bears some resemblance to old anti-capi-
talist movements; however, the most signifi cant difference is the 
shift of focus away from the sphere of production as the prime 
realm of mobilisation to the sphere of distribution and consump-
tion in order to scandalise injustices of production in a more 
lifeworld-oriented mode and thus allowing the anti-corporate 
movement to appear to be closer to humanitarian early socialist 
ideas than to Marxist theories of socialism. Contrary to both, the 
old labour movement and new social movements of the 1960s 
and 1970s, current political consumerism in Europe is neither 
simply anti-capitalistic nor anti-consumerist, nor simply based on 
working-class or middle-class actors. If there is any master frame 
at all, it can neither be described as solely materialistic in the sense 
of Marxist nor anti-imperialistic or solely postmaterialistic in the 
sense of Ronald Inglehardt. It is rather a new synthesis of both: a 
reframing of working-class issues like workers’ rights – fair pay, 
humane working conditions and the right to collectively organise 
– in a global dimension linked in with middle-class “lifestyle 
politics” (Bennett) of ethical consumption. 
 Mobilising the power of consumers has a long tradition particu-
larly in the US and other Anglo-Saxon societies. Consumerist 
action repertoires comprise most of all collective actions like 
boycotts or buycotts (e.g. fair trade products). Current attempts to 
appeal to consumer agency in order to evoke changes of corporate 
policies differ from similar mobilisations in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries in that they are less marketplace-oriented and more 
discursive and media-oriented (Friedman 1999, 45-62). While 
marketplace-oriented action presupposes the mobilisation of a 
large number of “foot soldiers to staff the boycott picket lines at 
the entrances to retail stores” (ibid., 51) media-oriented actions 
have a much lower demand on political participation. As long as 
campaigners know how to stage protest effectively in the media, 
protest action requires only a few – or in the case of Jonah Peretti 
just one – activist. 
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 “No logo” – the title of Naomi Klein’s bestseller expresses the 
particular anti-branding focus of political consumerist action. 
Transnationally operating corporations are the main targets of 
transnational consumer activists that scandalise global social 
norm violations (Evans 2000, 231). Brands offer a particularly 
well suited target for critical consumers “as they are trendsetters 
of world economy” (Werner & Weiss 2004, 47). Corporations 
are being held responsible for most of the injustices caused by 
economic globalisation. Attacking the brand image of a large tran-
snational corporation (also called “brand bashing”) has become 
the most prominent aim of consumerist protest because of “new 
cognitive burdens” on marketplace-oriented actors. Sizeable tran-
snational corporations have many subsidiaries that market their 
own products under many different brand names. The boycott 
of Nestlé in the 1970s has already shown how diffi cult it is to 
execute a successful boycott against a company whose goods and 
services were sold under many different brand labels. As a result, 
it is easier to damage the umbrella brand by symbolic action than 
to boycott all the goods manufactured by one company.  
 Resulting from the focus on media-oriented actions against well 
known brands, the framing of political consumerist campaigns 
follows a binary coded structure of moral communication. The 
economic power of ruthless corporate giants is confronted with 
moral superiority, creativity, humour, dedication and the courage 
of powerless advocates for a global ethic – a David versus Goliath 
action structure. The extraordinary attention that particularly the 
Adbusters Magazine or other acts of culture jamming receive is 
caused by this charming combination of avantgardistic humorous 
practices of “uncooling” brand images with “uncommercials” and 
a highly moral aim of freeing the public from the dominance of 
commercial icons. “We will take on the archetypal mind polluters 
– Marlboro, Budweiser, Benetton, Coke, McDonald’s and Calvin 
Klein- and beat them at their own game. …On the rubble of the 
old media culture, we will build a new one with a non commercial 
heart and soul.” (Adbusters Media Manifesto) 
 As the case of Jonah Peretti illustrates political consumerism is 
far less collectivistic than former social movement activities. 
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Support action like writing standardised electronic protest mails 
to scandalised corporations or boycotting certain brands is easy 
to integrate in everyday shopping practice and thus follows the 
general trend of individualisation and “Veralltäglichung” of po-
litical protest that Dieter Rucht considers to be characteristic of 
changes of political protest culture of recent decades. The low 
costs and threshold of participation in politics of the shopping 
basket help to avoid problems of free-rider-actions as well as a 
burn-out of activists. Consumer citizenship refl ects a general 
trend of political participation characterised by an increasing 
retreat from public to private life by politicising private lifestyle 
decisions and thus demarcating the traditional dividing line of 
public and political life (Micheletti 2003, 24). Apart from that, 
taking political issues into account when taking decisions on 
consumption presupposes no strong shared collective identity. 
A moral case-related contextual identity is suffi cient, based on 
weak ties among members of an action network. Members do not 
have to meet and develop strong emotional bonds or community 
feelings. The images of scandalised brands serve – aside from 
the image of the main scandalising NGO advocacy networks or 
direct activist networks – usually as the sole provider of collec-
tive identity among protesting citizen consumers (c.f. Häyhtiö 
& Rinne in this volume).
 Another feature that Jonah Peretti’s email exchange reveals lies in 
the crucial importance of internet-based network-like social rela-
tions among supporters. Ideally these networks mirror the tran-
snational network structure of the giant corporations attacked. 
There are two main types of transnational networks (Bennett 
2005, 213-216): First, “transnational advocacy networks” (Keck 
& Sikkink 1998) aim at linking actors from developing coun-
tries with more empowered actors in the so-called First World, 
assuming that they have greater infl uence on the dynamic of the 
global economy. Organisational coalitions connect diverse work-
ing-class and middle-class based civil society organisations: most 
of all trade unions, church groups, North- and South-NGOs. 
NGO-centred issue networks are usually rather homogenous. 
They share a common action frame advocating mostly single 
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protest issues, deploy fracture lines along their organisational 
identity, and restrict members infl uence on strategic decisions (cf. 
Mosca in this volume). Secondly, loose polycentric direct activ-
ist networks are structured by weak ties, relying – like Peretti’s 
protest against Nike illustrates – most of all on new ICTs for col-
lective self-organisation. They are considered to be characteristic 
of the Global Justice Movement targeting WTO, IMF or large 
corporations. They advocate multiple issues and pursue goals of 
individual empowerment and spread across diverse networks. A 
mixed type of network combines elements of both, for instance, 
the campaign against Coca Cola, where a network-centred on 
the transnational NGO Greenpeace cooperates with more direct 
Adbusters activists. Despite their different social structure and 
ideological background, in employing consumerist action rep-
ertoires all types of networks address a new agent of social and 
political change: the citizen as ethical consumer, a consumer who 
is offered the opportunity to articulate preferences and to pressure 
companies to accept and act according to their fi rst choice. 
SOCIAL-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY 
STRUCTURES OF POLITICAL CONSUMERISM
Having roughly described the main aims and general mode of political 
participation of political consumerism, I would now like to discuss in 
more detail the socio-economic and cultural background of this new 
social movement before highlighting in more depth the particular rel-
evance of the internet for its success.2 Therefore, I would like to draw 
on an explanatory approach developed by Cohen and Arato. In their 
discussion of the blind spots of social movement paradigms, Cohen 
and Arato plead for an understanding of new social movements that 
combines elements of both approaches. Following the Habermasian 
interaction theory, they propose a “dualistic conception of society” (Co-
hen & Arato 1990, 531) along the Habermasian distinction between 
system and lifeworld. While their intention is to conceptualise a frame 
that is able to analyse the strategically rational dimension as well as 
2.  For the following also see Baringhorst 2005 and 2006.
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the expressive and aesthetic element of collective action in general, in 
the following, the system/lifeworld distinction is taken as an analytical 
frame to typify the particular historical background of the rise of the 
current transnational political consumerism movement.
With regard to changes on the system level that have contributed 
to the increasing social and political empowerment of consumers 
we have to distinguish between political and economic structural 
changes. 
CHANGES ON THE SYSTEM LEVEL: NEW STRUCTURES OF GOVERNANCE 
AND THE GROWING POWER OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
Political opportunity factors for the mobilisation of consumer power 
result most of all from new structures of governance. The acceleration 
of processes of modernisation and the increasing complexity of social 
and ecological problems reduces the capacity of governments to regulate 
effectively within the borders of the nation state. Political problems 
are regulated more or less co-ordinately on different territorial levels 
in different functional sectors and networks of actors and with varying 
degrees of liability. Changing governing structures have increased the 
impact of NGOs in international politics. The generally grown cred-
ibility, public resonance and political consulting role of transnational 
NGOs is also benefi ting single NGOs and protest action networks 
campaigning for global social rights, human rights or ecological rights 
by scandalising product histories and aiming at changing consumer 
awareness and preferences.3 
Power in the traditional sense of Max Weber is understood as the 
chance to force ones will upon others. The new power of global eco-
nomic players, however, is not based on violence as the ultimate ratio, 
like state power. It is much more mobile than the power of the state 
and globally deployable. The threatening potential of transnational 
corporations reduces the possible options to a single one: the option 
3. As, for instance, the role of NGOs in the Global Compact Initiative of the United 
Nations shows, new structures of global governance give them increased options 
to infl uence global regulations and to pressurise transnational corporations or 
national governments in case of global norm violations.
289
to say no, not to invest and not to be held publicly accountable for 
entrepreneurial decisions.
According to Beck (2002) the structural change of economic 
power has made political consumerism the only counter-power left to 
confront global capitalism. Consumer power is like capitalist power 
based on a single negative power resource. In the case of consumer 
power it is the option not to buy, not to buy a scandalised product or 
all products from a scandalised company or disdained country or all 
products of a scandalised mode of production. Shopping power and 
consumer choice can be mobilised to become a global citizenship ac-
tion, organised and communicated by civil society organisations, and 
it can be converted into ballot votes affecting the politics of companies, 
independent of the boundaries of state territories. The crucial power 
resource of political consumerism lies in the fact that companies are 
usually powerless when confronted with consumer boycotts or other 
collective actions by consumer citizens, because even the most powerful 
transnational companies cannot dismiss their consumers like they can 
dismiss workers.4 Companies can leave particular places of produc-
tion but they cannot withdraw from a globalised market. The costs 
of exerting infl uence through consumer choice, however, are low as 
consumers can usually opt for alternative products of similar quality 
and similar prices.
CHANGES ON THE LEVEL OF LIFEWORLD: 
BRANDING OF SOCIAL RELATIONS
 
Apart from these processes of structural transformation, changes on the 
cultural level of everyday life practices of consumers favour a politicisa-
tion of consumption in order to scandalise violations of human rights. 
In this context we have to particularly mention the growing relevance 
of consumption for individual and collective formations of identities. 
Consumer resistance in terms of anti-corporate campaigning is only 
one expression of an overall increased consumer agency that is deeply 
connected with the grown symbolic power of corporate brands.
4. With the exception of highly qualifi ed workers with professions of high interna-
tional demand who can also choose the exit-option.
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Individualisation and changes in collective identity formation 
shape the cultural background of augmented social and cultural im-
portance of all matters of consumption, giving particular importance 
to brand names and the symbolic construction of lifestyles in com-
mercial marketing (Bennett 2003, 22). While ideological discourses 
have lost much of their former infl uence over identity formation in 
Western societies, lifestyle has become a highly signifi cant element of 
individual and collective identity construction. Ideological politics 
has been transformed to a large extent to “lifestyle politics” (Bennett), 
attaching political meaning to the cultural scenes and milieus we live 
in, the dress code we choose, the music we listen to, or in general, the 
goods we consume. The images of goods, most markedly expressed 
in powerful images of global icons of consumer brands, have become 
decisive elements of identity building, most of all in affl uent Western 
societies. 
The use-value of consumer goods thus is more than their response 
to extra-social needs and pleasures but results from their “ability to be 
deployed within productive consumer practice.” (Arvidsson 2006, 20) 
Brands are on the one hand means of capitalist domination of media 
culture and mediated lifeworlds of consumers. On the other hand, they 
only provide a context or a “brandscape” (ibid., 2006, 15) “where the 
autonomous productivity of co-workers is made to unfold in a particular 
direction, towards the creation of particular, valuable forms of meaning 
and social relations.” Consumers are not merely passive objects of media 
domination and brand marketing but we have to conceive of them 
as creative and productive consumer agents. Consumers use goods 
as well as mediated brands as means for their everyday performance 
of community, identity, solidarity and emotional bonds, in general. 
Branding, product placement, event marketing, sponsorship or other 
forms of marketing all aim at involving consumers in their co-crea-
tion, they try to control what consumers do with the brands, how 
they interpret them and employ them in everyday practices. However, 
these techniques of control are far from perfect. As consumer acts are 
refl exive and dependent on a conscious approval by customers of the 
product, the approval of a product or company can be withdrawn 
any time consumers change their minds. The augmented symbolic 
load of goods has created a demand well above the level of existential 
291
needs and objective use-value. At the same time consumer choices 
are increasingly vulnerable to disappointment and questioned as to 
whether they might not have been the right choices, especially given 
the multitude of offers of alternative goods of comparable quality and 
price. This increased refl exivity of consumption represents the strength 
and weakness of Western consumer societies: the precondition for a 
virtually endless market expansion as well as the option to opt out and 
to introduce ecological, human rights and social justice issues into the 
sphere of distribution. 
ICT AND THE EMPOWERMENT OF CONSUMERS
The structural and lifeworld-related cultural explanations for the rise 
of political consumerism are both deeply connected to a third level of 
justifi cation that is the changed media infrastructure as a most relevant 
technological opportunity structure. This interdependency between 
the development of political activism and media technology is far from 
new. Benedict Anderson has pointed out the great importance of the 
invention of printing techniques for processes of nation building which 
has offered the opportunity to generate abstract communities and form 
solidarity and collective identities beyond face-to-face communication. 
While due to its one-to-many communicative structure the mass media 
could only shape these abstract communities in terms of top-down 
communication, new digital ICTs facilitate horizontal communication 
in conceptual communities and allow for the operation of complex 
social interactions and the technical opportunity to connect various 
modes of mediated communication. Based on its multifaceted com-
municative structure, it has a huge potential to aggregate individual 
interests and allow for an individualist and network-related mode of 
political participation based on one-to-many as well as many-to-one 
and many-to-many modes of communication. (See also Mosca; Rättilä, 
Paltemaa; Häyhtiö & Rinne and Gillan in this volume)  
In the following, I would like to discuss the particular impact of 
online communication on the development of consumer agency and 
political consumerism as a social movement. The core question is: To 
what extent has the internet contributed or weakened the empower-
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ment of consumers? The answer will be ambivalent: On the one hand, 
digitalised media culture provides a productive infrastructure for the 
creation of brandspaces that increase the advancement of commercial 
branding into the lifeworld of consumers. On the other hand, digital 
media also provides protest actors with a technology that facilitates 
attempts at critical deconstruction of branded communication. In 
that respect, the empowerment of consumer groups and NGOs to put 
pressure on corporations is closely related to the increased importance 
of information technology and cognitive competences for industrial 
capitalism, which leads to a new formation of the capitalist economy 
that has also been called “informational capitalism” (Dyer-Witheford 




– THE ILLUSION OF EMPOWERMENT OF CONSUMERS
Many internet enthusiasts have argued in the 1990s that new digital 
media represent the technological embodiment of the “cultures of 
freedom” of the 1960s and 1970s and that they will generate and 
strengthen new forms of non-hierarchical political participation. This 
is the case to a certain extent, as I will describe later on. However, the 
internet also has an unprecedented potential to infl uence opinion and 
particularly consumer opinion through online branding and marketing 
due to the plasticity and malleability of content (Manchovic 2001, 
27) that digital media allow for. 
Online computer games or dating agencies are only two examples 
of the new levels of intimacy and openness that internet-based com-
munication provides and that are increasingly employed by corporate 
actors for all kinds of branding, product placement and immersion of 
users into pre-structured brandscapes. The internet can, as Arvidsson 
argues, create commercial environments that encompass all human 
senses centred around and all actions anticipated by the programme 
of a particular brand. In informational capitalism “ICTs have the tech-
nological potential to complete the real subsumption of life under capital, 
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to the extent that the becoming of subjectivity and the becoming of value 
coincide” (Arvidsson 2006, 96). 
Online brand management has become an important new element 
of marketing, aimed at strengthening the status of corporate brands 
by generating a community-like interaction between consumers. Thus 
members of the community of book lovers created by Amazon are 
encouraged to write reviews and share their book recommendations 
and eBay-users rate each other and thus create a relation of mutual 
trust as well as trust in the company by providing the environment 
for community formation. New modes of online marketing offer 
consumers new options to participate in the process of production in 
order to strengthen their emotional and interactive relations to the 
brand even more. They are even asked to take part in the planning of 
product design, an option of interactivity that has been shrewdly used 
contra-intentionally by Jonah Peretti’s attempt to mock Nike’s online 
communication and order invitation.5 However, if it comes to use the 
offered communicative space for messages deconstructing company 
images, the implicit limitations of consumer participation are soon 
made crystal clear as not only Peretti’s email-exchange illustrates. When 
the action network Attac tried to sell the anti-product N.I.X. Version 
11.04 via eBay on Buy-Nothing-Day, eBay stopped the auction of 
the extraordinary product once the bids of potential buyers reached 
150 Euro. While Attac Germany perceived this mock-auction as an 
art-action and N.I.X. Version 11.04 as an art-product, eBay Com-
munity Watch explained its actions by emphasising its responsibility 
to safeguard the seriousness of its online business. eBay, they argued, 
would not be the right place for fundraising.6  
5. Other examples are car manufacturers (e.g. Audi, Volvo, and Peugeot) who ask 
potential consumers to give their ideas on the development of future models.
6. “Hallo! Angebote sind nicht der richtige Ort fuer Spendengesuche und ebay ist 
es darueberhinaus auch nicht moeglich die Seriositaet derartiger Aufrufe zu ue-
berpruefen und einzuschaetzen. Der Inhalt von Angebotsbeschreibungen sollte 
auf eine Beschreibung des angebotenen Artikels beschraenkt sein. Mit freundli-
chen Gruessen, eBay Community Watch“ http://buynothingday.narra.de/bnd.
php?page=bnd2004_ebay
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ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT OF CONSUMERS ON THE NET 
The given examples reveal an increased opportunity of brand marketing 
to reach consumers and entice them to interact with other consumers 
in a community-like mode as well as with the company directly. Apart 
from the company-controlled modes of consumer interaction, the 
internet has at the same time increased consumer agency by providing 
easy access to market-related information. 
The internet is an extremely effi cient means for the collective 
production of knowledge and other immaterial values like communities 
and collective identities as well as a useful retrieval device for all kinds 
of information. Low transaction costs combined with free and ubiqui-
tous information have, in particular contributed to strengthening the 
social position of consumers relative to vendors or marketers. Vendors 
lose their information monopoly and are thus forced to lower prices 
and improve the quality of goods and services. In a similar argument 
the British political communication expert Margaret Scammell has 
summed up the impact of ICT on political consumerism as “re-writing 
the rules of the marketplace”. “The consumer is offered a considerably 
expanded choice. Digital deregulated markets lower the costs of entry for 
new producers and substantially reduce, or make irrelevant, barriers of 
time and space” (Scammell 2003, 5). 
However, if we only praise the increase of consumer information 
and interactive engagement as such, we ignore that much of the informa-
tion that consumers produce on and retrieve from the net is created in 
a highly commercialised environment. In the German speaking virtual 
realm, for instance, information on products and services provided by 
commercial portals like www.dooyoo.de; www.ciao.de; www.yopi.de 
which provide customer ratings and opinions are far from being favour-
able net contexts for enhancing consumer netizenship and online political 
discourse on consumption. On these portals users comment on goods 
and services that they have already bought. Thus it is unlikely that they 
will refl ect on issues of production and labour conditions or environment 
protection implications afterwards (Bieber & Lamla 2005). Apart from 
that the commercial context of these web-portals consists of price ratings 
and online shops with virtual shopping baskets and thus discourages 
the political activation of users. Even in terms of generating trustworthy 
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consumer opinions there is often no overall operative control that could 
guarantee the trustworthiness of postings. How can users be sure that 
these portals are not misused by retailers who negatively criticise offers 
of competitors and recommend their own goods and services?
Consumer protection is another important element of consumer 
empowerment. According to the neo-corporatist structure of consumer 
protection in Germany, it is mainly provided by independent state 
funded organisations like for instance the Bundesverband der Ver-
braucherzentralen (vzbw). Websites are mainly top-down information 
sites and offer little chances for political participation. There are some 
changes ongoing due to the general transformation of the state from 
an authoritatively organised state to a cooperative and or activating 
state. In more recent times, ideas of sustainable consumption have even 
had an infl uence on the consumer policy of state funded consumer 
organisation as well as in ministerial PR. The German government 
for instance has launched campaigns under the slogan “Echt gerecht 
–clever kaufen” (really fair – buy cleverly) and “fair feels good” (Kneip 
& Niesyto 2007). Like the websites of state-funded consumer organi-
sations the empowerment of consumer agency through government 
websites is primarily based on one-way-communication and pseudo 
participation: Multiple-choice-tests are offered to refl ect one’s own 
consumer behaviour, or an online library provides information on con-
sumer issues. Much of this information from consumer organisations 
and government sites is directed at journalists, politicians or academics 
and not at individual consumers (Bieber & Lamla 2005).
THE NETIZEN CONSUMER 
– POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT OF CONSUMERS ON THE NET 
In a commercialised media culture most mass media are dependent 
on advertising revenues and thus reluctant to support criticism against 
their fi nancial supporters. As they are often part of transnational 
corporations they cannot be expected to be particularly objective in 
reporting on anti-corporate criticism. Internet and direct street action 
thus is still much more powerful in providing the arena for anti-cor-
porate protest. The asymmetry between consumers and vendors is 
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not simply reversed by the plethora of information that consumers 
produce on and retrieve from the net. Given the seemingly endless 
stream of information on the net, independent fi lters and sources of 
trustworthiness are needed in order to enable consumers to use this 
information for a political empowerment of consumer agency. Inde-
pendent and trustworthy agencies of evaluation, interpretation and 
complexity reduction are indispensable. So far, civil society actors, like 
most non-governmental organisations and action networks are the 
only collective actors represented on the net that have the resources 
and competences to fulfi l these functions. In that respect the often 
mentioned individualisation of political protest and the identifi cation 
of the Global Justice Movement with direct activist networks ignores 
the great relevance of non-governmental organisations in the politi-
cal consumerism movement, be it as single organisational actors or 
as part of more or less extended action networks. Even if they are not 
always generating fi rst-hand knowledge on companies, their product 
histories and qualities, they function as major gatekeepers of critical 
opinion formation for the ethical consumer citizens.7 
Campaign websites often give extensive background facts on com-
pany policies as well as numerous links for further information requests. 
While objective reports on norm violation of private companies are 
limited by the indirect or sometimes even direct infl uence of private 
business on commercial media, net-based information resources have 
the chance to challenge brand images by highlighting the dark side of 
production and consumption. NGO and campaign websites serve as 
documentation centres and archives providing alternative information 
for journalists, multipliers, teachers as well as activists and individual 
consumers (c.f. Mosca in this volume). Usually they function as pull 
media; information has to be searched for and asked for, but sub-
scribers are also informed on a more regular basis by newsletters and 
mailing lists (c.f. Gillan and Lehtonen in this volume).By providing 
critical information on corporate production and PR practices these 
7.  The most relevant websites of political consumerist NGOs and NGO-networks 
are for instance: www.corpwatch.org; www.sweatshopwatch.org; www.globalwit-
ness.org; www.prwatch.org; www.endgame.org; www.multinationalmonitor.org; 
www.ethicalconsumer.org; www.oeko.investvest.com; www.transnationale.org; 
www.maketradefair.com.
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websites fulfi l – apart from the task of simple information – a signifi -
cant watchdog and orientation function. They monitor the activities 
of corporations and interpret the information provided according to 
their overall mission statements. By structuring information in top 
news and background news as well as in news on certain branches of 
industry or on certain moral issues or particular corporate activities 
they present signifi cant cognitive maps that help users to avoid infor-
mation overload and cognitive disorientation.
Apart from that, anti-corporate websites display many similarities 
with their commercial counterparts: Appealing to the growing demand 
for entertainment and distraction they not only offer serious news on 
scandalised companies, they also attract users’ attention through en-
tertaining elements like quizzes and comics strips and similar devices. 
In terms of service provision, they offer advice for supporters of their 
moral claims like instructions on how to organise a local picket line, 
a street theatre performance and other campaigning strategies. Above 
all, they complement their moral and strategic advice with anti-cor-
porate goods; selling books, posters, CDs and other merchandising 
that would support their resource mobilisation.
Providing alternative information is indispensable for the politi-
cal empowerment of consumers and also a crucial function of social 
movements. However, there are several other functions that have to be 
fulfi lled by NGOs in order to promote successful campaigns against 
scandalised corporations and in order to develop and sustain a social 
movement of critical consumers. Christian Lahusen has pointed out 
several functions (Lahusen 1996) as structurally essential for successful 
transnational campaigns. These functions can be taken as reference 
points for an evaluation of the potential as well as the realisation of 
the potential of the internet for political consumerism as a social 
movement, as this movement hardly exists apart from a series of 
transnational campaigns against the norm violations of corporations 
and branches of corporations. 
The functions that have to be fulfi lled by successful movement 
organisations are:
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1. The development of organised action programmes based on 
the strategic planning of interaction between confl ict actors and 
the coordination of collective action. 
2. Focusing public attention on selected issues and generating public 
pressure through moralisation and protest dramatisation oriented 
towards the news factors of mass media news production. 
3. The generation and stabilisation of action networks through re-
source mobilisation, means of political participation, and the 
mobilisation of collective identities among supporters. 
4. Vertical integration, i.e. the coordination and linkage of diverse 
spatial dimensions of action through the integration of local, 
regional, national and global actors and arenas. 
5. Horizontal integration of polycentric networks, i.e. cooperation 
with actors in diverse social subsystems like mass media, politics, 
economics and science.
As much research is still needed to give empirically valid evidence on 
the role of ICTs concerning these different functions, only some of the 
problems connected with the contributions of internet communica-
tion to these functions are highlighted. Much literature on new ICTs 
and protest politics focuses on the quality of political participation in 
net based social movements and on the character of protest networks, 
especially the geographical scope of networks as well as the quality of 
ties connecting members of networks. The normative reference point 
of evaluating the impact of digital communication on political par-
ticipation and network structures is usually a Habermasian notion of 
participative or deliberative democracy (Bohman 2004). The relevance 
of these normative perspectives not disputed, in the following, atten-
tion is focussed on a less normative and more functionalist frame of 
evaluation. By discussing the potential contribution of the internet 
for the above mentioned functional requirements of successful tran-
snational protest campaigns, the particular tension between a mass 
media-related campaign logic and a network logic that results from the 
network structure of protest organisations and their aim to enhance 
political participation of campaign supporters is highlighted. This 
tension characterises all protest campaigns launched and supported 
by civil society actors. On the one hand, civil society actors want to 
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attract a wide public awareness which is usually only realised through 
mass media attention and they aspire to put pressure on powerful 
corporations and/or governmental actors. On the other hand, they 
want to incorporate many citizens in collective action and organise 
their actions according to egalitarian and democratic norms as they 
are characteristic of the self-defi nition of civil society actors. While 
the internet, it is argued, supports the network logic by facilitating a 
more decentralised, egalitarian and direct participation, the success 
of political consumerist collective action also depends on a campaign 
logic that requires a more centralist approach to politics, aiming at a 
mass media audience based on the mobilising power of large, profes-
sionalised and well known protest actors.      
As far as the fi rst function is concerned, the development of or-
ganised action programmes based on strategic planning of interaction 
between confl ict actors and the coordination of collective action, it 
is obvious that it asks for a rather centralist attitude towards protest 
action. The net is helpful as intranet and email communication reduce 
the transaction costs of campaign organisers: communication is cheap, 
fast and collective action can be organised by a top-down circulation 
of dates, places and modes of collective protest action. Protest actors 
can strategically use accelerated communication processes to improve 
confl ict dramatisation and put attacked adversaries under pressure. 
Opponents of anti-corporate protest are usually powerful corpora-
tions. In order to place them in a defensive position and outmanoeuvre 
their PR machines, protest action has to be planned secretly and not 
talked about in net forums and mailing lists that are already part of the 
everyday observation procedure of large companies.8 Companies are 
learning quickly and adapt to changes of collective action repertoires. 
8. In Germany, an often cited example of the power of the net as a tactic weapon is 
the blockade of the Lufthansa website organised by the Deportation-Class-Cam-
paign, the “Tag für den Kranich” (the Day for the Crane”) which was launched by 
a network called “Kein Mensch ist illegal” (No Human Being is illegal) consisting 
of antiracist groups and the prisoners help organisation Libertad in order to raise 
public attention on the contribution of airlines to the inhuman treatment of asylum 
seekers. The action was successful in so far as it was supported by 150 organisations, 
unions and NGOs. 13.000 participants partially blockaded the possibility of ordering 
Lufthansa fl ights on the net for two hours during the shareholder assembly on 20 
June, 2001. However, due to the fact that the action plan was known by Lufthansa 
beforehand it was able to take preventive action to limit the damage. 
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Many of them already have dark websites in their virtual drawers in 
order to be able to respond immediately to any anti-corporate attack by 
giving counter-information. As confl ict opponents become ever more 
professional in monitoring all kinds of net communication in order 
to anticipate criticism and political consumerism action, successful 
protest campaigning can hardly afford to fully use the participative 
potential of the net and discuss action plans among a wide range of 
participants. Thus, despite the fact that the net structurally enables a 
more egalitarian approach to action planning, the necessity of success-
ful campaigning limits the realisation of this potential.
The second function mentioned, the focusing of public attention 
on selected issues and generating public pressure through moralisation 
and protest dramatisation oriented towards the news factors of mass 
media news production, is running against the more decentralised and 
egalitarian network logic of the internet. Although it has to be noted 
that independent media platforms like Indymedia as well as websites 
of known anti-corporate advocacy networks or single NGOs have 
become relevant sources of information for journalists, they usually 
only shift into focus after an action network has successfully gained 
mass media attention due to direct action in the physical realm of 
high streets and shopping centres. An analysis of a more recent and 
still running campaign against the discounter Lidl in Germany il-
lustrates the diffi culties for large heterogeneous action networks to 
communicate their diverse messages to a mass media operating on 
the selective fi lters of news factors, most of all by the need to provide 
strong visuals. The discounter Lidl is scandalised on the one hand by 
the German services union ver.di, on the other hand by the action 
network Attac Germany, WEED, the farmers’ organisation Arbeits-
gemeinschaft bäuerliche Landwirtschaft, e.V., BanaFair, a fair trade 
campaign, and Aktion Selbstbesteuerung e.V., an organisation for 
self-taxation. When it comes to gaining mass media attention, this 
diverse coalition of union, global justice actors, environmentalists 
and farmers is highly asymmetrical in its media representation. After 
one year of protest campaigning, campaigners from Attac admit in 
an internal evaluation that they had great diffi culties in getting their 
messages across to the mass media. Journalists widely reported on 
the dismal working conditions scandalised by the services union, but 
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hardly mentioned the global social and environmental issues added by 
the advocacy action network to the frame propagated by the unions. 
Although the internet facilitates cooperation among a wide range of 
network organisations, successful framing still demands an internal 
power structure, a hierarchy that allows for mass media concentration 
on one or only a few protest representatives and messages (Baringhorst 
& Kneip & Niesyto 2007).9 
However, gaining mass media attention in order to put ruthless 
and unethical companies in the public pillory is not the only strate-
gic intention of political consumerist campaigns. They do not only 
publicise political criticism of scandalised companies, but often aim at 
forcing managers to enter a dialogue with consumer groups on their 
production or distribution practices (Mark-Ungericht 2003). To what 
extent the internet helps to develop this more discursive approach to 
political protest is still unclear. Campaign organisers can pressurise 
company representatives and force them to react by simply spread-
ing critical background information on environmental production 
risks or poor working conditions on the net, on campaign websites 
or on weblogs and by encouraging campaign supporters to spread 
critical facts on chats, forums, weblogs or by writing protest emails 
to the company. In all these forms of action, internet and email can 
be extremely helpful. While mass media communication tends to 
strengthen binary moral coding and thus encourages either boycotts 
or buycotts, more discursive forms of confl ict interaction are very dif-
fi cult to communicate via television or even print media. Due to the 
opportunity to convey long and differentiated reports and comments 
on the net it enables netizens to develop more dialogue oriented forms 
of interaction. However, when it comes to direct communication with 
the scandalised company, face-to-face communication still seems to 
be essential in order to create the basis of trust necessary for a fruitful 
dialogue. 
While the fi rst two functional requirements of successful cam-
paigning speak in favour of a more hierarchical and professional cam-
9. A similar tension between network structure and mass media requirements char-
acterises the current controversy in the World Social Forum movement, which 
has resisted the demand from mass media to speak with only one voice instead 
of many voices down to the present day. (Civil Society Yearbook 2005.) 
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paign organisation the third, fourth, and sixth function ask for a 
more participatory protest culture that could greatly benefi t from 
internet and email. Although technically, political participation could 
be more easily facilitated by using the internet, not all civil society 
organisations and action networks make use of this new participatory 
means in the same way. Mario Diani suggested a useful distinction 
concerning resource mobilisation strategies between organisations or 
– we could add – action networks that rely on “professional resources” 
and those that rely more on “participatory resources” (Diani 2001, 
122f.). Organisations with a strong grassroots-orientation are usually 
organised less hierarchically and thus, could benefi t more from dig-
ital communication technology to improve internal communication 
and participation. Organisations that are – like Greenpeace – more 
hierarchically structured and that ask little more from its members 
than membership fees and donations are less likely to discuss action 
programmes with members. 
On the campaign websites analysed in a research project funded 
by the German Research Foundation (DFG)10 many protest actors 
provide a plethora of means of participation. Activism is promoted 
by providing campaign kits, online handbooks and activism guides, 
and daily updates on events. Consumer netizens are encouraged to 
download information, to sample fl iers, to subscribe to newsletters, to 
sign standardised electronic petitions or to write standardised protest 
emails. While all these forms of action reproduce a rather asymmetrical 
relationship between campaign organisers and supporters there are also 
various modes of participation that contribute to a more symmetrical 
structure of protest action. In that respect, individual contributions to 
consumer guides and to databases on goods, services and companies are 
interesting means of strengthening the active participation of support-
ers. The German branch of Greenpeace has, for instance, established 
an “EinkaufsNetz” (shopping net) where users were invited to register 
as “Gendetektiv” (gene detectives), market activists or cyberactivists. 
German foodwatch offers a similar chance to build up consumer 
agency by asking users to guard and patrol shelves in supermarkets 
and report their fi ndings to the organisation under Regalpatrouille@
10. For more information on the research project see www.protest-cultures.uni-siegen.
de
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foodwatch.de. Cyberactivists within political consumerism are not 
necessarily only market activists.11
As net communication has become more and more visual, political 
consumerist campaigns also increasingly make use of digital photos 
documenting the operations of companies as well as protest actions. 
The extensive documentation of mass media resonance on campaign 
websites serves a signifi cant motivational function, indicating to users 
the growing relevance of the moral issue they are supporting as well as 
giving credibility and attributing capability to campaign organisers. 
Visual or even audio-visual documentation plays a signifi cant role in 
the rather diffi cult process of collective identity formation in the move-
ment. The more campaigns become permanent and institutionalised, 
the more they rely on the continuous support of protest actors, and 
thus the more they need at least some sort of emotional bonding or 
collective identity among supporters. Within political consumerism, 
these bonds are constantly reproduced by the dramatisation of the 
moral failings of the companies accused and by focussing symbolic 
protest action on parodying and deconstructing the corporate brand. 
Thus the identity of campaign supporters signifi cantly relies on the 
reputation of the scandalised opponent. An analysis of German-speak-
ing anti-corporate campaign websites shows that nearly all campaigns 
use some sort of culture jamming as part of their symbolic politics. 
They also frequently offer local support groups the opportunity to il-
lustrate local activities by uploading digital photos and videos to the 
net. These visual documentations of picket lines in front of shops or 
other more spectacular local events function as crucial links between the 
virtual and physical sphere of consumerist campaigns. As mentioned 
above, discursive participation on the net is usually rather limited and 
11. Often, crucial information on norm violations of companies is revealed by cur-
rent or former employees. In particular, this rather vulnerable group of labour 
activists is encouraged by the anonymity of the net to leak company secrets, like 
for instance, the threat of plant closures, controversial foreign investments, or 
environmental production risks. An illustrative example of this labour based 
anti-corporate criticism by company employees on the net is the website of Alli-
ance@IBM, the offi cial national site for the IBM Employees’ Union CWA Local 
1701, AFL-CIO http://www.allianceibm.org/ . Furthermore, campaigns against 
poor labour conditions in discounters like Lidl often draw their information from 




consumer netizens’ activities are mainly reduced to standardised virtual 
protest actions like writing emails and signing electronic petitions and 
to contributing to consumer guides and background information; more 
radical forms like hacking or blocking websites are rather rare excep-
tions in the repertoire of consumerist campaigns. Being encouraged 
to visually document local protest action does not make up for this 
lack of dialogue on aims and overall strategies of campaigns; however, 
it gives local supporters a feeling of signifi cance: as has been pointed 
out in the beginning, political consumerism is more media than mar-
ket-related today because political activists who are willing to spend 
much of their spare-time marching in the street and organising local 
events have become rare. On many photos we only see three or four 
activists bravely holding banners in front of entrance doors to local 
retailers and branches of scandalised corporations which could indicate 
that maybe there are only a few supporters in each town. However, 
the impression that a whole gallery of digital action photos creates is 
very different and seems to tell a “we are many” story, showing a great 
number of activists spreading campaign messages over many different 
places. Another element of identity building is the formation of sup-
port campaigns in libel cases, as the success of the often quoted McS-
potlight website illustrates (http://www.mcspotlight.org). Although, 
US-based anti-corporate campaigns often focus their mobilisation on 
lawsuits that often attract a lot of mass media attention, it seems that 
European and particularly German companies have learned from US 
experiences and try to avoid lawsuits even if they would have the legal 
system on their side.
The net facilitates networking of a more decentralised kind than 
the practise of national or transnational advocacy networks. The fact 
that the large majority of campaigns are organised by advocacy net-
works gives evidence of the still dominant role of NGOs in consumerist 
campaigns compared to more direct activist network mobilisation. 
In that respect, the often quoted success of Peretti’s individualist and 
direct network approach shows the potential of net communication; 
however, it seems to represent the exception to the rule. Mass me-
dia attention can be acquired through the linkage of the individual 
micro- to the macro-media of national press and TV corporations. 
Nevertheless, NGOs and their professionalised knowledge on the 
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dramatisation of street action as well as on meso-media management 
often provide the crucial link between individual net media use and 
mass media attention. 
SUMMARISING
Literature on the political potential of the net tends to exaggerate its 
capability of transforming the political culture of representative democ-
racies in terms of strengthening responsive and interactive modes of 
political participation. Great hopes to democratise political and social 
systems through technological changes have meanwhile turned into 
sobering experiences. Like the netizen in general, the netizen consumer 
can benefi t from the net when it comes to gathering and spreading 
information and collaborating with other netizens. However, the active, 
interactive side of internet use is still underdeveloped, at least as far as 
the evidence of German anti-corporate campaigns is concerned. Thus 
consumerist action campaigns run the risk of being merely activism 
and event politics: individual acts of consumption need deliberative 
practices in order to legitimate consumption preferences and thus to 
contribute to a strengthening of civil society.
Mainly due to the still prevailing contradiction between the net-
work and the campaign logic of protest mobilisation, the asymmetry 
between organisations and individual supporters has not been sig-
nifi cantly diminished in political consumerism since the introduction 
of new ICTs: the individual activities of netizen consumers are still 
mostly steered by organisational centres (Bieber & Lamla 2005, 70) 
of advocacy networks. Thus the example of Jonah Peretti serves more 
as a kind of cybermyth among academics and political activists than 
as a representative example of the majority of consumerist action 
mobilisations. 
A strength of current political consumerism lies in the diversity of 
action networks, as it allows individual and organisational collabora-
tion beyond sectional borders of new and old social movement actors 
as well as beyond spatial limitations. However, the heterogeneity also 
results in problems of visibility and political infl uence: the current 
debate within social forums is also applicable to consumer activist 
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networks (see debate in Civil Society Yearbook 2005/6). Who speaks 
for whom in political consumerism? What are the common goals or 
consumption models beyond “relaxed frames” of global social rights? 
These questions are not only strategically important. Giving preference 
to high profi le campaigning or horizontal networking and political 
participation of activists is also a crucial question of political legitimacy 
of political consumerism. NGO based campaigning draws political 
legitimacy most of all from the expertise, experience and credibility of 
NGOs as well as their accountability towards members and sponsors. 
Direct activism in horizontal networks has the advantage of a broader 
public participation (c.f. Häyhtiö & Rinne and Rättilä in this volume). 
However, it lacks any accountability towards a wider public. In both 
cases the question of representation, which is a crucial question of 
liberal democracy, remains unsolved. As this chapter has mainly fo-
cussed on the impact of new ICTs on consumer agency in general and 
political consumerism in particular the problem of political legitimacy 
can not be dealt with in depth here. However, looking for the answer 
along the described tension between high profi le campaigning and 
horizontal networking seems to be a fruitful analytical perspective 
for future research.  
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TAPIO HÄYHTIÖ & JARMO RINNE1
Temporal dimensions of refl exive Net-politics: 
Politicking on the Internet with monsters 
INTRODUCTION
 
Our interest is to study emerging individualising political participa-
tion and activity on the Internet by analysing Finnish Net-protest 
campaigning mobilised against gossip journalism in May 2006. We 
contend that the case provides useful insights into the dynamics, pat-
terns of change and the variety of political activity taking place on the 
Internet. Methodologically, we combine case material with research 
literature to build a theoretical framework in which individualising 
citizen initiated net-politics can be analysed. At fi rst we set the case 
study in the context of refl exive politics (for the defi nition, see Intro-
duction in this volume) that illustrates confl icts arising from clashes of 
different subjective values, lifestyles and attitudes. As we understand 
refl exive politics, it refers both to the politicisation of private worries 
and issue-specifi c questions and to political judgement, and to out-
comes resulting in action. Therefore the term refl exive politics provides 
an explanation of intuitively and instinctually emerging modes of 
politics that unfold in more an organised form of action in the subjec-
tive process of political judgement. Secondly, we focus attention on 
the motivation of the protest refracted through the lens of a political 
consumerism perspective that is a form of refl exive politics. Thirdly, 
we address the contention that a central form of participation, acting 
and infl uencing on refl exive politics is publicness, which helps citizens 
1.  Both authors have contributed equally to this chapter
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get political issues close to their hearts, and to enter a more general 
consciousness. The Internet is reviewed as a space of micro-public 
spheres, through which self-made publicness has become a vital part 
for both media- and political reality. 
From the standpoint of refl exive politics, we also show how the 
Internet features temporal fl ow. To identify the Internet-based changes 
in temporality, we stress that temporal relations of past, present and 
future are the key elements in making (political) action possible. How-
ever, in a computerised environment the passing of objective time is 
replaced by the experience of subjective time, which extends and crosses 
traditional boundaries related to space and time. As a consequence, 
on cyberspace new types of we-relations and shared meaning contexts 
can be constructed; and in differentiated now-moments various types 
of activities may take place. Thus, asymmetric and asynchronous 
cyber time has an impact on the features of political net-activity that 
is characteristically more changeable, surprising and innovative than 
traditional “real world” politics. Our research case gives us an oppor-
tunity to study how a fragmented, complex, multi-spatial environment 
transforms the repertoire and forms of citizen-oriented politics into 
more individualised ones. It is setting the scene for the emergence of 
a new type of political presence, subjectivity and interactivity.
LORDI-PROTEST AS A PHENOMENON OF REFLEXIVE POLITICS 
Our research case as a phenomenon of refl exive politics resulted from 
a peculiar chain of events, in which we witnessed the political protest 
that exceptionally related to the Eurovision song contest.2 Hard-rock 
band Lordi became a topic of debate, when it won Finland’s Eurovi-
sion televote selection in March 2006. It elicited a lot of conservative 
commentaries in various media. Overall, Lordi’s selection was consid-
ered a sacrilege and the band was accused of Satanism. When Lordi 
performed with their monster costumes in the fi nal of the Eurovision 
2. The Eurovision song contest is a camp-spirited television spectacle, though it 
features some political aspects. For instance, the contest has been part of a Finn-
ish identity-building project since the 1960’s. The Eurovision song contest has 
also raised strong patriotic emotions in other geographical “border states”. (Pajala 
2006). 
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song contest on May 20th and gained an overwhelming victory, the 
Lordi-discussion went in totally new directions. After the contest, the 
leader of the band, Mr. Lordi, made a strong appeal to the media to 
not publish unmasked photos of the band members. However, they 
were published within a few days in the European media. 
In Finland, after Eurovision, daily newspaper Aamulehti was the 
fi rst to publish Lordi’s photo without monster make-up on May 23rd 
(see photo 1). The photo was attached to an article that discussed un-
masked Lordi-pictures published abroad. Next in Finland on 24th May, 
7 päivää (7 Days)–gossip magazine, produced by the Aller Publishing 
Company, printed the unmasked photo of Tomi Putansuu (Mr. Lordi) 
on the cover. On the same day, daily newspaper Hämeen Sanomat 
attached unmasked pictures to a Lordi-article. Furthermore, on 26th 
May Katso! (Look!) -gossip magazine, also by the Aller Company, 
printed the unmasked photos of the rest of the band. (Häyhtiö & 
Rinne 2007a, Wikipedia: Lordi.) In the following analysis we refer to 
the gossip magazines 7 Days and Look! with English translations. The 
Finnish print media, in publishing the unmasked photos of national 
hero Lordi, caused a refl exive shock reaction among citizens, who were 
swept up in a surge of emotion stemming from the Eurovision song 
contest victory. People went on the Internet to express their feelings of 
Photo 1. Tomi Putansuu on the cover of the German 
Bild-magazine on May 22, 2006. Aamulehti (the second 
largest newspaper in Finland) published the photo.
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disappointment and anger. Suddenly the Lordi-photos were the subject 
of thousands of raging net-discussions. The online-discussions caused 
a web-protest emerging from micro-publics and targeting the press. 
(Digitoday 24.5.2006; Häyhtiö & Rinne 2007a.) The protest ranged 
from swarming3 to an individualised collective network employing 
creative styles of resistance (cf. Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001, 12-13). 
The Lordi-campaign was very intensive in many respects although it 
lasted only a few days at the end of May 2006.
In the Lordi-case, Boycott 7 Days–magazine –petition caused the 
most massive swarming on the Net. The aim of the net-petition was 
to raise to the level of public discussion what the boundaries of good 
journalism are in respect of personal privacy. (Boycott 7 Days- maga-
zine.) A covering letter for the petition of Boycott 7 Days-magazine 
published on a website served as a manifesto of the Lordi-campaign:
… [D]espite several appeals from Tomi Putaansuu (Mr Lordi) the 
magazine published a photo of him without a mask. Such behaviour 
shows bad judgement on behalf of the magazine, and also a lack of 
respect toward people’s right for privacy. My greatest hope is, that 
by this petition we would be able to make the media think of the 
boundaries of good journalistic writing. Even though we have free-
dom of speech in Finland (most of the time I’m glad for it), we have 
got to draw a line.
To respect another person is a basic virtue. This article and the show-
ing of a photograph was the decisive act from a magazine that I have 
always detested. Say no to this kind of news- and money-making.
By this petition I want to bring out, that everything is not acceptable 
in the actions of the media. May this petition help all those who want 
to maintain their right to privacy to some extent. Revelations could 
also be made within the boundaries of good taste.
(Boycott 7 Days-magazine. Translated from Finnish.)
3. Arquilla & Ronfeldt (2001, 12) defi ne that “[s]warming occurs when the dispersed 
units of a network of small (and perhaps some large) forces converge on a target from 
multiple directions. The overall aim is sustainable pulsing – swarm networks must 
be able to coalesce rapidly and stealthily on a target, then dissever and redisperse, im-
mediately ready to recombine for a new pulse.”
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The number of signatures makes the petition the most important source 
of the protest rally. It gathered as many as 222 000 signatures in a few 
days.4 Due to the enormous number of signatures, it was suspected 
that they would have been forgeries, but most of the signatures were 
later proved to be genuine (Helsingin Sanomat 10.6.2006). 
In turn, Boycott Seven-site pleads for both subscribers of 7 Days 
and other readers of Aller Magazines to cancel their orders. The site 
offered links to cancellation of Aller magazine subscriptions. It also 
served as unoffi cial news agency of the protest by collecting “protest-
news” from different media sources. In addition, the site encouraged 
people to give feedback via links to Seven’s online-discussion forum, 
editorial e-mail petition and web-feedback form. There were also links 
to the personal contact information of editorial staff, a template on 
how to refuse direct marketing of Aller Magazines and the Turn the 
Seven Upside Down-site.
Before the Eurovision song contest, Votelordi.org exhorted Eu-
ropean rock fans to vote Lordi to victory. After the contest the site 
mobilised a culture jamming5 style of campaign, Turn the Seven Upside 
Down, which was changed to Turn the Allers Upside Down, after Look! 
published the picture. In addition to asking citizens to turn over maga-
zines in their selling stands, it also invited them to send photos of their 
activity in the campaign to Yahoo!’s Flickr site, which offers free space 
for photo sharing. (Votelordi.org .) 153 photos were submitted by the 
end of May in the votelordi’s photo folder (Flickr-votelordi’s photos). 
The campaign turned out to be successful in launching a snowball-
effect and “Lordi-copies” were turned upside down in almost every 
supermarket, store and kiosk.    
Culture jamming also became concrete on the sites of 7 Days and 
Look!, which were targeted by the virtual sit-ins, or in other words 
distributed denial of service attacks (IT-viikko 25.5.2006 ). Magazines 
had several server disruptions during the few days after the photo re-
leases (IT-viikko 26.5.2006). The swarming multitude assembled on 
4. The number of signatures is remarkable, when compared to the population of 
Finland (5, 3 million).
5. Wikipedia defi nes that “[t]he aim of culture jamming is to create a contrast between 
corporate or mass media images and the realities or perceived negative side of the 
corporation or media.” (Wikipedia: Culture Jamming).
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the sites of the magazines. Both constant page clicking/reloading and 
fi lling the discussion forums and feedback forms blockaded sites’ user 
interfaces. For instance, the discussion forum of 7 Days, was fl ooded 
with about 2000 individual messages on 24th May. The next day, the 
site webmasters made an announcement that forbade both sending 
messages provoking denial of service attacks and fi lling the forum 
with repeated inappropriate messages. The announcement threatened 
people with IP address tracking and legal acts if they could not follow 
the new rules. (Digitoday 24.5.2006b.)
The editorial staff of 7 Days and advertisers of the magazine were 
also targeted by activists. The magazine had to remove staff ’s contact 
information from their site because of the jamming of e-mail-inboxes 
(MikroPc.net 26.5.2006). However, a Lordi-activist managed to save 
the extracted contact information to another site, after which it was 
linked to the Boycott Seven-site. In addition, activists e-mailed ad-
vertisers demanding them to immediately cancel their advertising 
campaigns with the magazine. As a consequence 7 Days announced 
their intention of considering legal action against their ”stalkers”, who, 
according to the magazine, disrupted private business in illegal ways. 
(Digitoday 31.5.2006; ibid. 30.5.2006a.) 
On the subjective level the Lordi-campaign highlights the process 
of refl exive virtual politicisation that starts from the moment of self-
understanding. An individual realises and constructs a particular type 
of consistent identity where authenticity and autonomy are elements 
of the integrity (see Heller & Fehér 1988, 42). For many people the 
victorious hard-rock band stood as a symbol of overcoming obstacles, 
and hence it was linked to their own personal identity-building process 
and to strengthening self-esteem (see Häyhtiö & Rinne 2007b, 348). 
Other like-minded individuals can easily be found on the Internet, and 
thus the formation of networks is straightforward and easy (Gurak & 
Logie 2003, 44-45). The birth of political groups within the Internet is 
contingent and random, but as an instrument it contains an enormous 
potential for any political movement or actionist network by offer-
ing the sense of belonging to people from different parts of the globe 
(cf. Diani 2000, 397). This particular potentiality of the Net should 
not be overlooked, because according to infl uential social movements 
studies (Melucci & Avritzer 2000, 509) the principle of belonging is 
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an essential part in the formation of any social or political movement, 
network, or group.
MOTIVATIONAL DRIVES BEHIND THE NET-CAMPAIGN 
Even though the intensive Lordi-protest lasted only for few days, it 
also led to concrete results. Many of the magazine’s advertisers6 recalled 
ads because of fl oods of e-mails demanding them to discontinue 
advertising. Companies feared that negative publicity would affect 
their business. (Digitoday 26.5.2006b; 26.5.2006c; 31.5.2006; IT-vi-
ikko 26.5.2006b.) In the online-discussions a common topic was the 
cancellation of subscriptions to Seven Days. However, a chief editor 
denied in her notice to commercial partners that the circulation of the 
magazine would be in decline (Digitoday 30.5.2006). On the basis 
of civic reaction it seems clear that sales of the “Lordi-edition” were 
low. It is also known that copies were pulled out in some stores due to 
customer demand (Wikipedia: 7 päivää). Under public pressure both 
Aller-magazines, Seven Days and Look!, had to apologise for publishing 
Lordi-photos and promised not to release any unmasked photos of the 
band members without permission (IT-viikko 26.5.2006a). The protest 
movement succeeded in incurring expense and weakening the brand 
image of Seven Days to such an extent that the magazine wants to forget 
the whole episode. It has removed Lordi-discussions and the apology 
of the chief editor from its web-site. (Katajamäki 2006, 87.) 
Networking activity offers an ideal form for refl exive do-it-your-
self-politicking. People as individuals may express their own ideas, 
gather support for their own interests and deal with their own worries 
and concerns. (Bennett 2004, 144-145; cf. Lappalainen; Baringhorst 
and Rättilä in this volume.) In the Lordi-case individuals made their 
own choices to act on the Net by signing a petition, jamming web-
sites, pressuring journalists and advertisers etc., although they did not 
personally know each other. Michele Micheletti captures this form 
of citizen engagement with the concept of individualized collective 
6.  Travellink (a net travel agency), Olvi (a beverage manufacturer) and Dressman (a 
clothing retail chain) suspended advertising campaigns. Further, Altia (a beverage 
manufacturer) did not renew its advertising contract. 
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action that characterises different forms of political consumerism. 
According to Micheletti, the market is an arena for citizen-consum-
ers, where they may act individually or in groups. Personal concerns, 
responsibility-taking and subjective choices motivate the projects of 
political consumerism, in which an individual makes some choices; 
and when others make similar choices based on autonomous, subjective 
judgements, this activity will bring about more far-reaching effects. A 
precondition of the accumulation of consumerist confl icts is various 
public spheres, which enable the emergence of loose networks around 
politicised issues. (Micheletti 2003, 14-36.) 
The creative Lordi-campaign demonstrates that ad hoc-publics 
on the Net may be crucial for the politicisation of everyday-problems 
related to consumption. The Net as a tool provides both the spaces 
and means to publish the political micro-processes, that is to bring 
out topics that are personally (subjectively) felt to be important and 
worth promoting. The net also enables horizontal communication 
and allows people to take on the role of political agents pursuing a 
self-chosen political agenda on these open and free spaces (Häyhtiö 
& Rinne 2007b, 338). The Lordi-case features an outburst of more 
carnivalistic modes and forms of net-politics. It presents an alternative, 
pluralistic many-voiced approach in an attempt to unify the actors who 
come from different backgrounds (cf. Osterweil 2004, 504).
The Lordi-swarming could be understood as political consumer-
ism in a broad sense (see the Introduction in this volume; cf. Baring-
horst in this volume). Practising critical judgment - “[t]his article and 
the showing of a photograph was the decisive act from a magazine that I 
have always detested. Say no to this kind of news- and money-making” 
- citizen-consumers politicised the purchase of gossip magazines and 
the publishing practices of commercialised journalism on the micro-
public spheres of the Internet. In general, political consumerism has 
become more salient on the Internet’s public spheres, because indi-
vidualised citizen politics and engagement with politics have become 
easier (Garrett 2006, 206; Bennett 2006, 105-107; Baringhorst 2005; 
Micheletti 2003, 23; Scammell 2000, 354-355) and traditional mass 
media may also be giving more attention to the net-public spheres 
(Bennett 2006, 111-112, 118-120; see also Häyhtiö & Rinne 2007a, 
134). The individual self-expression, belonging to networks and build-
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ing ties in virtual micro-places enable people to transcend the normal 
limits and constraints of politics (physical, time, place and material 
resources) beyond the boundaries of any political system (Häyhtiö & 
Rinne 2006). 
The virtual civic meetings and acts related to the Lordi protest 
refl ect the individualisation of political participation and action emerg-
ing outside the formal organisations/institutions. Collective experience 
belonging to a networked group emerges when something is conducted 
together. Even signing a net petition is enough to constitute such an 
experience. A collectivity - and empowered multitude – arises due to 
action, and manifests itself in the representation of activity (McDonald 
2006, 212-213).  
VIRTUAL CO-PRESENCE AND TEMPORAL FLOW ON THE NET
The Finnish Lordi-movement shows how issue-specifi c episodes can 
politicise in the mediascape. In previously mentioned net-meetings, or 
discursive jam-sessions, Lordi-citizens opened up an arena, in which 
they rather soon realised they faced a shared problem, and they devel-
oped a free, horizontal, and open space for political action (cf. Garrett 
2006, 211; Osterweil 2004, 496). A thoroughly commercialised press 
was considered as a rude actor who in its greed for earning more profi ts 
leaves such questions as people’s right for privacy unattended. It is 
noteworthy that gossip magazines and the notorious Aller Publishing 
Company were attacked by Lordi-activists more intensively than daily 
newspapers, which managed to avoid the most passionate protest ac-
tions. The publication policy of 7 Days was the main subject on various 
Finnish online discussion forums after the release of the Lordi-photos. 
There were fl aming debates on justifi cations to publish the photos and 
the magazine’s self-interest in maximising economic profi ts. Online 
discussion forums also spread links and information on forms of action 
that were considered useful in protesting about the gossip magazines 
and the Aller Company. 
From the de-medialised point of view, the crossing of spheres 
can be facilitated by computer-mediated communication, enter-but-
ton or mouse-clicking. The public deliberations of the micro sphere 
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may even enter the macro-sphere by bringing about a”snowball-ef-
fect” which means the acceleration and accumulation of intensity of 
a controversial issue. Such a feature of the Internet has been taken 
advantage of in many politicised confl icts.7 The capability of political 
communication to permeate the levels of public spheres also brings 
forth the question of the communication tactics of refl exive politics 
(cf. Meikle 2002, 121). Computer-mediated communication enables 
the offering of information on a more individualised basis, exploiting 
time and opportunities and targeting special groups, which are vital 
to the forms of refl exive politics founding their activity on horizontal 
communication. The Lordi-case manifests in detail the strengthened 
power of narrowcasting in relation to broadcasting in today’s citizen-
oriented politics. Magazines were blamed for infringing subjective 
values and the personal right to privacy. The reason Seven Days was the 
main target of the campaign shows that for many people the magazine 
represented the most unpleasant features of gossip journalism (see 
Boycott 7 Days–magazine). 
The whole protest was initiated by citizens, and it proceeded 
self-refl exively through on-line forums from person to person, from 
below and horizontally. As an interactive media the Internet could 
challenge and on some occasions even replace the centralised (and 
sometimes controlled or else censored) mass media by offering in-
dependent alternative information about the world’s events (for this, 
see Paltemaa in this volume). As a channel of participation, action or 
mobilisation, it is going to have a huge impact on the content of the 
notion of political action (Häyhtiö & Rinne 2006).
As the Lordi-protest demonstrates, refl exive DIY-politicking has 
altered the notion of proper or relevant political activity (cf. Lappal-
ainen; Baringhorst and Rättilä in this volume). It has challenged the 
traditional (often named institutionalised) political understanding 
of how and where political activity and participation can emerge (an 
7.  Well known cases are among others the emergence of the local stuggle of the 
Zapatista-movement as the symbol of Internet resistance (Zapatistas Discussion 
Group) and the publication of the email exchange of Jonah Peretti (see Baringhorst 
in this volume) with the sports equipment manufacturer Nike. In the latter case 
an individual consumer brought embarrassment to a multinational company 
and set-up the company as a target of political criticism with the help of global 
publicness (My Nike Media Adventure)
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interesting example of this newly emerged politicisation and politicking 
is so called net-piratism, see Hintikka in this volume). It has dwindled 
the old distinction of a left-right-continuum and made it insignifi cant, 
as it has done to those dichotomies concerning private versus pub-
lic-debates. Individual subjective judgments are the corner-stones of 
refl exive politics, which means an almost infi nite growth of personal 
policymaking in which personal autonomy plays a crucial part. Thus, 
in some respects, it seems that personal is still political in general, but 
political is personal in particular. (Häyhtiö & Rinne 2006; Häyhtiö 
& Rinne 2007b.) Easy, fl exible, and informal access to de-medialised 
arenas for political involvement is what people are seeking nowadays. 
In individualised social reality - subjective values, life-style, attitudes, 
and motives are more and more steering the willingness and scope of 
political activity and especially the motives of participation. Anybody’s 
attempt to control one’s own life will turn into a political process, when 
the issue gains broader attention and resonates in a public group of 
likeminded people who are ready and eager to fi ght for their right to 
be (subjectively) right (ibid.; cf. Micheletti 2003, 22).
The most intensive phase of the Lordi-protest was at the end of 
May. In June the different forms of the protest quickly faded away. 
The last signature on the Boycott 7 Days-petition is dated May 28th 
when signature-collecting was discontinued. The “news” content of 
the Boycott Seven-site was released during the time period of May 
24th - 31st. The photos of Turn the Seven Upside Down/Turn the Allers 
Upside Down-campaign were not submitted anymore on the Flickr-
site in June. The online-forums of Finland24.fi  -site were the most 
active forums for the Lordi-protest with thousands of comments. The 
intensity of swarming was clearly distinguished from the discussions 
in March and June. The attached tables represent the proportion of 
messages sent to two discussion forums. The information originates 
from the public statistics of Finland24.fi , which registers the volume of 
discussion openings in the forums (Tables 1-2). One discussion open-
ing may include a myriad of responses. Both online-forums received 
thousands of messages in May 2006. It is confi rmed, that more than 10’ 
000 messages related to the boycott campaign and photo publications 
were sent to Finland24.fi  in less than two days between May 24th-25th 
2006 (Digitoday 26.5.2006a). 
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Individually steered collective meshing creates an actionist network 
and brings the element of subjectivity into politics On the Internet the 
temporal dimensions of past, present, and future may blur, because 
of the nature of the media. In the real world acting together requires 
co-presence, i.e. sharing the same space simultaneously in the company 
of others (Nowak & Biocca 2003, 482). The Internet dislocates space 
from temporality, and allows people to share the same virtual space 
without necessarily sharing a real-time co-presence (Zhao 2004, 97). 
That is to stay in certain places where their being there converges but 
their now diverges, as is the case in on-line campaigns and discussions. 
Computer mediated technology extends both spatial and temporal 
limits/boundaries of co-presence. On the Internet, there are no objec-
tive nows, the time is experienced subjectively. Access onto the Net to 
join the company of others is virtual, and the presence is mediated on 
the Net. The virtual social realms provide individuals with a chance 
to establish new kinds of we-relationships in a mutually shared virtual 
meaning context (ibid. 92). The co-presence might be temporally 
not-coincidental, i.e. happening objectively in different times. Blurred 
temporal boundaries make the political action on the Net more fl uid 
with respect to traditional political activity and fi ts better with the idea 
that there are no single dominant or objective cleavages causing the 
       Table 2. Finland24.fi ÆDiscussionÆMusicÆEurovision Song contest:
Year     Jan     Feb     March April     May      June     July  Aug     Sept     Oct  Nov      Dec
2006     93        35    1576  285     5062     108        30   23         13         6    
2005     43      250        16    16       705       11          3     5  3       10   31 5
2004     30        16        17    32       269         8        10     6  5         5     8        10
2002          15    43         96         6           
 
        (Suomi24.fi ÆKeskusteluÆMusiikkiÆLordiÆTietoja palstasta ([www-document]); 
        Suomi24.fi ÆKeskusteluÆMusiikkiÆEuroviisutÆTietoja palstasta ([www-document]).
Table 1. Finland24.fi  ÆDiscussion  ÆMusic  ÆLordi:
 
Year    Jan   Feb   March   April   May    June   July   Aug   Sept   Oct    Nov   Dec
2006                7065     725    60         37     45     13    
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Table 3*. Finland24.fi →Chat →Μusic→Lordi:25.5.2006 ≈ 10 pm.
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political confl icts. Rather politicking seems to refl ect on and correspond 
to individual life-styles and so it is an important constitutive element 
in building political identity (Melucci & Avritzer 2000, 518-519; cf. 
Bennett 2004, 127). 
The following samples from the popular on-line-chat forum 
Finland24.fi  show how the blurred temporal constraints were crossed 
and polyphonic discussions transformed into a discursive debate being 
political action per se. Addresses, replies, and remarks that constitute 
the discussion were not taken in the order of normal dialogue, rather 
they quite randomly preceded and followed each other, and still they 
somehow managed to mesh around the topic in a sensible manner.
The discussion was intensive and topics were coherent, even 
though the participants were not in the same spatial and temporal 
locus. It shows that the Internet as a tool, as well as a virtual space, 
allows collective action, in which each participant may join in different 
times and tune their actions in despite of their separate locations. 
The Internet as a virtual space radically alters the understanding 
of how time affects politics by stretching the understanding of the 
spatial and temporal co-location of two or more individuals (Zhao 
2004, 92, 96). Up to now, politics has been considered as an inter-
subjective social and collective activity which channels the interests 
of many and organises the pursuit of their own ends. The necessary 
premise for any joint activity by a multitude of people is simultaneous 
spatial- temporal co-presence (see ibid., 95; Zhao 2006). Actors must 
share the same space at the same time in order to show the power of 
the masses. Demonstrating, mass actions, reclaiming the streets, even 
voting in a parliament gain their effectiveness from this source. The 
crucial point here is; co-presence shapes both the lines and places of 
action. It constitutes a world as a place for politics8. This requires, of 
course, sharing the same place and time and synchronised actions. 
8. According to Hannah Arendt, the world (Welt) is constructed through action 
between actors. In her own vocabulary, this is what she called inter-est (between 
beings). This inter-place separates subjects from each other, and simultaneously 
enables them to share the same spatial temporal space (Arendt 1958; Parvikko 
1996; Segerberg 2005). In this space different interests collide and politics emerges 
through the clashes of plural opinions. To construct a world it is necessary that 
it is constructed at the same time between subjects. Nick Crossley (1996), for 
instance, claims that intersubjectivity itself constitutes a world, or more precisely, 
inter-world. In this inter-world intersubjectivity is possible when subjects are 
trying to tune in their act while sharing the same spatial and temporal horizon.
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On the Net, however, demonstrating the power of the masses can be 
temporally and spatially unsynchronised. Every actor is capable of tak-
ing part in collective action at the preferred moment from whatever 
spot that has Internet access.
The transformational potentiality of the Net with regard to collec-
tive action and infl uence could be described as revolutionary. Earlier, 
collective activity was characterised by action that happens intersub-
jectively in shared space and partakers were by defi nition consociated 
contemporaries. Being not physically there, but acting at a distance 
through the Net co-presently, empowers such collective action that 
may consist of a single act done by atomistic individuals throughout 
the world (Zhao 2004, 96). It is no longer necessary to share the same 
place to utilise collective pressuring, or employ the power of the masses 
(as virtual sit-ins, e-attacks and the like so clearly demonstrate). Still, 
activities of that kind require very precise temporal synchronising to 
be at their most effi cient. Yet, temporal fl exibility expands in some 
other forms of net-politics. In campaigns, such as the Lordi-protest 
highlighted earlier, consciousness of the present now is not neces-
sarily the objective now for all participants of collective action. The 
awareness of the now’s temporal being, that is grasping the enduring 
present now as a temporal object that exists in time, could be different 
for each participant due to the virtual nature of the sphere of activity 
which is accessible from every subject’s own temporal horizon. The 
participation takes place from the standpoint of a myriad of different 
present-nows because virtual time is beyond objective time, and the 
now-moments are asymmetrical in respect of the objective real-world’s 
nows. A message could be sent to an on-line forum or chat-room, 
and it may receive an almost immediate response, or the response is 
given after a long delay. Yet, all replies and responses are, in combo, 
constructing a reciprocal sense of sharing the same place and doing 
something together. On-line-discussions constitute a world between 
subjects in cyber-space and constructed virtual space in which inter-
subjectivity9 may emerge regardless of the limitations of being in the 
here-and now (cf. Zhao 2006, 462-463). 
9.  The nature of Net facilitated intersubjectivity and co-presence in cyberspace is, in 
some commentaries, regarded as being something more or less imperfect, compared 
to co-presence in the real, physical world. According to Zhao virtual co-presence 
(or tele-co-presence as he calls the phenomenon) is mediated and thus truncated 
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CONCLUSION
In current political arenas the role of the Internet is crucial. Various 
uses of the Internet facilitate different civic and individually organized 
networks and help to introduce their aims and strategies, and to out-
reach target groups and members of the public. Also it is more effi cient 
to run the core tasks of campaigning projects, such as communicating 
with supporters, coordinating events in the fi eld, organising crowds in 
fast-breaking situations, reacting quickly to breaking news, and gaining 
publicity for their issue. User friendly applications offer effi cient tools 
for horizontal interaction and carry out a variety of forms of refl exive 
politics. The traditional publicity of the mass media is easily replaceable 
by self-produced publicness from the grass-roots-level. From a de-me-
dialised point of view, issues may be approached just in the form in 
which message senders want. The effectiveness of the Internet is based 
on its’ potential to empower that horizontal communication between 
individual and different groups (Dahlgren 2005, 155). Everyone with 
access to the Internet may try to participate in public discussions and 
shape their agendas on on-line forums.
The Lordi-campaign is an exemplary case of the refl exive re-
invention of politics and the political that took gossip journalism as 
its target. Protest emerged on the Internet around the self-organised 
network which consisted of separate individual actors. The network 
adopted such actionist tactics that by right could be called individu-
alised innovative resistance. The network’s actionist repertoire include 
public appeals, boycotts, buycotts, sharing and publishing informa-
tion online and on websites, the gathering of action networks, and 
pressurising the employees and commercial partners of the magazine 
by a massive avalanche of emails. Also culture jamming was playing 
a rather visible role in the network’s actions (virtual sit-ins, turning 
magazines upside-down in the selling stands and sending photos 
of these events to Internet-galleries). 7 Days-magazine held virtual 
takeovers and put pressure on the protestors by claiming that they 
(Zhao 2004: 96; see also Williams (2006). For an alternative reading concern-
ing the nature of virtual presence, see Marion Hamm (2005). Unfortunately, in 
this chapter it is not possible to analyse these various concepts regarding virtual 
co-presence (being on-line) and its’ relationship to ‘real-worldly’ (being off-line) 
counterparts.
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were committing criminal activities, but no police investigation, nor 
legal processes followed from these acts (see Digitoday 31.5.2006; 
Digitoday 30.5.2006a). 
From the perspective of refl exive politics, confl icts spring up from 
the problematic relation between an individual and society. This is 
partly caused by a societal and global development, the shift from 
communal life to private life in which the sense of shared community, 
imagined belonging to a bigger whole, is profoundly changing the 
scope of the political (see Johnston & Larãna & Gusfi eld 1994; Beck 
1995; Polletta & Jasper 2001; Bernstein 2005; McDonald 2006). As 
pointed out earlier, there are no single dominant or objective cleav-
ages causing the political confl icts, rather confl icts arise from clashes 
of different subjective values, lifestyles and attitudes. Refl exive politics 
puts emphasis on the mobilisation process fostering the emergence of 
new ideas, world-views, and particularly the adaptation of political 
activity and participation to change conditions (Diani & Eyerman 
1992, 7-8). 
Self-made publicness strengthens the core idea of refl exive political 
action, in which the signifi cance of do-it-yourself culture is as crucial 
as the resistance to centralised ways of doing politics. It emphasises 
activities that take place in open, anti-hierarchical, free spaces. One 
characteristic feature in refl exive organisation and mobilisation is 
swarming. Horizontally communicating jungle drumming attracts 
people to visit interesting websites or hubs. This multitude of indi-
viduals may grow into a politically effective force if they unite in one 
or more respect. In other words they manage, at least temporarily, to 
transform people from different backgrounds into a unifi ed collective 
agent. By meshworking the swarming effect turns the plural into unity. 
All that is familiar from a Hobbesian standpoint, but in this age people 
do not unite in order to safeguard their miserable lives, but instead to 
express themselves freely, if they have found one or more interests in 
common worth taking action over. (cf. Osterweil 2004, 501, 504.) 
The horizontal nature of the Internet’s participation and action culture 
is far more democratic than traditional forms of government. In free 
net participation at a micro-level and activities occurring in cyberspace 
all participants are, by defi nition, equal; they share the same amount 
of power regardless of their position in the “real world” and all they 
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can trust in is the power of their arguments or the tempting nature 
of their agenda.
The extended present, in respect of intersubjectivity and facilitated 
happenings on the Net, has direct effects on the nature of action and 
on the styles it can adopt, as well as the outcomes of net-activism. 
The asymmetry in time-levels between the real world and virtual 
spaces enables that these different temporal zones might overlap; i.e. 
exist simultaneously at the level of subjective time experience. Conse-
quently, that could cause latency in the effi cacy of the action; the acts 
emerging now might change the course of events after a (long) while. 
In addition, this blurred temporality, especially the extended present 
on the Net empowers single actors by giving them a potentiality and 
tools to refl ect on and to alter the course of their action, just as single 
acts. To a certain extent, it is possible to go back in time on the Net, 
for instance to react to, or even change earlier remarks on on-line-fo-
rums and chat-rooms. As the case of the Lordi-protest shows, several 
asymmetric acts could create an exponentially accumulated collective 
action around the issue that was held to be controversial. In this case, 
individualized collective actors constructed in a temporal sense, an 
unsynchronised collective action employing the means and styles of 
political consumerism and had an impact on the course of events in 
the real physical world.
Transformative change in organising political activities is salient 
and ostensible in Internet politics, because the Net is regarded as a 
powerful tool to gather coalitions and organise mobilisation of any 
kind (Chadwick 2006; Dahlgren 2005; Meikle 2002). Communicative 
puttering on the Net may arouse peoples’ interest toward acute politi-
cal and social problems and may cause political involvement and may 
even lead to action. Through the Net, this is especially convenient; at 
the minimum level all you have to do is click your mouse. Googling, 
blogging, maintaining websites, Net downloading and uploading, 
producing the material on the Net, mobilising people to take action 
about something, and net-petitions have became more and more visible 
and notable forms of political participation (Micheletti 2006). All the 
activities surrounding the Lordi-protest are not bound to remain a sin-
gle atomistic by-plot within the story of political infl uence, but rather 
show the direction where civic participation and political activism is 
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heading. The innovative Lordi-protest indicates that de-medialised 
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Pirates in politics – Internet piracy 
as individualised politics
INTRODUCTION
“Denied topics and pirate versions of allowed topics were popular...
The ancient regime made a fateful mistake...with the underground, 
where the distance between political criticism, low-level criminality 
and pornography was not great. This situation enabled activities 
against the system.”
This modifi ed citation from Hannu Salmi (1996, 77) does not concern 
attempts to control the Internet nor copyright content piracy inside 
the Internet. It is about the invention of printing and its consequences 
when books became available to ordinary citizens in the 1700’s, and, 
before mechanical printing, the church had a monopoly on copying 
without paying any copyright royalties to the authors or heirs. Monks 
were the only authorised group to made copied artifacts by hand.
It is suggested, that current new technologies and innovations 
will dramatically change the work-intensive model of contemporary 
associations (e.g. Webster 2001). Formed in 2006 and 2007, Swedish 
Piratpartiet (The Pirate Party) and the Finnish movements Tietoy-
hteiskuntapuolue (The Information Society Party) and WikiPuolue 
(The Wiki Party) are examples of network intensive movements. They 
organise and mobilise themselves mostly with the existing tools of 
the Internet, create new tools and are framing the rights to use digital 
tools and content freely. Furthermore, the members and supporters 
observe and share the material reality quite a lot via devices such as: 
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www journals and forums, irc and instant messengers, webcams, blogs, 
video or mobile footages, hobbying multiuser network games, mobile 
pictures, to mention a few.
For this chapter and to create a case study about Piratpartiet 
(PP), I have used the qualitative analysis of Internet newspapers and 
journals and the graph of the www connections of PP created with 
IssueCrawler, which is an Internet-based network analysis tool. My 
purpose is not to argue, whether the content piracy movement or the 
’fair’ home use is legal, illegal, justifi ed or somewhere in-between. The 
Nordic piracy movement is a contemporary example of modern grow-
ing social activism and individualised politics, where the movement 
offers a loosely articulated framework to individuals and groups for 
occasional action, and the Internet provides a powerful environment 
for those kinds of activities. From the point of view of contemporary 
civil society research, there seems to be the tendency that many people 
are acting and participating more in single, temporary, project-like 
movements and protest forms without further commitments to longer-
lasting social movements than before. People have started to fi nd 
new ways of acting besides ordinary social movements, associates and 
political parties in society. This refl ects to the contemporary tenden-
cies of privatising and individualising everyday life and a project-like 
collectivity at the same time. Beside the Internet movements described 
above, other recent examples of the new forms of Internet action are 
uncoordinated crowds – or network mobs– the effective targeting of 
corporations, governments, political parties, public offi cials etc. (See 
Introduction in this volume.)
THE INTERNET AS THE IDENTITY MEGAPLEX
The main reason for studying the Nordic Internet piracy movement is 
that it offers a clear example of a new social movement (NSM), which 
mobilises and organises itself mostly on the Internet. Since 1994 after 
the Zapatista movement started the active use of the Internet with 
its supporters (Garrido & Halavais 2003), the Internet has become a 
versatile and everyday toolkit for all NSMs (see Mosca; Gillan; Vromen 
and Baringhorst in this volume). But to the Nordic piracy movement 
the Internet is also an arena for its actions, its publicity and the spatial 
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location of its targets or opponents. The other layers of reality, like 
media publicity and physical space, are regarded as important but 
secondary. On the other hand groups such as the European NSMs of 
the younger generations like Reclaim The Streets or the annual Eu-
romayday of the so-called precariate, still operate mainly in physical 
time and space.
The Swedish-originated Piratpartiet movement spread to almost 
twenty countries in four continents in various forms during 2006. 
There has been wide network-based content piracy around the world 
for decades, but PP has been the fi rst attempt by the pirates to come out 
publicly and broadly with the democratic repertoire for demanding the 
legalisation to share and copy freely copyrighted commercial content 
and patented ideas. Nordic pirate movements formed an alliance The 
Pro Piracy Lobby and there has been active fl agging for a global Pirate 
Party International unity also. The speed of the spreading indicates 
that somehow the point of view of PP has touched on some feelings 
among younger generations of Internet users, who are considered not 
to be socially or politically active otherwise. Piratpartiet was legally 
established in January 2006 and it participated in the Swedish general 
election later in September 2006. 
The fi rst copyright law, Statute of Anne, came into force in 1710, 
but before that its predecessors also had the approach, that copyrighted 
material should be stored on some physical medium or artefact. The 
basic idea nowadays is to protect the rights of creative, innovative 
and distinguishable (art)works. But from the copying monopoly of 
the church and hand-made artifacts we have been transferred to the 
situation of licensing immaterial commercial content via buying and 
owning the copyrighted materials for our personal use. We are also 
facing new situations, where digital and networked content creation 
and distribution meets new consumer devices, which enable novel and 
easy ways to copy, remix and distribute (Lasica 2005). 
The idea of the Internet piracy movement is to resist the current 
commercial copyright and distribution model and not to pay for 
copyrighted commercial materials, like software, music and videos 
but get and share them for free1. The copyright industry considers it 
1. The term ’piracy’ has innumerable forms from physical and illegal product or 
brand copying to name imitation on www sites. In this chapter I concentrate on 
so called Internet piracy only.
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tantamount to stealing. But there is also a longstanding way of thinking 
among many early-bird Internet users and some software developers, 
that many cultural innovations – like computer software – should be 
published for free so everyone could make them even better. This col-
laborative development of open software is continuously expanding 
- called the open source movement - and voluntary programming has 
created several successful and widely-adopted solutions competing 
with commercial products, like free www-browser Firefox and the 
operating system Linux. This juxtaposition between companies and 
cost-free oriented consumers is not so unambiguous as companies like 
to put it in publicity, and compared to many other laws in societies, 
copying laws vary a lot around the world, whether it is legal, illegal, 
not a legal issue at all or legal in some situations, like limited copying 
for personal purposes.
When NSMs and consumer-related campaigns start to transfer 
their presence mostly to networks, like the Internet, it indicates new 
kinds of possibilities for individualised politics (see Baringhorst, Häy-
htiö & Rinne and Rättilä in this volume). For this paper the Internet 
itself can be described as the ’identity megaplex’, which has political 
and social offerings 24/7 around the year; very easy, light, temporary 
and half-anonymous participation, like clicking a banner at a hunger 
aid site, signing a www-petition, commenting on blogs and other 
content resources, putting a banner on his or her own www homepage 
or blog etc. A user can easily build and mix her or his identity from 
various movement offers like shopping in a mall2. This Internet-driven 
presence and body of any Internet-based movement combined with 
the effi ency provided by the tools of the Internet is unfolding whole 
new possibilities for the allocation of the resources of NSMs and their 
supporters. Piratpartiet is an example of this shift.
Internet and network activism have been around since the 1980’s, 
such as GreenNet (Böök 1989). There have been numerous network-
based consumer campaigns, like case Lotus Marketplace 1990 or Yahoo 
/ GeoCities 1999, where consumers organised e-mail protests against 
2. For example, on the very popular social networking site Facebook it is easy to 
activate the Causes-feature where one can select icons from thousands of global 
and local campaigns, show them in her / his personal Facebook www-page and 
invite friends to join in. The ones who succeed in recruiting the most people to 
campaigns are honored in hall-of-fame-lists.
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computer companies (Gurak & Logie 2003, 26-28, 34-45). As Laura J. 
Gurak and John Logie describe, these two – and most of the - Internet 
campaigns have been more or less centralized and coordinated. But 
in the case of the pirate movement, there are an enormous number of 
potential supporters. For example The Pirate Bay (often abbreviated 
TPB) www service alone has some 1.6 millions users around the world 
and there are very many more popular peer-to-peer networks3.
 Encouraging an individual to personal protest or boycotting is 
quite common for example among non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), and consumerism and environmental movements (see Bar-
inghorst in this volume). But the nature of the piracy movement and 
the skills of its supporters form a powerful combination which goes 
beyond the innocent identity shopping of just clicking www char-
ity banners. In the case of Piratpartiet, a 17-year old Swedish boy 
mounted a DDoS-attack4 and forced down the www service of the 
Swedish police. He just tracked the biggest image fi le from the www 
site, published the www address of the image on the Internet discus-
sion forums, and others started to request the image fi le from www 
server so its service capacity was drained.
Compared to physical reality, the radical activity on the Inter-
net is a much easier and also half-anonymous form of participation 
(e.g. Calenda & Meijer in this volume). With this combination of 
convenience of access to occasional participation on the Internet and 
good Internet skills, the pirate movement and its individual support-
ers around the world can be quite effective from the point of view of 
activism. There are also some other Internet-savvy radical movements, 
like Nueremberg Files. The movement hosted a killing list on the 
3. Peer-to-peer (often referred as P2P) network is based on single and individual 
nodes (and computers), which for example communicate and share fi les directly 
instead of a centralised network with servers. The Pirate Bay is an Internet service 
which helps people to locate fi les for copying on the Internet. This kind of server 
does not usually have the actual and changeable (and pirated) fi les itself, but mere 
torrents or seeds of information, which locate the actual fi les inside P2P networks 
(see below) on the Internet. The owners of torrent services often claim that they do 
not do anything illegal because they do not offer the copyrighted fi les themselves 
but just these torrents.
4. In distributed denial-of-service-attacks (DDoS) a www site is slowed down so that 
it can not be used. There are many variations, but the basic idea is, that as many 
computers as possible request some kind of information from the attacked www 
service at the same time.
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www, the purpose of which was to motivate and report on the killing 
of doctors who undertook abortions (Meikle 2002, 22-23). Anybody 
who sympathises with the piracy movement or Nueremberg Files can 
be involved in activism or make a statement globally and there is no 
physical body of the movements to arrest or judge but autonomous 
groups or even individual cells.
The third factor to study is that many substance-framed NSMs 
(Della Porta & Diani 1999, 14) or their branches have had casual 
relationships with hackers and crackers for almost forty years. In 
many cases, social movements have had the ‘substance’ and hackers 
the technical means. This symbiosis has been so active, that its own 
branch or repertoire of activism has evolved and also a school of 
social and political research: hacktivism (hacking and activism) (see 
Gillan and Jordan in this volume). The term was coined by username 
Omega – “a longstanding member of the Cult of the Dead Cow (cDc)” 
1996 (Ruffi n 2004, 1). Ironically, Ruffi n states that hacktivism does 
not include www site defacing or DDoS-attacks, which are among of 
the most popular means of ’hacktivism’ nowadays. Defacing means to 
crack a www site and mess or replace its original content, some times 
with slogans or manifestos.
The defi nition of hacktivism is not essential in this paper. How-
ever, Piratpartiet is the fi rst time when hackers, crackers or pirates 
highlight their own way of thinking and agenda publicly and mobilise 
themselves via democratic means on this scale, althought there are many 
long-standing hacker communities and actors like Chaos Computer 
Club (Germany), 2600 (USA) or activities around xs4all (Holland). It 
could be said that hackers have tended to have a substance-framed or 
ethical need for justifying the application of their expertise for decades. 
Hackers have on innumerable occasions offered their skills in ‘helping’ 
against a supposed enemy like Iraq. One of the most recent excuses was 
the debate and riots about the Danish Mohammed-targeted cartoons, 
which ‘justifi ed’ the defacing of hundreds of Nordic www sites in 
2006. But after the public piracy movement, hackers, crackers, nerds 
and geeks are not only toolkits for wider substance-framed NSMs any 
more. It is useful to enlight both the beginning of this symbiosis and 
on the other hand, the birth of the commercial software industry and 
juxtaposition between the content industry and the pirates.
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A MOB, MOVEMENT, PARTY OR JUST A PRANK?
Organisationally the Nordic piracy movement resembles many social 
movements (SM) and political parties. In Sweden, Piratpartiet is an 
offi cially registered party with a named board of directors, regional 
contact persons and almost 9000 members at May 2007. There are 
independent but loosely connected educational and cultural actors; 
(Piratbyrån and Young Pirates -branch); very proactive radical action 
section (The Pirate Bay with its supporters); autonomous supportive 
and co-operative actors (like The Artliberated Network); The Nordic 
regional alliance (The Pro Piracy Lobby); loose international bodies 
(Pirate Parties International); eighteen affi liate parties more or less in 
the forms of registered associations or parties5. Piratpartiet also tries to 
achieve its goals and exert its infl uence through democratic elections 
and both the party and its radical wing The Pirate Bay (TPB) usually 
give statements in the media publicy with their own names and faces 
as opposed to traditional anonymous hackers. However, the declaration 
of principles of Piratpartiet is very thin compared to most parties in 
the Nordic democracies. It desires only to “fundamentally reform the 
copyright law, get rid of the patent system, and ensure that citizens’ rights 
to privacy are respected ” (Piratpartiet 2007).
Sandor Vegh (2003, 72-84) offers a versatile classifi cation about 
the political activism – or hacktivism – use of the Internet. He intro-
duces two main categories, whether Internet activism is Internet-en-
hanced or Internet-based. In the former case, the Internet is only used 
to enhance the traditional advocacy techniques. In the latter case, the 
Internet is used for activities that are only possible online. However, 
the Nordic piracy movement is quite diffi cult to classify or categorise 
in this scheme, because it operates actively in both realms - the physi-
cal society and the Internet – depending on the level of observation: 
5. Piratbyrån is an organisation which provides news, guides and a www forum for 
discussions on fi le-sharing, intellectual property and piracy. It arranges events 
such as lectures, demonstrations and media actions. The name derives from 
Antipiratbyrån (Anti-Piracy Bureau), which is a non governmental organisation 
controlling the interests of content industry-based anti-piracy issues in Sweden. 
The Artliberated Network consists of professionals in art, law and research and 
supports visual artists when a work is confronted with legal threats and when a 
work is being censored either on moral or on copyright grounds.
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Piratpartiet, the activism around The Pirate Bay or the supporters of 
the latter or the wholeness of the movement. One could even say that 
Piratpartiet is an Internet-based and reality-enhanced movement. 
The repertoire of Piratpartiet and its independent alliances, spe-
cially The Pirate Bay, varies from classic demonstration in material 
reality and participating in national elections to the provision of its own 
enemy-free Internet connection and attempts to form a copyright-free 
country. Instead of Veghs typology of the various forms of hacktivism, 
Piratpartiet more resembles the groups operating via tactical media as 
Graham Meikle has presented (ibid., 113-123). Tactical media is an 
approach where media publicity is used as a weapon with surprising, 
controversial and creative actions and campaigns and also to offer 
creative forms of participation to the occasional supporter. Some of 
the most famous groups are Adbusters, RTMARK (pronounced as 
‘ArtMark’), Critical Art Ensemble (CAE), Electronic Disturbance 
Theater (EDT) and YesMen. Theoretically, the tactical media has 
its origins in the radical movement Situationists International of the 
1950-60’s. For getting a clearer picture of what kind of activism or 
the tactical media the Nordic piracy movement is, we need to observe 
its recent actions.
THE CONTROVERSIAL REPERTOIRE OF THE PIRATES
The Piratpartiet itself was formed in January 2006, but the events 
in Sweden6 started to condense, when the police raided the Internet 
service The Pirate Bay at the end of May 2006. The original security 
camera sources of the raid were quickly distributed on the Internet and 
successful DDoS attacks were made against the Swedish police and 
government. Like many bombing strikes in material reality, an entity 
which called itself World Wide Hackers, soon claimed responsibil-
ity for both. It soon occurred that the attack against the police was 
coordinated only one teenager in ten minutes. The piracy movement 
arranged a ‘real-life’ demonstration on 3.6.2006 with the aid of some 
young wings of the traditional parties, the Liberal Youth of Sweden, 
Green Youth and Young Left.
6. Reporting of the events are mostly based on www news source Digitoday.fi  and its 
over forty articles by Jaakko Kuivalainen, Mika Lahdensivu and Mika Mannila.
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The Pirate Bay moved its activities and www servers briefl y to 
Holland, but quickly back to Sweden. The administrative copyright 
instrument in Sweden, Antipiratbyrån, and its lawyer got some severe 
warnings, but the lawyer took them with humour. Soon after the 
raid, the membership of Piratpartiet increased from 2 200 to 6 100. 
One image backslash to PP was that its own member list fl ooded the 
Internet with thousands of names. Slightly ironical here was specula-
tion, over whether someone had cracked the servers of the pirates 
(Digitoday 2006.)
The raid caused national debate in Sweden. Miljöpartiet de Gröna 
(The Green Party of Sweden) and the leaders of Moderaterna (The 
Moderate Party) and Vänsterpartiet (The Swedish Left Party) strongly 
critisised the government and its policy over the whole fi lesharing is-
sue. The Pirate Bay case and its implications thus gave some popular 
support to Piratpartiet. The Swedish government got a memo in the 
middle of June for getting rid of Internet piracy. After debate, two 
suggestions were broadly considered: one was a broadband fee, like 
for C-cassettes, without tightening the law, and the other was a new 
national network guard unit and specialised prosecutors. The latter 
could be some kind of national body, which could be linked to the 
police and the crisis management offi cials. Here we see two national 
and offi cial approaches. One is proactive, letting citizens do what they 
do and the other is reactive, for solving what might have happened 
and punishing the perpetrators.
The Swedish mass media found out, that there were mysterious 
and possibly criminal, racist or sex industry grey money streams and 
huge economic revenues linked to the commercial ads (banners) on 
The Pirate Bay and that the streams were leading to a Swiss offshore 
company. So maybe the running of the swapping servers with only 
information about the actual fi les was not as ethical as explained or 
thought only. TPB admitted the money streams, and some speculated 
that this commercialism of activism might be the main possible pros-
ecuting reason, not the piracy itself under Swedish law. On the other 
hand, the Swedish media introduced several Swedish offi cials, who 
think downloading from the Internet is daily life and ‘normal’.
The pirates created tankafritt.nu – an insurance collective for pos-
sible fees. The Nordic Pro Piracy Lobby was formed and Piratpartiet 
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started to offer a new service, Darknet7, which promised to anonymise 
an individual user totally from Internet tracking and surveillance 
means. In P2P networks the half-documentary Steal This Film started 
to spread which attempts to justify the piracy.
The election of the parliament was in the middle of September. 
Piratpartiet got nearly 35 000 votes and 0.63 percent of votes but 
not enough for the parliament (4 percent needed). Among Swedish 
minor parties, its performance surpassed many others. According to 
the party, the next step is to try to reach the 2009 European Union 
Parliament.
In 2007 Piratpartiet and The Pirate Bay started to operate more 
independently.  The ACFI-group around TPB started to collect money 
on the Internet for buying an island and to form a new sovereign 
country. They considered buying Sealand ten kilometers away from 
Great Britain, which has quite a colourful history in its efforts to be 
a sovereign micronation, but the owners of Sealand did not respond 
to efforts to negotiate. Soon TPB announced details about the new 
www service Playble. The idea is that people can transfer songs to the 
service and the artists would be paid. In May 2007, someone cracked 
TPB, and fl ooded the Internet with 1.6 million names of the users 
of the service.
Somehow The Pirate Bay tested its limits and supporter poten-
tial in May 2007. A Danish www service provider decided to end 
the hosting of a pedophilian www site but the Swedish www hosting 
company PRQ, owned by creators of TPB Gottfrid Svartholm Warg 
and Fredrik Neij, provided the host name www domain Pedofi l.se in 
the name of freedom of speech. For example in Finnish www forums 
the reactions have been quite mixed.
This commentary from The Pirate Bay is essential due to its thin 
substance framing. Supposedly the idea of free speech among the pirates 
and supporters has been some kind of phrase without any acid test (see 
7. The term darknet originally refers to a closed and isolated network inside pre-In-
ternet ARPANET and they were not visible to the main ARPANET in the 1970’s. 
Later the term has also referred to tightly structured piracy networks. In the USA, 
darknets, ‘pirate pyramids’ or ‘Shadow Internet’, are the distribution structures, in 
which the participants have tight professional roles like business organisations, such 
as Insiders (sources inside companies), Packagers (release groups converting originals), 
Distributors (groups distributing items to topsites) and Couriers (transferring fi les 
from the topsites to lower-level networks, like P2P) (Lasica 2005).
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Jordan in this volume). In Finland many comments have been similar 
to George W. Bush’s comments on the actions of RTMARKs www 
parody site gwbush.com 1999: “There ought to be limits to freedom”. 
In June 2007, TPB explained and specifi ed its view of the freedom of 
free speech. It published the new service ImgBay.com, where anyone 
can distribute digital images at their own volition without censorship. 
In the site FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) section they put their 
view this way: 
“There are a lot of ugly opinions out there, but demoracy ain’t worth 
much without the right to express those opinions. There is this myth 
about freedom of speech being a nice comfortable idea, well it’s not. 
It’s annoying, appalling and sometimes even dangerous. But the op-
posite is way worse”. (ImgBay.com 2007).
THE WEB OF PIRATES – THE FRAMING ANALYSIS
Based on the Swedish copyright law, The Pirate Bay has published 
dozens of examples of correspondence concerning copyright viola-
tions with companies from the USA on the internet, so it could be 
described as quite a provocative piracy actor (MPAA 2600). It was to 
be exposed in the Swedish media, that the raid of TPB was conducted 
mainly because of the demands of these companies and organisations in 
the USA, such as the Motion Picture Association of American (ibid.). 
Behind the scenes the USA forced Sweden to make the raid, which was 
prepared for two years, with the threat of sanctions by World Trade 
Organization (WTO). From the point of view of the pirates, the USA 
forced Sweden to operate against its own legislation and citizens on 
the behalf of the American content industry.
Piratpartiet has reacted proactively to the economic shift from 
traditional copyright ownership to the broader and emerging immate-
rial copyright industry. Thus the movement has social and economical 
dimensions. Instead of traditional artifact or item selling, the copyright 
industry tends to sell time-restricted licences nowadays like tickets to 
perfomative art shows, and at the same time includes more and more 
technical restrictions on consumer media devices. It means, that in 
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many situations at least in the United States, an average consumer does 
not anymore own or cannot for example lend or resell an immaterial 
product he or she has purchased, but has only bought a license to use a 
service with its content for a limited time (Lasica 2005).
Digital and networked producing, copying and distribution have 
not been the idea of traditional copyright laws in many countries 
(Hintikka 1993). The law was originally created mostly to protect 
physical artifacts in some form created by book publishers, patrons 
and individual authors, not for example for the concept of a cooking 
program8. With digital replication, the work-cost aspect of copyrighted 
content has loosened totally from the original idea of its creator and 
protection of the law. For example, for a concept of a new TV gardening 
series or www service there is, in general, a group of concept designers, 
who get monthly salaries from a company, which will own the rights 
of a show or service for selling the concept to different countries or 
audiences. This business idea is not to make individual and unique 
creations or artwork but just money in the form of the distinguishable 
content only. This could be considered as a “concept industry”, and 
whenever a new concept in the industry is created, it will have poorer 
commercial genre copycat creations without payments or licencing 
fees to the originator of the concept, like in reality tv shows, but just 
a competition to license and sell formats. Copyrighted material is 
nowadays often a tailored creation of production investments and more 
importantly, an economic asset, for which protection is eagerly sought 
from a law originally targeted to protect a “product of the spirit”. 
THE QUESTION OF FAIR USE
The symbiosis between substance-framed NSMs and hackers has 
its origins in the 1960-70’s on the Western coast of the USA, like 
the Homebrew Computer Club 1975-77, and it is also closely linked 
8. A typical example is that some football leagues are sueing the YouTube video footage 
sharing service for providing mobile phone video clips taken of the goals in football 
games and distributed by paid customers during the matches in 2007. Traditionally, 
the copyrights of the images or clips have belonged to the consumer camera user, but 
now the copyrights are regarded as belonging to the organisers and the producers of 
the football games because of the potential loss when selling the rights to distribute 
games on the (pay) television channels.
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to the rise of the computer software industry . In the universities of 
California there were many left-wing radical student movements such 
as those against the Vietnam War and the Cambodian crisis (Roszak 
1992, 135-138). For example, electronical bulletin boards systems 
(BBS) Resource One and Community Memory were created there; both 
had the aim of being a “free information system...without centralized 
editing or controlling of fl owing information”. According to Theodore 
Roszak, some of the activists were ‘guerilla hackers’ e.g. ‘socially aware’ 
hackers, who have backgrounds both in the hacker scene and anti-war 
movement (ibid., 143-146). A fi ne example of how the interests and 
aims of student and hacker movements merged was the underground 
newsletter Youth International Party Line. Its fi rst issue opposed a 
decision of the US government to tax telephone bills for funding the 
Vietnam confl ict (Jordan & Taylor 2004, 13).
The beginning of the copyright confrontation and the rise of the 
whole copyright industry can be accurately pinpointed. In one hacker 
meeting a young Bill Gates demanded payment for his BASIC program. 
In the hacker culture the idea of a commercial program was unheard 
of. Programs had been developed and distributed for free since the 
1960’s. Gates actually created a whole new industry. As Steven Levy 
(1984) tells, the BASIC program was ‘accidentally’ copied in the meet-
ing and started to spread as unauthorised copies around the USA, but 
it was also the beginning for the most powerful software company in 
the world – Micro-soft.
One of the founders of Microsoft, William Henry Gates III (1976) 
wrote an open letter to the hacker community: “1) Most of these “us-
ers” never bought BASIC (less than 10% of all Altair owners have bought 
BASIC), and 2) The amount of royalties we have received from sales to 
hobbyists makes the time spent on Altair BASIC worth less than $2 an 
hour... Why is this? ...Hardware must be paid for, but software is something 
to share...Is this fair? ... Most directly, the thing you do is theft.”
Naturally, one reason for content piracy is getting commercial 
products for free. But one of the main theses in the way of thinking 
of a hacker is that “information wants to be free”. From the very be-
ginning of the hacker era there has been the idea, that an individual 
would and should make his / her creative works available to others, so 
that others could improve the programmes, and everyone gets better 
348
solutions.  This is one reason how for example; the Internet itself was 
mainly developed 1970-1994 before it lured commercial interests 
and developers. 
For example, the fi rst issue of Newsletter of the Homebrew Computer 
Club started with the motive: “poured forth in a spontaneous spirit of 
sharing” (HCC 1975). The free sharing of information and thoughts 
- and created software – had been taken for granted among the hackers 
for some fi fteen years since the fi rst hackers at MIT 1950-60’s before 
the fi rst confrontation with BASIC software. Moreover, it is good 
to remember, that the whole idea of modern science is based on the 
sharing and referring of innovations for free. Roszak (1992) describes 
a picture of the world of a hacker (in the 1970’s) as a “weird mixing 
of political rebellionism, sci-fi  literature, Do-It-Yourself philosophy and 
pure joy and play”. Also Levy points out, that hackers are fascinated 
with everything weird and odd, which give mental challenges, like 
trying to translate the different dishes on the menu of a Chinese 
restaurant, in the original language and without dictionary guidance. 
This characteristic and imagination combined with superior technical 
skills also makes hackers quite a different movement compared with 
many other activist groups.
As Gates put it, the copying of this fi rst commercial software was 
“stealing”. But it is easy to interpret that the basic thought of Gates 
was that piracy was not “fair”. There was work involved in the pro-
gramme and there should be payment for using it. But consumers for 
example in Nordic countries have, for a long time had the possibility 
of taping TV programs or music for personal devices and use. It has 
been socially acceptable for example, to make a copy of a copyrighted 
product purchased, for example for a friend.
The fi rst reason for widespread or “common” piratism is the scale 
of the economic shift and the speed via networked tools against the 
longstanding business models of invention, production, marketing, 
distribution and exchanging (Anderson 2006; Tapscott & Williams 
2006). From the 1970’s to the middle of the 1990’s, the content in-
dustry did not fi nd serious problem with consumer copying of bought 
products, because of expensive personal costs and time-consuming 
distribution. The current problem arose in 1999 with Napster-soft-
ware. Neighbourhood copying and sharing started to spread globally. 
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As Peter Biddle, Paul England, Marcus Peinado and Bryan Willman 
remark: “In the past, most items of value were physical objects. Patent law 
and economies of scale meant that small scale copying of physical objects 
was usually uneconomic, and large-scale copying (if it infringed) was 
stoppable using policemen and courts” (2002). 
Another reason for this on-going confrontation and copyright 
infringement is the common availability and cheapness of digital 
content consumption, recording, creating and remixing tools, software 
and devices and developed media skills in how to use them (Lasica 
2005). The consumers started to use networked tools in daily life 
before the concept industry got any ideas of how to do business with 
them. As Lasica points out, the content industry is always basically 
against new rising technologies unless it is a certainty that they will 
be more profi table than the existing ones. Younger generations and so 
called digital natives, have spent their whole life among the rich digital 
audiovisual and networked environments. The righteous consumers 
like to buy legally, remix, lend and borrow digital content for their 
own or non-commercial use as with physical artefacts. The content 
industry is creating more and more restrictions on the devices and 
software, lobbying tighter laws and sueing in courts and the pirates 
invent more and more sophisticated techniques to pirate. Now con-
sumers and customers, especially in the United States, are increasingly 
in the situation that they do not have the right to “fair’ use of bought 
digital content anymore. Moreover, the DCMA copyright act in the 
United States has led to several cases, where companies have declined 
to publish shady internal material claiming that it would offend their 
copyrights as creators of the material (ibid.). Thus, at least in the USA, 
the current copyright law is becoming a powerful tool, which is used 
to defend against different kinds of harm to the business.
MONEY MACHINE, SERIOUS JOKE OR TRUE NSM?
So are Piratpartiet, The Pirate Bay and their alliances just money ma-
chines streaming sex ads, serious jokes or true NSM? It is too early to 
answer, but anyhow they have had quite a deep impact on framing 
the copyright issue and freedom in information societies, at least in 
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the Nordic countries by means of the tactical media. Although their 
framing has been quite thin so far, there is clear reference about the 
substance-framing of the movement.
IssueCrawler is an Internet tool, which trawls voluntarily created www 
links between www sites, captures their pages or site www outlinks, 
performs co-link analysis, and outputs the results in lists as well as 
visualizations (Rogers 2006). It is an easy and effi cient way to observe 
how different sites are networked or not together. When analysing the 























connections between the www sites of Piratpartiet, The Pirate Bay and 
Pirate Parties International, IssueCrawler showed the network graph 
on the opposite page.
On the upper right side there are quite a lot of connections to 
open source and other legal copyright related issues. On the bottom, 
there are quite dense network and cross linkages between piracy move-
ments and groups in different countries. In the middle left, there are 
connections both the piracy and open source software. Also, there are 
quite a few linkages to traditional NSMs. Based on the broad links of 
www services of the movement; the overall picture indicates that the 
movement is truly framing copyright and free software issues.
There have been many former movements and present day institu-
tions, like Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), addressing the issues 
of copyrights or digital privacy before Piratpartiet and The Pirate Bay. 
But considering the mass publicity and their provocative repertoire 
and initiatives, they have raised common awareness that severe social 
confl ict between the commercial sector, politics and common citizens 
is arising and also what, legitimate, legal, illegal, fair or justifi ed mean 
for individual use with modern technologies in society.
CONCLUSIONS
The rapid and diverse formation of national pirate parties – in six 
months in 2006 – around the world in nearly twenty countries indi-
cates that the legal and commercial struggle for consumer piracy has 
somehow struck a blow against (younger) consumers. The counter-
reaction could have been abbreviated or channeled through traditional 
parties or NSMs – like the precariate – but this time pirates, hackers, 
geeks, nerds and crackers liked to do it on their own.
The Nordic piracy movement is an example of how a novel net-
work-intensive movement can operate and it also refl ects the deep 
change from material and location-based production and distribution 
to their global and immaterial counterparts. The Internet provides 
tools for the movement, the platform for creating new tools, it is an 
arena for actions and publicity and the spatial location of its targets or 
opponents. Compared to traditional movements operating mainly in 
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material reality, the mobilisation, organisation and repertoire oppor-
tunities of the pirates are huge and it is not based on time or country 
or location at all. Everything needed is on the Internet. Piratpartiet 
itself has no need for radical attacks. The Internet makes it far easier 
for supporters and sympathisers to act without being caught than in 
material reality.
One role of the Internet itself is to become an identity megaplex, 
where NSMs and social or policical campaigns are offered as products 
and trends like in any marketplace. An individual can easily pick 
interesting arguments and act via the Internet. The argumentation of 
Piratpartiet might be attractive enough to basically anybody on the 
Internet, who is otherwise socially or politically inactive, for making 
such an occasional initiative like a DoS-attack. Before the Internet, 
it was quite difficult, for example, to strike on a mini scale, another 
country physically. Nowadays it is quite easily possible to get tools for 
serious cracking or creating computer viruses like the attacks against 
the Estonian www sites in May 2007.
It seems obvious that the piracy movement is demonstrating the 
ways in which social movements could transform their work intensive 
resources and mobilisation into a network intensive version. It could 
be imagined that this transformation is being adopted first among the 
movements of younger generations and the youth wings of traditional 
movements.
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TIINA RÄTTILÄ
“Here’s your fucking use of power!” 
Notes on how bloggers communicate politically1
INTRODUCTION
Weblogs (hereafter blogs) have attracted increasing attention both 
in the media and in research. Some observers welcome blogs and 
other digital technologies of the new social media as hitherto the most 
democratic feature of the Internet (e.g. Lintulahti 2006; Arina 2007).2 
Others are more critical, taking blogs as a sign of growing narcissistic 
individualism characteristic of the postmodern society (see discussion 
in Hodkinson 2007). The question many theorists (again) tackle is 
the extent to which such media really enhance democracy, i.e. increase 
opportunities for free expression, participation and political infl uence 
as well as interaction between citizens and political elites. Many of the 
earlier Internet enthusiasts eventually turned hesitant, and even became 
sceptics. Today the promise of a stronger democracy seems to be in the 
air again; now in the form of the horizontally expanding blogosphere.
1. This chapter is an extended and refi ned version of a paper under the title “Poli-
tics on the blogosphere,” presented at the international seminar “Politics on the 
Internet – New Forms and Media for Political Action”, November 24-25, 2006, 
University of Tampere.
2. The term ’social media’ refers to the new internet software and services which 
are based on user-generated content and which foster social interactivity. The 
term emphasises the transformation from one-to-many modes of mass-mediated 
communication to decentralised many-to-many, or peer-to-peer (P2P), commu-
nication. Such social software include e.g. wikis, RSS-feeds, social bookmarking 
services, podcasting, social networking platforms such as MySpace, Facebook, 
LiveJournal, SecondLife and Habbo Hotel.
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This chapter approaches the question of the empowering possi-
bilities of the Internet from a limited perspective, tracking how blogs 
and bloggers communicate politically.3 My starting supposition is that 
blogs can be a powerful tool for political communication by merit of 
some of their defi ning characteristics: easy connectivity between blogs 
through linking practices which builds a kind of visible ‘mass’ to their 
political activity on the blogosphere (cf. web-pages with emphasis on 
informational content rather than on interaction), an easy publish-
ing technology which speeds up and extends web publishing to ever 
wider publics, and the diary/journal format which enables multi-party, 
peer-to-peer conversation between bloggers. While blogs still have a 
relatively short history, they have already proved to be a phenomenon 
that no serious political actor, candidate, or corporation can afford to 
ignore (e.g. Einhorn 2006; Economist.com 2006).
I also strive to make an analytical point as to how we should ap-
proach communication on the blogosphere. As noted above, blogs have 
re-established visions of improved democracy by offering opportunities 
for free and relatively equal discourse between citizens (though much 
less between citizens and political elites). Against the background 
of such hopes stands the irrefutable infl uence of Jürgen Habermas’s 
theory of communicative action and deliberative democracy and the 
related assumptions of ‘rational’ communication and the legitimate 
democratic process (e.g. Habermas 1984 and 1996). My suggestion is 
that this theory has always been somewhat displaced in its understand-
ing of communication and that, consequently, it has tended to place 
unnecessary restraints on democratically meaningful communication. 
As I have argued elsewhere4, Habermas and his followers have not 
3. Like Brian McNair (2003, 4), I understand political communication in a wide 
sense as ‘all purposeful communication about politics.’ This view includes three areas: 
a) all forms of communication undertaken by politicians and other political actors 
for the purpose of achieving specifi c objectives, b) communication addressed to 
these actors by non-politicians such as voters and newspaper columnists, and 
c) communication about these actors and their activities, as contained in news 
reports, editorials, and other forms of media discussion of politics. It should also 
be noted that political communication does not denote only verbal or written 
statements but also visual means of signifi cation such as body language and public 
protests.
4. Tiina Rättilä, “In your face! On the nature of political performance as communication.” 
A doctoral thesis (in progress), University of Tampere, Department of Political Sci-
ence and International Relations.
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taken suffi cient theoretical notice of how communication between 
people is not mere exchange of speech acts but relies extensively on 
extra-linguistic communicative means such as signs, gestures and 
sounds. Arguably, if we accept that without bodily encounters (real 
or imagined) and visual and aesthetic clues communication loses its 
meaningfulness for human beings, a linguistically defi ned model of 
communication is untenable even as a normative ideal.
In order to understand and theorise communication more au-
thentically, then, we need to pay serious attention to its different 
dimensions, verbal and nonverbal. In order to do so, I suggest we turn 
to the analytical language of performance. The performative perspective 
on communication, as developed in the works of, for example, Erving 
Goffman (1959) in sociology, Richard Schechner (2002, 2003) in 
theatre/performance studies and Judith Butler (1990, 1997) in gender 
studies, acknowledges that various extra-linguistic forms of communi-
cation, bodily signs, sounds, and visual and aesthetic markers etc., offer 
effective even if often unconscious means of communicating ideas, 
feelings, even arguments. Performative dimensions of communication 
are well understood by us all, at least instinctively, in our everyday 
social encounters; not to mention skilful political actors and orators 
who sometimes command highly impressive artistry in their public 
presentations. Public performance has also been an important, and 
sometimes, the only available communicative media, in conditions of 
censorship and repression, for new social movements and sub-cultural 
groups. For example, the historical labour movement, the women’s 
movement(s), the civil rights movement and, more recently, the anti-
capitalist and anti-globalist movements have all been fi nely versed in 
performative communication.
The question of this chapter is, then, what happens to this rich 
estate of political communication when it turns virtual. Is there any 
‘body language’ on the Internet, or inventive use of visual and symbolic 
signs? And if indeed such communication can be found, why would 
it matter for democracy?
I will start by discussing briefl y some of the characteristic features 
of blogs as social and political media (second section). I will then move 
on to introduce the performative perspective to political communica-
tion (third section) and to discuss some of the special characteristics 
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of blog communication (fourth section). The main interest of the 
chapter is in considering how the performative perspective can be 
used to analyse communication on the blogosphere. Some outlines 
are given in the fi fth section, and fi nally, a test case is reviewed in the 
fi nal section of the chapter.
BLOGS AS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MEDIA
Time magazine made an interesting choice for the 2006 ‘Person of 
the Year.’ It didn’t pick Bill Gates (named year before) or Tony Blair 
(also a prior nominee) or any other ‘Great Man’ with indisputable 
political and/or economic infl uence. Instead, Time’s choice for the 
person of the year was ‘You,’ or rather, all of us who use the new ‘social’ 
Internet. According to the Time editor Lev Grossman, the new Web is 
“a tool for bringing together the small contributions of millions of people 
and making them matter. Silicon Valley consultants call it Web 2.0, as 
if it were a new version of some old software. But it’s really a revolution” 
(Grossman 2006). The cover of the issue, featuring a mirror-screen 
with the imagined projection of ‘You’ on it, is reproduced in the blog 
below, where it is sarcastically commented on by the blogging com-
munity “Gawker” (“Time Person of the Year”, gawker.com) and their 
readership. (See picture 1.)
Time’s peculiar choice tells something essential about the de-
velopment of the Internet at the beginning of the third millennium. 
Yet, its current stage is not easily pinned down by such hotchpotch 
terms and distinctions like Web 1.0 versus Web 2.0, or informational 
media versus social media etc.5 In fact, the Internet has since the start 
developed in a complex process which has been infl uenced by various, 
often confl icting interests, visions, and technical solutions. As Chris 
5.  The latest development of the Internet is often referred to as the spread of ’Web 
2.0’ phenomena. According to Majava 2006, 90), Web 2.0 refers both to technical 
changes in the Internet environment like increases in rapid broadband connections 
and the growth of net-based software development, as well as to social and cultural 
changes in its communication structure. The latter changes the point to the grow-
ing importance of ordinary net users as the real benefi ciaries of the ’net revolution’, 
as Time magazine also recognised. The emerging read/write web is generating an 
information environment that is more interactive and multivocal and ultimately 
more democratic than the older Web 1.0 environment.
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Atton (2004) notes, we need to move away from essentialised notions of 
the Internet and consider it, instead, as existing in a complex of features 
and pressures which are at once technological, historical, social, cultural, 
economic and political (cf. Introduction and Jordan in this volume). In 
this view the Internet appears “as a fi eld of confl ict, where symbolic 
resources are fought over, where citizenship and civil engagement may 
be redefi ned, where the predations of the asymmetries of symbolic 
power may be rebalanced” (Atton 2004, 19). Yet, the confl ict is not 
‘only’ symbolic; it also translates as an adamantly political and tacti-
cal struggle over free versus controlled, and commercialised versus 
anti-commercialised (open source) uses of the Internet. It can be 
argued, then, that social and political communication has never been 
Picture 1. The writer to a group blog called “Gawker” comments on the 
choice of ‘You’ as Time’s person of the year, in his entry on December 18, 
2006. The posting includes links to Time magazine as well as to other Internet 
sources. The comment section of the posting (not featured in the picture) con-
tains a lengthy discussion on the subject by visiting commentators. Like all 
posts, this one also has its individual URL-address (also falling out of the 
picture frame) which other blogs can link to when referring to this particular 
posting.
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as politicised as it is today. Rephrasing Hobbes, we could say that the 
Internet hosts thriving communication ‘of all to/against all’.
Mark Poster (1995) has called the development of the new digital 
media ‘the second media age.’ While the ‘fi rst media age’ was structur-
ally centred, featuring (broadcast) systems of one-to-many commu-
nication with politicians and journalists acting as the gatekeepers of 
information and public opinion, the second media age is characterised 
by decentralisation, many-to-many (or all-to-all) communication, 
individualisation of media consumption, interactive technologies 
and more democratic opinion formation. Perhaps the most shocking 
feature of the new digital media has been the massive breakthrough 
of peer-to-peer production of web content (cf. Lappalainen and Häy-
htiö & Rinne in this volume). Today the Internet makes it possible 
for anybody to become content producers and publishers, a type of 
citizen journalist. The net’s peer groups can work much faster and 
much more knowledgeably than any institutionalised news room, as 
could be witnessed e.g. during the Asian 2004 tsunami catastrophe 
(Sirkkunen 2006, 56).
As part of the wider Web 2.0 phenomenon weblogs add yet an-
other fl avour to this constellation of forces in and around the Internet. 
Advanced blog technologies are central to the development that has 
brought easy and almost free web publishing into the hands of the 
end-users previously placed at the receiving end of the communicative 
hierarchy. Blogs have provided a much welcomed counter-weight to 
the power of commercial interests and fi nancial capital on the Internet, 
in effect revolutionising (say optimists) the nature of communication 
in our contemporary world.
Weblogs date back to the early 1990s, but the fi rst public blog 
service was introduced by Blogger in 1999. With Blogger and other 
service providers like WordPress and LiveJournal, the software quickly 
developed its signature outlook of webpages with frequent entries in 
reverse chronological order, blogrolls (links to ‘friend blogs’), archives, 
comment sections, ‘permalinks’ (individual URL-addresses), ‘tags’ (words 
used to describe content) and RSS-feeds (via which blogs can be sub-
scribed to). After 9/11, and later after the US attack in Iraq, the number 
of blogs quickly multiplied as individuals “rushed to describe their 
personal experiences and fi nd an outlet for their heightened political 
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awareness” (McKenna 2004, 3). An interesting milestone in blog history 
was when during the 2004 American presidential election campaign a 
number of bloggers were accepted as on-site media representatives in the 
nominating party caucuses alongside the traditional media (Kilpi 2006) 
– which was a clear sign of the rising importance of the blogosphere. 
Today the number of blogs exceeds 100 million (or more) and keeps 
growing day by day.
While the bulk of blogs are maintained as personal refl ection 
boards, many focus on politics too, though there is cultural variation 
in the popularity of political blogs. Posts on political blogs are often 
critiques and refutations of content produced by journalists, politicians 
and other powerful public fi gures, and they frequently link to other 
blogs as well as to diverse sources available throughout the Internet, 
articles, speeches, academic studies etc. The style of commentary 
varies from short notes urging the readers to ‘go and check it out,’ to 
debates with the readership/commentators and lengthy political essays. 
Some bloggers are motivated to highlight issues that have received 
little attention in the mainstream media because of bias or neglect 
(McKenna 2004, 5).
So far, relatively little survey data is available on the bloggers as 
a political constituency. A 2004 American survey among the top 125 
political blogs showed that political bloggers are typically white, well-
educated men who had participated actively in traditional forms of 
politics before taking up active blogging. This would seem to suggest 
that only a few non-elites have taken up the opportunity to engage in 
political communication on the blogosphere. “At least at this point in 
time, there has been no revolution of idea makers,” concludes McKenna 
(ibid, 24). The survey also indicated - which is interesting - that after 
taking up their blogging activity, bloggers became less motivated in 
participating in off-line political action. This fi nding would seem to 
support the thesis that engagement in ‘cyberlife’ increases individu-
alisation of communication patterns.
Political bloggers contrast somewhat with the general blogger 
population. A 2006 telephone survey made by the Pew Internet & 
American Life Project showed that bloggers are overwhelmingly young 
adults, that they are less likely than other Internet users to be white 
(60% were white, 11% African American, 19% English-speaking 
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Hispanic and 10% other ethnicity; of the overall Internet users more 
than 70% are white), and that they are evenly divided between men 
and women.6 As to the ‘consumption’ of news, the survey found that 
95% of bloggers get news from the internet and that the majority of 
bloggers like to gather news from diverse sources. Moreover, bloggers 
are as likely as the general Internet population to pursue non-partisan 
news sources: 45% of bloggers said they preferred getting news from 
sources with no particular political point of view, 24% preferred get-
ting news from sources that challenge their own political views, and 
only 18% stated preferring getting news from sources sharing their 
personal political ideas. (Lenhart & Fox 2006)
What, then, is the existing or potential political signifi cance of 
blogs? What kind of role do they have in the Internet’s public sphere? To 
Drezner and Farrell (2004) the infl uence of blogs is puzzling, consider-
ing that their readership still does not match that of the mainstream 
media, that there is no central organisation to the blogosphere, that 
there is no ideological consensus among its participants, and that the 
vast majority of bloggers lack proper policy expertise. “Despite these 
constraints, blogs appear to play an increasingly important role as a fo-
rum of public debate, with knock-on consequences for the media and for 
politics,” Drezner and Farrell conclude (ibid., 4).
For instance Michelle Micheletti (2006) suggests that blogging 
has played a major role in the campaigning and the results of recent 
presidential and parliamentary elections in e.g. the US, Britain, Finland 
and Sweden. Blogs have also caught the attention of the mass media 
and the business world, now eager to enter the playing fi eld themselves 
– as witnessed recently by the acquisition of MySpace in 2005 by the 
media giant News Corp for $580, and of YouTube by Google Inc. 
in 2006 for a staggering $1.65 billion. The rationale behind these 
big-scale corporate acquisitions becomes understandable considering 
that MySpace has more than 130 million users around the world, and 
that YouTube gets around 100 million daily hits, not least by bloggers 
(MSNBC.com 2006).
6. According to the survey statistics, 147 million American adults used the Internet 
in 2005/2006. 57 million American adults read blogs and 12 million kept their 
own blog. In Finland over three million people used the Internet in 2007 (79% 
of the population, age 15 and up), of which around one million read blogs (33%) 
(Statistics Finland 2007).
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Micheletti suggests that blogging is a sign of the times, proving 
that we need to take information-seeking, -providing, -retrieving and 
-interpreting seriously. Growing distrust in government, politicians, 
political parties and the mass media make information-seeking and 
political understanding “more than just political foreplay for real politi-
cal participation (like voting).” Blogs enable a form of communicative 
participation increasingly important in times when citizens question 
the prefabricated information packages provided by experts, parties 
and organisations. Blogging also illustrates how “political communica-
tion and political understanding have entered the DIY [do-it-yourself ] 
world.” In the world of such politicised communication, the media, 
advocacy groups, corporations and even established organisations in-
vite ordinary people to involve themselves directly in communicative 
actions. “Political communication is, therefore, no longer just a way of 
getting across messages. It is action in itself that mobilizes and structures 
political thought and engagement” (ibid. 2006).
A remarkable example of such DIY tactics is the growing use by 
‘citizen journalists’ of camera phones and videocams to record off-line 
incidents involving visible misuse of power as well as other politically 
sensitive material (consider e.g. the Abu Ghraib -pictures) in order to 
expose it to the public via the Internet (for a closer review of such uses, 
see Häyhtiö & Rinne 2009). The last section of this article explores one 
such example. Related to this development Drezner & Farrell (2004) 
note that bloggers have fi rst-mover advantage in formulating public 
opinion. The comparative advantage of blogs in political discourse is 
the low cost of their real-time publication. Immediately following an 
event of political consequence – a presidential debate, a terrorist attack 
etc. – bloggers have the ability to post their immediate reactions before 
other forms of media can respond. Beyond initial reactions, bloggers 
can also respond to other blogs reactions before the mainstream media 
has time to react (ibid., 16). Mickey Kaus (2003) explains: 
“[T]he virtue of speed isn’t simply, or even primarily, that you can 
scoop the competition. It’s that you can post something and provoke 
a quick response and counter-response, as well as research by readers. 
The collective brain works faster, fi ring with more synapses”.
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POLITICAL PERFORMANCE AS COMMUNICATION7
Along with the linguistic turn of the social sciences in the mid-20th 
century, the notion that the human world is linguistically and discur-
sively constructed started to gain high theoretical ground. Moreover, 
in the wake of the infl uence of fi rst pragmatism and later Habermas, 
dialogical speech and the communicative competence it requires of 
participants in discourse came to be taken as the primary normative 
ideal for democratic life. 
Habermas’s basic theory and argument is that communicative 
action is by defi nition linguistic and argumentative, and therefore 
rational. It is based on the communicative competence of the members 
of society, and it is necessary for maintaining mutual understanding 
and coordinating subjects’ actions peacefully. In modern conditions 
where the dictates of money and power increasingly control social and 
political relations, communicative action is also potentially (but rarely 
in practice) pluralistic and democratic, providing much-needed basis 
for commonality and social cohesion between individualising subjects. 
(Habermas 1984, 397)
To some critics Habermas’s theory has over-emphasised the power 
of language as (rational) speech. His critics have pointed out for ex-
ample, that the idea of universal communicative competence rests on 
untenable gender and power -blind assumptions regarding human 
subjectivity. Another argument is that the rational-consensual com-
municative style tends to privilege speech which is formal, disembodied 
and dispassionate, thereby undervaluing expressions of identity, cul-
tural commitments and emotion. There is also the inevitable question 
of power, as feminist and postmodern critics have repeatedly noted. 
Rational communication, they argue, cannot effectively address issues 
of power, because power does not typically appear as ‘bad arguments’ 
which could be argued away with better ones. (Of such critiques, see 
Rättilä 1999.)
Nonetheless, Habermas’s theory is problematic on other accounts 
as well. Ideals of communicative and participatory democracy often 
come with a distrust of aesthetic representation, as J.D. Peters (2000, 
7. This section of the article utilises ideas developed in the author’s doctoral disserta-
tion, chapters two and three (Rättilä, forthcoming).
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563) claims. Habermas himself valorises conversation, reading and 
plain speech as worthy forms of democratic discourse and is frankly 
hostile to theatre, courtly forms, ceremony, the visual, and rhetoric. 
In Peters’ view, Habermasian communication 
“is a resolutely sober affair -- an Apollonian principle, one of unity, 
light, clarity, sunshine, reason. He slights the Dionysian side of lan-
guage, its dangers and irrationalities and its creative bursts. The term 
‘communication’ invites one to envision the social life of symbols in 
a subtly normative way, unlike terms such as rhetoric or discourse” 
(ibid.). 
To be fair, Peters adds, Habermas does appreciate thinkers such as 
Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt, who fathom the world-creat-
ing and political powers of language, but his purposeful reading of 
these thinkers aims more to rescue normative capital from them than 
to discover the complex and quirky side of their understanding of 
language.
But what is the danger for Habermas in defi ning the public 
sphere aesthetically? At stake is nothing less than the whole direction 
of modern politics. Given the Nazi aestheticisation of politics and 
Habermas’s lifelong struggle against fascism, it is not hard to imagine 
why he resists theatre, rhetoric, narrative, festival or spectacle from 
entering into the political. Yet, public representations “can be more than 
smoke and mirrors, more than Nuremburg rallies, more than ermine and 
purple” (ibid., 565). Habermas’s ‘iconoclastic’ stance toward symbolic 
communication both leaves us with an impoverished account of how 
communication in fact works and impedes the imagination of alterna-
tive forms of participatory media. This is an important point, when 
thinking of the evolving forms of communication on the Internet. 
Moreover, modern democracy is practically unthinkable without forms 
of social and political representation, both political and aesthetic, 
which mediate society for us. Modern media, Peters reminds us, are 
means for ‘imagining community.’ Our plight is only that the making 
of such public visions has become largely undemocratic and is left to 
‘the experts or the commissars’ (ibid., 566).
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As a contrast to the linguistically determined models of com-
munication we can consider the role of visual means of signifi cation. 
Think for example about the conspicuously visible role that many 
social and political movements have played in Western political life. 
This point can be taken concretely: namely, movements have often 
strived to make themselves visible in the public eye. I don’t want to 
say that only movements do so, however. In fact, to a large extent 
all political actors do. Yet it is an emblematic feature, especially of 
movements, that they re/present ideas and problems through public 
demonstrations, protests and (sometimes) through symbolic or physical 
violence; marching something like live public theatre on to the streets 
and other public spaces. This communicative strategy is compatible 
with postmodern art, or avant-gardism before it, which have struggled 
to challenge dominant ideas and practices from within the discourses 
of power, questioning overriding meanings and striving to produce 
alternative ones. Similarly, the core purpose of the politics of performance 
is to expose the realities of power to the public eye, to probe dominant 
cultural codes, and to deny overbearing political truths.
While performance has a number of usages in different walks 
of life – business, sports, the arts and everyday social encounters - in 
social science and critical theory it has a more 
focused fi eld of reference. In social scientifi c (sociological, an-
thropological, theatrical) approaches performance is typically used to 
refer to ‘everyday drama,’ and to the ways in which the elements of 
this drama constitute social-political categories and relations. In Erv-
ing Goffman’s terms (1959) a performance is the pre-patterned and 
role-governed activity of a given participant which serves to infl uence 
other participants in a given situation. Here the stress is on the rela-
tion between the performer and the audience, that is, on the social 
context and the social ‘functions’ of performance rather than on the 
performer’s own personal contribution to the situation. In critical and 
poststructuralist approaches the emphasis is elsewhere, on the possible 
fi ssures, breaks, and opportunities for resistance that are embedded 
in the performance’s citationality, in the way the performer repeats 
or ‘reiterates’ the familiar and expected speech acts and gestures. The 
basic idea and assumption is that the cycle of oppressive social norms 
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can be broken by citing the given category – role, norm, identity 
– differently through exaggeration, subversion etc.
Judith Butler’s renowned theory of gender construction works 
in the latter theoretical frame (1997). In order to understand what 
performance means in the present context, we need to discuss it in rela-
tion to Butler’s work, and Butler’s work, in turn, in relation to John L. 
Austin’s (1975) and Jacques Derrida’s theories (1988) of performative 
speech acts. First, Austin used the notion ‘performative’ to describe ut-
terances such as ‘I take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife.’ In 
such cases ‘to say something is to do something.’ Promises, bets, curses, 
contracts, and judgments, then, do not describe actions; they are ac-
tions (Schechner 2002, 110). Performatives are an essential part of life, 
notes Schechner, “[e]ven when the heart says “no,” if the tongue says “yes” 
a performative occurs” (ibid.). Moreover, since the primary purpose of 
the performative is to do rather than simply to assert something, Austin 
suggested that its success had to be judged not on the basis of truth or 
falsity, as was the case with ‘constative’ assertions, but on whether the 
intended act was successful or not (Carlson 2004, 61). Performance is 
successful, ‘felicitous,’ if uttered in appropriate circumstances.
This presupposition of the authentic performance in ‘felicitous 
circumstances’ and the implied separation between non-mimetic (genu-
ine, real) and mimetic (copying, representing) speech was later fi ercely 
criticised by Derrida. Derrida argued that it is only by virtue of citation, 
or ‘iterability,’ that performative utterances can succeed (1988, 18). 
A performative could not accomplish what it is meant to accomplish 
if it were not identifi able as a citation. This is the equivalent of saying 
that performatives, in being by nature repetitions, are ‘acted’, an idea 
that Austin and Habermas would most likely oppose. Yet, for Derrida, 
citation is never exact or ‘pure’ because it is always being adapted to 
new contexts. Any citation or sign can break with any given context 
(Carlson 2004, 75-76).
Using fi rst Austin’s idea that speech acts are performatives and 
later Derrida’s ‘correctum’ that all speech acts are socially and politically 
ungrounded citations, Butler (1990) has argued that a social category 
like gender is not a primordial attribute but a category constructed 
in/through ‘gender producing’ performance. Moreover, gender is not 
‘done’ by a pre-existing subject, but the subject is itself constituted 
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through the same performative acts. Butler also argues that since 
gender is citational, it can never precisely repeat the ‘original’ which 
does not exist to begin with. 
This idea has been found fruitful for countering the power of stere-
otypical social and political categories. Namely, if categories like gender 
are reproduced by, and their force relies on, indefi nite citations of 
performative acts, this power can be interrupted and resisted by break-
ing the citational chain. Butler’s examples of such resistance include 
gender parodies like drag-performances, cross dressing, gay-identifi ed 
dressing etc. which question the myth of originality and create new 
practices of gendering. Drag, for instance, might refuse the equation 
of gender with biological sex. The biologically male body outwardly 
adorned as female may denaturalise sex and gender by highlighting 
the distinctions between them (see Pitts 2003, 43).
Overall, I endorse Butler’s theory, yet, would like to point to a 
slight terminological difference between Butler’s understanding of 
performance and the understanding suggested in this article. To Butler 
performance equals a somewhat stable category, in that it is that which 
appears to be (or is posed as) the person’s identity; it is therefore more 
an ’image’ than activity (in Butler’s theory performatives are the active, 
the ‘doing’ element). In my usage, however, performance is an activity, 
an event, a public ‘happening,’ and by nature ’politics of the excep-
tional.’ The distinction between performatives and performance as I 
understand them is that the function of linguistic and extra-linguistic 
performatives is to fi x meanings and thus to produce regularity and 
‘sameness’ in political life. Performances, however, are meant to play 
with and disturb those meanings and regularities. Performativity, a 
related term to the other two, refers to a liminal space between perfor-
mative and performance, to a moment when the performative ceases 
to appear ‘natural’ and is opened up for critique and alteration.
Performance in the sense I am using the term can be physical, 
visual, linguistic, and/or symbolic, or all at once. Performance is 
an act that ‘reiterates something differently,’ or at least iterates it in 
inappropriate (‘infelicitous,’ as Austin called them) circumstances. It 
regularly features some element that breaks up routines, catches at-
tention, generates new questions and provokes reactions - acceptance, 
rejection or something in between. Here, ritualistic performatives turn 
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into politicised performances. Performances typically employ visual 
(often bodily) means to mark the difference between the normalised 
and the suggested ‘other’ representation.
Jessica Kulynych (1997) points out that the notion of performativ-
ity is important also for understanding the possibilities for innovation 
in Habermasian deliberative participation, which she claims Habermas 
himself is able to acknowledge to an extent. Just as protestors may 
expose the contingency of concepts like justice and democracy, a dia-
logue may in the end expose the limits and contingency of rational 
argumentation. Once we are sensitive to the performative nature of 
speech, language and discourse, we can see that deliberative politics 
cannot be confi ned to the rational statement of validity claims. Ku-
lynych argues that, 
“[d]eliberation must be theatrical: it is in the performance of delib-
eration that which cannot be argued for fi nds expression. Indeed it 
is precisely the non-rational aspects of deliberation that carry the 
potential for innovation” (ibid., 334).
VIRTUAL PERFORMANCE
It is possible to argue that the Internet features specifi c characteristics 
which invite users to communicate performatively. The Internet is a vast 
space fi lled with content that competes for readers’ and viewers’ atten-
tion. In order to create interesting profi les of themselves and to express 
their identities and goals in recognisable ways, net activists are required 
to put up distinctive visual and graphic – but often also argumentative 
- ‘shows’ that can be likened to ‘live’ political performance.
The difference between online and off-line performance is, how-
ever, that in the latter the actors bring their showcase into an open 
space where they can be seen and heard by all. They are by defi nition 
public performances. The nature of publicness is different on the 
net, where it changes into a kind of quasi-publicity where actors can 
perform anonymously and hide their ‘real bodies’ and identities from 
the public view.8 Scandalously to political conservatives, at least, this 
8. For a qualifi cation to this argument see the discussion at the end of this chapter.
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feature provides endless opportunities and incentives for creative free-
dom by the Internet’s ‘communication artists’. On the Internet, one 
has to put all the more effort into the communicative performance, 
especially political performance, to make it effective. In this perspective, 
performative communication on the Internet need not shock anyone; 
it can rather be expected and looked for.
Net activists have found a myriad of ways to put on such perform-
ances, sometimes very annoyingly to those they are directed at, like 
virtual sit-ins and mass emailing campaigns aimed at closing down 
the targeted organisation’s server and blocking access to its web site. 
Such DOS (denial of service) tactics are part of the ‘electronic civil 
disobedience’ artistry, a notion that sprang up in the late 1990s in the 
context of mobilising international support for the Mexican Zapatistas 
against the government’s military aggression (Atton 2004, 20-21, see 
also Jordan in this volume). The performative, visually and aestheti-
cally arresting, nature of the action was fi ttingly disclosed in the name 
of the group behind it, the “Electronic Disturbance Theatre”, as well 
as in the group’s decision to fi ll the government’s log with the names 
of the people killed by the military during the Zapatistas’ uprising in 
Chiapas (ibid., 21). Other equally famous, and controversial, to be 
sure, acts of electronic civil disobedience include the mass emailing 
campaign in 1998 against the French government in order to turn 
down the MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investment), the virtual 
attack on the WTO’s (World Trade Organisation) server during the 
1999 Seattle demonstrations, and the aggressive attack against the 
government of Estonia’s website in the spring of 2007 during the 
public controversy over the removal of the bronze Russian soldier 
statue from the centre of the capital Tallinn. The removal sparked 
large-scale riots in the streets of Tallinn and other Estonian cities, as 
well as a severe DOS-attack on the government website arguably by 
Russian hactivists (e.g. Finn 2007).
Häyhtiö & Rinne (in this volume) discuss another interesting 
case of virtual performance surrounding the Finnish ‘monster band’ 
Lordi after winning the Eurovision song contest in May 2006. The 
historic victory (itself a product of the Internet age!) was followed by a 
colossal reaction among fans against the decision of some mass media 
to publish unmasked pictures of ‘Mr. Lordi,’ (the singer) despite the 
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band’s explicit appeal after the victory that unmasked pictures not 
be published. The decision generated an unprecedented collective 
mobilisation in Finland, including massive e-mail, net, and off-line 
campaigning against the media participating in the publishing act. The 
campaign also proved successful, in the end forcing the major target 
of the campaign, the “7 Days” (7 Päivää) -magazine to make a public 
apology to the band and its fans.
These are some examples of the numerous DIY actionist perform-
ances on the net – but what about blogs, what are their communicative 
styles and strategies? Blogging is a highly personalised form of Internet 
communication. Bloggers take up and develop virtual identities which 
in a sense give them a ‘public face.’ There could be more at stake here, 
compared to other forms of net communication, in so far as bloggers 
aspire to maintain the credibility and attractiveness of their virtual 
personality. Some bloggers become ‘virtual celebrities’ and may not 
wish to jeopardise their esteemed position on the blogosphere. We 
might conjecture that bloggers rely more on the power of communica-
tive and literary wit than the more anonymous net activists. Or does 
performative communication play a signifi cant role in blogs as well?
”HERE’S YOUR PATRIOT ACT, HERE’S YOUR 
FUCKING ABUSE OF POWER…”
As a test case I briefl y hooked up with the blogosphere in relation to 
an incident which occurred in the University of California library 
(at Bruin, LA) on November 14, 2006. First a brief account of what 
happened; pieced together from postings in various blogs (the whole 
story is also available in Daily Bruin, www.dailybruin.com):
On the night of November 14, Mostafa Tabatabainejad, an Ira-
nian-American student at UCLA (University of California at Los 
Angeles), was asked by UCLA Community Service Offi cers to show his 
university ID during a random check in the Powell library after 11.30 
pm. Tabatabainejad declined or for other reasons failed to produce his 
ID (it is not known why), after which he was told to leave the premises 
immediately. He did not comply with the request. Although, there is 
controversy in blog comments as to whether Mostafa Tabatabainejad 
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refused deliberately or whether he was simply so engrossed in the 
work that he failed to react to the request immediately. The offi cers 
left, returning a few minutes later with two University of California 
Police Department offi cers to escort the student out. By this time 
Mostafa Tabatabainejad had started to walk toward the door with his 
backpack. One of the offi cers approached him and grabbed his arm. 
Tabatabainejad responded by trying to free his arm, yelling “don’t 
touch me” several times.
At this point Mostafa Tabatabainejad was stunned with a Taser a 
gun which releases electric shocks, as a result of which he dropped to 
the fl oor, screaming loudly in pain. While he was still down and crying, 
the police kept ordering Tabatabainejad to stand up and stop resisting. 
He was also told that if he failed to do so, he would be tasered again. 
Again there is controversy over whether Mostafa Tabatabainejad resisted 
deliberately or whether his muscles were enervated so that he was not 
Picture 2. UCLA police offi cers are pulling the tasered student out of the 
library at Bruin. Soon after video footage of the incident is uploaded to 
YouTube and starts circulating on the blogosphere. Eleven days later the 
video had reached one million viewers.
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able to stand up any way. Tabatabainejad did not stand up and was 
tasered again. Tabatabainejad screamed and the offi cers kept telling 
him to stand up. Tabatabainejad did not follow the order and shouted 
“Here’s your Patriot Act, here’s your fucking abuse of power…”. He 
was tasered at least twice more, also after already being handcuffed. 
As Tabatabainejad was dragged through the room by two offi cers, he 
shouted, ‘I’m not fi ghting you, I said I would leave’. In the end, the 
offi cers managed to drag Tabatabainejad out of the building and he was 
booked overnight to be released next morning. (The video is available 
at numerous sites, e.g. at http://technorati.com/pop/)
Signifi cantly, in connection with later events, a fellow student 
present in the library at the time of the incident decided to record it 
with his/her camera phone. The six-minute video footage, later circu-
lated widely on the net, played a crucial role in the ensuing reaction 
of the blogosphere to the incident. Arguably, had the reporting on the 
episode been based on eye-witness accounts only, the reaction would 
not have been the same. Once on the net, the video triggered a quick 
and extensive response among bloggers, most of whom were shocked 
by the extensive use of force by the police. Questions, critique, com-
ments, and demands for re/action fl ooded the blogosphere. Was the 
incident related to the US anti-terrorist home security policy? Did 
racial profi ling play a role? Can citizens ever feel safe in the hands of 
the authorities? What does the incident tell us about current American 
political realities? The incident was also tackled normatively: In what 
circumstances is extensive use of force against citizens legitimate? Did 
Mostafa Tabatabainejad ‘have it coming’ because he resisted the police 
(if, indeed, he did)? Are citizens allowed to argue with authorities and 
defy them verbally?
What, then, does this test case demonstrate about the patterns 
of communication on the blogosphere? We can make several observa-
tions. The fi rst is that the UCLA incident represents a typical case of 
political events which today fi nd their way quickly on to the net and 
begin circulating and resonating there freely. As people now carry their 
mobile communication devices everywhere, it is more than likely that 
interesting and exceptional events are quickly forwarded to the net, in-
creasingly by everyday ‘citizen reporters’. As one blogger points out: 
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“[I]n today’s culture, police and politicians can’t hide their actions 
as easily as before. Sunlight is the best disinfectant, or so it’s said. 
Today’s sun is the light of a camcorder or video phone. The people 
have the power. Use it.”
 (Truth to power,” blogs.ink19.com). 
The new blogging technology has signifi cantly empowered formerly 
passive observers of public events and processes, turning them into 
active spectators, interpreters and public actors. Citizens equipped 
with mobile, camera andvideophones, laptops and Wlan-connections 
are tantamount to a 24-hour ‘citizen watch, guard,’ many times with 
surprisingly effective results. As one commentator put it, “I’m guessing 
-- that the police involved in this are going to have a rough few weeks. 
Cameras in the hands of citizens may end up being a far, far more 
effective counter to police abuses than guns in the hands of citizens 
ever were” (“Here’s your Patriot Act,” nielsenhayden.com).
Another and related observation is the wide scope and practical 
infl uence of blogospheric communication. The blogosphere is a vast 
and complex, but at the same time effective communication network 
capable of disseminating information quickly around the world. In 
the test case, Technocrati found 638 results for the search words 
“UCLA taser” on November 17, and 2 084 results four days later. On 
November 25, nielsenhayden.com reported that the video had been 
accessed by one million viewers. Authorities and powerful political 
and economic elites are already forced to take into close account blog-
gers’ actions and opinions due to the sheer magnitude of the ‘World 
Wide Blogosphere’ and the publicity it is able to generate on debated 
events and issues. In the UCLA case, several organisations responded 
to the events, including the university administration and police, the 
established media, human rights organisations, and the Council of 
American-Iranian Relations (CAIR). 9
The third point relates to the structure of communication within 
the blogosphere. Compared to many other technologies, blogging and 
other new social media are highly interactive, thanks to easy linking 
functions. On the other hand, ‘conversation’ in blogs is somewhat 
9. CAIR is an organisation defending the interests of Islamic people and groups in 
the US (www.cair.com).
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curious; it can be directly dialogical as in “Here’s your Patriot Act”, 
nielsenhayden.com or, in the majority of blogs, only indirectly so when 
bloggers prefer commenting on issues on their own blogs instead of 
writing in the comment zones of other blogs. This peculiar conversa-
tional practice draws attention to the bloggers’ own virtual profi les and 
visibility, providing accentuated evidence of what Michele Micheletti 
(2003) has termed ‘individualizing collective action’. The blogosphere 
is a collective phenomenon, yet not a ‘mass’ where each part would 
be similar to other parts as when sharing the same ideology, identity 
or political objectives. The power of the blogosphere relies, rather, 
on randomly shared common orientations – that is, on individual 
bloggers’ actions occasionally coalescing into common objectives and 
campaigns, which then quickly dissolve when the project is completed. 
As a collective political phenomenon, the blogosphere undoubtedly 
challenges traditional political elites, who from now on have to learn 
to address and appeal to a very miscellaneous assemblage of individual 
voters and actors.
The fourth observation pertains to blogs’ communicative styles. 
Bloggers like whenever possible to use tangible material to back up their 
comments and assessments such as photos, videos, podcasts, offi cial 
documents, pictures, symbols etc. In the UCLA case, many bloggers 
attempted to reconstruct the events by gathering information from a 
variety of sources in order to construct a fuller account and interpreta-
tion of the episode and its signifi cance. It is interesting to note that, 
in doing so, bloggers exploited both careful argumentation as well as 
various visual, rhetorical and symbolic means of communication.
Also, performative communication was displayed, both during 
the incident itself, as well as in the subsequent communication on the 
blogosphere. There the performative element centres on the video foot-
age itself, which reproduced the event as ‘a public show’. For example, 
Mostafa Tabatabainejad used performative means when being held and 
dragged in the library by the police, as witnessed by his yell, “Here’s your 
Patriot Act, here’s your fucking abuse of power”. Confrontation, we may 
note, typically calls forth performative action. Here Tabatabainejad’s 
tasered, almost tortured, body became a symbol of oppression of what 
was taken as unjust use of coercive power. Reactions on the blogosphere 
were so intensive partly because the bodily element was so strongly 
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present in the video. Bodies communicate effectively, they are easily 
related to and sympathised with (Gregory et al. 2002).
The police likewise acted performatively, as shown by their in-
sistent ‘stand up’ commands and their coercive behaviour overall. 
Their ‘performance’ may have been addressed to the other students 
present in the library, or even to a wider audience. The sense of such 
a brutal performance lies in that it represents the sort of micropower 
or biopower techniques which Michel Foucault has described as typi-
cal means of modern power to control protesting ‘political bodies’. 
In the current circumstances, where the ‘war on terrorism’ dominates 
American political discourse, such controlling techniques also have a 
prominent political role in domestic security policy.
Blogs per se, as visual and rhetorical representations, are rather 
rich in communicative elements. Think e.g. of the names of blogs 
such as “Horsesass.org”, “Truth to power”, “AlienTed” or “Nihilix”. 
It is interesting that so many blogs and bloggers would seem to be 
concerned with ‘revealing the truth’, which are in themselves rhetori-
cal and symbolic performances. Bloggers also use visual symbols as a 
way of creating, expressing, and playing with their identity. This is one 
way of ‘putting on a show’ for those visitors or ‘friends’ who may be 
looking. One further observation is that even though bloggers often 
trifl e with the visual and verbal projections of their identities, this does 
not seem (contra Habermas’s beliefs) in any way to prevent them from 
engaging in ‘serious’ talk and political commentary.
Earlier critical appraisals of cyberlife have worried about the 
potentially over-individualising effects of net communication. Their 
point is that transcending bodies and social differences over the Internet 
does not really do much to eradicate the problems related to them 
in real-life political structures and practices. Therefore the insistence 
of many feminist difference advocates that in order to be effective, 
resistance to existing hegemonies must be visibly present in real-life 
public spaces.
Boler (2007) argues, however, that the role of bodies as major 
social signifi ers remains more or less intact in digital communication 
too. As an example of this, bloggers’ personal profi les often include 
basic information about their age, sex, location, ‘ideological’ standing 
and fi elds of interest. Furthermore, only half of bloggers use pseudo-
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nyms, according to the Pew survey (Lenhart & Fox 2006). Why so? 
It seems that the credibility of bloggers as public fi gures with a virtual 
‘face’ requires putting in such information, and this is the information 
most visitors seek any way to be able to relate to the blogger. Ironically, 
notes Boler (ibid), even in digital communication the body actually 
functions as a necessary arbiter of meaning and a fi nal signifi er of what 
is accepted as ‘real’ and ‘true’.
Moreover, with the coming of the social media technologies the 
structure of communication on the Internet has changed dramatically 
from the earlier text-based modes. It is these social software features of 
the net which really seem to be thriving in the current development 
of the Internet.
This is not to say that blogs with and without video footage and 
other visual ‘embodiments’ would in themselves be able to correct 
real-life power differences. Yet, they markedly increase the net’s com-
Picture 3. 
An example of a blog with clear performative elements in its linguistic 
and non-linguistic design of communication.
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municative potential, and as such, merit much closer attention than 
hitherto from political researchers.
The above fi ndings support at least partly, the idea embedded in the 
above critique of Habermas’s theory of communicative action and 
communicative competence. Namely, my argument is that it is not the 
‘rational’ and formal give-and-take dialogue that is crucial for open, 
democratic discourse. That is, we need not require that individual com-
municators be ‘rational’ and ‘other-orientated’ in their argumentation 
when partaking in public discursive processes. What matters is that 
the structure of communication is ‘rational’ (quotation marks here are 
intended); i.e., that public communicative processes are inclusive and 
open to all interested participants, that they allow different modes 
and styles of expression, that they accept social and political diversity, 
and that they make possible the production of new political ideas and 
public initiatives. The blogosphere, I believe, is one step forward in the 
process of creating such a structure of public communication.
The nature of the democratic culture the current electronic 
(r)evolution is crafting is by no means easy to defi ne. Perhaps the best 
we can do is to say that democracy on the net is becoming increasingly 
creative, diverse, and messy.
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